More from the Abidharma article:
"The Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika [...] argues that the sensory object exists as a real entity. The Sautrāntika theory of perception, however, is rather different. It rests on the Sautrāntika radical view of momentariness, according to which there is no real duration but only a succession of infinitesimal moments, and on its view of causation, according to which causes cease to exist when their effects come into existence. The application of these principles to sensory perception makes it difficult to explain how perception directly apprehends sense objects, for it implies that objects have ceased when their apprehending consciousness arises. The Sautrāntika reply is that consciousness does not have direct access to its sense objects. By contrast to phenomenalist realism, the Sautrāntika view of perceptual consciousness may be characterized as representationalism: it sees perception as apprehending its objects indirectly, through the mediation of aspects (ākāra) representative of their objects."
The Sautrāntika school seems to be avoiding Platonic realism, so they've got my immediate sympathies -- though my goal here to find something similar to Homestuck's auto-phenomenology, so I might be better off approaching one of the schools where thought objects are regarded as real? Unsure. The phrase 'mediation of aspects' is also tantalizing, but is currently meaningless to me.
















