Reforms and the Chilean Election Results
With victory sealed in the second round it is possible to begin analysing Bachelet’s ability to deliver on the reform programme her New Majority coalition promised.
Although the 15 December election took place in the context of an abstention rate that varied from 50-59%, depending on how large the voting population is assumed to be (incredibly figures from the last census are unusable and estimates of the voting population vary from 12 million to 13.5 million people, in addition the SERVEL electoral service has admitted some 600,000 dead people remain on the rolls – unbelievably including Salvador Allende and the dictatorship’s disappeared), it was also the largest second round victory recorded under this electoral system (nearly 25 percentage points difference). While some commentators seem to be focusing on the abstention issue, it is not this sector that will be politically decisive over the near term. Furthermore, since second round voting rates are always lower than first round votes, and since the abstainers did not all abstain for the same reasons, the result can be seen as a ringing endorsement of the government’s reform programme by the vast majority of the politically active population.
Bachelet and the New Majority have promised to fight for the following measures:
-free education and education reforms
-tax reform to make the system more progressive and to fund education reforms
-more spending on health and housing
-constitutional reforms, including a definition of rights, the secularisation of the state and proportional representation in elections
-the creation of a state run pensions company
Other reforms she is expected to push for are a civil partnership/gay marriage law, legalising some forms of abortion, all as part of a drive to create legal equality for all and balancing gender differences, as well as taking steps to deal with severe inequality, a legacy of the Concertacion governments of 1990-2010.
Under the current constitution and despite the majority her government has in parliament, not all of these reforms will be simple to achieve because of the purposefully conservative bent of the Chilean constitution inherited from the Pinochet dictatorship and because of the nature of the coalition she leads. This coalition is a left-centre coalition in which the left at the moment holds the advantage. However, the Christian Democrat party contains both left and right wings, arguably having more in common with the more moderate sectors of the right-wing Alianza coalition.
Reforms for which the New Majority needs a simple majority in parliament include:
Gay marriage/civil partnership
Introducing PR for elections to lower chamber
Giving Chileans abroad the vote
There is a broad Congressional and social majority backing for electoral reforms (with a survey of parliamentarians carried out by Que Pasa magazine, which interviewed all but 2 congressmen, indicating that the vast majority of politicians are ‘in principle’ behind changes to the binomial electoral system). However, a large number want to see what alternative is proposed before committing to voting for it. However, on other issues there are potential divisions. The New Majority coalition includes some rather conservative Catholic politicians who are unlikely to vote for abortion or gay marriage. On the other hand the same survey shows that several members of the right-wing Alianza, and the 4 independent politicians are willing to vote with the government on certain issues such as abortion, gay marriage, and so on. So on these and other issues we may see temporary alliances formed to push through specific measures.
Within the New Majority, unity on the broad agenda of the coalition is undermined by the varying views on the urgency and extent of the agreed reforms. Thus, on the education reforms the Bachelet government has promised change within 4 years, but 2 of the student leaders (who are now deputies) and several other politicians are known to want immediate and more wholesale change. At the same time a number of PDC congressmen own profit-making educational institutions and they will be reluctant to reform the system to their disadvantage. Yet their votes will be needed to push through a reform. Similar divisions exist on some other issues such as the proposed tax reforms. These problems are eminently negotiable, and will be resolved by Bachelet and the parties of the New Majority. Whether the result will be moderate or radical will depend on the extent of social mobilisation, on Bachelet’s position in this regard, and on the activity of the more left-wing parliamentarians.
The likelihood of a moderate reform exists thanks to the possibility that members of the Alianza will vote for specific moderate reforms. It is possible that some form of alliance will be formed between the unwilling reformers within the New Majority and the reformists of the Alianza to water down reforms as far as possible. It is probable the government will bet that by making education free at source for the vast majority of students the steam will be taken out of the movement as a whole. Therefore, a radical reform - nationalising education - is unlikely under this government.
The defining issue for the New Majority government will be reducing inequality and constitutional reform. Bachelet’s coalition doesn’t have the majority necessary to write the necessary new constitution and this leaves four basic options:
1 – A constituent assembly
3 – A plebiscite on constitutional reform
4 – Reforms through congress (via negotiation with the right)
The first option would mean stretching the existing legal framework, even if many people, including leading constitutional lawyers, support it as the best way of cutting the Gordian knot of the Pinochet constitution. Former President Lagos, who carried out the last set of limited reforms to the 1980 Constitution, has also said that it would be ‘better to start with a blank page’, having carried through the last set of reforms to the 1980 constitution. Furthermore, during the recent elections some 10% of voters marked their ballots with ‘AC’, calling for a constituent assembly - showing that a significant minority of the public want this option (Despite the fact that this action wasn’t officially supported by the New Majority. It is highly likely that the true figure for those that want a constituent assembly is much higher). There is also significant support for this option from intellectual circles and the world of culture. However, it is politically risky and would be an unprecedented move. On the other hand, not dealing with the issue of the Constitution decisively will be political suicide, and will likely result in the fracture of the New Majority. Bachelet’s government cannot afford to confront the social movement head on, and yet social demands on every front come up against constitutional constraints meaning that for any significant change the constitution must be changed.
Meanwhile some form of Citizen’s Assembly would write a document that would in effect be analysed and changed by Congress. This would necessarily be a document heavily mediated by the right-wing in Congress. The plebiscite on whether a new constitution should be written can be called by Bachelet, but only with sufficient majority support in Congress. This option could combine with the call for a constituent assembly, except that a majority in Congress oppose this form of developing a new constitution. And the final option is to go through Congress, where the New Majority would need the support of at least 4 additional senators and between 4 and 12 additional deputies to push through various constitutional reforms. This may be possible given the support for reform shown in the Que Pasa survey despite declarations of opposition by the most recalcitrant right-wing. It would not be the most democratic way of making changes, but it could serve until the next elections – although it is doubtful that people have the patience to wait that long for substantial changes. Bachelet has yet to commit to any particular one of these possibilities, and no doubt it will be the subject of negotiation with other political groupings.
Other difficulties to be faced by the Bachelet government will be the falling price of copper on world markets, the latent possibility of discontent with the slow pace of reforms, the international court’s verdict on the maritime border with Peru, and a similar case involving Bolivia. However, none of these are necessarily too difficult to deal with. More difficult may be dealing with military and elite opposition to more profound reforms, given the dominant right-wing and in some cases, neo-fascist ideology of both. This can be seen in the recent statement by one Chilean businessman that if Bachelet ‘undermined the economy’ (a euphemism for systemic changes) then “we would need another Pinochet.”
Chile may also come under pressure to define its international position more clearly. Latin America is increasingly divided between the integrationist and left-wing efforts of Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Cuba and to some extent Brazil and Argentina – ALBA, UNASUR and so on, as against the US-backed Pacific Alliance free trade area made up of Mexico, Colombia, Chile, Peru and Panama. President Evo Morales of Bolivia has already said that for him the issue will be a litmus test of the new Chilean government’s left-wing credentials. While in the past Bachelet has been able to steer a more left-wing international policy, turning away from established free market alliances may be difficult given the make up of the New Majority coalition. There is as yet little social pressure from outside the left in Chile to join Latin American-led integrationist efforts, and any substantial leftward turn in Chile’s international politics may be resisted by a military which remains dominated by dictatorship-era ideological visions. If combined with laws on homosexual marriage and abortion, an increase in taxes and measures to deepen the role of the state, we may see quite vehement right-wing elite reaction to events. Again, the solution lies in a close linkage of social pressure and political manoeuvres within the institutions.