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Art. 1199. A person alternatively bound by different prestations shall completely perform one of them.

The creditor cannot be compelled to receive part of one and part of the other undertaking. (1131)

This article focuses on Alternative Obligations. In an alternative obligations, there is more than one prestations or object, but the fullfillment of one is sufficient to extinguish the obligation.

To demonstrate, here's the case of ARCO PULP vs Lim.

FACTS:

Lim is engaged in the business of supplying scrap papers, cartons and other raw materials to factories engage in paper mill business. In one of ita transactions, Lim delivered to Arco Pulp a scrap materials amounting to 7 million. Allegedly, they had an agreement of either to pay Lim in the amount of 7 million or to pay him through finished products with the equivalent value. Later on, Arci Pulp issued check in the amount of 1.4 million as initial payment to Lim.

Unknown to Lim, Arco Pulp entered into a MOA with another company citing Lim as the supplier. In other words, the obligation of paying Lim was transferred from Arco Pulp to the said company.

Hence, Lim sued ARCO Pulp.

The RTC ruled in favor of Arco Pulp. Accordingly, when ARCO Pulp entered into MOA with another company, novation took place.

The CA reversed the decision and ruled in favor of Lim. According to them, the obligation between the parties was alternative obligation.

Hence, the petition went to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

Weather or not the obligation between the parties was alternative obligation.

HELD.

The obligation between Lim and Arco Pulp was indeed an alternative obligations. This could be manifested in their agreement of either to pay Lim in the amount of 7 million or to pay him through finished products with the equivalent value.

Furthermore, Arci Pulp issuance of check in the amount of 1.4 million as initial payment to Lim waa a manifestation that they have opted to pay Lim in cash. Therefore, they are obliged to completely perform their chosen mode of payment pursuant to Article 1199 of the Civil Code.

Thus, the decision of Court of Appeals was AFFIRMED.

G.R. No 159966 30 March 2005

Case Digest

Facts:

Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other. When his parents subsequently got married on September 22, 1998, they executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the child’s name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.

The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore for a long time because they will let him study there together with his sister named Wang Mei Jasmine who was born in Singapore. Since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a person’s name, they anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be discriminated against because of his current registered name which carries a middle name. Julian and his sister might also be asking whether they are brother and sister since they have different surnames. Carulasan sounds funny in Singapore’s Mandarin language since they do not have the letter “R” but if there is, they pronounce it as “L.” It is for these reasons that the name of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be changed to Julian Lin Wang.

Issue: 

Whether or not dropping of middle name of a minor child is allowed under Philippine laws.

Held:

G.R. No. 103695 March 15, 1996

Case Digest

Facts:

On 1988, private respondent spouses Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto filed for the adoption of Midael C. Mazon, then fifteen years old, who had been living with private respondent Jaime B. Caranto since he was seven years old. When private respondents were married on January 19, 1986, the minor Midael C. Mazon stayed with them under their care and custody. The Solicitor General opposed the petition insofar as it sought the correction of the name of the child from "Midael" to "Michael." He argued that although the correction sought concerned only a clerical and innocuous error, it could not be granted because the petition was basically for adoption, not the correction of an entry in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The RTC dismissed the opposition of the Solicitor General. According to the trial court, the error could be corrected in the same proceeding for adoption to prevent multiplicity of actions and inconvenience to the petitioners.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the private respondents' petition for adoption.

Held:

Yes. The instant case involves an obvious clerical error in the name of the child sought to be adopted. In this case the correction involves merely the substitution of the letters “CH” for the letter “D”, so that what appears as “Midael” as given name would read as “Michael”. Even the Solicitor General admits that the error is a plainly clerical one.

G.R. No. L-41427 June 10, 1988

Case Digest

Facts:

A complaint was filed by petitioner with the CFI of Quezon City against Consuelo David for the purpose of stopping and enjoining her by injunction from using the surname Tolentino. Respondent filed her answer admitting she has been using and continues to use the surname Tolentino. Trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court.

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, this appeal

Issue:

Whether or not there is usurpation when a divorced woman continues to use the surname of her former husband.

Held:

No. Philippine law is silent whether or not a divorced woman may continue to use the surname of her husband because there are no provisions for divorce under Philippine law.

Art 371 is not applicable because it contemplates annulment while the present case refers to absolute divorce where there is severance of valid marriage ties. Effect of divorce was more akin to death of the spouse where the deceased woman is continued to be referred to as “Mrs. of the husband” even if he has remarried.

There was no usurpation of the petitioner’s name and surname. Usurpation implies injury to the interests of the owner of the name. It consists with the possibility of confusion of identity.

The elements of usurpation were 1. Actual use of another’s name, 2. Use is unauthorized, 3. Use of another’s name is to designate personality or identity of a person.

G.R. No. 84698 February 4, 1992

Case Digest

Facts:

A stabbing incident caused the death of Carlitos Bautista, an enrolled 3rdyear commerce student, while on the second-floor premises of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA). The parents filed suit in the RTC against PSBA for their alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of security precautions, means and methods before, during and after the attack on the victim. It was established that his assailants were not members of the school's academic community but were elements from outside the school. Defendants sought to have the suit dismissed, alleging that since they are presumably sued under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the complaint states no cause of action against them, as jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect that academic institutions, such as the PSBA, are beyond the ambit of the rule in the afore-stated article. The trial court overruled petitioners' contention and denied their motion to dismiss. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not PSBA may be held liable.

Held:

NO. Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied.

When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school’s academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations. Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.

G.R. No. L-68374 June 18, 1985

Case Digest

Facts:

Private respondent Maria Lourdes Santos was an illegitimate child of the petitioner Horacio Luna who was married to his co-petitioner Liberty Hizon-Luna. She is married to her co-respondent Sixto Salumbides, and are the parents of Shirley Santos Salumbides, also known as Shirley Luna Salumbides, who is the subject of this child custody case. Private respondents gave their daughter to petitioners two or four months after birth. The couple doted upon Shirley who called them “Mama” and “Papa”. She calls her natural parents mommy and daddy. The petitioners decided to take the child to the US. When the petitioners asked for the respondents’ written consent to the child’s application for a U.S. visa, the respondents refused to give it, to the petitioners’ surprise and chagrin. The petitioners had to leave without Shirley whom they left with the private respondents. The petitioners, however, left instructions with their chauffeur to take and fetch Shirley from school every day. When the petitioners returned, they learned that the respondents had transferred Shirley to another school. The private respondents refused to return Shirley to the petitioners. Neither did the respondents allow Shirley to visit the petitioners. The petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with the CFI of Rizal, against the private respondents to produce the person of Shirley and deliver her to their care and custody The CFI granted the petition. The CA reversed.

Issue:

Whether or not the duty of lower courts to enforce a final decision of appellate courts in child custody case should prevail over the preference of the child.

Held:

G.R. No 188801 15 October 2014

Case Digest

Facts: 

Atty. Castro was allegedly married to Rosario Castro (Petitioner). Unfortunately, they separated later on due to their incompatibilities and Jose’s alleged homosexual tendencies. Their marriage bore two daughters: Rose Marie, who succumbed to death after nine days from birth due to congenital heart disease, and Joanne Castro (Petitioner).

On 2000, a petition for adoption of Jose Maria Jed Gregorio (Jed) and Ana Maria Regina Gregorio (Regina) was instituted by Atty. Jose Castro. Atty. Castro alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children with Lilibeth Gregorio (Rosario’s housekeeper). After a Home Study Report conducted by the Social Welfare Officer of the TC, the petition was granted.

Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment seeking to annul the decision of the TC approving Jed and Regina’s adoption. Petitioner allege that Rosario’s consent was not obtained and the document purporting as Rosario’s affidavit of consent was fraudulent.

Issue:

Whether consent of the spouse and legitimate children 10 years or over of the adopter is required?

Held:

As a rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for adoption. The law, however, provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a spouse seeks to adopt his or her own children born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is not necessary. But the spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain the consent of his or her spouse.

In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario remained legally married despite their de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first signify her consent to the adoption. Since her consent was not obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.

The law also requires the written consent of the adopter’s children if they are 10 years old or older (ART. III, Sec. 9, RA 8552).