#logic relativity

A few interesting ramifications of the empiric definition of logic:

First, logic is always an approximation. In practice, it is the best approximation of some "real" logic. But even in principle, that "real" logic is inferred from the approximation, and this inference is of course done using the approximation itself.

Second, actually empirically defining logic is like axiomatizing experience: the precise details of that process and its answer depend on the details of your experience stream. Thus, logic relativity.

Third, at any moment in any experience stream, there are are least three different things one might validly want to call "real" logic:

the logic(s) which would have predicted that experience stream so far more correctly than all other logic(s),

the best logic(s) that can actually be defined from just that experience stream so far, or

In many situations, it is more useful to think of logic as relative instead of absolute.

We know that our sense of logic is relative to our mental state: what seems logical to us is modified by what emotions we are feeling, our biases, past trauma, rationalizing, and so on.

Logic must also be relativistic because it can only be empirically defined: the only logic available to us is an approximation which can be no more discerning or precise than its errors have been observably wrong.

The idea of an absolute logic is either the result of confusing our approximation with reality, a game theoretic focal point for communication, or shorthand for one or more hypothetical systems of logic which could never be empirically wrong.

This does not justify dismissing logic as subjective: logic may be relative, but if it predicts future experiences with useful accuracy and reliability, then it must be at least approximately objectively correct.

But now I feel obligated to do the more thorough thinking about whether or not all cognetic openings can be explained in terms of logic relativity.

Of course I then immediately lost it again because it was a slippery nuance for me, so here's me groping around for it again:

The cognetic openings that I can actually remember really bothering me were all also situations that boiled down to my sense of logic having a discerning wrinkle where the other person's sense of logic was smooth. They felt their reasoning (usually implicit in their prediction pyramids and other intuition that led to some emotional reaction) - to be soundly correct where I could see a flaw.

And in that situation where I was spotting the cognetic opening they were either right on accident or wrong in a way that they could not yet appreciate as wrong. And I could see how it could lead to errors or unethical choices in other situations.

I had to sacrifice the explicit link to "mental reference frames" because it just didn't fit well, but I left the tag on it because they are intimately related ideas.