#goal-directedness

Nor is it just Aristotle's doctrine of natures, forms, or essences that finds an echo in the new essentialism. As many of these theorists have recognized, to affirm the existence in physical phenomena of inherent powers or capabilities is to acknowledge phenomena that are directed at or point to states of affairs beyond themselves. For example, to be fragile is to point to or be directed at breaking, and a fragile thing of its nature points to or is directed at this particular state even if it is never in fact realized. To be soluble is to point to or be directed at dissolving, and a soluble thing of its nature points to or is directed at this particular state even if it is never in fact realized. And so forth. The late "new essentialist" philosopher George Molnar concluded that the powers inherent in physical objects exhibit a kind of "physical intentionality" insofar as, like thoughts and other mental states, they point to something beyond themselves, even though they are unlike thoughts in being unconscious. But the notion of something which points beyond itself to a certain goal or end-state even though it is totally unconscious is, of course, nothing other than the Aristotelian notion of final causality.

If there are no final causes, then reason does not have as its purpose the attainment of truth or the knowledge of the good. What we are left with are at best whatever desires we actually happen to have, for whatever reason -- heredity, environment, luck -- but these will be subjective preferences rather than reflective of objective goodness or badness. And the most reason can do is tell us how we can fulfill those desires; since there are no natures or causes or essences of things, not any final causes or natural purposes either, it cannot tell us what desires we ought to have.