The problem when discussing African development is that, so often, what is best for Africa is decided not by African officials but by policyâmakers in Washington or Beijing. The conflict between these two differing viewpoints may decide the future of African development. The Washington Consensus, as the previous hegemon, has been involved in Africa for several decades (for better or worse). Previously unchallenged, it forced Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) onto countries that were unable to bear the burdens they imposed. More recently, however, this superpower has been threatened by a new global approach â âChinaâs approach to bilateral relations and economic development, characterized by Joshua Cooper Ramo as the âBeijing Consensus,â provides an alternative to development and political economic reforms espoused by âthe Westâ and typified by the âWashington Consensusâ of the World Bank and IMFâ.1 The involvement of the international systemâs two superpowers in Africa in the 21st century has naturally sparked debate over whether this is a new âScramble for Africaâ, or indeed a new âmarch into Africaâ2 and, vitally, which countryâs approach (if either) is best for African development. What this paper hopes to show is that there is enough of a difference between the two Consensuses to justify the debate, but the difference is not as significant as some commentators believe. Ultimately both have a lot to offer Africa whether they are successful will depend on African governments.
