#creditratingstrap

From Issuer Pays to Polluter Pays: Unearthing Piramal Pharma’s Credit Ratings by DebaprasadBandyopadhyay Via Flickr: onceinabluemoon2021.in/2026/01/16/from-issuer-pays-to-pol... Piramal Pharma Limited (PPL), demerged from Piramal Enterprises in 2022, enjoys high investment-grade credit ratings (e.g., CARE AA; Stable upgraded July 2025) under the issuer-pays model, which critics claim manufactures trust to enable cheap borrowing despite severe financial strain—Q2 FY26 revenue down ~9% to ₹2,044 crore, EBITDA crashed 44%, net loss ₹99 crore, high leverage (~3x net debt-to-EBITDA), weak interest coverage, and share price falling ~19% from ₹204 (July 2025) to ~₹166 (mid-January 2026). This rating resilience contrasts sharply with the alleged “Digwal massacre” at its Telangana plant: repeated effluent dumping (comprehensively reported by 2018) contaminating water/soil, devastating farmland, and linked to spikes in kidney failures, respiratory issues, and cancers among villagers; despite NGT’s ₹8.3 crore polluter-pays fine (2019), TSPCB closure orders, and weak enforcement, SEBI deemed events non-material post-demerger, reportedly shielded by Ajay Piramal’s substantial BJP donations and crony ties. Echoing the Piramal Finance rating controversy, PPL’s playbook—restructurings to quarantine liabilities, OTC pivot to mask industrial risks, and paid-for “stable” ratings—externalizes financial, environmental, and human costs onto investors and poisoned communities, highlighting the urgent need to dismantle the ratings oligopoly and opaque political funding that sustain such systemic expropriation.

From Issuer Pays to Polluter Pays: Unearthing Piramal Pharma’s Credit Ratings by DebaprasadBandyopadhyay Via Flickr: onceinabluemoon2021.in/2026/01/16/from-issuer-pays-to-pol... Piramal Pharma Limited (PPL), demerged from Piramal Enterprises in 2022, enjoys high investment-grade credit ratings (e.g., CARE AA; Stable upgraded July 2025) under the issuer-pays model, which critics claim manufactures trust to enable cheap borrowing despite severe financial strain—Q2 FY26 revenue down ~9% to ₹2,044 crore, EBITDA crashed 44%, net loss ₹99 crore, high leverage (~3x net debt-to-EBITDA), weak interest coverage, and share price falling ~19% from ₹204 (July 2025) to ~₹166 (mid-January 2026). This rating resilience contrasts sharply with the alleged “Digwal massacre” at its Telangana plant: repeated effluent dumping (comprehensively reported by 2018) contaminating water/soil, devastating farmland, and linked to spikes in kidney failures, respiratory issues, and cancers among villagers; despite NGT’s ₹8.3 crore polluter-pays fine (2019), TSPCB closure orders, and weak enforcement, SEBI deemed events non-material post-demerger, reportedly shielded by Ajay Piramal’s substantial BJP donations and crony ties. Echoing the Piramal Finance rating controversy, PPL’s playbook—restructurings to quarantine liabilities, OTC pivot to mask industrial risks, and paid-for “stable” ratings—externalizes financial, environmental, and human costs onto investors and poisoned communities, highlighting the urgent need to dismantle the ratings oligopoly and opaque political funding that sustain such systemic expropriation.

From Issuer Pays to Polluter Pays: Unearthing Piramal Pharma’s Credit Ratings by DebaprasadBandyopadhyay Via Flickr: onceinabluemoon2021.in/2026/01/16/from-issuer-pays-to-pol... Piramal Pharma Limited (PPL), demerged from Piramal Enterprises in 2022, enjoys high investment-grade credit ratings (e.g., CARE AA; Stable upgraded July 2025) under the issuer-pays model, which critics claim manufactures trust to enable cheap borrowing despite severe financial strain—Q2 FY26 revenue down ~9% to ₹2,044 crore, EBITDA crashed 44%, net loss ₹99 crore, high leverage (~3x net debt-to-EBITDA), weak interest coverage, and share price falling ~19% from ₹204 (July 2025) to ~₹166 (mid-January 2026). This rating resilience contrasts sharply with the alleged “Digwal massacre” at its Telangana plant: repeated effluent dumping (comprehensively reported by 2018) contaminating water/soil, devastating farmland, and linked to spikes in kidney failures, respiratory issues, and cancers among villagers; despite NGT’s ₹8.3 crore polluter-pays fine (2019), TSPCB closure orders, and weak enforcement, SEBI deemed events non-material post-demerger, reportedly shielded by Ajay Piramal’s substantial BJP donations and crony ties. Echoing the Piramal Finance rating controversy, PPL’s playbook—restructurings to quarantine liabilities, OTC pivot to mask industrial risks, and paid-for “stable” ratings—externalizes financial, environmental, and human costs onto investors and poisoned communities, highlighting the urgent need to dismantle the ratings oligopoly and opaque political funding that sustain such systemic expropriation.

From Issuer Pays to Polluter Pays: Unearthing Piramal Pharma’s Credit Ratings by DebaprasadBandyopadhyay Via Flickr: onceinabluemoon2021.in/2026/01/16/from-issuer-pays-to-pol... Piramal Pharma Limited (PPL), demerged from Piramal Enterprises in 2022, enjoys high investment-grade credit ratings (e.g., CARE AA; Stable upgraded July 2025) under the issuer-pays model, which critics claim manufactures trust to enable cheap borrowing despite severe financial strain—Q2 FY26 revenue down ~9% to ₹2,044 crore, EBITDA crashed 44%, net loss ₹99 crore, high leverage (~3x net debt-to-EBITDA), weak interest coverage, and share price falling ~19% from ₹204 (July 2025) to ~₹166 (mid-January 2026). This rating resilience contrasts sharply with the alleged “Digwal massacre” at its Telangana plant: repeated effluent dumping (comprehensively reported by 2018) contaminating water/soil, devastating farmland, and linked to spikes in kidney failures, respiratory issues, and cancers among villagers; despite NGT’s ₹8.3 crore polluter-pays fine (2019), TSPCB closure orders, and weak enforcement, SEBI deemed events non-material post-demerger, reportedly shielded by Ajay Piramal’s substantial BJP donations and crony ties. Echoing the Piramal Finance rating controversy, PPL’s playbook—restructurings to quarantine liabilities, OTC pivot to mask industrial risks, and paid-for “stable” ratings—externalizes financial, environmental, and human costs onto investors and poisoned communities, highlighting the urgent need to dismantle the ratings oligopoly and opaque political funding that sustain such systemic expropriation.

Piramal Finance and the Rating Ruse: How India’s Credit Rating Agencies Manufacture Trust to Enable Systemic Expropriation by DebaprasadBandyopadhyay Via Flickr: onceinabluemoon2021.in/2026/01/06/piramal-finance-and-the... In India’s deeply captured financial regime under prolonged BJP-NDA rule (2014–2025), credit rating agencies (CRAs)—dominated by the CRISIL-ICRA-CARE triopoly—have degenerated from purported risk sentinels into systemic enablers of crony expropriation, perpetuating a predatory cycle of manufactured trust, retail mobilization, delayed collapse, and crony oligarchical consolidation. The Piramal Finance–DHFL saga stands as the paradigmatic indictment: investment-grade ratings (AA to AAA) were stubbornly retained despite whistleblower alerts, Cobrapost exposés, and KPMG audits exposing ~₹29,000–34,000 crore in promoter diversions through shells and evergreening, facilitating continued borrowing until 2019 defaults; post-crisis, Piramal—bolstered by dynastic kinship to Mukesh Ambani (via his son’s marriage to Isha Ambani) and alleged political shielding through disproportionate ruling-party contributions—secured DHFL via a sweetheart IBC resolution that controversially valued ~₹45,000 crore in fraud/avoidance recoveries at a nominal Re 1, acquiring the ~₹90,000+ crore portfolio for ~₹37,250 crore while the Supreme Court’s April 1, 2025, ruling vested all future windfalls exclusively in the bidder and condemned ~2.5 lakh retail depositors (mostly middle-class and elderly savers) to brutal 55–77% haircuts, aggregating colossal losses exceeding ₹50,000 crore across similar NBFC failures. Swiftly rebranded as Piramal Finance through reverse merger alchemy, the entity achieved rapid rehabilitation—~₹91,447 crore AUM with over 80% retail pivot, PAT doubling to ~₹327 crore in Q2 FY26, and fortified net worth ~₹27,000 crore—crowned by CRISIL’s fresh AA+/Stable assignment in January 2026 (with A1+ short-term), shaving funding costs by 50–80 bps and unlocking diversified inflows, even as Moody’s Ba3/Stable alone cautioned lingering wholesale exposures (~14%) and volatility. Driven by issuer-pays conflicts, oligopolistic convergence, epistemic blindness to governance rot and political proximity, and implicit “too connected to fail” pricing, CRAs orchestrate performative legitimacy—inflating optics pre-crisis, reacting belatedly post-default (as in IL&FS’s AAA-to-junk plunge and Yes Bank’s pre-moratorium investment-grade persistence), and aggressively upgrading post-consolidation—thereby externalizing ruin onto vulnerable constituencies while privatizing distressed assets for networked oligarchs within a broader architecture of institutional capture, democratic erosion, and cunning capitalism that demands radical rupture: abolishing issuer-pays, imposing personal liability, deconcentrating markets, and centering retail justice to reclaim accountability from this reverse merger republic.

Piramal Finance and the Rating Ruse: How India’s Credit Rating Agencies Manufacture Trust to Enable Systemic Expropriation by DebaprasadBandyopadhyay Via Flickr: onceinabluemoon2021.in/2026/01/06/piramal-finance-and-the... In India’s deeply captured financial regime under prolonged BJP-NDA rule (2014–2025), credit rating agencies (CRAs)—dominated by the CRISIL-ICRA-CARE triopoly—have degenerated from purported risk sentinels into systemic enablers of crony expropriation, perpetuating a predatory cycle of manufactured trust, retail mobilization, delayed collapse, and crony oligarchical consolidation. The Piramal Finance–DHFL saga stands as the paradigmatic indictment: investment-grade ratings (AA to AAA) were stubbornly retained despite whistleblower alerts, Cobrapost exposés, and KPMG audits exposing ~₹29,000–34,000 crore in promoter diversions through shells and evergreening, facilitating continued borrowing until 2019 defaults; post-crisis, Piramal—bolstered by dynastic kinship to Mukesh Ambani (via his son’s marriage to Isha Ambani) and alleged political shielding through disproportionate ruling-party contributions—secured DHFL via a sweetheart IBC resolution that controversially valued ~₹45,000 crore in fraud/avoidance recoveries at a nominal Re 1, acquiring the ~₹90,000+ crore portfolio for ~₹37,250 crore while the Supreme Court’s April 1, 2025, ruling vested all future windfalls exclusively in the bidder and condemned ~2.5 lakh retail depositors (mostly middle-class and elderly savers) to brutal 55–77% haircuts, aggregating colossal losses exceeding ₹50,000 crore across similar NBFC failures. Swiftly rebranded as Piramal Finance through reverse merger alchemy, the entity achieved rapid rehabilitation—~₹91,447 crore AUM with over 80% retail pivot, PAT doubling to ~₹327 crore in Q2 FY26, and fortified net worth ~₹27,000 crore—crowned by CRISIL’s fresh AA+/Stable assignment in January 2026 (with A1+ short-term), shaving funding costs by 50–80 bps and unlocking diversified inflows, even as Moody’s Ba3/Stable alone cautioned lingering wholesale exposures (~14%) and volatility. Driven by issuer-pays conflicts, oligopolistic convergence, epistemic blindness to governance rot and political proximity, and implicit “too connected to fail” pricing, CRAs orchestrate performative legitimacy—inflating optics pre-crisis, reacting belatedly post-default (as in IL&FS’s AAA-to-junk plunge and Yes Bank’s pre-moratorium investment-grade persistence), and aggressively upgrading post-consolidation—thereby externalizing ruin onto vulnerable constituencies while privatizing distressed assets for networked oligarchs within a broader architecture of institutional capture, democratic erosion, and cunning capitalism that demands radical rupture: abolishing issuer-pays, imposing personal liability, deconcentrating markets, and centering retail justice to reclaim accountability from this reverse merger republic.