#couverture

Let us now consider the relation of husband and wife. There are many injuries to them and to their property, for which they may sue jointly, others for which they must sue jointly, and some for which the husband must sue alone. The principles of the distinctions are understood to pleaders, but certainly not to the world at large. For instance, if the wife, after marriage, has earned money by labour, and that it remains unpaid, the law will not permit the husband and wife to join in an action to recover it. The wrong in withholding it is done to the husband, and not to the wife, and therefore he must sue alone. But if the wife is entitled to land, and a stranger enters and treads down the grass, and pulls it up, and carries it away, here is an injury for which they may join in action. Perhaps you will think this is owing to the circumstance of the field in fact belonging to the wife; and if so, you would think that a stranger, who should enter into the adjoining field, which we will suppose equally belonging to her, and cut down, and carry off some corn, would equally be answerable to them jointly. Believe me the case is widely different; for this injury the husband must sue alone, and this is a distinction between corn and grass, the reason of which is obvious to the eyes of special pleaders, though not perhaps to the eyes of other mortals. I shall not cite any further instances of the peculiar views which the rules of special pleading take of these matters; I believe I have adduced sufficient to convince you, that it is a system which must be painfully studied, in order to be at all understood; and that any young man who comes to the bar, trusting to his common sense for the application of its rules, will find himself embarked on a wide sea, without oar or compass, while his character, and perhaps his existence, depend upon his skilful navigation of the first vessel committed to his charge. — Richard Lovell Edgeworth, Essays on professional education, 2nd. ed (1812), pp. 512-3