The Supreme Court released its final three rulings of the 2025-2026 term on Tuesday. There is cause for celebration in the holding of the birthright citizenship case. But there is a dire warning embedded in each of the three opinions issued Tuesday: The reactionary majority poses an existential threat to the Constitution, American democracy, and the rule of law.
Before turning to the threat to democracy posed by the reactionary majority in general, we should pause to acknowledge that the holding in the birthright citizenship case is a tremendous relief for all Americans, especially so for the millions of children under 18 whose citizenship status would have been implicated by a decision holding that the president can override the Constitution by executive order. (See FN 1.)
Thankfully, a 5-4 majority held that the plain language of the 14th Amendment means what it says, i.e., âAll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States.â
Tens of millions of Americans are breathing a sigh of relief on Tuesday evening, knowing that their citizenship status is secureâfor now. As with all things Trump, he refuses to take âNoâ for an answer and is already urging Congress to pass legislation to override the 14th Amendmentâwhich is, of course, a logical absurdity. Or at least it should be.
As noted, only 5 justices agreed with the reasoning that the 14th Amendment means what it says, i.e., âall personsâ means âall persons.â Kavanaugh concurred in the result but issued a bizarre dissent in which he suggested that although Trump could not override the Constitution by executive order, Congress could do so by statute. (It is long past time for Yale Law School to revoke Kavanaughâs law degree; he should have flunked every course he took at Yale, based on his illiterate opinions on the Supreme Court.)
The opinion is here: Trump v. Barbara. Justice Robertsâ majority opinion reviews English common law and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (which preceded the 14th Amendment) to conclude that the Framers of the 14th Amendment intended for all persons born in the US to be citizens, period.
Roberts rights:
Citizenship, then and now, was the right to have rightsâ to freely participate in our political community. The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment extended that promise to âevery free-born person in this land.â We keep that promise today.
It is astounding that four justices of the Supreme Court believe that the 14th Amendment does not mean what its plain language says, even when that language is buttressed by centuries of common law and a century of Supreme Court precedent. The views espoused by Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh are part of a lunatic, ahistorical fever dream that the Old South will rise again.
Commentators struggled to describe the fact that four justices disputed the Constitution's text. See, e.g., Ian Millhiser, Vox, The Supreme Court just came one vote away from a constitutional catastrophe.
Millhiser writes,
When Judge John Coughenour, a Reagan appointee who was the first judge to block Trumpâs attempt to strip citizenship from many Americans born in this country, announced that decision, he said that heâs âbeen on the bench for over four decadesâ and he âcanât remember another case where the question presented is as clear as this one is.â
Itâs not just that the Constitution is clear. The Supreme Court also held more than a century ago, in United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898), that the Constitution means what it says. The question in Barbara, which was whether Trump can simply cancel the citizenship of people born in the US, may be the easiest question that has reached the justices in anyoneâs lifetime.
See also Mark Joseph Stern, Slate, The Supreme Courtâs 5â4 vote in the birthright citizenship case is a scandal.
Stern writes,
But the margin is a scandal. It is nothing short of stunning that Trump came one vote away from persuading the Supreme Court to repeal the bedrock of the Reconstruction Amendments based on a brazenly partisan contortion of their text and history. A view held only by fringe, far-right nativists until very recently has secured support from four of the nine members of the court: Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh.
As Millhiser notes, âif Donald Trump gets to replace just one member of the Barbara majority, the United States enters a very dark place.â
The members of the Barbara majority are Roberts, Barrett, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson. While no imminent retirements are expected among that group, illness is always a threat. We stand but one vote away from a majority of the Supreme Court striking down the key provision of the 14th Amendment, despite the amendmentâs plain language.
The conservative majority thus represents one of the greatest threats to the Constitution that our nation faces today. If we do not engage in radical reform of the Supreme Court to protect the Constitution, we will have proved ourselves unworthy of the freedoms and liberties guaranteed by our nationâs charter.
Before turning to our role in protecting the Constitution (see Concluding Thoughts), we should pause to reflect on the towering concurrence by Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson. A direct link to Justice Jacksonâs dissent is here:Â Trump v. Barbara, 609 U. S. ___, ___ (2026) (Jackson, J., concurring) (slip op., at 32).
Justice Jackson concurs fully in Justice Robertsâ opinion, but calls out Justice Thomasâ dissent:
Despite his longstanding endorsement of a âcolorblindâ Constitution, Justice Thomas now surprisingly suggests that the Citizenship Clause was a race-conscious remedial measure, relating only to âfreed slaves such as Dred Scott.â
Justice Jackson then engages in a tour de force of historical scholarship, demonstrating that the 14th Amendment adopted a âuniversalistâ approach to ensure that the phrase âall personsâ covered all persons, not merely âfreed slavesâ as argued by Justice Thomas.
Justice Jackson writes,
As I have shown in this opinion, the Fourteenth Amendment is not color-blind; rather, its core principle is that our Nation does not tolerate racial casteâi.e., the systemic subordination that many (even some who opposed slavery) had wished to perpetuate after the Civil War.
So, the architects of the Second Founding did not think or pretend that race didnât matter. Quite to the contrary, they understood that race made an enormous difference to the lived experiences of all concernedâand to the fate of our union. Indeed, it is for that very reason that a radical restructuring was required.
The Citizenship Clause applies universally precisely because such universal application was necessary to achieve the Amendmentâs own race-conscious remedial purposes.
If you have time, reading Justice Jacksonâs concurrence is well worth the effort. Her concurrence educates and empowers all of us to be better, more engaged citizens.
The takeaway from the Supreme Courtâs decision in Trump v. Barbara is that if we do not act swiftly and boldly, the Roberts Court may eliminate the 14th Amendment from the Constitution.
Coda: Brett Kavanaugh suggested in his concurrence that Congress can override the 14th Amendment by passing legislation. (Again, Yale, please revoke Kavanaughâs law degree ASAP!) Predictably, Trump has called on Congress to pass legislation limiting birthright citizenship. The right-wing media is now attacking Justice Barrett, calling her a âDEIâ hire. And some MAGA influencers are calling for an expansion of the Supreme Court to compensate for the recent âliberalâ votes by Roberts and Barrett in the mail ballot grace period and birthright citizenship cases.
If the above does not convince us that we must act quickly to expand the Court with an overwhelmingly liberal majority, nothing will.
The reactionary majority strikes down campaign finance limits for political parties
In a 6-3 ruling, Justice Kavanaugh wrote for the majority in an opinion striking down campaign finance limitations applicable to political parties. In doing so, Kavanaugh overturned a 2001 Supreme Court precedent, again demonstrating the Roberts Courtâs contempt for precedent. See NPR, Supreme Court strikes down limits on political party spending.
Kavanaugh wrote that there was little evidence of corruption in spending by political partiesâwhich, of course, raises the question of whether the campaign finance limitations are the reason for relatively low levels of party corruption. In Kavanaughâs view, a law designed to prevent corruption is necessary only if it is ineffective. (Again, Yale. Law degree. Kavanaugh. Revoke.)
When we expand the Court to overwhelm the reactionary majority, one of the first cases to be overruled must be Citizens United (and related decisions). The flood of money in politics is disenfranchising American voters and giving billionaires disproportionate control over elections, legislatures, judges, and policy.
The reactionary majority upholds the ban on transgender athletes in womenâs sports.
In a decision with broad implications, Justice Kavanaugh again wrote for a 6-3 majority to hold that the term âsexâ under Title IX meant âbiological sex.â According to Kavanaugh, that means that bans on transgender athletes in girlsâ sports are lawful. See Erin in the Morning, Supreme Court Rules Title IX Means âBiological Sexâ In Devastating Anti-Trans Ruling.
Although Kavanaugh claimed that the ruling was narrow, saying that it did not decide whether schools must ban transgender athletes from participating in girlsâ sports, we can expect the Trump administration to use the ruling as a cudgel to force all schools into compliance with the views expressed by Kavanaugh. Moreover, we can expect schools with sports bans to broaden their discrimination against transgender students by imposing restrictions on bathrooms, housing, medical care, and employment.
As noted by Chris Geidner in his Substack, Kavanaugh refuses to call the affected athletes âtransgender girlsâ or âtransgender women.â Geidner writes,
In Kavanaughâs opinion, he never once calls the people involved in these cases âtransgender girlsâ or âtransgender women,â despite that being who he was failing to protect on Tuesday. He generally â at least 13 times â instead referred to âbiological males who identify asâ girls or women. Even when referring to transgender people, it was by using a non-gendered term like âtransgender athletesâ or âtransgender students.â This erasure is stigmatic, despite his effort at other points to put forward a softer tone.
MAGA has decided to target transgender people for discrimination because they believe they can get away with it. That is the playbook of every authoritarian regime whose plan is to discriminate against larger groups.
While we should protect the rights of transgender people because they are people entitled to the same protections under the Constitution as all other people, we must resist the efforts by MAGA to use discrimination against transgender people as a wedge to unwind hard-won rights of LGBTQ people, women, and racial minorities.
Concluding Thoughts
There is much more to talk about (Trumpâs corruption, recent positive polling for Democrats in Texas, the deteriorating situation in the Middle East). I will discuss those topics tomorrow.
It is encouraging to hear elected officials and commentators finally acknowledging that expanding the Court is necessary. Harry Litman said on Chris Hayesâ show on Tuesday evening that he was a very reluctant convert to Court expansion, but now sees that other remedies, like term limits and constitutional amendments, would take too long to change the Court's direction. We are one vote away from eliminating the 14th Amendment to the Constitution. If we do not act quickly and boldly, the victories of the Civil War will be erased.
Some who have finally come around to expanding the Court want to do the minimum expansion necessary to out-vote the reactionary majority by adding four justices. A limited expansion of four justices is a bad idea. It would face all the opposition of a larger expansion, but would result in a 7-to-6 liberal majority. But that advantage could be erased by a single illness, resignation, or change of heart by one member of the seven-person liberal majority.
The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals has 27 judges and operates just fine. But if the Supreme Court had only 17 justices (for example), that would create a liberal majority of 11 justices with a 5-vote advantage (11-to-6). I think the best number is 27, to allow the Court to split into panels to divide the work of overruling Dobbs, Citizens United, Trump v. US, Callais, Shelby County v. Holder, and a dozen other decisions by the Roberts Court.
A frequent objection to expanding the Court is, âBut wonât Republicans just do the same thing?â Of course they willâif they ever win a trifecta, which they wonât if we have the courage to expand the Court, eliminate the filibuster, and pass legislation to mandate that states use independent redistricting commissions.
But even if Republicans were to win a trifecta, they would have to expand the Court significantly to overcome the advantage of a large expansion by Democrats. So, if the Court were 27 justices, Republicans would have to expand the Court to somewhere in the range of 50 justices to overcome the liberal advantage.
Ridiculous, you say? Is it any more ridiculous than a Court that is one vote away from eliminating the 14th Amendment to the Constitution because Trump was able to appoint three justices? A court that can be destroyed by such a slight change in personnel is a fragile creature unable to withstand corrupting influences.
Moreover, as Josh Marshall notes, increasing the size of the Supreme Court will, paradoxically, reduce its centrality in American politics. See Talking Points Memo, Will GOPers Just Expand the Court Too? Probably. And Thatâs Okay.
As Marshall writes,
[T] hereâs a very good chance that Republicans will do the exact same thing as soon as they get a trifecta. But this is largely a self-correcting problem. Because successive expansions will have the effect both of reducing the centrality of the Court in our politics, as well as the importance of any single Justice. And thatâs good.
We want the Supreme Court to be more limited in its interventions into our politics, and we want to reduce the perceived advantages of stacking or corrupting it again.
One of the most salutary impacts of expanding the Court will simply be to send the message âYou spent half a century building the machinery for stacking the Court with corrupt ideologues, then you did it, and now itâs gone.â Poof.
We will get one chance to get this rightâwhen we win a trifecta in 2028. We cannot surrender to half-measures or agonize over no-longer-relevant concerns about preserving the Courtâs non-existent legitimacy. By expanding the Court, we will be protecting the Constitution, which is the first order of business. When the Supreme Court begins to honor the Constitution once again, its legitimacy will return, slowly but surely.
Thatâs all for today! It has been a rough week, but we are still standingâand that is all we need to continue the fight.
Stay strong!
FN 1: Trumpâs executive order ending birthright citizenship was prospective only, meaning that approximately 260,000 children born each year would have been directly affected if the Court had upheld Trumpâs executive order. See Pew Research Center, About 9% of U.S. births in 2023 were to unauthorized or temporary legal immigrant mothers. But if the Court had upheld the executive order, the citizenship status of millions of existing birthright citizens under 18 would have become vulnerable to future attacks. See Pew Research Center (11/1/2018), U.S. births to unauthorized immigrants have fallen since 2007. I could find no estimate of the total number of US citizens of all ages who would have been subject to a birthright citizenship attack if Trump v. Barbara had upheld the executive order, but if there were 5 million minors under 18 who would have been vulnerable in 2016 (per Pew Research Center), a reasonable inference suggests that a decade later the total population of vulnerable birthright citizens of all ages exceeds 10 million.
Anya is live and ready to show you everything. Watch her strip, dance, and perform exclusive shows just for you. Interact in real-time and make your fantasies come true.
â Live Streamingâ Interactive Chatâ Private Showsâ HD Qualityâ Free Actions
Free to watch âą No registration required âą HD streaming
Legal scholars say that the nation has reached a tipping point and that the right question is not whether there is a crisis, but rather how
ââIf anyone is being detained or removed based on the administrationâs assertion that it can do so without judicial review or due process,â said Jamal Greene, a law professor at Columbia, âthe president is asserting dictatorial power and âconstitutional crisisâ doesnât capture the gravity of the situation.â
Mr. Trump raised the stakes on Tuesday by calling for the impeachment of the judge who issued the order, James E. Boasberg of the Federal District Court in Washington, describing him on social media as a âRadical Left Lunatic.â
The president did so even as the issues at hand have just started to be tested in a case that seems headed to the Supreme Court.
A few hours later, Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. issued an unusual statement, seemingly prompted by such exhortations, and perhaps by the filing of articles of impeachment against Judge Boasberg by a Republican member of the House.
âFor more than two centuries, it has been established that impeachment is not an appropriate response to disagreement concerning a judicial decision,â the chief justice said. âThe normal appellate review process exists for that purpose.â
(âŠ)
Aziz Huq, a law professor at the University of Chicago, said that assessing whether a given development is a constitutional crisis is âgenerally unhelpful.â
âI think itâs more useful to say that this is moving us into a completely different kind of constitutional order, one thatâs no longer characterized by laws that bind officials and that can be enforced,â Professor Huq said. âThe law, in other words, becomes a tool to harm enemies, but not to bind those who govern. That is a quite different constitutional order from the one that weâve had for a long time.â
(âŠ)
âIt should go without saying that, at the Justice Department, the rule of the road is that, in the absence of a true emergency, the government complies with judicial orders, even if the orders are patently lawless, until it can get them reversed â either by the issuing judge or a higher court,â Andrew C. McCarthy, a former federal prosecutor, wrote in the right-leaning National Review. âItâs all right to complain bitterly about court orders, but they are not to be ignored, much less knowingly flouted.â
(âŠ)
The lawyer representing the government at Mondayâs hearing had another argument: that Judge Boasberg was powerless to order the planes to turn around once they had left American airspace. That assertion was also labeled unconvincing by many legal experts.
âThe administration has this completely wrong,â Hannah L. Buxbaum, a law professor at Indiana University, wrote in a blog post. âThe judge is ordering the administration to take action inside the United States â that is, to instruct the planes to turn around. That instruction will in turn cause something to happen elsewhere (the pilots will change course), but that doesnât make the order impermissibly extraterritorial.â
(âŠ)
Pamela S. Karlan, a law professor at Stanford, said the development was emblematic of how the Trump administration had acted in its first months in office.
âThe problem with this administration is not just acute episodes, like whatâs happening with Judge Boasberg and the Venezuelan deportation,â Professor Karlan said. âItâs a chronic disrespect for constitutional norms and for the other branches of government.â
Asked whether the nation had reached a tipping point plunging it into a constitutional crisis, Professor Karlan questioned the premise. ââTipping pointâ suggests a world in which things are fine until suddenly theyâre not,â she said. âBut weâre past the first point already.ââ
Judges are constrained in their ability to make the president obey their orders.
âIt is not hyperbole to say that the future of American constitutional democracy now rests on a single question: Will President Trump and his administration defy court orders?
Federal judges have issued more than a dozen temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions against Trump administration actions. But it is unclear whether the government will comply, and in at least two cases, judges have said their orders were ignored.
The Trump administration is already facing at least 100 legal challenges. Two recent court orders no doubt will test Mr. Trumpâs patience.
(âŠ)
But the hard truth for those looking to the courts to rein in the Trump administration is that the Constitution gives judges no power to compel compliance with their rulings â it is the executive branch that ultimately enforces judicial orders. If a president decides to ignore a judicial ruling, the courts are likely rendered impotent.
(âŠ)
Removing federal judges because of disagreement with their rulings would be unprecedented. The Constitution allows for impeachment only for âtreason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.â There is no plausible basis for claiming that standard has been met. And it is risible to see conservatives, who repeatedly went to court to enjoin Biden and Obama administration policies, now saying that the judiciary should not review executive branch actions. All of this is about an administration that does not want to be constrained by the Constitution, laws or courts.
It is unsettling even to be asking whether the president would defy a court order. Throughout American history, presidents have complied with mandates from the courts, even when they disagree. In the 1930s, the Supreme Court struck down many of the New Deal programs of Franklin Roosevelt. He was angry and proposed expanding the size of the Supreme Court to uphold his initiatives, but never went as far as defying the rulings. When the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional Harry Trumanâs order to seize steel mills during the Korean War, a major blow to his presidency, Truman, too, was angry, but he complied with the decision.
Similarly, when the court ordered Richard Nixon to turn over the White House tapes, he did so even though it meant the end of his presidency. More recently, when courts blocked Biden administration policies â from student loan relief to vaccine mandates â the White House complied.
(âŠ)
But there are no definitive instances of presidents disobeying court orders. The line attributed to Andrew Jackson about the chief justice, that âJohn Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it,â is likely apocryphal. Purportedly about a Supreme Court ruling that Georgia could not enforce its laws against whites on Cherokee land, the quotation did not appear in print until long after Jacksonâs death. And, in fact, the court order was directed at Georgia, not Jackson or the federal government. In addition, modern scholarship has undermined the story that Abraham Lincoln defied an order from the chief justice invalidating a suspension of habeas corpus during the early days of the Civil War.
Thus far, the Trump administration has given conflicting signals as to whether it will defy court orders. On Feb. 11, Mr. Trump said, âI always abide by the courts, and then Iâll have to appeal it.â And that same month, the acting solicitor general, Sarah Harris, wrote in a footnote in a brief to the Supreme Court: âThe executive branch takes seriously its constitutional duty to comply with the orders of Article III courts.â
But just one day prior, Mr. Trump posted on social media, âHe who saves his Country does not violate any Law.â A week earlier, Vice President JD Vance posted, âJudges arenât allowed to control the executiveâs legitimate power,â implying that the president decides what is âlegitimate.â This follows a history of assertions by Mr. Vance suggesting that the president need not comply with adverse court rulings. And while this did not involve a court order, in January, in one of his first acts in office, Mr. Trump signed an executive order to delay enforcing a federal ban on TikTok, even though that ban had just been upheld by a unanimous Supreme Court.
The reality â and Mr. Trump and those around him know it â is that he could get away with defying court orders should he, ultimately, choose to do so. Because of Supreme Court decisions, Mr. Trump cannot be held civilly or criminally liable for any official acts he takes to carry out his constitutional powers.
Those in the Trump administration who carry out his policies and violate court orders could be held in contempt. But if it is criminal contempt, Mr. Trump can issue them pardons. Although civil contempt can involve being jailed until the person complies with the court order, that is enforced by the United States marshals, who are part of the Department of Justice and thus under the presidentâs control.
Defiance of court orders could be the basis for impeachment and removal. But with his party in control of Congress, Mr. Trump knows that is highly unlikely to happen.
If the Trump administration chooses to defy court orders, we will have a constitutional crisis not seen before. Perhaps public opinion will turn against the president and he will back down and comply. Or perhaps, after 238 years, we will see the end of government under the rule of law.â
The presidentâs escalating conflict with federal courts goes beyond what has happened in countries like Hungary and Turkey, where leaders sp
ââHonest to god, Iâve never seen anything like it,â said Steven Levitsky, a Harvard political scientist and coauthor of âHow Democracies Dieâ and âCompetitive Authoritarianism.â
âWe look at these comparative cases in the 21st century, like Hungary and Poland and Turkey. And in a lot of respects, this is worse,â he said. âThese first two months have been much more aggressively authoritarian than almost any other comparable case I know of democratic backsliding.â
(âŠ)
Mr. Levitskysaid he was struggling to find a precedent for what the Trump administration is doing.
âThe zeal with which these guys are engaging in increasingly open, authoritarian behavior is unlike almost anything Iâve seen. Erdogan, Chavez, Orban â they hid it,â Mr. Levitsky said.
(âŠ)
The Trump administrationâs tactics are highly unusual, said Andrew OâDonohue, a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, who studies clashes between courts and elected leaders around the world. Typically, battles over court power have tended to be extensions of political divisions.
(âŠ)
But Mr. Trump and the federal courts are not ideological foes in the same way. Federal judges hold a range of views, but the judiciary has grown more conservative in recent decades. And the Supreme Court, which has a conservative majority, has delivered the political right a number of significant legal victories in recent years, including granting presidents sweeping immunity from criminal prosecution.
(âŠ)
Usually, voters wonât reward their elected leaders for violating norms, disrupting a stable constitutional order, or taking actions that are intrinsically unlawful, said Aziz Huq, a law professor at the University of Chicago and co-author of the book âHow to Save a Constitutional Democracy.â
But that calculus may not apply to Mr. Trump, who has based his political appeal on gleefully flouting sacrosanct norms. Refusing to accept courtsâ authority may actually appeal to the presidentâs base, Huq said, if they take it as evidence of strength rather than lawlessness.
Past presidents have also been more constrained by elites within the political establishment.
âRichard Nixon had to care not just about public opinion, but Walter Cronkite, and Republican and Democratic Party leaders,â Mr. Levitsky said. âThat constraint, which was difficult to measure, but I think very real in the 20th century, has lifted.â
(âŠ)
âIf even a dozen Republicans in Congress had the capacity to stand up to Trump, this would be a very different ballgame,â Mr. Levitsky said. âTrump and Musk and Stephen Miller could not do this alone. Theyâre doing it with the full cooperation of the majority party in Congress.â
âWeâre in a bad place,â he said.â
Not all political upheaval is created equal.
âIn a book written about 30 years ago, I defined a revolution as âthe destruction of an existing state by members of its own society, followed by the creation of a new political order.â Although the ultimate impact of Trumpism remains to be seen, at first glance his aspirations (and those of his supporters) appear to fit that definition. As the past two months have made abundantly clear, U.S. President Donald Trump isnât just trying to modify or reverse the policies of his predecessors. All presidents do that to some degree. Rather, he and his supporters are seeking to destroy or radically alter some of the key institutions that have governed the United States for decades, including the meaning of the Constitution itself. They are also attempting to implement far-reachingâindeed, revolutionaryâchanges to key aspects of U.S. foreign policy, moves far more fundamental than Richard Nixonâs outreach to China or George W. Bushâs ill-fated effort to transform the Middle East.
(âŠ)
The good news is that Trumpism isnât a mass movement like the ones that toppled the Bourbons, the Romanovs, or the Pahlavis, and Trump isnât that kind of revolutionary leader. Trumpism is a ârevolution from above,â where disenchanted members of the elite (frequently the military) gain power and replace key elements of the old order with new ones. In this sense, it is more like the Turkish revolution led by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (a disaffected Ottoman general), the Egyptian revolution led by Gamal Abdel Nasser and the âFree Officersâ (more disaffected military leaders), or the Meiji Restoration in Japan. âRevolutions from aboveâ can also lead to conflict and war, but they tend to be less disruptive than mass revolutions âfrom below.â
Nor is Trumpism likely to prove contagious. Trump and allies like Steve Bannon have made common cause with autocrats or illiberal democrats such as Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia, Prime Minister Viktor Orban of Hungary, and former President Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, and the administration has shown a strong affinity for right-wing extremists such as the Alternative fĂŒr Deutschland in Germany and the National Rally in France, but these movements predate Trumpism and were not inspired by him. Trump hasnât invented a radically new revolutionary model; heâs just following the playbook for democratic backsliding and self-dealing perfected by leaders like Orban or Turkeyâs Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Having the worldâs most powerful country lined up with these autocrats is significant, but weâve seen this movie many times before. And it is worth noting that Trumpâs early moves have helped mainstream parties in several places, most notably Canada, Germany, and Great Britain. The French Revolution it ainât.
It is more accurate to think of Trump not as a revolutionary leader advancing a radically new and potentially contagious model for the world, but as a reactionary leader seeking to turn the clock back. The âMAGAâ slogan gives the game away: If youâre claiming to make the country great again, your gaze is firmly fixed in the rearview mirror and not on the future.
Instead of the managed free trade that fueled seven decades of economic growth, he wants import taxes (aka tariffs) like the ones that President William McKinley imposed more than a century ago. Instead of racial and gender equality and tolerance for other minorities, he wants a return to white supremacy and traditional gender roles. Instead of sustained global engagement guided by international law and collaborative multilateral institutions in which Washington plays a leading role, he wants to disengage. Instead of great-power competition constrained by norms, he wants the great powers to be free to grab whatever they can, just as they did a century ago. Instead of freedom of speech and patriotic dissent, he wants a muzzled press, subservient universities, and the ability to deport legal residents solely because of their political views. Instead of presiding over a diverse nation whose energies are renewed by the arrival of ambitious immigrants, he wants an America surrounded by walls, where only some of the people born here are citizens. Instead of public policy based on science and evidence, he wants the âfactsâ to be whatever he and Robert F. Kennedy Jr. say they are.
Apart from the peculiarly destructive role that Elon Musk is playing in this process, there is nothing new or revolutionary about any of this. Itâs the familiar autocratâs playbook that has been perfected and pursued in many other placesâusually to their detrimentâjust not here in the United States. Lest we forget: The United States was founded in a revolution against this way of running a country, and it has moved closer to those stated ideals over time. Until now. On the eve of the 250th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, it would be tragic indeed if what we end up celebrating next year is not the revolutionary principles contained in that document, but rather their demise.â
Anya is live and ready to show you everything. Watch her strip, dance, and perform exclusive shows just for you. Interact in real-time and make your fantasies come true.
â Live Streamingâ Interactive Chatâ Private Showsâ HD Qualityâ Free Actions
Free to watch âą No registration required âą HD streaming
coastalcurmudgeon asked: Hi, would you mind pointing me towards any articles, books, video essays  etc that make reasonable modern pro-monarchist arguments? When queen Elizabeth passed a few months ago it got me wondering why not just the British but several other wealthy democratic nations  hang on to their monarchs. I'm from the US so it's a little difficult to understand the monarchies perspective off the bat and you seemed a good person to ask about where to find good arguments for it. Thanks and have a nice day
I want to thank you for asking such a simple question but one that many of us donât really give a thought to. We get sucked into the tittle tattle of court intrigue or the tawdry gossip of the latest royal scandal made public, partly because itâs a visceral pleasure to see those above us squirm in discomfort, and partly to see them bleed - perhaps to remind us that they are as mortal and as fallen as we all are.
In the wake of Queen Elizabeth IIâs death, the question of monarchy is brought sharply into focus. The sombre and reflective tone of the tributes to the late Queen Elizabeth II suggests the esteem in which she was held, as well as the apparent popularity of Britainâs constitutional monarchy. But it was not always so, as the queen herself was fully aware. She might have remained more or less beyond reproach, but her family-members have not. Often the Windsors seemed like a bad soap opera, attracting derision and resentment in equal measure. Yet, like their ancestors, they have slogged on regardless. Other monarchies have been toppled, or cut down to size, all over Europe and beyond.
We focus on the institution and its rituals and trappings without asking the underlying question of why? Why do we believe in the institution? Itâs a question that even ardent monarchists find hard to answer properly.
The hard leftists of course do know why they want to get rid of a monarchy in the name of some vague and unrealised ideal of equality and freedom from tyranny as well in the name of democracy. They do so out of historical ignorance given that the constitutional monarchy does exactly that and has been paradoxically a guarantor of these ideals through custom, heritage, and the rule of common law. For them itâs better to destroy than it is to build as Roger Scruton once said. Being historically illiterate, they donât fully understand the folly on pulling one thread runs the danger pulling the entire tapestry of a nation apart.
I donât want to caricature all them with one brush because not all leftists believe in the destruction of the monarchy in Britain. Some understand its value and even harmonise it within their leftist beliefs.
Stephen Fry, a socialist in his political beliefs but still widely considered (and righty so) as a national treasure, came out in his support of the monarchy in Britain. The beloved British actor, writer and presenter admitted in a podcast with Jordan Peterson that the Royal Family in interviews that âon the face of it is of course preposterousâ. But he went on to explain how they can play a key role in society. The author referred to the Queenâs weekly Audience with the Prime Minister and suggested that the US could benefit from having a Monarch. He explained how his thoughts stemmed from his belief in âceremony, ritual and symbolismâ.
Fry told the podcast: âI look at America and I think if only Donald Trump and now Biden, if every week they had to walk up the hill and go into a mansion in Washington and there was uncle Sam in a top hat and striped trousers.â He explained how âuncle Samâ might be the US equivalent of a Monarch and described him as âa living embodiment of their nationâ.
Stephen Fry added: âMore important than they were thatâs the key. He [uncle Sam] is America, the President is a fly-by-night politician voted for by less than half the population and he has to bow in front of this personification of his country every week. And that personification, uncle Sam canât tell him what to do, uncle Sam canât say âpass this Act and donât pass that Act and free these people, give them a pardonâ. All he can do is say âtell me young fella what you done this weekâ and heâll bow and say âwell uncle Samâ.â
He suggested how uncle Sam might reply âoh you think thatâs the right thing for my countryâ. Fry concluded: âWell thatâs what a constitutional monarchy is and of course itâs absurd but the fact that Churchill and Thatcher and everyone had to bow every week in front of this something.â
The author went on to claim that âempirically look at the happiest countries in the world thatâs all you need do and they happen to be constitutional monarchiesâ. Fry finished up by listing Norway, Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Japan as some of those "happiest" places who have monarchies.: âTheyâre always right up there on the list. Now it may be that we canât find the causal link between the constitutional monarchy but it might just be something to do with that.â
I happen to think Stephen Fry is right. For these reasons yes, but there are much better ones too.
Itâs first worth stating it helps to understand what kind of monarchy are we talking about? A surprising number of countries have ruling monarchs but not the same role or power. Itâs important to break down the distinctions between the types of monarchies that exist today. Generally, there are four kinds.
In the constitutional monarchy, the monarch divides power with a constitutionally founded government. In this situation, the monarch, while having ceremonial duties and certain responsibilities, does not have any political power. For example, the UKâs monarch must sign all laws to make them official, but has no power to change or reject new laws. Example of countries that follow this are United Kingdom, Japan, and Denmark.
In the absolutist monarchy the monarch has full and absolute political power. They can amend, reject, or create laws, represent the countryâs interests abroad, appoint political leaders, and so on. Such countries Said Arabia and Eswatini and even arguably the Vatican (the Papal office is like an absolutist monarch but of the church).
In the federal monarchy the monarch serves an overall figurehead of the federation of states which have their own governments, or even monarchies, ruling them. These countries include UAE and Malaysia.
In the mixed monarchy there is an unusual situation wherein an absolute monarch may divide powers in distinct ways specific to the country. Here Jordan, Liechtenstein, and Morocco are stand out examples.
To many contemporary critics and political progressives, monarchies seem to be purposeless antiquated relics, anachronisms that ought to eventually give way to republics.
On the contrary, nothing can be farther from the truth. Monarchies have an extremely valuable role to play, even in the 21st century and beyond. If anything their number should be added to rather than subtracted from. To understand why, it is important to consider the merits of monarchy objectively without resorting to the tautology that countries ought to be democracies because they ought to be democracies.
There are several advantages in having a monarchy in the 21st century. First, monarchs can rise above politics in the way an elected head of state cannot. Monarchs represent the whole country in a way democratically elected leaders cannot and do not. The choice for the highest political position in a monarchy cannot be influenced by and in a sense beholden to money, the media, or a political party.
Secondly and closely related to the previous point is that in factitious countries like Thailand, the existence of a monarch is often the only thing holding the country back from the edge of civil war. Monarchs are especially important in multiethnic countries such as Belgium because the institution of monarchy unites diverse and often hostile ethnic groups under shared loyalty to the monarch instead of to an ethnic or tribal group. The Habsburg dynasty held together a large, prosperous country that quickly balkanised into almost a dozen states of no power without it. If the restoration of the erstwhile king of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah, widely respected by all Afghans, went through after the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001, perhaps Afghanistan would have more quickly risen above the factionalism and rivalry between various warlords.
Third, monarchies prevent the emergence of extreme forms of government in their countries by fixing the form of government. All political leaders must serve as prime ministers or ministers of the ruler. Even if actual power lies with these individuals, the existence of a monarch makes it difficult to radically or totally alter a countryâs politics. The presence of kings in Cambodia, Jordan, and Morocco holds back the worst and more extreme tendencies of political leaders or factions in their countries. Monarchy also stabilises countries by encouraging slow, incremental change instead of extreme swings in the nature of regimes. The monarchies of the Arab states have established much more stable societies than non-monarchic Arab states, many of which have gone through such seismic shifts over the course of the Arab Spring.
Fourth, monarchies have the gravitas and prestige to make last-resort, hard, and necessary decisions - decisions that nobody else can make. For example, Juan Carlos of Spain - now in disgrace but not in the beginning of his reign - personally ensured his countryâs transition to a constitutional monarchy with parliamentary institutions and stood down an attempted military coup. At the end of the Second World War, the Japanese Emperor Hirohito defied his militaryâs wish to fight on and saved countless of his peopleâs lives by advocating for Japanâs surrender.
Fifth, monarchies are repositories of tradition and continuity in ever changing times. They remind a country of what it represents and where it came from, facts that can often be forgotten in the swiftly changing currents of politics.
Finally, rather counterintuitively, monarchies can serve up a head of state in a more democratic and diverse way than actual democratic politics. Since anyone, regardless of their personality or interests, can by accident of birth become a monarch, all types of people may become rulers in such a system. The head of state may thus promote causes or stir interest in issues and topics that would otherwise not be significant, as King Charlesâ views on architecture and climate change proved. Politicians on the other hand, tend to have a certain personality - they are generally extroverted, can make or raise money, and have a tendency to pander or at least publicly hold to pre-defined mainstream views. The presence of a head of state with a psychological profile different from a politician can be refreshing.
Most of the criticisms of monarchy are no longer valid today, if they were ever valid. These criticisms are usually some variation of two ideas. Firstly, the monarch may wield absolute power arbitrarily without any sort of check, thus ruling as a tyrant. However, in present era, most monarchies rule within some sort of constitutional or traditional framework which constrains and institutionalises their powers. Even prior to this, monarchs faced significant constraints from various groups including religious institutions, aristocracies, the wealthy, and even commoners. Customs, which always shape social interactions, also served to restrain. Even monarchies that were absolute in theory were almost always constrained in practice.
A second criticism is that even a good monarch may have an unworthy successor. However, todayâs heirs are educated from birth for their future role and live in the full glare of the media their entire lives. This constrains bad behaviour. More importantly, because they have literally been born to rule, they have constant, hands-on training on how to interact with people, politicians, and the media.
In light of the all the advantages of monarchy, it is clear why many citizens of democracies today have an understandable nostalgia for monarchy. As in previous centuries, monarchy will continue to show itself to be an important and beneficial political institution wherever it still survives.
Constitutional monarchies are undoubtedly the most popular form of royal leadership in the modern eraâ , making up close to 70% of all monarchies. This situation allows for democratically elected governments to rule the country, while the monarch performs ceremonial duties. Most monarchs are hereditary, inheriting their position by luck of their birth, but interestingly, the French president, Emmanuel Macron, technically serves as a Co-Prince of Andorra - a fact I enjoy making my good French republican friends squirm in discomfort. But France remains resolutely a republic despite many other European countries being a constitutional monarchy.
Monarchy has a long history in Europe, being the predominant form of government from the Middle Ages until the First World War. At the turn of the twentieth century every country in Europe was a monarchy with just three exceptions: France, Switzerland and San Marino. But by the start of the twenty-first century, most European countries had ceased to be monarchies, and three quarters of the member states of the European Union are now republics. That has led to a teleological assumption that in time most advanced democracies will become republics, as the highest form of democratic government.
But there still remains a stubborn group of countries in Western Europe which defy that assumption, and they include some of the most advanced democracies in the world. In the most recent Democracy Index compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit, six out of the top ten democracies - and nine of the top 15 - in the world were monarchies. They include six European monarchies: Norway, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and the UK.
It remains a historical paradox. These monarchies have survived partly for geopolitical reasons, most of the other European monarchies having disappeared at the end of the First or Second World Wars. Their continuance has been accompanied by a steady diminution in their political power, which has shrunk almost to zero, and developing roles that support liberal democracy. What modern monarchies offer is non-partisan state headship set apart from the daily political struggle of executive government; the continuity of a family whose different generations attract the interest of all age groups; and disinterested support for civil society that is beyond the reach of partisan politics. These roles have evolved because monarchy depends ultimately on the support of the public, and is more accountable than people might think.
Understanding this paradox of an ancient hereditary institution surviving as a central part of modern democracies is a key part of understanding why monarchies persist and will continue to exist.
Iâm going to confine answering your question to constitutional monarchy because itâs what the United Kingdom and the rest of Europe is. This is partly to narrow the wide question to something more manageable but also reflective of the fact that each country is different with its own unique history of customs, traditions, and heritage, and practices of governance, that make up the unique quality of the monarchy in question.
Iâm just going to give you a general recommendation list rather than a deep academic dive into political theory. But then theory is no good without practice. History is the best place to start to understand some of the things Iâve already highlighted.
1. The English Constitution by Walter Bagehot
I know I said to start with history and here Iâm recommending you begin with reading a book on constitutional theory and practice. But hear me out.
First published in 1867, this remains the indispensable guide to the role and purpose of the British sovereign. The text by Walter Bagehot (who was editor of The Economist for 17 years) is often mistaken for an official account of constitutional monarchy. In fact, it is a lively argument on how Britainâs old institutions should cope with the coming of mass-democracy. It was in this spirit that Bagehot contrasted the âdignifiedâ parts of the constitution - the monarchy and the House of Lords - with the merely âefficientâ, the Cabinet, MPs and the like. In the new age of mass-politics, he considered that the role of the monarchy was to âexcite and preserve the reverence of the populationâ for the countryâs institutions and government. Although monarchs might not have executive power anymore, they maintained three rights over âefficientâ politicians - âto be consulted, to encourage and to warnâ.
That the British monarchy survived while many of Europeâs were overthrown is in no small measure to the Windsorsâ scrupulousness in following Bagehotâs advice. And, prophetically, he cautioned that the whole royal conjuring trick could only work if its dignity was preserved: âIf you begin to poke about it, you cannot reverence itâŠits mystery is its life. We must not let in daylight upon the magic.â
The great thing is you donât even have to buy it. Free copies exist online to download. I have my own copy because it really is a sort of bible for me when I have to think soberly and stay grounded as the latest royal scandal erupts and everyone is losing their heads.
2. Crown and Country: A history of England through the Monarchy by David Starkey (2010)
David Starkey is one of Britainâs finest medieval historians and fine prose stylist. A Cambridge historian whose lectures I used to sneak off to listen to - I did Classics - because the man was so charismatic, provocative, and damn clever. From one of our finest historians comes an outstanding exploration of the British monarchy, from the retreat of the Romans up until the modern day.
Crown and Country is a spin off from his TV series on the same subject. However the book is a great introduction to monarchy in Britain. In it he provides the reader with enough intellectual rigour to impart context, before livening the page with pithy tales of treachery or cruelty, of double-dealing or disaster. His delight at their shock value is tangible as he takes us from England's earliest status, as a barbarous outpost of the Roman empire, through to a rather uncomfortable attempt to second-guess how history will one day judge the contemporary members of the Windsor family (going up to the marriage of William and Kate).
Academic historians often complain that Starkey writes with the snappy zest of an unrepentant telly-don, but I doubt anybody else minds very much. He has a lovely eye for a good story â William the Conqueror being so fat that he could not fit in his sarcophagus, so that âthe swollen bowels burst and an intolerable stench assailed the nostrils of the bystandersâ, for example, or Henry II having such a tantrum that he fell out of bed and âthreshed around the floor, cramming his mouth with the stuffing of his mattressâ.
He also has a nice line in snarky humour. Academics have recently been trying to rehabilitate King John as a good administrator, he notes, but to praise him âfor being a royal filing clerk shows historians looking after their own with a vengeanceâ.
Starkeyâs great skill is to weave big themes quietly into a rollicking narrative, so that you absorb them almost without noticing they are there.
From the beginning, he argues, Englandâs monarchy has been unlike any other, divorced from imperial Roman traditions and based on an unspoken contract between king and people, and so reflecting a deep sense of patriotic exceptionalism. From Alfred, who effectively invented the idea of an English nation, to George III, who became the incarnation of bluff, beef-eating John Bull during the Napoleonic Wars, and on to George VI, the personification of quiet determination during Britainâs darkest and finest hours, successful kings have come to embody a wider spirit of national defiance. Perhaps that explains why, for all his faults, we remain fascinated with Henry VIII: he may have been a monster, but he was proudly, unapologetically, our monster.
Since it is evidently raw power that turns Starkey on, perhaps it is not surprising that once we are past the Glorious Revolution and the rule of dour, cunning, competent William of Orange, his narrative begins to flag. The House of Hanover, he says, was a ânational jokeâ and although he clearly relishes the amorous misadventures of George IV and Edward VII, he spends barely 20 pages on the House of Windsor.
Compared with the blood-soaked warrior kings of his opening chapters, our recent monarchs have been personally colourless and politically irrelevant. But Starkey is not ready to give up on the monarchy. Just like his forebears, he points out, the current Prince of Wales has become the symbol of something bigger than himself, the cause of the environment and the spirit of voluntary service.
Nobody else could have set up such a vast empire of charitable endeavour: âOnly he has the necessary combination of social and economic power and imagination to pull it off.â And here, Starkey argues, lies a formula for survival: âA new kingdom of the mind, spirit, culture and values,â which would appeal even to Oliver Cromwell.
Starkey is particularly good at explaining the shifting tone of monarchical power. After the straightforward Anglo-Saxon model, English kings had to incorporate the Norman way of doing things, with its "chivalric virus"; we then see the Tudors appear with their imperialist vision, followed by the disastrous Stuart belief in the divine right of kings, which James I subscribed to intellectually, and which Charles I paid for with his head. After that we see Hanoverian mediocrity, followed by Victorian pomp, and Windsor flexibility â changing nationality and name as wars with Germany, their ancestral home, demanded.
Crown & Country is a masterpiece of accessible history, underscored with profound scholarship: it takes the essential structure of hereditary monarchy, chronicles the struggles and triumphs of a rich panoply of carefully crafted characters and lays out the story of a nation. Above all, the author's passion for his subject, the royal tale of England, which is the backbone of this nation's story, explodes from every page. I defy anybody not to enjoy this book.
3. Blood Royal: Dynastic Politics in Medieval Europe by Robert Bartlett (2020)
Throughout medieval Europe, for hundreds of years, monarchy was the way that politics worked in most countries. This meant power was in the hands of a family - a dynasty; that politics was family politics; and political life was shaped by the births, marriages and deaths of the ruling family. How did the dynastic system cope with female rule, or pretenders to the throne? How did dynasties use names, the numbering of rulers and the visual display of heraldry to express their identity? And why did some royal families survive and thrive, while others did not? Robert Bartlettâs engaging Blood Royal tries to answer these questions by focusing on both the role of family dynamics and family consciousness in the politics of medieval European monarchical systems circa 500 to 1500 CE.
He creates an authoritative historical survey of dynastic power in Latin Christendom in western and central Europe and the Byzantine Empire (or former Eastern Roman Empire), providing an impressive level of depth while putting aspects of royalty and kingship in perspective. Each chapter brings the reader into this political world and aspects of medieval politicsâ ties to family politics. Bartlett transitions seamlessly from example to example, but this apparent ease and vast knowledge reflects years of research and underscores his area expertise.
Blood Royal is an excellent book for anyone who has ever had a question about medieval European monarchy. If youâve ever wondered how medieval marriages worked, the politics of dynastic succession, or even something as simple as what happened when the current monarch died then Bartlettâs book probably has an answer for you. Blood Royal is split into two sections, the first focusing on the specific lives of medieval royals, with chapters on medieval marriage, children, paternal relationships, as well as female rulers and mistresses. The second section covers dynasties rather than individuals. It is in this latter section that youâll find discussions of names and numbers, pretenders, as well as heraldry and even the role of prophecy and astrology in medieval dynastic politics.
The scope of Blood Royal is immense. Bartlett includes early medieval dynasties like the Merovingians and Carolingians alongside later examples like the Plantagenets and the Hohenstaufen. Bartlett also incorporates an impressive range of dynasties from across medieval Europe, not limiting himself to just the French, English, and German royal families. Overall, it makes for a very impressive piece of scholarship from a senior historian, but one that is written in a very approachable and engaging fashion. The breadth of the coverage means that no matter where your interest in medieval Europe lies thereâs probably something relevant to it in Blood Royal.
4. On Power: The Natural History of Its Growth by Bertrand De Jouvenel (1945)
Bertrand de Jouvenal is one of the most under-read political theorists in Europe today and itâs only in the last couple of decades his works have been translated into English. He wrote two seminal books pertinent to the state and how politics and monarchy mixed. I would thoroughly recommend his book âSovereigntyâ (1957) in that regard. How he treats sovereignty is clear and insightful and better than any academic I know. He describes how sovereignty in the modern sense can be traced back to the eleventh century, when absolutism was developed under such rulers as Philip the Fair. Before absolutism, it was acknowledged that every man had his seigniory, the king just as much as a simple farmer. The seigniory of the king was far greater, of course, but only as inviolable as that of every other person (as exemplified in the anecdote of Frederick the Great and the miller). The idea of a sovereignty that flows down from the sovereign to all his subjects was taken from the ancient Romans, and formed the basis of absolutism. One consequence of this was that democracy as we know it became possible in the first place. Before absolutism, there simply was no sovereignty that could be removed from the king and given to the people.
However Iâm going to recommend his other book, âOn Powerâ, as itâs book that defines the role of power and its relationship to sovereignty and where it came from. It goes into the role of sovereign or dux, and his or her shared responsibility with the larger group. This book explains how absolute monarchy is a recent concept, and as a result of the Enlightenment. It points out the hazards of absolute power within any form of government. It then goes into change v.s. distrust of initiative, and emerging liberalism. One of the best political treatises I have ever read. Bertrand de Jouvenel is unconventional, creative, very thorough and stringent. It's not easy to sum up, as the book is rather suggestive in nature. It doesn't so much tell you the solutions as make you think for them yourself. It gives you tools with which to overthink and analyse political problems, but doesn't force a solution on you.
Bertrand de Jouvenel (1903-1987) was a French journalist and political theorist. During World War II, he participated in the French resistance movement and finally took refuge in Switzerland, where he finished his masterpiece, On Power.
Jouvenel was troubled by the savagery of the war. Such a total war, Jouvenel realised, could not happen without the power of the modern centralised state. Jouvenel called this state, âPowerâ or âthe Minotaur.â The question he set out to analyse was how this monster had grown so large. As indicated by the subtitle of the book, The Natural History of Its Growth, the analysis is meant to be positive political science, as opposed to normative political philosophy. When he wrote On Power, Jouvenel obviously knew little of the libertarian or classical liberal tradition. He has been labelled a âconservative liberalâ Ă la Alexis de Tocqueville (whom Friedrich Hayek, it is worth recalling, does recognise as a full member of the classical liberal tradition).
The modern state has acquired a crushing power that includes war and conscription, an âinquisitorial mechanism of taxation,â and a police more effective than at any time in history. âEven the police regime, that most insupportable attribute of tyranny, has grown in the shadow of democracy,â Jouvenel observes. âNo absolute monarch ever had at his disposal a police force comparable to those of modern democracies.â Power has continued and continues to grow.
Power is âcommand that lives for its sake and for its fruits.â State rulers want power and the perks that come with it. But, Jouvenel explained, in the very process of being self-interested, Power also benefits its subjects compared to what would be their situation in the anarchic state of nature. To gain their support and to make them more productive and taxable, Power provides its subjects with security, order, and other public goods. This is an old philosophical idea dear to defenders of absolutism, but it carries an analytical value of its own.
From Antiquity until the 16th or 17th century, Jouvenel argues, three ways existed to limit Power: divine law, fixed customary law, and powerful social authorities such as the ancient or the medieval aristocracy. All these were overcome. Divine law was brushed away by modern rationalism. Fixed customary law was replaced by changing laws made by absolute monarchs and, even more, by democratic parliaments. The aristocracy was stripped of any power.
Sovereignty, Jouvenel explains, is âthe idea⊠that somewhere there is a right to which all other rights must yield.â The king claimed sovereignty against the aristocracy. Once the aristocracy was defeated, âthe peopleâ invoked it against the king. The king was simply replaced by the people or, in practice, by its representatives.
Jouvenel conceives liberty as âthe direct, immediate, and concrete sovereignty of man over himself.â It is not participation in government, which is âabsurdly called âpolitical libertyâ.â He forcefully argues that no regime other than aristocracy is âequally allergic to the expansion of Power.â Between the fall of the Roman empire and the modern nation-state, kings had to negotiate grants in aid from the aristocrats in order, for example, to fight wars, which were limited for this very reason. General conscription was unknown and impossible.
Jouvenel argues that liberty has aristocratic roots for it came from aristocrats who had the means and the will to defend their own liberty against Power. Liberty âis a subjective right which belongs to those, and to those only, who are capable of defending it.â It was certainly âa system based on class,â with all the drawbacks that this implies. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, a modern prophet of democracy, suggested that slavery might even be the necessary counterpart of free and independent citizens voluntarily devoting their time to public affairs.
To eliminate the independent social power that the aristocrats represented, kings allied themselves with powerless individuals such as the common people and the new capitalist bourgeoisie. Aristocrats were replaced by âstatocrats,â individuals who derived their authority only from their position in the service of the state. The new democratic citizens would soon fall under a Power much more encompassing than that of the local lord.
A crucial idea of On Power, which can also be found in Tocqueville, is that instead of restraining Power, popular sovereignty reinforced it. Democracy was conceived by its early theorists as liberty and the rule of law. But another conception, which won the day, identified democracy with the sovereignty of the people. In this conception, democracy replaces the rule of law by the peopleâs good pleasure, which in practice means the good pleasure of its elected representatives and the government bureaucracy.
The popular sovereign became the new king, but without the restraints that law and aristocracy previously imposed. Liberty diminished since â[e]very increase of state authority must involve an immediate diminution of the liberty of each citizen.â Like ancient philosophers, Jouvenel sees aristocracy, democracy, and tyranny as the only feasible regimes.
5. The Role of Modern Monarchy: European Monarchies Compared edited by Robert Hazell and Bob Morris (2020)
No new political theory on this topic has been developed since Walter Bagehot wrote about the monarchy in The English Constitution (1867). The same is true of the other European monarchies. So this is a welcome update in terms of whatâs happened in the last 150 years or so across Europe. Itâs actually the brainchild of a project coming out of the Constitutional Unit at University College London. The book is excellent and is written by experts from Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the UK. It considers the constitutional and political role of monarchy, its powers and functions, how it is defined and regulated, the laws of succession and royal finances, relations with the media, the popularity of the monarchy and why it endures. This collections of essays written by academics is the first comparative study of its kind and broadly asks with their formal powers greatly reduced, how has this ancient, hereditary institution managed to survive and what is a modern monarchâs role? What theory can be derived about the role of monarchy in advanced democracies, and what lessons can the different European monarchies learn from each other?
The public look to the monarchy to represent continuity, stability and tradition, but also want it to be modern, to reflect modern values and be a focus for national identity. The whole institution is shot through with contradictions, myths and misunderstandings. This book should lead to a more realistic debate about our expectations of the monarchy, its role and its future. As a whole these twenty contributors notes several factors to the continued survival of the constitutional monarchy in Europe today.
Firstly, remain politically neutral. Monarchs who are too interventionist will encounter resistance and lose their reputation for neutrality. Secondly, avoid scandals, or any hint of corruption. Thirdly, keep the team small. The greater the size of the royal family, the greater the risk that one of its members may get into trouble and cause reputational damage; and the greater the risk of criticism about excessive cost, and too many hangers-on. Fourthly, Understand better the plight of the minor royals, allow them a means of escape and equip them to enter careers commensurate with their abilities. They lead lives of great privilege, but lack fundamental freedoms: the right to privacy and family life which ordinary citizens take for granted, free choice of careers, freedom to marry whom they like. Fifthly, keep in your lane. Although hereditary, the monarchy is accountable, just like any other public institution. The most high profile example is King Juan Carlos of Spain, now in exile and the subject of prosecutorial investigations. But he is not alone: other monarchs who stepped out of line have also lost their thrones.
Arguably the biggest factor of all is how accountable the monarchy is to its subjects - as paradoxical as that sounds. Accountability of the monarchy in a democracy is vital and necessary. Individual monarchs can be forced to abdicate; and support for the institution as a whole can be tested in a referendum. During the twentieth century there were 18 referendums held on the monarchy in nine European countries. It was through referendums that the monarchy came to an end in Italy and Greece, and was restored in Spain; and through referendums that the future of the monarchy was endorsed in Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg and Norway. The monarchy may seem the very antithesis of a democratic or accountable institution; but ultimately continuation of the monarchy depends on the continuing support of the people for the roles it is seen to undertake. And people can be equally fickle with emotions as they can be reasonable and grounded in common sense.
I would also recommend two videos you can watch online which basically saves your from reading the above - or watching it may inspire you to go and read the books (which would be my intention).
1. Monarchy by David Starkey (TV documentary series)
Monarchy was originally made by Channel 4 as a British TV series that ran from 2004â2007. It was written and presented by the historian David Starkey charting the political and ideological history of the English monarchy from the Saxon period to modern times. The show also aired on PBS stations throughout the United States. You can watch the series on YouTube.
The first episode looks at discusses the early history of England and the birth of the Monarchy. It looks migration of the Anglo-Saxons into Britain and discusses some early rulers including. It looks at the roles of Aethelbert and his Frankish wife Bertha in the Christianisation of Britain. It examines the dominant reign of King Offa of Mercia. Finally, it looks at Alfred the Great and how he united England against Viking invasion.
2. The Role of Modern Monarchy: European Monarchies Compared: book launch discussion
This is an online discussion hosted by BBCâs David Dimbleby amongst some of the main contributors of the book and the conclusions they reached. Itâs very good discussion both wide ranging and insightful how modern monarchies operate across Europe.
On the face of it, the British monarchy runs against the spirit of the times. Deference is dead, but royalty is built on a pantomime of archaic honourifics and frock-coated footmen. In an age of meritocracy, monarchy is rooted in the unjustifiable privilege of birth. Populism means that elites are out, but the most conspicuous elite of all remains. Identity politics means that narratives are in, but the queen kept her feelings under her collection of unfashionable hats. By rights, support for the crown should have crumbled under Elizabeth has sometimes imagined it might. Instead, the monarchy thrived. And it continues to thrive and thus maddening the bourgeois woke elites and perplexing trendy decolonisation academics.
Writing in the 1860s, Walter Bagehot, The Economistâs greatest editor, noted that under Britainâs constitutional monarchy âA republic has insinuated itself beneath the folds of a monarchy.â The executive and legislative powers of government belonged to the cabinet and Parliament. The crown was the âdignifiedâ part of the state, devoted to ceremony and myth-making. In an elitist age, Bagehot saw this as a disguise, a device to keep the masses happy while the select few got on with the job.
You do not need a monarchy to pull off the separation, obviously. Countries like Ireland rub along with a ceremonial president instead. He or she comes from the people and has, in theory, earned the honour. A dud or a rogue can be kicked out or prosecuted. To a degree, history lays down the choice - it would be comic to invent a monarchy from scratch.
However, constitutional monarchy has one advantage over figurehead presidencies that is the final reason behind Elizabethâs surprising success: its mix of continuity and tradition, which even today is tinged with mystical vestiges of the healing royal touch. All political systems need to manage change and resolve conflicting interests peacefully and constructively. Systems that stagnate end up erupting; systems that race away leave large parts of society left behind and they erupt, too.
Under Elizabeth, Britain changed unrecognisably. Not only has it undergone social and technological change, like other Western democracies, but it was also eclipsed as a great power. More than once, most recently over Brexit, politics choked. During all this upheaval, the continuity that monarchy displays has been a moderating influence. George Orwell, no establishment stooge, called it an âescape-valve for dangerous emotionsâ, drawing patriotism away from politics, where love of country can rot into bigotry. Decaying empires are dangerous. Britainâs decline has been a lot less traumatic than it might have been.
Elizabethâs sleight of hand was to renew the monarchy quietly all the while, and King Charlesâs hardest task will be to renew it further. The prospect is daunting, but entirely possible. My money is on the monarchy.
Anyway, this is by no means a definitive listing of books or other kinds of resources such as online resources. But I hope I can give you the flavour of the terrain of how and why monarchies continue to persist but also thrive in today's democratic environment.
Understanding Delhi's Status: Union Territory or State?
The status of Delhi has been a subject of confusion for many. Is it a Union Territory or a State? This blog seeks to provide an in-depth analysis of Delhi's status, its unique constitutional position, and the implications of its current status.