#consequentialist ethics

@mycupofstars: A wash

"Normative ethics is concerned with principles of morality. This branch itself can be divide into various sub-branches (and in various ways): 

consequentialist theories,

deontological theories, and

virtue-based theories.

A consequentialist theory says that an action is morally permissible if and only if it maximizes overall goodness (relative to its alternatives). Consequentialist theories are specified according to what they take to be (intrinsically) good. For example, classical utilitarians considered intrinsic goodness to be happiness/pleasure. Modern utilitarians, on the other hand, define goodness in terms of things like preference-satisfaction, or even well-being. Other kinds of consequentialists will consider less subjective criteria for goodness. But, setting aside the issue of what constitutes goodness, there is a rhetorical argument supporting consequentialist theories:  How could it ever be wrong to do what’s best overall?  (I take this straight from Robert N. Johnson.)  Although intuitively the answer is that it couldn’t be wrong to do what’s best overall, there are a plentitude of purported counterexamples to consequentialism on this point – on what might be called “the maximizing component” of consequentialism. For example, consider the Transplant Problem, in which the only way to save five dying people is by killing one person for organ transplantation to the five. Such counterexamples draw upon another kind of normative/ethical theory – namely, deontological theory. Such theories either place rights or duties as fundamental to morality. The idea is that there are certain constraints placed against persons/agents in maximizing overall goodness. One is not morally permitted to save five lives by cutting up another person for organ transplantation because the one person has a right against any person to be treated in this way. Similarly, there is a duty for all people to make sure that they do not treat others in a way that merely makes them a means to the end of maximizing overall goodness, whatever that may be.

Finally, we have virtue theories. Such theories are motivated by the idea that what’s fundamental to morality is not what one ought to do, but rather what one ought to be. But given that we live in a world of action, of doing, the question of what one ought to do creeps up. Therefore, according to such theories, what one ought to do is what the ideally virtuous person would do. What should I do?  Well, suppose I’ve become the kind of person I want to be. Then whatever I do from there is what I should do now. This theory is initially appealing, but nevertheless, there are lots of problems with it, and we cannot get into them for an article like this."

A situation where I can only save a pet or a stranger? There's a lot that would go into my decision, albeit it all will make me sound like a terrible person.

Is anyone else around? If no one is around, I may be more prompted to save my pet. It would cause other humans some sadness, anger, or frustration to know that the stranger could have been saved (more so if it is family/friends of the stranger), it would be better off them thinking that they had no chance of survival (plus, they would not take their anger and frustration out on me, but that's a sideline issue). But, why would I think of saving the pet over the human in the first place? Well:

Can I get a clear view of the stranger to judge their character? Although I'm not a perfect and unbiased source of judgement, if I can clearly see this stranger is a damaging being, then it would be wrong for me to save them. I could be saving a rapist, a murderer, an abuser. But if I save a cat or dog, I'm just saving an innocent animal. It's consequence of my actions - how much comes out of saving a human vs. saving an animal? To be honest, there is more negative potential in saving a human, but there could also perhaps be more positive potential. They could be a charity worker, a pro-bono lawyer working for the mentally handicapped, a surgeon about to save 3 lives tomorrow... Any sort of judgement I can make on the stranger is going to influence my choice. 

Are we in a situation where the human animal would suffer more than the non-human animal?

1. Nietzsche was not "anti" vegetarianism, he merely lived and abided by a system which did not give rights to animals. And as much as I like Nietzsche as a figure in philosophy, some of the stuff he said was pretty loony. Nietzsche was brought up devout Christian and believed that the body was filthy and evil, then he began to believe that the body was wonderful. He first thought that people could overcome cowardice, but then denied this. It's easy to say that Nietzsche doesn't have "one opinion" on any matter - he would never even ascribe himself to one philosophical view.

Nietzsche was, evidently, quite anti-women in many texts, but you can also say that this was a product of his time: he believed, like many others, that women couldn't comprehend deeper things, that they only care about what men do, that they are meant to be "playthings" for men. 

I wouldn't exactly agree with Nietzsche on many levels. 

2. If you have paid for the animals to die, then that is your action. You are responsible for paying for their deaths. That is a direct consequence of your action - in order to eat an animal, the individual knows it must be killed. You do not have to extend your actions to every single third and fourth consequence, because they are out of your control. The existentialist deals with what is immediately within one's control - that said, choosing to eat animal products is absolutely directly in one's control, and it is our choices which shape our being.