Given that you are more knowledgeable than me in these matters, how problematic adopting a child during the Napoleonic Era was? And let's say, a child was born from a secret affair, what would have happened if it was discovered? What kind of issues the wife and the child would have encountered? Lastly, how hard would have been for the real biological father to adopt their child, after the death of the supposed father?
Feel free to contradict me if I say anything nonsensical; once again, Iâm not infallible.
The short answer: I have no idea about adoption. During napoleonic era if the wife were caught in flagrante delicto with an adulterous child, the husband could, in addition to requesting a divorce, have the wife imprisoned, and itâs possible that the court would grant the husbandâs request since adultery for a women is punishable by a prison sentence while the husband will only be entitled to a fine . (This is why I think that Jacques-Marie Botot, despite becoming bitter towards Sophie, the widow Momoro, according to some sources, because he fell from disgrace during napoleonic era, still had enough decency to let her go with her lover and not cause her trouble. The fact that she had a child by her lover and was not pursued by the police might be why Botot never mentioned in his records that he had divorced his wife, among other things but like I said before it was not the villain Sophie or the villain Jacques-Marie, I think the wrongs were shared). The child would have lost much of their inheritance.
Well, the third response is very complicated, as youâll see in the long answer Iâm about to give. But yes, the father can acknowledge his child, although there are several obstacles and issues with that, even though he will have certain prerogatives.
By the way, for some courts under Bonaparte, there was an estimation that children from adulterous relationships were considered "monstrosities in the social order" and a "real calamity for morals," according to the terms of the tribune Lahary. This shows how much this weighed on their shoulders.
Warning: I will discuss the rights of natural children during the Revolution before addressing Bonaparte
Napoleon once said, "Society has no interest in recognizing bastards," and he ordered this in the Civil Code. During the Revolution, some revolutionaries fought to ensure equality between illegitimate and legitimate children. Speaking of Prieur (since this is the origin of the questionđ due to my comment about his goddaughter/daughter in your excellent post ), an interesting point about the city of Dijon is that some of cahiers de dolĂ©ances, such as those from the Third Estate of Dijon, expressed the desire to improve the conditions (of natural children) so that they would be useful to the state. Others, like those from certain communities of Aix, demanded that they be granted civil and political existence. These demands were realized early in the Revolution: the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen abolished "bastardy," and the law of 12 Brumaire, Year II (1793), granted natural children the same inheritance rights as legitimate children.
On June 4, 1793, CambacérÚs, on behalf of the Committee of Legislation, presented a draft decree aimed at granting rights to natural children. In his speech to the Convention, he emphasized the importance of restoring equality that had been destroyed by the old law, asserting that the Convention must "restore the rights to natural children that had been so unjustly taken from them." However, it should be noted that not all revolutionaries agreed on granting rights to natural children.
CambacérÚs' draft decree was part of a political will to grant all citizens, including children, their civil rights, regardless of age, gender, or status. This marked a significant step forward, as it recognized rights for children, beings naturally dependent on adults, thus realizing the revolutionary principle that "all men are born free and equal in rights." This initiative fulfilled the promise of 1789.
The question of inheritance rights for natural children was first raised on September 20, 1792, by LĂ©onard Robin, who proposed that they inherit from their parents, though not on equal footing with legitimate children. This debate, centered on inheritance, concerned not only the rights of natural children but also those of their mother and the restrictions imposed by the presumed father.
However, the initial decree by the Committee of Legislation did not go as far. It granted natural children inheritance rights from their father, but with restrictions: if legitimate children existed, they should not be disadvantaged. In 1793, a proposal was made to eliminate the term "bastard," a term seen as insulting, replacing it with "natural child."
LĂ©onard Robin's proposal, on the other hand, went further by granting mothers the exclusive right to designate a father for their child, believing that women were the only ones who could judge paternity. This position sought to protect mothers from the abuses of men trying to claim the inheritance of a child born out of wedlock, particularly those trying to claim a significant inheritance.
However, in August 1793, CambacérÚs' new draft rejected the possibility of paternity investigations. This draft prioritized the rights of the father, allowing him to choose whether or not to recognize his natural child, without the mother being able to force recognition. This was based on the idea that paternal recognition should be the free will of the man, not an obligation imposed by the law.
The reasons for this restriction were mainly economic: once natural children had the same rights as legitimate ones, recognition of paternity had significant consequences, especially regarding inheritance and family name. As a result, fathers now had the right to choose whether or not to recognize a child and include them in their family, while mothers remained solely responsible for the child.
Berlier, a member of the Committee of Legislation, justified this position by stating that the mother alone was responsible for the situation of her natural child, as she had not secured a "paternal status" beforehand, meaning a marriage contract. Although Berlier was sympathetic to the suffering of natural children and their mothers under the Ancien RĂ©gime, he believed that paternity recognition should remain a father's right to prevent abuses and fraud. He also highlighted the practical and economic consequences of recognition: once a natural child was recognized, they were entitled to a share of the inheritance, which represented a significant "cost" to the father. (This once again shows the limits of revolutionary ideas, and I say this without bashing).
As an example, historian Suzanne Desan, after studying the decisions of the Committee of Legislation and the Court of Cassation between 1794 and 1804, shows that the few natural children whose cases were examined by the authorities were systematically deprived of their rights. Provincial courts strictly applied the law of 12 Brumaire, making it very difficult to recognize paternity. For instance, a 40-year-old woman, Marie-Catherine Dampville, tried to prove her paternity with her deceased father by producing a baptismal certificate and witnesses, but these were deemed insufficient. The law now required more rigorous written proof, such as a marriage promise or demonstration of "continuous care," which she could not provide.
Now letâs return to the subject of Bonaparte, the Civil Code, and the rights of natural children.
Aside from the phrase he said about natural children (it is worth noting that he used the term "bastards," a word considered insulting by the revolutionaries who tried to erase it by using the term "natural children"), here is what Bonaparte said: "As soon as there is a possibility that the child might be the husband's, the legislator must turn a blind eye." But he also says, "There must be a fixed rule to remove all doubts," Napoleon Bonaparte continues. "It is said that this is against morality. No; because if the absolute principle were not adopted, the woman would say to her husband: 'Why do you want to limit my freedom? If you suspect my virtue, you can prove that the child is not yours.' This must not be tolerated. The husband must have absolute power and the right to tell his wife: 'Madam, you will not go out, you will not go to the theater, you will not see such and such a person; because the children you bear will be mine.'"
Now, the legal articles: "A child conceived during the marriage has the husband as its father. The law does not accept exceptions to this paternity, neither the wifeâs adultery nor the husband's natural or accidental impotence." The Civil Code, through principles like the wifeâs obedience and her obligation to follow her husband, as well as harsher penalties for female adultery, tends to limit women's rights. Paternity presumption and the prohibition of questioning paternity are in effect.
The evolution of paternal rights in France, particularly through the laws of Year II and the 1804 Civil Code, highlights that these laws, which were supposed to offer more rights to natural children, actually reinforced the rights of fathers to the detriment of unmarried mothers and their children. Historians have identified a conflict between equality among children, regardless of their origin, and the father's liberty, with the father generally holding dominion.
Despite these inequalities, the laws of Year II are sometimes considered a precursor to modern fatherhood, emphasizing paternal will rather than biological reality. The 1804 Civil Code, with its presumption of paternity, perpetuated this logic, allowing the father to assert his paternity regardless of biological truth. This legislation, while emphasizing the appearance of a legal union, also strengthened the surveillance of women by their husbands, particularly to prevent non-biological children from being attributed to a father.
Natural children, born out of wedlock, do not have the same inheritance rights as legitimate children and are excluded from their parents' inheritance unless they are legally recognized. The legislation emphasizes social stability and the preservation of public order through the family, which is seen as a foundational pillar of society. The Civil Code reinforces the authority of the father within the family, aiming to restore the order disturbed by the excesses of the Revolution.
In summary: The legitimization of natural children through the marriage of their parents is allowed, which enables them to acquire the same rights as legitimate children. However, this legitimization assumes that the parents intended to marry at the time of the childâs birth, which is seen as a means to preserve moral and social order. In contrast, children born of adultery or incest are excluded from any form of legitimization and cannot benefit from family-related rights, as their situation is judged to be too contrary to social order.
In short, the 1804 legislation, while granting some possibilities for reintegration for natural children, primarily seeks to maintain social stability and paternal authority, emphasizing the clear distinction between legitimate and natural children.
Although legitimate children, born within marriage, benefit from full inheritance rights, natural children cannot claim total equality. Their share of inheritance depends on several factors, including the presence of legitimate children or ascendants, and is generally less than that of legitimate children. The 1804 legislation provided specific rules for natural children: in the presence of legitimate children, their share of the inheritance is reduced to one-third of what they would have received if they were legitimate. If the parents have no legitimate descendants or ascendants, their share is larger, up to half of the estate. Some proposals from appellate courts, such as from the Tribunals of Grenoble or Brussels, suggested increasing this share in certain cases, especially if the natural child was the sole heir or if the parents had no legitimate children.
Overall, the 1804 Civil Code recognizes a right to inheritance for natural children, but this right is limited compared to that of legitimate children. This solution aimed to strike a balance between fairness for natural children and the preservation of social order, which favored legitimate families.
Some courts contested a provision of the 1804 Civil Code that limited the inheritance share of natural children, even when they had already received a significant portion of their parents' estate during their lifetime. The Lyon and Bourges Tribunals considered this restriction unjust, as it added an additional inequality to natural children, already deprived of the benefits of legitimacy. Moreover, the legislation prevented parents from making donations or wills in favor of their natural children without reducing their inheritance share, which was also deemed unfair. Some courts called for the advance payment of succession liquidation costs by the heir, so as not to penalize natural children, who were often in precarious situations.
Some lawmakers in 1804 addressed the issue of children born of adultery and incest. Although considered a "monstrosity" and a "calamity for morals" by some, lawmakers felt that these children should not be left in poverty. Figures like Chabot de l'Allier and SimĂ©on insisted that, despite their disapproved birth, these children remained human and deserved pity and support. However, the framers of the 1804 Code did not recognize the rights of adulterine or incestuous children on par with legitimate natural children. They were granted "aliments" (support), but these were strictly regulated and proportional to the parentsâ income and the number of legitimate children. Society was required to provide them with support to enable them to lead a useful life, but recognition of their right to a fair share of inheritance was excluded, except in cases of donations or wills that respected the hereditary reserve.
Portalis also stated about natural children, "They belong to no family, but to the State." He also said, "When children, whether natural or legitimate, reach adulthood, they become arbiters of their own destiny; their will suffices." Legislators acknowledged that both children born within marriage and natural children, as long as they had not reached adulthood, deserved protection, particularly in terms of marriage. Parental consent was deemed essential, not only for the public interest but also for the child's welfare, as marriage was seen as a fundamental institution for social and family order. However, natural children, being deprived of legitimate recognition, were considered differently. Some, like Defermon, believed that natural children should be free to dispose of their rights, particularly regarding marriage. However, others, such as Tronchet and Boulay, felt that these children, lacking stable family support, required special protection, especially in contractual matters and marriage. Thus, parental consent was required for minor natural children, and in the event of the parentsâ death, a guardian had to be appointed, preventing marriage before the age of 21 without such authorization.
Recognition of paternity was still in place. The father who recognized his natural child had rights over the child's education and, in particular, the right of correction: "The examples of parents, their exhortations, are not always sufficient means to keep certain children, who may have developed vices or bad inclinations, in line with duty: public authority then joins the paternal magistracy, but with precautions compatible with the familyâs interest." This is why natural children could not be excluded from measures aimed at overseeing their education and behavior. In particular, the father, whether legitimate or natural, had disciplinary power over his child, including in cases of delinquency. Thus, just as with legitimate children, natural children under the age of 16 could be arrested at the fatherâs request, by order of the district court president, and imprisoned for up to one month. For children aged 16 to adulthood, detention could be extended to six months, depending on the severity of the situation. This measure aimed to strengthen parental authority and maintain social order, giving fathers the power to control their children's behavior, even when those children were born out of wedlock.
However, don't forget one thing: if the father recognizes his adulterine child from a married couple, the child loses much of their inheritance. Furthermore, as we can see in the post, they are sometimes treated with various insults. So, itâs possible that some fathers may decide to care for them but not recognize them to avoid further problems.
Sources:
Mathilde LarrĂšre
Josée Bloquet
The Civil Code
