A temporary injunction provides urgent relief by stopping harmful actions before a full trial can resolve the underlying dispute. If you face a situation where ongoing activities threaten irreparable damage, you can apply for this court order. Below is a comprehensive guide to help you navigate the process, complete with practical steps, legal standards, and recent case examples from…

If the property is found to be Joint Hindu Family Property, any sale of a specific piece of land without partition is impermissible.

The case involves a dispute over land that was purchased by the petitioners.

The petitioners filed this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to challenge the temporary injunction orders passed by the 9th Civil Judge Junior Division and the order was affirmed by the 4th District Judge, Rewa. The injunction restrained the petitioners from raising construction on the land they purchased.

The respondents had filed a suit in 2012 seeking a declaration of title, partition, and injunction, along with challenging the validity of Wills and Sale Deeds related to the disputed property.

Ahmad Khan & Others v. Bhaskar D Datt & Others

Misc. Pet. 4060/2023

Before HC of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur

Heard by Hon'ble Mr. Justice G S Ahluwaia J

Legal Issue

Whether the temporary injunction issued by the lower courts was justified, particularly when the sale deeds were executed during a period when no injunction was in force, and whether Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act applies to these sale deeds executed during the pendency of the suit.

Argument of the parties

Petitioners submission: Argued that since the sale deeds were executed during a time when no temporary injunction was in force, they should not be restrained from constructing on the land. They also contended that the purchasers (petitioners) were bona fide buyers, and the injunction causes irreparable loss.

Respondents Submission: Claimed that the disputed property is ancestral and has not been partitioned, so the sale deeds executed by defendants were invalid. They argued that the land could not be alienated without partition, and the injunction was necessary to preserve the status quo.

Court's Observation

The Court observed that under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, any sale deed executed during the pendency of a suit does not become void but is subject to the final outcome of the suit. The Court also noted that if the property is found to be Joint Hindu Family Property, any sale of a specific piece of land without partition is not permissible. Therefore, the lower courts' temporary injunction was appropriate to prevent potential irreparable harm.

Order:

The petition was dismissed by the High Court, the Court didn't found any jurisdictional error in the orders passed by the trial and appellate courts. The temporary injunction order restraining the petitioners from raising construction was upheld.

Trump gets a temporary restraining order on his niece's "tell all" book (but I don't think it's going to last). #SorryAmerica #NotMyPresident

Various media outlets reported yesterday that the Trump family managed (in their second attempt) to get a temporary restraining order against Mary L. Trump relative to the publication of her “tell all” book.

Summarizing briefly:

Mary L. Trump is the daughter of Fred Trump Jr. (Donald’s elder brother), who passed away…

by Robert Clore

Clore Appeals & Litigation Support  [email protected]

1.  Temporary Injunctions and the Appointment of Receivers.

In re Benson, No. 04-15-00087-CV, __ S.W.3d __ (Tex. App.—San Antonio, Sept. 2, 2015, no pet. h.).

Author:                              Barnard, Justice.

Panel:                               Angelini, J., Barnard, J., Martinez, J.

Originating Court:             Probate Court No. 2, Bexar County. 

Trial Judge:                      Rickoff, J.

This case involves the fortune of 88-year-old billionaire Tom Benson, owner of the New Orleans Saints and Pelicans.  Tom’s daughter, Renee Benson, is the remainder beneficiary of a trust established by Shirley Benson, Tom’s deceased first wife.  Tom is the trustee. 

The trust’s considerable assets include a non-controlling interest in Bensco, Inc., a ninety-seven percent interest in Lone Star Capital Bank, a ninety-nine percent interest in Uptown Blanco, Ltd., real estate interests in Texas and Louisiana, and several million dollars in cash. According to Renee, Tom’s behavior changed dramatically in 2014, and their relationship became estranged.  Renee alleges that Tom breached his obligations as trustee in his handling of trust assets, including withdrawing $25 million dollars--$4.76 million of which belonged to the trust—from Lone Star Capital Bank.  Renee filed suit, seeking to have Tom removed as trustee. 

The probate court entered a temporary injunction enjoining Tom from acting as trustee and appointing temporary co-receivers (one of whom is former Chief Justice Phil Hardberger) over the trust assets. The court of appeals dissolved the temporary injunction based on its failure to articulate, except in conclusory fashion, the reasons Renee will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted.  See Tex. R. Civ. P. 683.  The order simply states, “Petitioner [Renee] will have no adequate remedy at law, and the Petitioner will be irreparably harmed.”  As the court explained, simply stating a party “will suffer irreparable harm” does not satisfy Rule 683’s specificity requirement.  AutoNation, Inc. v. Hatfield, 186 S.W.3d 576, 582 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). Although an addendum to the order explains injuries to the trust, it does not explain how Renee, the applicant for temporary injunction, will suffer harm, nor why injury will result to her in the absence of an injunction. 

The court of appeals affirmed the probate court’s appointment of temporary co-receivers.  The court found some evidence that Tom committed a breach of his fiduciary duty and therefore a breach of trust in his handling of trust assets.  According to the court of appeals, “Tom’s abrupt severance of all communications with the Trust beneficiaries, his undisclosed transfer of funds that could have negatively impacted the market value of Lone Star Capital Bank—a Trust asset, his unexplained attempts to fire members of the Bank’s board—including long-time business associates, and his concealment of the Trust bookkeeper from the Trust beneficiaries constitute some evidence of actions a person of ordinary prudence and discretion would not take when managing his own affairs.”

The court rejected the argument that in order to obtain appointment of receivers, Rene was required to show, in equity, that she suffered irreparable harm or that less invasive equitable remedies would be inadequate.  Because the probate court appointed receivers pursuant to Tex. Prop. Code § 114.008(a)(5), and not based on equity, there was no requirement that Renee show irreparable harm or lack of another remedy.  Accordingly, the probate court did not abuse its discretion in appointing the receivers.   

OPINION     APPELLANT'S BRIEF    APPELLEE'S BRIEF   

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

2. Orders Granting Permissive Interlocutory Appeals Must State Why the Appeal May Materially Advance the Ultimate Termination of Litigation.

In re Marshall, No. 04-15-00521-CV (Tex. App.—San Antonio, Sept. 9, 2015, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).

Author:                             Per Curiam

. Panel:                            Alvarez, J., Chapa, J., Pulliam, J.

Originating Court:            Probate Court No. 1, Bexar County, Texas.

Trial Judge:                     Cross, J. 

Beginning in 2011, the Texas Legislature authorized permissive interlocutory appeals where a trial court signs an order permitting an appeal.  Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(d).  The order appealed must “involve a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion[.]”  Id at § 51.014(d)(1).  Further, the statute requires that “an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.”  Id. at § 51.014(d)(2).

Here, the 4th Court of Appeals denied a petition for permissive appeal from an order granting the motion respondents’ motion for summary judgment and denying the petitioner’s competing motion for summary judgment.  The court of appeals rejected the permissive appeal because “the trial court’s order granting permission to appeal does not ‘state why an immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.’”  Accordingly, the court of appeals determined that the requirements for a permissive appeal were not met, denied the petition, and remanded the cause to the trial court.