#suezcrisis

Britain and the Suez Canal: 75 Years of Colonialism & Crisis

The Suez Canal in Egypt, which links the Mediterranean to the Red Sea, was taken over by the British in 1882 and was only reluctantly released 75 years later. The seizure in the 19th century caused an international furore every bit as damaging to Britain's reputation as the more famous Suez Crisis of the mid-20th century. Successive British governments regarded the canal as a vital strategic link between the home country and the British Empire, particularly India. Held on through two world wars, the British were eventually obliged to withdraw when Egypt was taken over by the nationalist leader Gamal Abdel Nasser and by the rejection of the Anglo-French-Israeli military intervention in 1956 by both the United States and the United Nations.

Crossing the Isthmus

The purpose of an artificial waterway to join the Mediterranean to the Red Sea, an idea that was first entertained in antiquity, was that ships could reduce their sailing time between Europe and Asia by avoiding the long route around the Cape of Good Hope in Southern Africa. This shortcut would save around 3,000 sea miles of travel from, for example, London to Bombay (now Mumbai). In addition, a canal here would allow East African states to more easily send goods to Europe and vice versa.

From the 1840s, an overland route for travellers and trade goods was organised across the isthmus of Suez. This was first developed by the British officer Lieutenant Waghorn. People and goods took a ship to Alexandria on the Mediterranean coast, disembarked and crossed down to Suez using river boats and animal transport like camels, and then boarded another ship on the Red Sea coast to continue their voyage. This was a rather cumbersome arrangement and not suitable for heavier cargo, but it did save four weeks of travel compared to the Cape route. The land crossing was improved somewhat in the 1850s by the construction of a railway from Alexandria to Cairo by no less a figure than George Stephenson (1781-1848), who had built the world's first passenger-carrying steam train. Obviously, a waterway that permitted the same ship to perform both legs of the journey and carry cargo of any kind would be a tremendous advantage.

The Suez Canal was built by a private French company, the Compagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez, from 1859, cutting through the isthmus of Suez. The Egyptian government leased the land for 99 years and took around 45% of the canal company's shares. Curiously, the British were against the project since they were paranoid that a rival power could seize control of the canal and block British use, or even use the canal to attack British colonial possessions elsewhere. They were also very doubtful that such a canal could even be built. The project was envisaged and then supervised by the rather more imaginative and technically skilled French engineer Ferdinand de Lesseps (1805-1894) using Egyptian labour. Fortunately, the largely flat and sandy terrain was not too difficult to excavate, and no locks were needed. The canal, around 100 miles (160 km) in length, was completed in 1869 and opened in a lavish ceremony on 17 November.

The Suez Canal was a great success, helped along by the coincidental invention of steamships, which were capable of carrying far more cargo than sailing vessels and which did not struggle in the difficult sailing conditions of the Red Sea. As sailing ships still made up 90% of the British merchant fleet, then the world's largest, the Cape of Good Hope route still thrived despite the canal. As time went on, though, and steam steadily replaced sail, the canal's traffic would grow significantly. In its first full year of service, the canal gave passage to around 436,000 tons of shipping; a decade later, this had rocketed to over 5 million tons. In 1910, over 16 million tons of shipping passed through the canal. The importance of the canal to both Britain and France was reflected in the permanent presence of their advisors within the Egyptian government.

Read More

As a British nationalist, I must confront an uncomfortable truth: the Suez Crisis 1956 was a watershed moment when Britain, once the world’s preeminent power, faced the harsh reality of its diminished global standing. That fateful period saw Britain falter on the world stage and lose much of its grip on the illusion of imperial dominance.

The Crisis Unfolds

On July 26, 1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal, previously owned and operated by the Suez Canal Company, a Franco-British enterprise. For Britain, the canal was more than a strategic asset—it was a lifeline to the Empire, connecting Europe to vital colonies and oil supplies in the Middle East. Nasser’s bold move was perceived as a direct challenge to British authority.

The ensuing weeks were marked by diplomatic wrangling, covert planning, and military posturing. Prime Minister Anthony Eden, a staunch believer in Britain’s imperial legacy, saw Nasser’s actions as intolerable. Alongside France and Israel, Britain hatched a plan to regain control of the canal. The strategy was clear: Israel would invade the Sinai Peninsula, and Britain and France would intervene under the guise of peacekeeping, seizing control of the canal in the process.

The Illusion of Power

On October 29, 1956, the plan was set into motion. Israeli forces attacked the Sinai, and Britain and France issued ultimatums, which Nasser predictably rejected. Airstrikes and landings followed, but instead of showcasing British strength, the intervention highlighted its vulnerabilities.

The United States, under President Eisenhower, condemned the operation. Eisenhower, wary of Soviet exploitation of the crisis amidst the Cold War, pressured Britain and its allies to withdraw. The financial strain of the operation compounded the issue. Facing a collapsing pound and a lack of American support, Britain had no choice but to abandon the campaign. By March 1957, British troops had withdrawn.

A Humbling Defeat

The Suez Crisis was not just a military setback; it was a blow to Britain’s pride and prestige. For centuries, Britain had projected an image of unassailable authority. The events of 1956 shattered that illusion. The country was forced to reckon with a new world order where the United States and the Soviet Union held the reins of power, relegating Britain to the status of a secondary player.

For Eden, the crisis marked the end of his political career, his reputation was irreparably damaged. For Britain, it signalled the twilight of the empire. The humiliation at Suez accelerated decolonization, with countries in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean pushing harder for independence.

Reflections on What Was Lost

As a nationalist, it is painful to look back on Suez and not feel a sense of loss—loss of influence, loss of unity, and loss of the boldness that once defined our nation. The crisis underscored how much had changed since the days of Victoria’s empire. It revealed the cracks in the foundation of British power, forcing us to confront the limitations of our ambitions.

Yet, amidst the gloom, there is a lesson. The Suez Crisis, while a defeat, should remind us of Britain’s capacity for reinvention. From the ashes of empire, the country forged a new path, albeit a humbler one, grounded in soft power, diplomacy, and economic resilience.