Why VCs Invest: Three Ingredients
VC firms like Spark see thousands of deals a year and only invest in 10-15. What makes us pull the trigger?Â
Every investor is different, and people can get excited about wildly different companies. However, I believe you can boil down almost any venture investment thesis into three basic ingredients. This isn’t rocket science, but hopefully provides a simple window into how we think about things on this side of the table.Â
1. Could this have a huge impact?
Imagination around what could be “huge” is a VC’s secret sauce. Spark happens to be a firm that’s very product and team-focused: we invest in high-performing teams building beautiful products we believe will capture the imagination of the world. Most VC firms are highly focused on business model and market, carefully analyzing a company's unit economics and the total addressable market for a new product or service before committing capital. We do this too, especially at the growth stage, but we also invest in companies creating completely new product categories, like Oculus. When Spark invested in Twitter, we had no idea how big the “market” was, but we believed that the product and team had the potential to change the way that people communicate globally. (To be clear — I had nothing to do with either of these investments and hadn’t yet joined the firm.)Â
When we make an investment, we’re about to get married to a founding team for what could be a decade. We take this commitment seriously and think critically about the team’s ability to shoot for the stars and push through the hardest times because of the passion they have for their product. That's why we have backed some founders in our portfolio multiple times: we trust them and know that they are thinking big.Â
From a financial perspective, discipline around only investing in companies that could be huge is probably the most important feature of a venture firm. For a $450M fund like ours to meet LP expectations, it needs to contain multiple exits in the $B range, or at least one big multi-$B outcome. (1)Â
2. Could this company have a sustainable competitive advantage at scale?
Most businesses don’t fall into this camp, but venture investments need to. Businesses that could be huge in theory but have no competitive advantage at scale are difficult to invest in as a venture firm, as they are easily displaced over the 10-year investment horizon of our deals. The ideal is to invest in a company that could be winner-take-all in its category.Â
Oftentimes, for internet companies this advantage has to do with network effects — for example, the “strong” network effects of a communication platform (e.g. Kik, Whatsapp, Snapchat), where users pull other users onto a platform because it’s necessary for their product experience, or the “weak” network effects of a marketplace (e.g. Kitchensurfing, Uber), where increased supply drives increased demand and vice-versa. For enterprise software businesses, the moat is often based on platform / data lock-in (e.g. SurveyMonkey, eShares). Sometimes, you get all three (e.g. Slack: a communication tool, app marketplace, and system of record for collaboration). (2)Â
3. Does this business have substantial barriers to entry?
Operationally complex businesses or ones that rely on IP have the advantage of keeping out hordes of copycats and newcomers. This isn’t a necessary condition, and only provides a short-to-medium-term advantage. However, barriers help us to believe that we’re picking the right horse in the race in a potential winner-take-all category (see #2) where a long-term sustainable competitive advantage can be built. Postmates is an example of a logistically complicated business where only a few competitors have achieved any scale in the US. Freight Farms has substantial IP around its vertical farm technology and produce growing techniques, which gives it a leg up on the competition in building a distributed food production network. Biotechnology firms invest in companies that go through the FDA process, a harrowing ordeal and huge barrier to entry. (3) Oftentimes, an unusually talented technical team or one with a substantial “unfair advantage” (relationships, etc.) in their given industry creates an effective barrier and discourages would-be competitors. Palantir is a success story in this category.
Putting these three ingredients together, you have the recipe for an enormous outcome. With a huge business opportunity, the potential for a long-term competitive advantage at scale, and barriers for newcomers, there’s the chance for a truly defensible category-leader to break out. Companies like this are career-defining investments and are the ones that drive outsized returns in venture capital.
Ultimately VCs are human, and venture capital is a human business. We care about these three ingredients, but we also invest with our heart. When we can really see a founder in his or her product and know that the passion runs deep, that’s what helps us to become believers. Out of the thousands of teams we encounter each year at Spark, the 10-15 we back are the ones that win both our minds and our hearts.
Thanks to Andrew Parker, Ryan Shmeizer, Danya Cheskis-Gold, and Christina Phillips for helping me to edit and think through this piece.
(1) Some quick VC math on this, which is applicable to funds of our size/stage at Spark: Limited partners are looking for 3x+ returns over 10 years when they invest in a VC firm. VCs who lead early-stage deals like Spark own roughly 15% of a company when it exits. Therefore, each $1B exit returns ~$150M to a VC fund. Most venture investments fail or merely return invested capital, so only the companies that exit for many times our investment valuation drive performance. You can do the math on what the aggregate exits need to be for a fund like ours to return 3x+. It’s a lot.Â
(2)  I couldn’t be more excited about our recent investment in Slack, both as an avid user and for these more intellectual reasons.
(3) Traditional biotechnology is not our focus at Spark, but I have nothing but admiration for the investors and entrepreneurs in this space. As this space becomes increasingly driven by software, we will continue exploring new opportunities.