#realrevwar

So as I mention here I recently started watching the American Revolutionary War drama Turn, which all things considered is pretty decent (and you know how high my standards are!). One issue I did have, however, was the close of episode 1 where Crown forces attempted to launch a surprise attack on what they believe is a rebel safehouse, and do so by wandering up during the middle of the day, stopping and firing two volley and then sauntering inside. I thought it'd be good to highlight an actual episode in the Revolution where such an incident occurred, except, of course, things went a lot differently. 

One cold evening in late September, 1778, a man rode into the British Army encampment at New Bridge, New Jersey. He was taken before Earl Charles Cornwallis, where he introduced himself as a loyal subject of King George III. He told the Earl that a troop of 116 men and officers of the 3rd Continental Light Dragoons, the best of the rebel cavalry fighting in the northern colonies, had settled in for the night in several barns near his own farmhouse a little off Overkill Road, less than twenty five miles away. When he had left, the rebels had still been there.

Cornwallis acted fast. He appointed his subordinate Charles Grey, along with the 33rd and 64th Foot and a composite battalion of Light Infantry and Grenadiers - a total of almost 700 men - to strike the rebels immediately, before they left the next day.

Grey was a rough-pelted bloodhound of an officer. A veteran of the Seven Years War, just a few weeks earlier he had savaged the rebel forces under "Mad" Anthony Wayne in a brutal night-time surprise attack at Paoli's Tavern. He planned to do the same to the Continental Dragoons at Overkill. 

Grey had earned the nickname "No Flints Grey" because he ordered his men to remove the flints from their muskets, making it impossible for them to fire. This forced them to get in close and rely on their bayonets, as well as ensuring nobody could discharge their weapon by accident and alert any unsuspecting enemies. Grey was a master of shock and terror tactics. 

Grey detached his twelve light infantry companies from his main force and sent them ahead as a flying column, led by their loyalist guide. On approaching the small hamlet of Overkill the light infantry were divided into two groups. One stalked the patrol protecting the encampment and, in the darkness, silently killed them. With the piquets dead, the other half of the column crept silently in among the buildings. 

In the darkness they went from house to house, putting their bayonets to use on the sleeping rebels. By the time any of the dragoons realised what was happening most of them were already prisoners or dead. The commander of the dragoons, along with his second, tried to escape the farm they found themselves cornered in by climbing its chimney. Both men were shot down and one stabbed in the lungs. 

The deadly efficiency of the attackers was made manifest in the accounts of the rebels who survived the assault. Southward Cullency, one of the dragoons, spoke of how he heard a British captain ask "his Men how many of the Rebels were, actually, Dead; and, on being told the number, he order'd all the rest to be knock'd on the head [killed]." Cullency himself is recorded among pension records as having suffered twelve wounds in the attack. Two other dragoons, Julian King and George Willis, spoke of how, when asked by his men what to do with the rebel prisoners, a British officer "returned for an answer, that they were to kill every one of them." Thomas Benson, another witness, mentioned that one British captain "had ordered them to stab all, and take no prisoners." 

This column comes to me from Lynn Robb via Facebook.

Three young and devastatingly handsome officers formed the nucleus of "Howe's Strolling Players" first in New York and then in Philadelphia when the British held it from September 1777 to June of 1778. Based on their portraits, Major John Andre, Coronet Lord William Schaw Cathcart and Captain Banastre Tarleton could have pulled crowds of swooning girls on any red carpet in Hollywood.

Andre led the troupe as director and set designer, and they took over the old Southwark playhouse on South street. Their motto was "We act Monday, Wednesday and Friday." Going by letters and diaries of well-to-do loyalist girls, the rest of the week they devoted themselves to chasing the ladies who proved not at all hard to get.

Their success was amazing, and the proceeds of "No One's Enemy but his Own" and "The Deuce is in Him" directed by John Andre and assisted by loyalist Captain Oliver De Lancey performed on January 14, 1778 were given to the widows and orphans of the army. For the backdrop Andre painted a waterfall in a forest glade. The women's parts were taken by local loyalist ladies and at least one professional actress.

A fellow officer who attended a performance on Monday, March 16, evidently thought it was below the dignity of a member of the peerage."...Play tonight "The Inconstant" and "The Letcher" pretty well done. Ld. Cathcart play's in both with more propriety in speech than in some of the parts chosen---ridiculous in a man of his rank and fashion to play the part of a Valet & suffer the ceremony of being kick'd."

Over the eight month period they put on fourteen plays including "Henry IV, part 1," "The Constant Couple," and "Duke or No Duke." They closed in May with "Douglas" and "The Citizen."

BRITISH ARMY COMBAT DOCTRINE DURING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION - MYTH AND REALITY

The image is a well-known one, reinforced by centuries of bad history and nationalistic nation-building. The American Revolution saw rifle-armed frontiersmen go up against the ruthless redcoats, sniping officers and decimating the densely packed red ranks, which swiftly fell into mindless confusion, were routed and, thus, eternally humbled.

The problem with such a narrative is that it simply isn't true. The British Army had already experienced the difficulties of irregular warfare in the colonies two decades earlier. When the Revolution began it already had dedicated light infantry companies, marksman training and combined arms units. 

Traditionally it has been said that the ability of British regulars to fire three shots a minute was the primary reason for their European battlefield victories, but they were unable to combat the colonists in their native woodlands. The Patriots certainly made excellent use of both terrain and artificial defences throughout the war, but this did not confound British generals, in fact the reverse is true. Even from the first major battle of the war, at Bunker Hill, British troops were ordered not to fire at the entrenched rebels, but to drive them off using their bayonets.The reason the initial attacks on the hill failed was down to the fact that the regulars, less experienced soldiers than the American militia, panicked and refused to charge, but blazed away ineffectively with their muskets.

Throughout the war the British came to rely almost solely on the use of bayonets. Many observers commented on the fear the rebels had for the weapon, which they viewed as savage and excessive.

A typical engagement would play out as follows - British troops would adopt open files, with as much as eighteen inches separating each man in the line. This was to assist with moving quickly through woods and difficult terrain, and to make the American sharpshooter's job of hitting them harder. As soon as they came under small arms fire, the line typically broke out into a brisk trot, approaching the enemy at speed and increasing the pressure on them, often accompanied by shouts and huzzahs. They would either halt briefly to fire a single volley, or simply keep on going and break out into a bayonet charge. At several battles, such as Paoli's Tavern and Overkill Road, the rank and file were actually ordered to remove the flints from their muskets, making them impossible to fire and forcing them to rely on their bayonets. 

The loose formations used by the redcoats meant that they were as quick and maneuverable as their foes, but this came with a price. A loose line was less able to withstand sudden shocks, like a fully formed battalion of Continental infantry, or an unexpected (and rare) bayonet counter-attack. After being smashed at Cowpens, British officers complained their their leader, Banastre Tarleton, had relied too much on the loose, open files during the battle, which had ultimately led to their men becoming scattered and overwhelmed. Regimental flags and colours were also only rarely carried into battle, partly because they were impractical in woodland, and partly because they were difficult to defend when the men were so spread out.