#philosophy problem

I’m currently working on my writing sample for MA philosophy graduate program admission, due within a few days.             In my essay I’ve made certain claims, and it was pointed out the claims I’ve made are flawed, so I’m now backed into a corner, and either must revise my claim, or find a crack that I can exploit. I will explain some background, then my claim, and its weakness, moving into some possible resolutions.

           Descartes uses his dualism theory to explain what he characterizes as the “passions” - what we call emotions (passions are emotions). He says that the passions cause us sensations by agitating the soul - the part of us which the mind is contained in. So we feel emotions by the movement of our soul. There are two sources of a passion - external objects, which are material; and the soul itself - which is immaterial. External objects are nonliving things which have the property of inciting our soul; it does this through our senses, causing spirits in the blood to move our pineal gland in a way to incite our soul. (I don’t support these claims- spirits in the blood are absurd, and the pineal gland is NOT the conduit to the soul; but this is the premises I accept and are a part of Descartes’ dualism theory. To use knowledge we now have that wasn’t accessible back then is not a proper way of arguing against a discarded theory). The second way to incite passions is in the soul itself - the soul self-causes itself to agitate passions. e.g: I think of a happy moment and feel the passion of joy.

           The pineal gland works by being affect by the spirits in the blood which have their effect by the nature of the material object which incited the passions e.g. a beautiful rose makes me feel joy or wonder by affecting the spirits in the blood through the senses. The spirits move particles in the pineal gland in a way which cause the soul to be agitate din a particular way, and this particular way causes a particular passion.

           The problem I see is that either the soul possess in its essence a property of self-causation which allows it to affect itself, or that the soul causes the pineal gland to incite the spirits in the blood, which can then affect the pineal gland to agitate the spirits. What happens is that a passion can be caused by two things: a material object (a rose) and the soul itself (a thought of a rose) - let’s suppose these two have the same effect (they incite the same passion). I notice that the things that cause the passions are different, they are two different efficient causes (efficient cause is the thing which begins the chain of causation - a painter is the efficient cause for a painting). One cause is an immaterial cause, and the other a material cause. 

          I claim that having two different efficient causes is, especially two radically distinct efficient causes, impossible. I base my argument on this. It was pointed out that a thing can have two efficient causes. e.g. wind can move an object, but I can also move this same object with my hand two efficient causes are the wind, and my hand for the movement of the object.

          I might be able to argue that there is no cause that is both material and immaterial, unless the efficient cause is god (god is immaterial, but is a special case of causation). The case of the wind and the hand use both material efficient causes. I can think of no causation arising from both material and immaterial efficient causes besides using god.