Margaret Thatcher: The Iron Lady of British Politics
Margaret Thatcher is one of the most liked and simultaneously hated figures in modern British history. She privatized state-owned companies, steadily increasing public participation in the economy, and transformed London from a manufacturing hub to a financial center, a trend that continues to this day. She prioritized individualism over collectivism. People should be able to stand on their own feet instead of relying on state aid, she believed. This was one of the factors that eroded the sense of solidarity in society. In southern England, she is seen more as a prime minister who modernized and enriched the country, but in northern England, Scotland, and Wales, she is remembered as someone who destroyed industry and disintegrated communities.
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â Margaret Thatcher: The Iron Lady of British Politics
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The US Federal Reserve has two imperatives: keeping employment high and inflation low. But when these come into conflictâââwhen unemployment falls to near-zeroâââthe Fed forgets all about full employment and cranks up interest rates to âcool the economyâ (that is, âto destroy jobs and increase unemploymentâ).
An economy âcools downâ when workers have less money, which means that the prices offered for goods and services go down, as fewer workers have less money to spend. As with every macroeconomic policy, raising interest rates has âdistributional effects,â which is economist-speak for âwinners and losers.â
Predicting who wins and who loses when interest rates go up requires that we understand the economic relations between different kinds of rich people, as well as relations between rich people and working people. Writing today for The American Prospectâs superb Great Inflation Myths series, Gerald Epstein and Aaron Medlin break it down:
Recall that the Fed has two priorities: full employment and low interest rates. But when it weighs these priorities, it does so through âfinance coloredâ glasses: as an institution, the Fed requires help from banks to carry out its policies, while Fed employees rely on those banks for cushy, high-paid jobs when they rotate out of public service.
Inflation is bad for banks, whose fortunes rise and fall based on the value of the interest payments they collect from debtors. When the value of the dollar declines, lenders lose and borrowers win. Think of it this way: say you borrow $10,000 to buy a car, at a moment when $10k is two monthsâ wages for the average US worker. Then inflation hits: prices go up, workers demand higher pay to keep pace, and a couple years later, $10k is one monthâs wages.
If your wages kept pace with inflation, youâre now getting twice as many dollars as you were when you took out the loan. Donât get too excited: these dollars buy the same quantity of goods as your pre-inflation salary. However, the share of your income thatâs eaten by that monthly car-loan payment has been cut in half. You just got a real-terms 50% discount on your car loan!
Inflation is great news for borrowers, bad news for lenders, and any given financial institution is more likely to be a lender than a borrower. The finance sector is the creditor sector, and the Fed is institutionally and personally loyal to the finance sector. When creditors and debtors have opposing interests, the Fed helps creditors win.
The US is a debtor nation. Not the national debtâââfederal debt and deficits are just scorekeeping. The US government spends money into existence and taxes it out of existence, every single day. If the USG has a deficit, that means it spent more than than it taxed, which is another way of saying that it left more dollars in the economy this year than it took out of it. If the US runs a âbalanced budget,â then every dollar that was created this year was matched by another dollar that was annihilated. If the US runs a âsurplus,â then there are fewer dollars left for us to use than there were at the start of the year.
The US debt that matters isnât the federal debt, itâs the private sectorâs debt. Your debt and mine. We are a debtor nation. Half of Americans have less than $400 in the bank.
Most Americans have little to no retirement savings. Decades of wage stagnation has left Americans with less buying power, and the economy has been running on consumer debt for a generation. Meanwhile, working Americans have been burdened with forms of inflation the Fed doesnât give a shit about, like skyrocketing costs for housing and higher education.
When politicians jawbone about âinflation,â theyâre talking about the inflation that matters to creditors. Debtorsâââthe bottom 90%âââhave been burdened with three decadesâ worth of steadily mounting inflation that no one talks about. Yesterday, the Prospect ran Nancy Folbreâs outstanding piece on âcare inflationââââthe skyrocketing costs of day-care, nursing homes, eldercare, etc:
As Folbre wrote, these costs are doubly burdensome, because they fall on family members (almost entirely women), who have to sacrifice their own earning potential to care for children, or aging people, or disabled family members. The cost of care has increased every year since 1997:
So while politicians and economists talk about rescuing âsaversâ from having their nest-eggs whittled away by inflation, these savers represent a minuscule and dwindling proportion of the public. The real beneficiaries of interest rate hikes isnât savers, itâs lenders.
Full employment is bad for the wealthy. When everyone has a job, wages go up, because bosses canât threaten workers with âexile to the reserve army of the unemployed.â If workers are afraid of ending up jobless and homeless, then executives seeking to increase their own firmsâ profits can shift money from workers to shareholders without their workers quitting (and if the workers do quit, there are plenty more desperate for their jobs).
Whatâs more, those same executives own huge portfolios of âfinancializedâ assetsâââthat is, they own claims on the interest payments that borrowers in the economy pay to creditors.
The purpose of raising interest rates is to âcool the economy,â a euphemism for increasing unemployment and reducing wages. Fighting inflation helps creditors and hurts debtors. The same people who benefit from increased unemployment also benefit from low inflation.
Thus: âthe current Fed policy of rapidly raising interest rates to fight inflation by throwing people out of work serves as a wealth protection device for the top one percent.â
Now, itâs also true that high interest rates tend to tank the stock market, and rich people also own a lot of stock. This is where itâs important to draw distinctions within the capital class: the merely rich do things for a living (and thus care about companiesâ productive capacity), while the super-rich own things for a living, and care about debt service.
Epstein and Medlin are economists at UMass Amherst, and they built a model that looks at the distributional outcomes (that is, the winners and losers) from interest rate hikes, using data from 40 yearsâ worth of Fed rate hikes:
They concluded that âThe net impact of the Fedâs restrictive monetary policy on the wealth of the top one percent depends on the timing and balance of [lower inflation and higher interest]. It turns out that in recent decades the outcome has, on balance, worked out quite well for the wealthy.â
How well? âWithout intervention by the Fed, a 6 percent acceleration of inflation would erode their wealth by around 30 percent in real terms after three yearsâŠwhen the Fed intervenes with an aggressive tightening, the 1%âs wealth only declines about 16 percent after three years. That is a 14 percent net gain in real terms.â
This is why you see a split between the one-percenters and the ten-percenters in whether the Fed should continue to jack interest rates up. For the 1%, inflation hikes produce massive, long term gains. For the 10%, those gains are smaller and take longer to materialize.
Meanwhile, when there is mass unemployment, both groups benefit from lower wages and are happy to keep interest rates at zero, a rate that (in the absence of a wealth tax) creates massive asset bubbles that drive up the value of houses, stocks and other things that rich people own lots more of than everyone else.
This explains a lot about the current enthusiasm for high interest rates, despite high interest ratesâ ability to cause inflation, as Joseph Stiglitz and Ira Regmi wrote in their recent Roosevelt Institute paper:
The two esteemed economists compared interest rate hikes to medieval bloodletting, where âdoctorsâ did âmore of the same when their therapy failed until the patient either had a miraculous recovery (for which the bloodletters took credit) or died (which was more likely).â
As they document, workers today arenât recreating the dread âwage-price spiralâ of the 1970s: despite low levels of unemployment, workers wages still arenât keeping up with inflation. Inflation itself is falling, for the fairly obvious reason that covid supply-chain shocks are dwindling and substitutes for Russian gas are coming online.
Economic activity is âlargely below trend,â and with healthy levels of sales in ânon-traded goodsâ (imports), meaning that the stuff that American workers are consuming isnât coming out of Americaâs pool of resources or manufactured goods, and that spending is leaving the US economy, rather than contributing to an American firmâs buying power.
Despite this, the Fed has a substantial cheering section for continued interest rates, composed of the ultra-rich and their lickspittle Renfields. While the specifics are quite modern, the underlying dynamic is as old as civilization itself.
Historian Michael Hudson specializes in the role that debt and credit played in different societies. As heâs written, ancient civilizations long ago discovered that without periodic debt cancellation, an ever larger share of a societiesâ productive capacity gets diverted to the whims of a small elite of lenders, until civilization itself collapses:
Hereâs how that dynamic goes: to produce things, you need inputs. Farmers need seed, fertilizer, and farm-hands to produce crops. Crucially, you need to acquire these inputs before the crops come inâââwhich means you need to be able to buy inputs before you sell the crops. You have to borrow.
In good years, this works out fine. You borrow money, buy your inputs, produce and sell your goods, and repay the debt. But even the best-prepared producer can get a bad beat: floods, droughts, blights, pandemicsâŠPlay the game long enough and eventually youâll find yourself unable to repay the debt.
In the next round, you go into things owing more money than you can cover, even if you have a bumper crop. You sell your crop, pay as much of the debt as you can, and go into the next season having to borrow more on top of the overhang from the last crisis. This continues over time, until you get another crisis, which you have no reserves to cover because theyâve all been eaten up paying off the last crisis. You go further into debt.
Over the long run, this dynamic produces a society of creditors whose wealth increases every year, who can make coercive claims on the productive labor of everyone else, who not only owes them money, but will owe even more as a result of doing the work that is demanded of them.
Successful ancient civilizations fought this with Jubilee: periodic festivals of debt-forgiveness, which were announced when new monarchs assumed their thrones, or after successful wars, or just whenever the creditor class was getting too powerful and threatened the crown.
Of course, creditors hated this and fought it bitterly, just as our modern one-percenters do. When rulers managed to hold them at bay, their nations prospered. But when creditors captured the state and abolished Jubilee, as happened in ancient Rome, the state collapsed:
Are we speedrunning the collapse of Rome? Itâs not for me to say, but I strongly recommend reading Margaret Cokerâs in-depth Propublica investigation on how title lenders (loansharks that hit desperate, low-income borrowers with triple-digit interest loans) fired any employee who explained to a borrower that they needed to make more than the minimum payment, or theyâd never pay off their debts:
[Image ID: A vintage postcard illustration of the Federal Reserve building in Washington, DC. The building is spattered with blood. In the foreground is a medieval woodcut of a physician bleeding a woman into a bowl while another woman holds a bowl to catch the blood. The physician's head has been replaced with that of Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell.]
What are your thoughts about Andrew Mellon and how much blame he has for the Great Depression?
Andrew Mellon was a bastard, and his policies hurt way more than they helped, but I don't hold with the monetarist explanation for the Great Depression. I think Keynes was right.
We are huge 80s fans (sit us in front of Pretty in Pink and weâll be ever so good). Our protagonist here appears to be contemplating a leverage buyout followed by a substantial amount of asset stripping. Lovely picture, but weâre definitely Keynesian lingerie bloggers whilst our lady here appears to be a Chicago-school monetarist.
In 1932 and 1933, Keynes began developing what he called a monetary theory of production, a phrase he used as the title of a short 1933 essay. The classical economists of the 18th and 19th centuries wrote as if money didn't exist, or, more precisely, existed only 'as a neutral link between transactions in real things and real assets and does not allow it to enter into motives or decisions.' In such a world, the level of prices has no effect on production, consumption, or the willingness to lend or borrow. But as Keynes pointed out, wages are 'sticky,' meaning they don't change as rapidly as commodity prices, and debt contracts are denominated in money terms, meaning that if prices fall, entrepreneurs will have trouble meeting their wage bills and servicing their debts. In classical doctrine, a fall in prices would be either neutral, since money prices don't matter for real exchange, or possibly stimulative since the fall in prices might increase demand. Conveniently, Keynes noted, in a world of neutral money, 'crises do not occur' (emphasis in original). For someone writing in 1933, at the trough of the depression, this 'assumed away the very matter under investigation.'
Right-wing icon Friedrich Hayek introduced the term 'neutrality of money' into English, attributing it wrongly to Wicksell; it was actually a product of Dutch and German writers of the 1920s. The doctrine, though not the term, goes back to the mid-18th century and David Hume ('it is of no manner of consequence... whether money be in greater or less quantity'); two famous statement of the theory, incorporated into the creeds of many economists, belong to John Stuart Mill ('there cannot, in short, be intrinsically a more insignificant thing, int he economy of society, than money') and Irving Fisher ('money is a veil')...
[The monetarists] do have a point; the excessive extension of credit beyond an economy's capacity to satisfy the resultant demand will give rise to inflation. But this argument ignores the reason governments used to try to stimulate economies- chronically high levels of unemployment. (It also ignores the endogeneity of money, of which more later). Friedman and Schwartz also blamed capitalism's most dire crises, the Great Depression, on the allegedly tightfisted policies of the Federal Reserve, an argument that has the pleasant ideological effect of acquitting the inner workings of the market system- such as the overproduction of commodities combined with the polarization of incomes that characterized the 1920s- of any involvement. Crises may occur, inflationary or deflationary, but they're the state's fault.
Friedman used to urge that central banks be required by law or 'monetary constitution' to increase the quantity of money at a constant rate of 3-5% a year. Thirty years later, Friedman's faith seemed a bit shaken: "It is tempting to conclude from the close average relation between changes in the quantity of money and changes in money income that control over the quantity of money can be used as a precision instrument for offsetting the forces making for instability in money income. Unfortunately, the loose relation between money and income over short periods, the long and variable lag between changes in the quantity of money and other variables, and the often conflicting objectives of policy-makers preclude precise offsetting control.' Now he tells us...
Monetarism officially prevailed in the U.S. from 1979, on Paul Volcker's ascension to the chair of the Federal Reserve, to 1982, when it was abandoned for ostensibly technical reasons, but actually because the U.S. economy was falling apart, the financial system was making horrible sounds, and Mexico was on the verge of default. In truth, Volcker's adoption of monetarism was a ruse for driving up interest rates to unprecedentedly high levels to create a deep recession, to break inflation, and with it, to crush the last traces of labor militancy.
Doug Henwood, Wall Street: How it Works, and For Whom
On the pretenses of supply-side economics vs. the reality of how theyâve played out
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Real incomes falling for a decade. The legacy of a searing financial crisis weighing on confidence and growth. The very nature of work disrupted by a technological revolution.
This was the middle of the 19th century. Liverpool was in the midst of a golden age; its Custom House was the national Exchequerâs biggest source of revenue.
And Karl Marx was scribbling in the British Library, warning of a spectre haunting Europe, the spectre of communism.
We meet today during the first lost decade since the 1860s. In the wake of a global financial crisis. And in the midst of a technological revolution that is once again changing the nature of work. Substitute Northern Rock for Overend Gurney; Uber and machine learning for the Spinning Jenny and the steam engine; and Twitter for the telegraph; and you have dynamics that echo those of 150 years ago.
Then the villains were the capitalists. Should they today be the central bankers? Are their flights of fancy promoting stagnation and inequality? Does the spectre of monetarism haunt our economies?
Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England, in a speech from December 2016 called âThe Spectre of Monetarismâ
This Saturday (May 20), Iâll be at the GAITHERSBURG Book Festival with my novel Red Team Blues; then on May 22, Iâm keynoting Public Knowledgeâs Emerging Tech conference in DC.
On May 23, Iâll be in TORONTO for a book launch thatâs part of WEPFest, a benefit for the West End Phoenix, onstage with Dave Bidini (The Rheostatics), Ron Diebert (Citizen Lab) and the whistleblower Dr Nancy Olivieri.
David Roth memorably described the job of neoliberal economists as finding ânew ways to say âactually, your boss is right.ââ Not just your boss: for decades, economists have formed a bulwark against seemingly obvious responses to the most painful parts of our daily lives, from wages to education to health to shelter:
How can we solve the student debt crisis? Well, we could cancel student debt and regulate the price of education, either directly or through free state college.
How can we solve Americaâs heath-debt crisis? We could cancel health debt and create Medicare For All.
How can we solve Americaâs homelessness crisis? We could build houses and let homeless people live in them.
How can we solve Americaâs wage-stagnation crisis? We could raise the minimum wage and/or create a federal jobs guarantee.
How can we solve Americaâs workplace abuse crisis? We could allow workers to unionize.
How can we solve Americaâs price-gouging greedflation crisis? With price controls and/or windfall taxes.
How can we solve Americaâs inequality crisis? We could tax billionaires.
How can we solve Americaâs monopoly crisis? We could break up monopolies.
How can we solve Americaâs traffic crisis? We could build public transit.
How can we solve Americaâs carbon crisis? We can regulate carbon emissions.
These answers make sense to everyone except neoliberal economists and people in their thrall. Rather than doing the thing we want, neoliberal economists insist we must unleash âmarketsâ to solve the problems, by âcreating incentives.â That may sound like a recipe for a small state, but in practice, âcreating incentivesâ often involves building huge bureaucracies to âkeep the incentives alignedâ (that is, to prevent private firms from ripping off public agencies).
This is how we get âsolutionsâ that fail catastrophically, like:
Public Service Loan Forgiveness instead of debt cancellation and free college:
https://studentloansherpa.com/likely-ineligible/
The gig economy instead of unions and minimum wages:
As infuriating as all of this âactually, your boss is rightâ nonsense is, the most immediate and continuously frustrating aspect of it is the housing crisis, which has engulfed cities all over the world, to the detriment of nearly everyone.
America led the way on screwing up housing. There were two major New Deal/post-war policies that created broad (but imperfect and racially biased) prosperity in America: housing subsidies and labor unions. Of the two, labor unions were the most broadly inclusive, most available across racial and gender lines, and most engaged with civil rights struggles and other progressive causes.
So America declared war on labor unions and told working people that their only path to intergenerational wealth was to buy a home, wait for it to âappreciate,â and sell it on for a profit. This is a disaster. Without unions to provide countervailing force, every part of American life has worsened, with stagnating wages lagging behind skyrocketing expenses for education, health, retirement, and long-term care. For nearly every homeowner, this means that their âmost valuable assetââââthe roof over their headâââmust be liquidated to cover debts. Meanwhile, their kids, burdened with six-figure student debtâââwill have little or nothing left from the sale of the family home with which to cover a downpayment in a hyperinflated market:
Meanwhile, rent inflation is screaming ahead of other forms of inflation, burdening working people beyond any ability to pay. Giant Wall Street firms have bought up huge swathes of the countryâs housing stock, transforming it into overpriced, undermaintained slums that you can be evicted from at the drop of a hat:
Transforming housing from a human right to an âassetâ was always going to end in a failure to build new housing stock and regulate the rental market. Itâs reaching a breaking point. âSuperstar citiesâ like New York and San Francisco have long been priced out of the reach of working people, but now theyâre becoming unattainable for double-income, childless, college-educated adults in their prime working years:
A city that you canât live in is a failure. A system that canât provide decent housing is a failure. The âyour boss is right, actuallyâ crowd won: we donât build public housing, we donât regulate rents, and it suuuuuuuuuuuuuuucks.
Maybe we could try doing things instead of âaligning incentives?â
Like, how about rent control.
God, you can already hear them squealing! âPrice controls artificially distort well-functioning markets, resulting in a mismatch between supply and demand and the creation of the dreaded deadweight loss triangle!â
Rent control âcauses widespread shortages, leaving would-be renters high and dry while screwing landlords (the road to hell, so says the orthodox economist, is paved with good intentions).â
Thatâs been the received wisdom for decades, fed to us by Chicago School economists who are so besotted with their own mathematical models that any mismatch between the modelsâ predictions and the real world is chalked up to errors in the real world, not the models. Itâs pure economism: âIf economists wished to study the horse, they wouldnât go and look at horses. Theyâd sit in their studies and say to themselves, âWhat would I do if I were a horse?ââ
The real risk of rent control is landlords exploiting badly written laws to kick out tenants and convert their units to condosâââthatâs not a problem with rent control, itâs a problem with eviction law:
https://web.stanford.edu/~diamondr/DMQ.pdf
Meanwhile, removing rent control doesnât trigger the predicted increases in housing supply:
Rent control might create winners (tenants) and losers (landlords), but it certainly doesnât make everyone worse offâââas the neoliberal doctrine insists it must. Instead, tenants who benefit from rent control have extra money in their pockets to spend on groceries, debt service, vacations, and child-care.
Those happier, more prosperous people, in turn, increase the value of their landlordsâ properties, by creating happy, prosperous neighborhoods. Rent control means that when people in a neighborhood increase its value, their landlords canât kick them out and rent to richer people, capturing all the value the old tenants created.
What is life like under rent control? Itâs great. You and your family get to stay put until youâre ready to move on, as do your neighbors. Your kids donât have to change schools and find new friends. Old people arenât torn away from communities who care for them:
Rent control doesnât just make tenants better off, it makes society better off. Rather than money flowing from a neighborhood to landlords, rent control allows the people in a community to invest it there: opening and patronizing businesses.
Anything that canât go on forever will eventually stop. As the housing crisis worsens, states are finally bringing back rent control. New York has strengthened rent control for the first time in 40 years:
Theyâre battling against anti-rent-control state laws pushed by ALEC, the right-wing architects of model legislation banning action on climate change, broadband access, and abortion:
And thereâs a kind of rent control that has near unanimous support: the 30-year fixed mortgage. For the 67% of Americans who live in owner-occupied homes, the existence of the federally-backed (and thus federally subsidized) fixed mortgage means that your monthly shelter costs are fixed for life. Whatâs more, these costs go down the longer you pay them, as mortgage borrowers refinance when interest rates dip.
We have a two-tier system: if you own a home, then the longer you stay put, the cheaper your ârentâ gets. If you rent a home, the longer you stay put, the more expensive your home gets over time.
America needs a shit-ton more housingâââregular housing for working people. Mr Market doesnât want to build it, no matter how many âincentivesâ we dangle. Maybe itâs time we just did stuff instead of building elaborate Rube Goldberg machines in the hopes of luring the marketâs animal sentiments into doing it for us.
Catch me on tour with Red Team Blues in Toronto, DC, Gaithersburg, Oxford, Hay, Manchester, Nottingham, London, and Berlin!
If youâd like an essay-formatted version of this post to read or share, hereâs a link to it on pluralistic.net, my surveillance-free, ad-free, tracker-free blog:
What do you think of the monetarist argument notably made by Milton Friedman that the Great Depression was mostly caused by the Federal Reserve allowing the supply of money to decline?
I think itâs profoundly wrong, and symptomatic of Friedmanâs obsession with fixed monetary rules. Friedmanâs ideas failed the reality test everywhere they were tried - when the Fed tried to target M1 in 1979-1982, when Margaret Thatcher implemented monetarism after â79, and when Argentina tried it in the 80s. By the end of his life, even he didnât believe in it.
Keynes was right about the Great Depression, and anyone who tells you anything else is trying to sell you something. And while Iâm at it, you should read Zach Carterâs Keynes biography.