#meng da

Yi Province stands as the western-most territory of Han China. In what is now Sichuan and Chongqing. Hot, humid, trading in silk and spice and constantly threatened by aggressive tribes and encroaching petty kingdoms on the borders, the reign of Emperor Ling did the province no favours.

All that changed, however, when Liu Yan took control. Formerly a speaker at court, it was his petition to reintroduce the office of provincial governorships, officials with far more control over their territories with the right to marshal armies and act decisively without waiting for the court's consent, that arguably paved the way to the warlord era after the rule of Dong Zhuo.

Liu Yan is ambitious and highly capable, revitalising a previously rebel-ridden backwater into the powerhouse of Western-China, protected on all sides by natural terrain with sizeable armies and productive bounty, providing a haven to refugees near and far. Soon becoming a rival to those who seek to make the empire theirs, Liu Yan knows that Yi will not fall easily.

However, he remains just a man, vulnerable and mortal, and after him, his unpromising youngest son, Liu Zhang, is the only child currently not a hostage in the capital. If Liu Zhang takes command, he shall be unable to reign with the resolute nature his father was famous for and corruption and treachery will follow, presenting the ideal playing-field for powerful men with their own agendas. (Left To Right) (Top Row) Yan Yan, Zhang Ren, Lei Tong (Upper-Middle Row) Peng Yang, Pang Xi, Lai Jinggong, Liu Yan, Fei Baifen, Meng Da, Huang Quan (Lower-Middle Row) Dong He, Liu Ba, Liu Zhang, Fa Zheng, Qin Mi (Bottom Row) Wu Lan, Wu Mutan, She Yuan, Zhang Song

The whole “Emperor of Zhong” thing comes to mind...

As far as things that worked out well go, Sima Yi’s Xincheng campaign comes to mind. Although it doesn’t seem so strange, since we know how things turned out, but it was actually quite daring at the time.

For context, Sima Yi was relatively new to command. He’d been Cao Cao’s second for years, so he wasn’t inexperienced, but the first time he held independent command in the field was in 226, just a year earlier. While it’s easy to think of Sima Yi as being a monolithic figure whose authority was unquestioned, in 227 he was still just one of many generals. He had excellent credentials and an impressive record, but he didn’t dominate the nation the way he would later in life.

Meng Da was, at the time, well liked. His defection in 220 was a coup for Wei, and he helped to retake Xincheng from Shu. He was also a personal friend to Cao Pi, Xiahou Shang, Huan Jie, and a number of other (recently deceased) important figures in Wei.

The only reason that Meng Da’s loyalty came into question was because of Shen Yi, administrator of the neighboring Weixing commandery. Shen Yi had his own history of disloyalty, so he wasn’t the most reliable source of information. He sent a memorial to the court accusing Meng Da of conspiring with Zhuge Liang (which he was). The court at Luoyang evidently wasn’t certain what to make of this.

Meng Da himself wasn’t sure what to do, now that his plans were revealed. There was a chance that, if he acted like Shen Yi was just slandering him, Cao Rui would take his side and punish Shen Yi instead. But if the court ruled against him, Meng Da would be in a precarious situation. But he figured that he had time before he needed to make a decision. His reasoning was that the only general near enough to be a threat was Sima Yi at Wan. Before marching on Xincheng, Sima Yi would need to send a letter to Luoyang to get authorization (1600 furlongs there and back) and then march to Shangyong. That would give Meng Da ample warning.

And it would have, if Sima Yi had waited for orders. Instead, he sent Meng Da a letter saying that he didn’t believe the rumors in order to put his mind at ease. While the letter was still being sent, he was secretly making a forced march. Sima Yi covered the 1200 furlongs in just 8 days, catching Meng Da totally by surprise.

Shu and Wu both sent reinforcements to aid Meng Da, but it was already too late. Sima Yi sent subordinates to hold strategic points and kept the reinforcements from reaching Shangyong. Sima Yi besieged the city and, after 16 days, Meng Da’s own nephew opened the gates and surrendered. Sima Yi executed Meng Da on the spot.

All of this could easily have gone very badly for Sima Yi. If Shen Yi’s words had just been slander, Sima Yi certainly would have found himself executed for attacking Meng Da. And conducting such an operation without approval from the emperor was especially risky - there was a good chance that Sima Yi would be punished even if he was right. The campaign itself was risky, too. Shanyong was well-defended, Meng Da was a capable general, and he did receive reinforcements. The operation could easily have failed in any number of ways.