#mason shefa

For the purposes of this essay, I will use a labeling scheme similar to Van Inwagen. I am going to define a miracle as that phenomenon which departs from natural law within an interval of “t1 to t2”, (t1 being the moment of the initiation of the event departing from natural law, and t2 being the moment this event ends), and label it A, and disassociate it from that which happens after t2, i.e. the consequence of the said miracle.[1] I will define “t2 to the present” to refer to the consequences of the said miracle A, and label this B.

We live in a world which places great precedence on science, and, in fact, relies on it to an extent. Who now sees a ball fall to the ground and thinks of a different explanation for its proclivity towards the Earth than that of Newton’s laws of gravity? Furthermore, we use these laws to help design such things as airplanes and grandfather clocks, relying on the idea that these laws will never change. This may be so, but what if the grandfather clock’s weights being pulled towards the Earth by the force of gravity were the consequence B of a miracle A? This would mean that if A had never occurred, B may or may not have happened, possibly resulting in a consequence in which the laws of gravity were perceived to be broken. By Hume’s and Van Inwagen’s definitions of a miracle, this would be considered a miracle. However, this is clearly not a miracle, and would, in fact, be how the world would function in the absence of miracles. If the very underpinning of the laws of gravity (and indeed any other scientific or observed law) is incessant strings of miracles A[2] setting off expected consequences B, then the absence of miracles A might or might not cause a complete undermining of any and all perceived laws in science. A good analogy to use for this scenario would be to think of the miracles A as a kind of “fuel” for the consequences B (the laws of nature as we currently understand them). If the fuel were to “run out,” (if the miracles were to stop occurring) it would be quite plausible that the consequences B would be unable to occur.

A scientific world-view would not make belief in the occurrence of miracles irrational. It seems that there is an infinite amount of knowledge about our world that we do not yet know, or have not discovered. For example, we still have not found a definitive answer to the question of what is the “smallest particle,” or subdivision of any body. Time seems to be infinitely dividable, challenging our ability to set arbitrary units upon it. Thus, conjectures such as the ones I am making regarding the origins of the laws of nature are still possible, given that we still do not know what causes them on a fundamental level. It is equally possible that we cannot know, a conjecture surely harrowing to scientists. The end of scientific inquiry occurs when the final underpinning of our experience is understood, one which is possibly unobservable or miraculous and, if indeed it is, must be accepted as such given our experience. If indeed the underpinning is miraculous, by its very nature, we should not assume that the occurrence of miracles is a constant. Instead, we should assume that, at any time, miracles may not occur, and this would not be surprising. Thus, we should not be surprised if the consequence of a lack of this underpinning, miracles, were the breaking of natural laws. Perhaps a contrived story could further illustrate and make plain this assertion. Let’s say that Mark is sitting at an empty desk, when, all of a sudden, a book spontaneously appears in front of him on the desk. Surely, Mark would be surprised, as he is expecting his world to constantly conform to the laws of nature and this is contrary to them. However, now that this event has occurred, Mark can begin to realize that the laws of nature themselves could be seen as laws which were assumed by man to be constant, when in fact, they are not. After realizing this, any other breach in the laws of nature that Mark might encounter would not surprise him, as a fundamental change in his view and understanding of the world has taken place. In this way, if science reaches a point where the underpinning of our experience is fundamentally and essentially unobservable or miraculous, there is no way for us to ever be able to place such complete predictive power on the consequences of such unobservable or miraculous elements (such as the laws of physics, gravity, or any other natural law). We would need to include, after the formulation of a law of nature, a clause which states that “the law is true with the condition that the essentially unobservable elements which make up all aspects of our experience remain in a state that is consistent with how they have always been, or interchange with any state which would produce the same consequences that remaining in the same state would.” This clause, given that we still do not know the smallest, most fundamental particle that makes up that which we experience, is perfectly acceptable. Thus, a scientific world-view incorporating these clauses would not find a belief in miracles problematic or irrational. Mackey states, in his Miracles and Testimony, that “we are fairly good at detecting dishonesty, insincerity, and lack of conviction, and we readily reject what we are told by someone who betrays these effects. But we are strongly inclined simply to accept, without question, statements that are obviously assured and secure.” (Mackey 426) This is the cause of Mark’s initial surprise. Because scientists often make statements about the laws of nature with such certainty, this causes us to be “strongly inclined” to take their words as the fullness of truth. Scientists should not, however, continue to have this air of certainty, because, as I have pointed out, many things have yet to be discovered (and may even be undiscoverable) which could completely reverse their idea of the very fundamentals of our experience.

In conclusion, the fact that we still do not know the smallest particle or the shortest duration of time leads me to believe that (based on the history of science finding ever smaller particles) the smallest particle and shortest duration of time is unobservable. Given this lack of information, it is possible that miracles could be occurring to such a particle (as Van Inwagen surmises) that we are unable to observe. If this is the case, and if it is also the case (a highly likely proposition) that the consequences of this miraculous change in the causal power of this unobservable particle follow the natural law, it could be stated that, though we do not (and cannot) know for certain the nature of the miracle, we can say with certainty that, unless we know the nature of this smallest and most fundamental particle (an impossibility), we cannot be certain that the laws of nature (or indeed, any law obtained by scientific method or life experience) are constant.

Works Cited

Mackey, J. L. “Miracles and Testimony.” Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology. By Louis P. Pojman and Michael C. Rea. Sixth ed. Boston, MA: Wadsworth/Cengage Learning, 2012. 425-432. Print.

Van Inwagen, Peter. “Of ‘Of Miracles’.” Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology. By Louis P. Pojman and Michael C. Rea. Sixth ed. Boston, MA: Wadsworth/Cengage Learning, 2012. 415-425. Print.

[1] Van Inwagen combines t1-t2 with “the early stages of any such ‘divergence’” (Van Inwagen, 416), which, “stages” being plural, would include the most direct consequence(s) of the miracle occurring immediately after t2.

            First, I would like to argue that perceptual beliefs based on religious experiences are at least equally valid as perceptual beliefs based on sensory experience. I will do this by means of responding to objections.

            Objection I. If not everyone has religious experiences, how can we determine that God exists? Why then should religion be universally accepted?

            Answer. The ability to have sensory experience is not also universal, yet it is universally applied; for instance, a completely blind man never having seen colors has no evidence to support the belief of their existence. However, if he believes in their existence, he has come to such a conclusion based on evidence drawn from other people’s sensory experiences. Explaining colors entirely to a blind man is impossible; and for the blind man, the existence of color is something ineffable. The blind man cannot fully comprehend the nature of color, yet this does not preclude its existence. If for one man color is ineffable and incomprehensible, and for another it is describable and understandable, nothing prevents God, Whom only those with the ability to have religious experiences are able to perceive, from being describable and understandable to some,[1] and ineffable and incomprehensible to others. Thus, colors exist as surely as God exists, and vice versa. Religion should be universally accepted just as our perceptual beliefs about our world are accepted. Our world is physically accessible and understandable only through the senses; and, as such, “…we have no cognitive access [to our physical world] that is not based on sense perception.” (Alston 242) Our reliance on—and restriction to—sense perception for perceiving and understanding our world in the physical does not mean that understanding the divine must also be restricted to sense perception.[2] Just as a blind man understands as much as he can about what the world looks like by means of hearing a description of it by a man who can see, so too are people who do not have the proclivity of having religious experiences able limitedly understand God through revealed religion and by those to whom religious experiences are common. In fact, it could be said that the basis of religion is a text received by means of religious experience.

Objection II. Accounts of religious experiences are diverse and often contradictory. For example, some religions hold that there is but one God, while others hold that there are many. As for sensory experience, all agree on the perceptual belief. Given this, how can religion be universally accepted?

            Answer. The question of religious pluralism often divides people who maintain that their religion is the true religion. This is belief is not a problem in itself; the problem arises when, given that there is one true religion, yet do different false religions claim that title. I would like to argue, however, that all religious experiences are experiences of that one true religion, but due to a person’s preconceived notions of what he believes, the religious experiences are corrupted subconsciously so that they may fit into the model of his religion (if his religion is a false religion). Due to this corruption, the information extrapolated from such a corrupted version of the religious experience is contradictory to another false religion, and may even be contradictory to the true religion which produced it in the first place.

One way we can tell that all religious experiences are initially (or “prima-facie”, to use Alston’s term (Alston 242)) from the same source, that is, the one true religion, is that it becomes clear after comparing accounts of religious experiences that there are some commonalities. For example, let’s say a man who professes Buddhism has a religious experience. The religious experience (unadulterated) has to do with a single, omnipotent God, and not many Gods. The Buddhist would then subconsciously adapt the religious experience to be about his polytheistic faith by interpreting it to be about multiple gods. This adaptation is what causes and perpetuates the existence and prevalence of false religions, and the strife and turmoil that arises from their existence.

            Second, I would like to counter William James’s idea that a religious experience is not applicable universally. James comes up with criteria for use in determining whether something is a religious experience or not. However, he does not have any criteria which help determine whether a religious experience is corrupted from the original unadulterated religious experience of the one true religion, or whether it is prima-facie. James’s criterion of ineffability, while it could be true that religious experiences in the prima-facie stage are unable to be communicated fully, this does not mean that an acknowledgement of the fact that one had a religious experience is impossible. What I am arguing here is that the very acknowledgement of a religious experience is applicable universally in that it provides evidence for the existence of the possibility of religious experience to those who never have them. For something to be completely ineffable, its very existence would not be able to be expressed. The fact that we do have many historical and current accounts of religious experiences tells us that they are not purely ineffable; they are able to be acknowledged at least in their basest form: as a religious experience. If it were possible to express the prima-facie religious experience, this would be ideal, and should be universally accepted, but as it is not possible, the best way to utilize accounts of religious experiences is to compare them with each other and to deduce what the core similarities are. These core similarities are as close as we can get to an account of the prima-facie religious experience. This should be applied universally, as the sample of the religious experiences used in deducing the prima-facie religious experience should be all-inclusive. Practically every major religion has at least one god or higher power, so deducing the simple fact that “God exists” from an all-inclusive sample of religious experiences would be easy. Thus, given this logic, it should be universally applicable that God exists.

            Conclusion. It is clear now that religious experiences should not be judged by the same set of standards as sense perceptions. Religious experiences are part of an entirely separate class of experience than physical sense perception. At the present moment, the realm of religion and the realm of the physical are not connected, and they must be accessed using different faculties. Instead of applying a scientific method to religious experiences as we would to sense perceptions, we should create a standard of verification to determine how corrupted from the prima-facie religious experience any given report of a religious experience. The standard should be the deduction of commonalities of a large non-biased sample of religious experience, and if a given religious experience contains more commonalities to the standard, it can be judged to be less corrupt than if it had less commonalities, in which case it would be judged more corrupt.

Works Cited

Alston, William P. "Perceiving God." Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology. By Louis P. Pojman and Michael C. Rea. Sixth ed. Boston, MA: Wadsworth/Cengage Learning, 2012. 241-247. Print.

James, William. "Mysticism." Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology. By Louis P. Pojman and Michael C. Rea. Sixth ed. Boston, MA: Wadsworth/Cengage Learning, 2012. 224-241. Print.

  Footnotes

1. Here, I am assuming that God is readily revealing Himself to be understood and experienced by those who have religious experiences.

In the Revelation of St. John, in the twentieth chapter, St. John prophesies that there will be two resurrections of the dead: one for those who

...were beheaded for the witness of Jesus, and for the word of God, and which had not worshipped the beast, neither his image, neither had received his mark upon their foreheads, or in their hands; and they lived and reigned with Christ a thousand years (Rev. 20:4)[1]

and one for the “rest of the dead” (Rev. 20:5) who shall be “judged out of those things which were written in the books, according to their works” (Rev. 20:12). This raises a question about what role works play in salvation. St. James notes that “faith, if it hath not works, is dead, being alone” (James 1:17), and rhetorically asks, “can faith save him?” (James 1:14). Conflict arises when one considers what St. Paul writes in the First Epistle of St. Paul the Apostle to Timothy. He writes that “…Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners; of whom I am chief” (1 Timothy 1:15). This is problematic; if the very purpose of Christ’s sacrifice was to save them whose sin is their very identity, which would make works irrelevant. A sinner with many works and a sinner with few works are both equally sinners, and thus, equally atoned for. In the passage from Revelation, there are two resurrections; one for martyrs and one for the rest of the dead. In the second resurrection, the dead are judged according to their works as written in the Book of Life. However, with martyrs, the idea of works is not even brought up. If one were to make the case for works being necessary for all men to be saved, how could it be that the act of being martyred was a work? Perhaps the solution to this problem can be found in a different interpretation of how works arise. Perhaps having faith (as is described of the martyrs, they believed in the “witness of Jesus, and…the word of God” [Rev. 20:4]) inevitably produces works, regardless of intention. If this be the case, then it is not by the amount of works that the dead are judged and chosen, but the depth of their faith.

The parable of the wise and foolish virgins, Matthew 25:1-13, is rich in allegory, full of possibility for interpretation, but also a bit problematic. Dean O. Wenthe, in his essay “The Parable of the Ten Bridesmaids”, notes that the parable “has been interpreted in a wide variety of ways. One scholar has understood it as an attack upon the hypocrisy of Jewish teachers in Jesus day. Still another says that it can only be properly understood if we assume that the setting is Passover-night. Bultmann and Donfried regard it as an allegorical creation of the early church” (Wenthe 9).[1] I would like to systematically put forward my own interpretation of the parable, give examples of other avenues of possible interpretations as they might arise, and analyze what Jesus’ concluding admonition means in the context of my interpretation. The context of this parable is important in determining what type of information it conveys. Wenthe notes that “this parable is placed in a series of eschatological admonitions” (Wenthe 9), so it is highly probable that the content is similar. If the parable be indeed eschatological, this would inform the range of possible interpretations we could give it.