The Procrustean Bed of Logic.—Since the bulk of the problem of logic is not in the process of deduction itself, but rather lies in the formalization of the problem that precedes deduction, almost any deductive framework will serve equally well. Whether we employ Aristotelian syllogisms, Stoic propositional logic, medieval terminist logic, or contemporary mathematical logic, is largely indifferent. While our modern logic is more advanced in virtue of having incorporated into itself the logical discoveries of the past twenty-five hundred years, it is not the be-all and end-all of logic. The formalization of a problem to the point at which it can be made to fit the Procrustean bed of logic is instead where we should seek the embodiment of human reason, but that would be formalization seemingly unmoored to logic, and that would deliver us over to a kind of rational vertigo—a disequilibrium of the reason, apparently without a handhold to steady ourselves. But not quite. We formalize a body of knowledge with an eye to how exactly it can be funneled into the strictures of logic, so our choice of logic for our deduction is not indifferent in this sense. The logic we employ governs the formalization we employ, so it is our choice of logic that ought to be attended by a rational vertigo, but here we have the spirit of seriousness to guide us, which, in the case of logic, is not the self-deception of ready-made values, but rather the self-deception of ready-made calculi. Given the calculus, our problem has been preemptively defined for us, as has its formalization; we have already surrendered our logical autonomy in our implied consent to the mode of formalization entailed by our chosen logic.