#liberal values

John Anderson: When we talk about the liberal global order that's prevailed since the 1940s, it's prevailed because America has been strong enough to make sure it prevails.

Konstantin Kisin: Absolutely, and believed in its values, even if you don't like them, right? They believe in freedom of speech. Europeans believe in restricting people's speech so that no one's offended. That's at a governmental level, right? At the moment, that's who you're choosing between. If you're choosing between America, the American administration believes in free speech and is prepared to accept sometimes very unpleasant costs that come with free speech, right? The Europeans want the opposite, right? That's the choice, right? And so this is a question of values.

Anderson: Well, that's right, but there's an even bigger choice that I'm alluding to, and that is that if America loses its global dominance, what will the new order, global order look like?

Kisin: Well, that's what I'm saying, right? Our values are better than the values that would be in place of those values if we were not the strongest civilization. So being strong has to be one of our values. So this sort of makes sense, doesn't it?

And so, you know, this idea that we should walk around and sort of keep ourselves small and, you know, we have this weird thing. I know it's a British thing. Maybe this is a sign that I haven't fully integrated, but we have a debate in this country every time the Prime Minister of the country goes to some global summit on a big plane, and everyone's like, oh, no, he's spending government money. I'm like, no. What, you're saying Xi Jinping arrives on a megabus? This is a game. There's a game being played here, and people will treat you depending on how powerful they perceive you to be, and human beings are very shallow. And if you've got a big plane with the name of your country on it, people tend to respect that, especially people who are not Western and don't have this moronic ideology where the stronger you are or appear to be, the worse you are as a human being. They don't have that. Xi Jinping doesn't think like that, nor does Vladimir Putin, nor do most people in the world. I think you'd back me up on this, John.

Anderson: You're right. You're absolutely right.

Kisin: Having dealt with people in different governments around the world.

Anderson: Yeah, yep, that's right. You know, we don't want braggarts, but on the other hand, we don't want our leaders to look like they're not respected or respectable.

Kisin: No. On an international stage, I think of them kind of like our champion in a battle, right? Do you want somebody who is strong and capable in that role, or do you want someone who's not, as the Americans had at the last election? I think it was as basic a choice as that, frankly,

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Do you need hope right now?

My professor / rabbi-superhero, Rabbi Dr. Andrea Weiss is launching the second round of American Values Religious Voices letters. 

Over the first 100 days of the Biden/Harris administration, she has coordinated 100 short letters written by progressive religious scholars of nearly every faith tradition from around the United States to send the administration a letter grounded in our shared values and religious texts.

Each of the letters is only a little over a paragraph in length.

You can sign up to receive them at the link above.  Please reblog this message, and share the link with interested friends.

People described the last round of letters as inspirational, and the only thing that got them through really difficult days of the Trump administration.  It’s worth subscribing.

By: Helen Pluckrose

Published: Jun 24, 2026

I am frequently told that the word ‘liberal’ has become so confused and contested, and so deeply associated with the (often illiberal) left in the United States, that attempts to defend it as a distinct philosophical tradition are no longer worthwhile. While I generally agree that it is futile to try to reclaim words to their ‘proper’ meaning, liberalism is not simply a word that can be replaced with another word. It is the term for the cluster of concepts that form the philosophical foundations of modern Western liberal democracies. To explain why I believe it remains essential to preserve the concept of liberalism, it is worth taking a historical and geographical look at how liberalism came to be associated with different political positions in different countries and what would be lost if we abandoned the concept altogether.

As a general rule, I believe it is futile to try to hold onto words when their meanings have changed in common usage. Language evolves naturally in response to a variety of pressures to serve the purposes of communicating changing ideas and concepts. I have always argued that if this is reflective of a worrying cultural shift, it is better to engage with the ideas and concepts than to try to remedy the problem by insisting on universal recognition of what the word ‘really means.’ At best, the conversation shifts to a discussion of semantics which does not address the core issue. At worst, one ends up looking like an angry, old man yelling “‘Gay’ means ‘happy’, I tell you!”

When it comes to liberalism, however, we are not talking about a word which could potentially be replaced by another word, but about the cluster of concepts underlying the foundation of modern Western liberal democracies. These include individual liberty, universalism, freedom of conscience, free speech, free trade, freedom of inquiry, meritocracy, equality before the law, support for viewpoint diversity as an engine of knowledge production and conflict resolution, a willingness to live and let live provided this does no material harm to others, firm limitations on state power, a preference for reform over revolution and a democratic system which governs by the consent of the governed.

Once we stop using the word ‘liberalism’ to describe this philosophical tradition, we find ourselves having to list all those concepts individually every time. This makes for rather laborious conversation. In practice, it also risks separating these concepts from each other and losing a sense of the cohesive philosophy which binds them together and defines the modern west.

The fact that ‘liberalism’ is used to define such different positions on the left/right political spectrum in different countries is illustrative of the history of this philosophy. When I speak about liberalism in other countries, the part where I clarify what I am not talking about varies widely. In America and parts of Europe, I have to stress that I am not referring to the left. In Australia and other parts of Europe, I must clarify that I do not mean the right. Liberalism does not belong to either the left or the right but uses of its name for such positions are revealing of what its principles were competing against historically in a particular country.

In countries where the main threats to liberty have been monarchy, feudal systems, nationalism, religious conservatism or traditional social hierarchies, liberals have been the people pushing for reform, civil liberties, secularism and democratic rights. Consequently, liberalism became associated with the left. We see this history in France, Spain and Portugal. It is also very much the case now outside the Western world in religiously conservative countries where people push for religious tolerance, women’s rights and the rights of same sex attracted people. The ‘woman, life, freedom’ protests in Iran following the death of Mahsa Amini in the custody of the Morality Police is very much a liberal protest against state authoritarianism.

In countries where strong socialist or Marxist movements emerged, liberals became the defenders of markets, private property, free trade and constitutional constraints on state power. Consequently, liberalism became associated with the right. We see this in Eastern Europe after communism, in Germany, the Low Countries and much of Latin America. Interestingly, we also see this in Australia where the Liberal Party is the conservative party. This is because Australia was established as a British colony after the major great liberal battles had been won. It never had to oppose a powerful feudal order, monarchy or church. Australia did have to deal with powerful rising Labour Movements and consequently the free trade, free enterprise and minimal government interference elements of liberalism emerged most strongly and associated liberalism with the right.

Both the United States and the United Kingdom are interesting cases within this general pattern. The US - the first country to be explicitly founded on liberal principles following its (liberal) revolution against authoritarian state power from England - has retained a strongly libertarian ethos and deep suspicion of state overreach. America has also never had a significant Marxist electoral force. Both its left-wing and its right-wing currents have supported free trade and free enterprise. It has also retained a significantly stronger cultural influence of Christianity than all the other English-speaking countries and much of the West. Consequently, its political conflict has largely been between religious conservatives and progressives within a capitalist framework. As a result, “liberal” came to be associated with the progressive side of politics, particularly after the New Deal and Civil Rights eras.

The UK, as the home of John Locke who developed the philosophical foundations of liberal government, Adam Smith who articulated economic liberalism, Thomas Paine who argued for democratic liberalism and John Stuart Mill who synthesised liberty, free speech, individuality and representative government, has a history in which liberalism developed as a distinct philosophical tradition separate from left and right-wing politics. Further, it developed into a significant political force of its own creating a three-way political distinction: Labour (socialism and economic redistribution), Conservatives (tradition and social order) and Liberals (individual liberty, constitutionalism and equal rights). Because liberalism existed as its own political tradition, the meaning remained somewhat clearer than it did elsewhere. Unfortunately, because the UK is currently so deeply tuned into US political and cultural debates, we are increasingly hearing ‘liberal’ used to describe the (often illiberal) left.

What these histories demonstrate is that although the word ‘liberalism’ has come to be used to refer to different positions on the political spectrum in different countries, its underlying function has remained remarkably consistent. Whether liberals were opposing monarchies, feudal system, theocratic authoritarianism, nationalist movements, military dictatorships or socialist states, they were engaged in the same fundamental freedom-oriented project. The specific threats to liberty liberals have found themselves opposing have varied according to time and place and, consequently, came to be associated sometimes with the left and sometimes with the right. What remained consistent was its commitment to individual liberty, freedom of conscience, freedom of inquiry, viewpoint diversity, universalism, constitutional constraints on power and democratic government. The history of liberalism is therefore not the history of a particular faction within the left-right spectrum, but of a long chain of people in different times and places committed to a philosophical tradition rooted in protecting people from authoritarian power and enabling people with different ideas and values to live together peacefully within free societies.

This is why I continue to defend the term ‘liberalism’ despite generally being skeptical of attempts to police linguistic change. If liberalism were just a word, it would not matter very much if it drifted in meaning or fell out of use. Words come and go. Concepts evolve.

The problem is that liberalism is the irreplaceable name we have for a coherent philosophical tradition that binds together an array of political, intellectual, economic and social freedoms. These are not simply a collection of attractive but unrelated values that we can pick and choose from. They form a cohesive system. Each principle supports and reinforces the others.

Once we stop thinking in terms of liberalism, it becomes easier to think of these principles as separable. We begin to imagine that we can keep democratic systems while abandoning freedom of speech, or preserve viewpoint diversity while weakening freedom of inquiry, or uphold individual liberty while expanding the powers of the state into the private lives of individuals. Keeping the concept of liberalism intact and true to its philosophical heritage reminds us that these commitments belong together because they emerged together and have historically succeeded together.

This matters because liberalism is not simply one political philosophy among many. It is the philosophical foundation of modern Western liberal democracies. When conservatives speak of defending Western civilisation, this is surely what they are seeking to defend. When progressives speak of hard-won civil rights victories, this is the philosophical tradition to which they are indebted. We cannot have a society in which conservatives lose sight of what they are conserving and progressives fail to recognise what achieves progress. The institutions, rights and freedoms that many of us take for granted did not emerge naturally or inevitably. They were won through centuries of intellectual, political and social struggle against myriad authoritarianisms. Liberalism was the tradition that united these struggles and articulated the principles on which modern democratic societies would be built.

By: Frederick Alexander

Published: Dec 21, 2025

If a fundamentalist Christian or a radical Hindu massacred a group of innocent civilians, would the first instinct of politicians be to protect churches or temples? Of course not. The ideology would be named and condemned. Apologists for religiously inspired terror would be sidelined and treated as morally adjacent.

So why, when the violence is inspired by political Islam, is the reflex always to protect mosques, draft laws on “Islamophobia”, and resurrect the looming threat of the “far right”?

It’s because Western liberalism has been captured and deformed by a progressive ideology that treats plain speaking about political Islam as the cardinal sin. To judge is to imply hierarchy; to imply hierarchy is to admit that liberal values might be superior – something now utterly taboo and status-destroying among those with institutional and cultural power. This doctrine is so internalised among the progressive class that it functions like a substitute religion. Naturally, it’s ruthlessly exploited by our enemies.

In theory, liberalism is perfectly capable of moral discrimination. It emerged from the Enlightenment precisely to allow members of society to assess competing beliefs, criticise some, adopt others and, through arguments and persuasion, reject those beliefs that seek to undermine these same rights. It assumes that ideas matter, that some are better than others, and that individuals have the right – indeed the duty – to defend the conditions that make liberty possible.

Progressivism has gradually and almost imperceptibly rewritten that agreement. In its current form, it treats all cultures as morally equivalent, while moral judgement is almost exclusively reserved for the West. The result is a ruling class that no longer understands what liberal principles are for and has lost the language to say that certain belief systems are not merely inferior but incompatible with a liberal society.

Islamism isn’t morally complicated, any more than fascism is. What’s complicated is the West’s refusal to judge it.

This strange development – to see Western culture as uniquely guilty, and therefore uniquely undeserving of defence – is one of the great moral errors of our time.

It’s an intellectual failure as much as a moral one. Western liberal societies are increasingly governed by people with only the most basic understanding of the civilisation they have been entrusted to protect. Beyond the crudest moral shorthand – Hitler bad, tolerance good – their grasp of history, philosophy and our cultural inheritance is alarmingly shallow.

How many senior civil servants in the UK could explain what the Magna Carta actually constrained? Who among our governing class has heard of John Stuart Mill or could say what the Enlightenment was about? Could any articulate how Christianity shaped Western ideas of rights, duty, and human dignity? These are not pub-quiz questions. They are foundational to the order our leaders are meant to protect.

Instead we are served by a managerial class reading from a competence worksheet put together by McKinsey. They mistake box-ticking for wisdom and DEI protocols for moral precepts. Intellectually incurious and historically illiterate, our leaders imagine that what matters above all else is process, media training and fluency in the language of risk management. These are technocrats presiding over institutions whose moral and cultural logic would baffle them if they bothered to look into it.

It’s this combination of ignorance and hubris – ignorance of what liberal civilisation is, hubris about their right to redesign it – that makes the progressive ruling class so censorious, brittle and profoundly unlikeable.

For decades now, Western institutions have treated certain belief systems as exempt from serious scrutiny, provided they arrive under the banner of cultural sensitivity. Political correctness turns ideological critique into a moral transgression and disagreement into bigotry. Once that move is accepted – through decades of institutional messaging from universities, NGOs, and diversity consultancies – the public conversation becomes fraught with anxiety and policed by busybodies who derive enormous satisfaction from others’ breach of etiquette.

Language above all is where these distortions play out, and there’s no better example than with the charge of “Islamophobia”. The word functions like a magic incantation. Emotionally charged and strategically deployed, it collapses distinctions between people and ideas, specifically between Muslims as people and Islam as a system of beliefs. To be accused of “Islamophobia” is to be excommunicated from the cultural establishment and made a pariah from polite company. The substance of the argument is irrelevant.

Crucially, the term “Islamophobia” doesn’t exist to protect Muslims from violence or discrimination (a legitimate concern), but to insulate a set of ideas from scrutiny. And because progressive elites have made non-judgement a moral absolute, the tactic works, promising moral purity, high status and – as we are all now very tired of seeing – the opportunity to signal virtue.

Many of our current cultural problems stem from this same pathology. Identity narcissism, cancel culture, a far-right backlash and, above all, the persistent threat of Islamism – all of them are enabled by progressive ideology and its attendant moral confusion.

Breaking the spell doesn’t require hostility to Muslims. It means recovering moral clarity and being willing to say that liberal societies are worth defending, that some values are non-negotiable, and that not all belief systems are compatible with freedom of speech, equality before the law, or the right to leave one’s religion without fear.

By: Lisa Bildy

Published: May 12, 2026

Does anyone understand what “classical liberalism” is anymore? The British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal certainly doesn’t. Last month, it tossed out a complaint filed by a former political science professor against Simon Fraser University. He argued that he was passed over for a tenure-track position because his classical liberal beliefs did not align with the university’s demand for ideological conformity to equity, diversity & inclusion (EDI). His case didn’t even get past the gatekeeping stage. Four years after his complaint was filed, the tribunal ruled, without a hearing, that his beliefs were not grounded in a cohesive and recognized political philosophy and that there was no reasonable prospect of success.

This is the philosophy that shaped the modern West. But it’s apparently not one that the tribunal, or SFU, recognizes.

According to the decision, issued on April 15 but released publicly on May 7, Dr. Joshua Gordon’s early research focused on the sort of class-based concerns for social justice that used to preoccupy the political left: affordable housing for the working poor, the role of labour unions in building a robust welfare state, and so on. But that’s not what passes for acceptable research in today’s academic environment: ‘activist EDI’ requires the use of critical‑theory frameworks that sort people into identity groups and demand adjusted outcomes based on group hierarchy rather than individual merit or economic class. In a pluralistic society like Canada’s, this sort of thinking is corrosive.

In setting out the parties’ positions, tribunal member Devyn Cousineau noted that Dr. Gordon “describes himself as a ‘classical liberal’, who supports ‘mild EDI’, meaning ‘a liberal commitment to eliminating overt forms of discrimination and systemic barriers.’” That was the sole mention of classical liberalism in the entire decision. She could not properly characterize Gordon’s opposition to ‘activist EDI’ as classical liberalism – a coherent political tradition with centuries of scholarship – because she appeared to have no conception of it.

Perhaps that’s not surprising. Universities have spent decades marinating students in identity-based theories, and those graduates now populate the institutions that shape public meaning: media, law, education, and the public service. Meanwhile, Marxist educator Paulo Freire’s revolutionary “praxis,” drawn from Pedagogy of the Oppressed, has seeped into K–12 education, mobilizing students to view and transform society through the lens of oppression. Classical liberalism, seen by the critical theorists as an ‘oppressor ideology,’ is no longer on the syllabus.

Classical liberalism emerged during the Enlightenment as a political philosophy centred on individual rights, freedom of conscience and expression, equality before the law, and limits on state power. Drawing on earlier traditions of rational inquiry and constitutionalism, it dismantled hereditary privilege and group‑based legal hierarchies by insisting that each person possesses inherent dignity and must be treated as a rights‑bearing individual. It is the only political philosophy that treats the right to free speech as inviolable. These principles became foundational to modern Western institutions and offered a way to restrain our tribal impulses by grounding political order in universal legal equality rather than in the claims of groups or castes.

But group rights are all the rage today, and along with them an intolerance for any expression to the contrary. Despite Dr. Gordon’s strong teaching evaluations, his “responses with respect to EDI” were deemed insufficient by the activist Faculty Group – five faculty members who opposed his appointment and held enough votes to sink it. Their concern? Gordon’s statement indicated that he treated people equally, without regard to race, gender, or sexual orientation. That is no longer acceptable. Under activist EDI, one must not treat people equally; one must treat them unequally, according to a shifting hierarchy of “marginalized” identities.

This hierarchy is unstable and often incoherent. Gay men who do not identify as “queer,” or non-white individuals who hold conservative or classical liberal views, can find themselves reclassified as “oppressors.” The logic is political, not principled.

Critical theory rejects the core assumptions of the classical liberal legal order: equality before the law, individual rights, and Enlightenment rationalism. Within this framework, disagreement is treated as harm, and dissenters are viewed not as interlocutors but as obstacles to justice. The result is an ideology that cannot tolerate dissent and that must correct, exclude or sanction those who reject its premises.

Gordon’s affidavit described his worldview as prioritizing equality over equity, colour-blindness, individualism over group rights, and open inquiry over ideological policing. That political worldview has a name – classical liberalism. But according to Cousineau, it lacks “the necessary cohesion and cogency” to qualify as a protected political belief under s. 13 of the Code.

Interestingly, she concluded that the activist EDI orthodoxy embraced by the Faculty Group is not a cohesive political belief either. When an ideology becomes so pervasive that it is simply “the water everyone swims in,” its political nature can become invisible to those enforcing it. When everything is political, nothing is.