January 2023/6
It would be wrong to think that the discussion of âidentityâ ought to proceed prior to a discussion of gender identity for the simple reason that âpersonsâ only become intelligible through becoming gendered in conformity with recognisable standards of gender intelligibility.Â
Whereas the question of what constitutes âpersonal identityâ within philosophical accounts almost always centres on the question of what internal feature of the person establishes the continuity or self-identity of the person through time, the question here will be: To what extent do regulatory practices of gender formation and division constitute identity, the internal coherence of the subject, indeed, the self-identical status of the person? To what extent is âidentityâ a normative ideal rather than a descriptive feature of experience? And how do the regulatory practices that govern gender also govern culturally intelligible notions of identity? In other words, the âcoherenceâ and âcontinuityâ of âthe personâ are not logical or analytic features of personhood, but, rather, socially instituted and maintained norms of intelligibility. Inasmuch as âidentityâ is assured through the stabilising concepts of sex, gender, and sexuality, the very notion of âthe personâ is called into question by the cultural emergence of those âincoherentâ or âdiscontinuousâ gendered beings who appear to be persons but who fail to conform to the gendered norms of cultural intelligibility by which persons are defined.Â
Judith Butler, Gender Trouble, 1990
