#ethical foundations

The ontology of ethics is one of the most foundational and contested areas of philosophy. It asks: What is the fundamental nature of moral values, duties, and virtues? Do they exist independently of human minds, or are they human constructions? If they exist, what kind of reality do they have?

In essence, the ontology of ethics investigates the mode of being of the ethical. It is the inquiry into whether "good," "right," "evil," and "obligation" name features of reality itself or are projections of human subjectivity onto a morally neutral world.

Here is a systematic exploration of the ontology of ethics, mapping the major positions and the arguments for and against each.

I. THE CORE ONTOLOGICAL QUESTIONS

The ontology of ethics can be organized around a series of fundamental questions:

Do moral properties exist?

If they exist, are they objective?

If they exist, are they natural or non-natural?

If they don't exist, what are we doing when we moralize?

II. MORAL REALISM: THE CLAIM THAT MORALITY IS REAL

Moral realism is the view that moral properties exist objectively, independently of human beliefs, feelings, or conventions. Just as scientific claims aim to describe a mind-independent physical world, moral claims aim to describe a mind-independent moral reality.

A. Naturalism: Morality as Part of the Natural World

Moral naturalism holds that moral properties are natural properties—the kind studied by the empirical sciences. "Goodness" might be identical to "pleasure" (utilitarianism) or "that which promotes human flourishing" (Aristotelian naturalism).

Utilitarian Naturalism: Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill effectively identified the good with pleasure and the absence of pain. These are natural, empirically observable states. "Right" actions are those that produce the best balance of pleasure over pain.

Aristotelian Naturalism: Philippa Foot and Rosalind Hursthouse argue that moral goodness is analogous to biological flourishing. Just as a good oak tree is one that realizes its natural potential (deep roots, broad canopy, abundant acorns), a good human is one that realizes human natural potential—through virtue, reason, and community.

Cornell Realism: Richard Boyd and David Brink argue that moral properties are natural properties (like "conductive to human flourishing") that can be investigated empirically, though they may not be reducible to simpler natural properties.

Strengths: Naturalism makes ethics continuous with science. It avoids mysterious, non-natural entities. It provides a method (empirical investigation) for resolving moral disputes.

Weaknesses: The "open question argument" (G.E. Moore) suggests that for any natural property proposed as identical to "good," we can intelligibly ask: "But is it good?" This seems to show that "good" is not identical to any natural property. Also, deriving "ought" from "is" remains problematic (Hume's guillotine).

B. Non-Naturalism: Morality as Sui Generis

Non-naturalism holds that moral properties are real and objective but not reducible to natural properties. They are sui generis—of their own unique kind—and known through rational intuition rather than empirical observation.

G.E. Moore's Intuitionism: In Principia Ethica, Moore argued that "good" is a simple, indefinable, non-natural property. Just as "yellow" cannot be defined to someone who hasn't seen it, "good" cannot be defined but only directly intuited.

W.D. Ross's Pluralism: Ross argued that we have immediate, self-evident intuitions of prima facie duties (fidelity, gratitude, justice, beneficence, non-maleficence, self-improvement). These duties are objective but may conflict; judgment is required to determine our actual duty in concrete situations.

Rational Intuitionism (Audi, Huemer): Contemporary intuitionists argue that we have intellectual seeming or rational insight into basic moral truths, analogous to our insight into logical and mathematical truths.

Strengths: Non-naturalism preserves the objectivity of ethics while respecting the uniqueness of moral discourse. It explains why moral truths seem categorically binding, not merely hypothetical.

Weaknesses: Critics charge that non-naturalism posits a "queer" kind of property (J.L. Mackie)—utterly unlike anything else in the universe—and a mysterious faculty of "intuition" that lacks explanatory power. It also struggles to explain moral disagreement: if moral truths are self-evident, why do intelligent people disagree so profoundly?

C. Moral Realism in Theological Context

Classical theism provides another form of moral realism: moral properties are grounded in the nature or will of God.

Divine Command Theory: Moral obligations are commands of God. Right actions are those God commands; wrong actions are those God forbids.

Divine Nature Theory (Aquinas, Adams): Moral goodness is not arbitrary divine will but is grounded in God's necessary, unchanging nature. God's commands are expressions of this nature.

Strengths: This view provides a robust foundation for moral objectivity and explains the categorical, authoritative character of moral demands.

Weaknesses: The Euthyphro dilemma remains powerful: Is something good because God commands it (which seems arbitrary), or does God command it because it is good (which makes God subject to an independent standard)? Also, this view is unavailable to non-theists.

III. MORAL ANTI-REALISM: THE CLAIM THAT MORALITY IS NOT REAL

Moral anti-realism denies that moral properties exist objectively and independently. There is no moral reality to be discovered; morality is something we create, project, or express.

A. Error Theory: Morality is a Mistake

Error theory, most famously defended by J.L. Mackie in Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, holds that:

Moral claims purport to describe objective, mind-independent moral facts.

But no such facts exist.

Therefore, all positive moral claims are false.

Mackie's "argument from queerness" contends that objective moral properties, if they existed, would be utterly unlike anything else in the universe—they would have to be both intrinsically action-guiding and objectively prescriptive. Since we have no reason to believe in such queer entities, we should conclude that they do not exist.

Strengths: Error theory takes moral discourse seriously (it doesn't reinterpret it as something else) while maintaining a naturalistic worldview. It explains moral disagreement and the historical variability of moral codes.

Weaknesses: If all moral claims are false, then "murder is wrong" is as false as "murder is right." This seems deeply counterintuitive and undermines the practical function of morality. Error theorists struggle to explain why we should continue moralizing at all.

B. Expressivism (Non-Cognitivism): Morality as Attitude

Expressivism holds that moral claims do not describe facts at all; they express attitudes, emotions, or prescriptions.

A.J. Ayer's Emotivism: "Murder is wrong" does not state a fact but expresses disapproval: "Murder, boo!" It is more like an exclamation than a statement.

C.L. Stevenson's Emotivism: Moral terms have both descriptive and emotive meaning. They express attitudes and are used to influence others' attitudes.

R.M. Hare's Prescriptivism: Moral language is prescriptive—it tells someone what to do. "You ought to X" means something like "Do X!" combined with a commitment to universalize the prescription.

Simon Blackburn's Quasi-Realism: Blackburn attempts to capture the benefits of realism (the appearance that we are talking about objective facts) while maintaining an expressivist foundation. We "project" our attitudes onto the world and then talk as if they were properties of the world.

Strengths: Expressivism fits naturally with a naturalistic worldview. It explains the intimate connection between moral judgment and motivation (if moral judgments are expressions of attitude, their motivational force is built in). It handles the open question argument effortlessly.

Weaknesses: Critics charge that expressivism fails to capture the cognitive content of moral discourse. When we say "torture is wrong," we seem to be saying something about torture, not just expressing our feelings. The "Frege-Geach problem" challenges expressivists to explain how moral terms function in unasserted contexts (e.g., "If torture is wrong, then what X did was wrong"). Expressivists have developed sophisticated responses, but the debate continues.

C. Constructivism: Morality as Rational Construction

Constructivism offers a middle path between realism and anti-realism. Moral truths are not discovered (realism) nor merely projected (expressivism); they are constructed through rational procedures.

Kantian Constructivism (John Rawls, Christine Korsgaard): Moral principles are those that would be agreed upon by rational agents under conditions of fairness (Rawls's original position) or that are constitutive of rational agency itself (Korsgaard).

Humean Constructivism (Sharon Street): Moral values are constructed from our contingent, evaluative starting points through a process of reflective equilibrium. There is no Archimedean point outside our evaluative perspective.

Strengths: Constructivism avoids the metaphysical commitments of realism while preserving moral objectivity (at least relative to a procedure). It explains why moral reasoning matters: we are working out the implications of our own commitments.

Weaknesses: Critics question whether constructivism delivers genuine objectivity. If the procedure is itself a matter of choice, the results may be less binding than moral truth requires. The scope of constructivism (can it generate all moral truths?) is also contested.

IV. THE METAPHYSICAL DEPTH OF ETHICAL ONTOLOGY

The ontology of ethics is not merely an abstract exercise. The position one takes has profound implications for how we understand:

Moral Motivation: If moral properties are real and objective, why should they motivate us? Realists must explain the connection between recognizing a moral fact and being moved to act. Expressivists build motivation into the moral judgment itself.

Moral Disagreement: Realists must explain how sincere, intelligent people can disagree about objective moral truths. Anti-realists must explain why we argue as if there were objective truths.

Moral Progress: If morality is constructed or projected, can there be genuine moral progress? Realists can say we have discovered truths previously hidden. Constructivists can say our constructions have improved. Error theorists face a challenge: "progress" must be defined in non-moral terms.

The Meaning of Life: For many, the reality of moral value is essential to a meaningful life. If morality is an illusion, is life itself illusory? Existentialists like Sartre embraced this conclusion; Camus defiantly affirmed meaning despite the absurd.

V. CONCLUSION: THE UNFINISHED INQUIRY

The ontology of ethics remains one of philosophy's deepest and most contested domains. After millennia of debate, there is no consensus. Each position captures something important:

Realism captures the sense that some things are truly wrong, not just matters of opinion.

Naturalism captures the continuity between ethics and our empirical understanding of the world.

Non-naturalism captures the unique, authoritative character of moral demands.

Theological realism captures the sense that morality is grounded in something transcendent.

Error theory captures the difficulty of fitting morality into a naturalistic worldview.

Expressivism captures the intimate connection between morality and emotion/attitude.

Constructivism captures the active, reasoning dimension of moral life.

Perhaps the deepest truth about the ontology of ethics is that it forces us to confront our own nature as beings who experience the world as morally meaningful. Whether that meaning is discovered in the fabric of reality or projected from the depths of our own subjectivity, the experience of obligation, of value, of right and wrong is as fundamental to being human as perception itself.