#distributivejustice

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although there is a strong argument against the contention, i think political philosophy adds a thoughtful substance to the wrath of the protestors. (getting it out of the way: the “strong argument against” being that purposefully-unarticulated wrath, or intuitive wrath, is the heart of the whole thing—articulated wrath quickly “becomes” a part of the “political-language system,” and is subject to its control; that is, the wrath as expressed through “political language” loses its agency, is transformed, diminished, pared down to nothing, or what have you; and yeah, there is definitely something to that.) but still. if your intuition leads to rage, then probably(?) there are rational arguments out there which may clothe your rage in a useful form—and the trick then is finding a language enclave which is good and free—or one at least which has a tendency to be good and free. and thus, american politicians tend not to care about classical liberalism vs. egalitarian liberalism, or affirmative vs. transformative redistributions of wealth; and so i see little harm (of the kind worried about above—because obviously there might be classist harm)  in clothing protestor wrath in egalitarian political philosophy. in any event, the following excerpts are pretty on-point. (note also that             this stuff is pretty tame; communitarians like robin west tend to be even         more out there, in the left.) “For these writers, the historical emphasis on toleration, plurality and justice underscore their work; they differ on their interpretation of toleration, public and private roles, and the perceived need for opportunities to be created or not. Some modern liberals, however, do try to remove themselves from classical liberalism (for example, Kymlicka) and therefore become more like ‘social democrats’, that is, humanitarians of a socialist bent who assert the primacy of minorities and even individuals to partake freely in the democratic processes and political dialogues, or whose emphasis on equality demands an active and interventionist state that classical liberals would reject. Dworkin, for example, claims justice is the essential motif of liberalism and that the state’s duty is to ensure a just and fair opportunity for all to compete and flourish in a civil society. That may require active state intervention in some areas – areas that classical liberals would reject as being inadmissible in a free economy. Dworkin’s position emanates from Aristotle’s ethical argument that for a person to pursue the good life he requires a certain standard of living. Poverty is not conducive to pursuing the contemplative life, hence many modern liberals are attracted to redistributive or welfare policies. Such fairness in opportunity to create equal opportunities underpins John Stuart Mill’s liberalism for example. However, the modern liberal’s emphasis on equality is criticized by classical liberals who argue that people are neither born equal nor can be made equal: talents (and motivation) are distributed unequally across a population, which means that attempts to reduce men and women to the same status will imply a reduction in the ability (or freedom) of the more talented to act and to strive for their own progression. Similarly, the modern liberal’s criticism of inherited wealth is chastised as being misplaced: although the policy connects well to the desire to ensure an equal start for all, not all parents’ gifts to their children are monetary in nature. Indeed, some, following Andrew Carnegie’s self-help philosophy, may contend that monetary inheritances can be counter-productive, fostering habits of dependency.-IEP http://www.iep.utm.edu/polphil/ “These two authors are noted political philosophers. Ronald Dworkin … Mr Dworkin’s aim in “Sovereign Virtue” is to rescue the “endangered” value of equality and to accommodate it to personal responsibility. He chides modern conservatives for short-changing the first ideal and old egalitarians for neglecting the second. His own middle position is what he calls an “ethical individualism” embodying two principles: it is equally important, for each human life, that it be successful; and every person has a special responsibility for the success of his own life. If you take both these ideas seriously, you will be driven, so Mr Dworkin argues, to demand equality of resources. Mr Dworkin is not advocating primitive communism, and the idea of a market is built in from the start. Resources are equal, in his sense, if their distribution passes an “envy test”, by which he means that no one would prefer anyone else’s property bundle. Resources are costed in terms of social opportunity: the value of my bundle depends on how much it is worth to everyone else. These two ideas—the “envy test” and social opportunity cost—come together in an imaginary initial auction of an island’s resources by shipwreck survivors. Are we yet at equality? Not quite. Brute luck, which deals out talents and handicaps, will produce inequality down the road. And Mr Dworkin thinks that collectively we have a duty to correct for this, too. He imagines a hypothetical insurance market that would work as follows: identify the premium the average person would pay to insure against bad luck; by taxation, collect an amount equal to all the premiums, then distribute the total so that people receive what they would have got through insurance. Equal concern leads Mr Dworkin to equality of resources and this ideal in turn connects with political legitimacy: a government that does not show equal concern for its citizens is, he says, a tyranny. If equal concern amounts to assuring equal resources, this implies that probably no government is or was legitimate. A weaker and perhaps more persuasive view is that a legitimate government must show a minimum, but not necessarily equal, concern for its citizens. The most ambitious chapter of “Sovereign Virtue” seeks to square liberty with equality by building liberty into the notion of equal resources. But might not equal resources be imposed by a benevolent dictator using a brilliantly programmed computer? That would violate democracy, but Mr Dworkin’s case for equal resources is meant to work without appealing to political equality.” –the economist, http://www.economist.com/node/374861 “Let me begin by briefly distinguishing affirmation and transformation. By affirmative remedies for injustice, I mean remedies aimed at correcting inequitable outcomes of social arrangements without disturbing the underlying framework that generates them. By transformative remedies, in contrast, I mean remedies aimed at correcting inequitable outcomes precisely by restructuring the underlying generative framework. The crux of the contrast is end-state outcomes versus the processes that produce them. It is not gradual versus apocalyptic change. This distinction can be applied, first of all, to remedies for cultural injustice. Affirmative remedies for such injustices are currently associated with what I shall call “mainstream multiculturalism.” This sort of multiculturalism proposes to redress disrespect by revaluing unjustly devalued group identities, while leaving intact both the contents of those identities and the group differentiations that underlie them. Transformative remedies, by contrast, are currently associated with deconstruction. They would redress disrespect by transforming the underlying cultural-valuational structure. By destabilising existing group identities and differentiations, these remedies would not only raise the self-esteem of members of currently disrespected groups. they would change everyone’s sense of self. Analogous distinctions hold for the remedies for economic injustice. Affirmative remedies for such injustices have been associated historically with the liberal welfare state. They seek to redress end-state maldistribution, while leaving intact much of the underlying political-economic structure. Thus, they would increase the consumption share of economically disadvantaged groups, without otherwise restructuring the system of production. Transformative remedies, in contrast, have been historically associated with socialism. They would redress unjust distribution by transforming the underlying political-economic structure. By restructuring the relations of production, these remedies would not only alter the end-state distribution of consumption shares; they would also change the social division of labour and thus the conditions of existence for everyone. Now contrast this logic with transformative remedies for distributive injustices of class. Transformative remedies typically, combine universalist social-welfare programs, steeply progressive taxation, macroeconomic policies aimed at creating full employment, a large nonmarket public sector, significant public and/or collective ownership, and democratic decision making about basic socioeconomic priorities. They try to assure access to employment for all, while also tending to delink basic consumption shares from employment. Hence, their tendency is to undermine class differentiation. Transformative remedies reduce social inequality without, however, creating stigmatised classes of vulnerable people perceived as beneficiaries of special largesse. They tend therefore to promote reciprocity and solidarity in the relations of recognition. Thus, an approach aimed at redressing injustices of distribution can help redress (some) injustices of recognition as well. This approach is self-consistent. Like affirmative redistribution, transformative redistribution generally presupposes a univeralist conception of recognition, the equal moral worth of persons. Unlike affirmative redistribution, however, its practice tends not to undermine this conception. Thus, the two approaches generate different logics of group differentiation. Whereas affirmative remedies can have the perverse effect of promoting class differentiation, transformative remedies tend to blur it. In addition, the two approaches generate different subliminal dynamics of recognition. Affirmative redistribution can stigmatise the disadvantaged, adding the insult of misrecognition to the injury of deprivation. Transformative redistribution, in contrast, can promote solidarity, helping to redress some forms of misrecognition. What, then, should we conclude from this discussion? In this section, we have considered only the “pure” ideal-typical cases at the two extremes of the conceptual spectrum. We have contrasted the divergent effects of affirmative and transformative remedies for the economically rooted distributive injustices of class, on the one hand, and for the culturally rooted recognition injustices of sexuality, on the other. We saw that affirmative remedies tend generally to promote group differentiation, while transformative remedies tend to destabilise or blur it. We also saw that affirmative redistribution remedies can generate a backlash of misrecognition, while transformative redistribution remedies can help redress some forms of misrecognition.” nancy fraser, From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a “Postsocialist” Age http://ethicalpolitics.org/blackwood/fraser.htm