#developmentseries

the starting point: the agenda is not built on the assumption that zambia needs to start over. it is built on the assumption that what has worked — the SCT programme, the ART rollout, the mobile money ecosystem, the MFEZ model — needs to be scaled, sustained, and supplemented with specific investments in specific gaps.

priority one — energy: every other development priority depends on energy. the education system, health system, agricultural transformation, and manufacturing industries all depend on affordable, reliable power. the investments underway — 61.8MW of solar in 2024, 600MWh of battery storage, net metering — must be accelerated and complemented by larger-scale solutions: batoka gorge, the angola HVDC interconnector.

priority two — secondary school completion: the gap between 97.2% primary enrolment and 49.9% secondary enrolment is the most direct measure of the human capital investment zambia is currently failing to make at the secondary level. school feeding programmes, targeted cash transfers for continued enrolment, community secondary school construction, and the girls2030 programme.

priority three — water infrastructure: 46% of rural population without safely managed drinking water, 5-7% of irrigable potential under irrigation. a borehole installed is fewer waterborne disease incidents, reduced school absenteeism, and freed hours for women and girls. irrigation installed is two crops per year, insulated from el niño drought vulnerability.

priority four — informal economy productivity: connectivity for mobile money in rural areas, digital literacy for agritech platforms, cold storage and market access infrastructure allowing farmers to sell at market prices rather than distress prices.

priority five — sustained social protection: social cash transfers are not charity. they are human capital investment. the SCT programme at 1.56 million households, with the world bank simulation showing six percentage point poverty reduction from universal coverage, makes the fiscal case as well as the moral case.

zambia's next decade is, if these five priorities are pursued at scale and with sustained commitment, the decade in which the conversion happens — in which extraordinary endowment begins to produce the broad-based welfare that zambia's assets can and should provide.

the paradox, stated precisely: nineteen posts later, the series can state the development paradox more precisely than the first post did. it is not a paradox of absence. it is a paradox of conversion — the challenge of converting extraordinary natural endowment into broad-based human welfare at the pace and scale that a rapidly growing population demands.

the gains the series has documented: child mortality fallen 61% since 2000. primary school enrolment at 97.2%. ART reaching 85%+ of people living with HIV who know their status. the SCT programme reaching 1.56 million households. mobile money from 14% to 69% of adults in a decade. the LSMFEZ attracting $1.68 billion and 12,500 jobs.

the gaps the series has documented: secondary school enrolment at 49.9%. zambia falling well below the WHO minimum of 44.5 health workers per 10,000 population. mental health treatment gap exceeding 90%. 46% of rural population without safely managed drinking water. 85%+ of smallholder farmers practising rain-fed agriculture. 60-70% of lusaka in informal settlements. youth informal employment at 90%.

the pattern the series found: zambia's development gains have been achieved through specific, targeted interventions that work because they address specific, defined problems with specific, effective tools. zambia's development gaps are concentrated in areas where the same specificity is harder to achieve.

the three conclusions: first — zambia's development story is not a failure. it is a partial success at a pace the opportunity demands should be faster. second — the gap between endowment and welfare has specific, addressable causes and specific, evidence-backed solutions. third — investment creates the fiscal space for development. development creates the human capital that makes investment sustainable. neither story is complete without the other.

zambia's paradox is not permanent. it is the gap between what has already been built and what remains to be built. and the evidence is that the building is underway.

the development argument: zambia's public sector is making genuine progress on health, education, infrastructure, and social protection — but at a pace constrained by fiscal capacity. the mathematics are clear: the development investments zambia needs cannot be funded by the public sector alone. private sector investment is the mechanism through which the revenue, employment, and economic activity that funds everything else is generated.

the four specific constraints:

power supply: the load-shedding crisis was not only a crisis for international mining companies. it was a crisis for every zambian business that depends on reliable electricity — the bakery whose products spoil, the manufacturer whose production schedule is disrupted, the hospital whose equipment requires stable power, the school whose computer lab is useless. affordable, accessible distributed energy solutions for SMEs are the specific gap the energy constraint requires addressing.

access to finance: the formal financial sector's coverage of zambian businesses is limited by collateral requirements, credit assessment methodologies designed for formal income, and high interest rates. SAFF, the LuSE GEM portal, and mobile money lending are all attempts to extend financial access to SMEs — but the gap between what these reach and what the full population of zambian SMEs needs remains large.

land and property rights: a business without clear title to its operating premises cannot use those premises as collateral, cannot invest with the confidence of permanence, and is exposed to displacement risk.

skills: the new curriculum is the right long-term response to the skills gap. the immediate constraint requires targeted vocational and technical training that bridges the gap between current graduate supply and current business demand.

the development case: when the private sector grows in zambia, people find employment. when people find employment, tax revenues increase. when tax revenues increase, the public sector can invest more in health, education, and infrastructure. the private sector is not separate from the development story. it is the engine without which the story cannot proceed at the pace the opportunity demands.

what the SCT programme is: regular, non-contributory cash payments to households with elderly persons aged 60+, persons with disabilities, child-headed households, and households caring for chronically ill individuals. no conditionalities — robust impact evaluations show beneficiary households consistently spend transfers on improving livelihoods and human capital.

the programme's growth: began as five separate pilots between 2003 and 2010, each targeting the poorest 10% of households in its district. expanded from 53 districts in 2014 to all 116 districts by 2021. by february 2026, reached over 1.56 million households.

the 2025-2026 expansion: government planned 250,000 new households for 2025, but after extensive nationwide sensitisation, more than 300,000 were ultimately added. new enrolments used scientifically developed poverty-targeting methods aligned with zambia statistics agency profiling standards.

the payment structure: beneficiaries receive K150, paid bimonthly (K180 per payment), with persons with disabilities receiving double (K300). payments made six times per year through cash, mobile network payments, and bank transfers.

the nutrition-sensitive pilot: 23,000 households in kawambwa, monze, mumbwa, and chibombo districts integrate poverty reduction with child nutrition interventions.

the evidence on impact: a world bank simulation found regular cash transfers to all eligible beneficiaries could reduce poverty in zambia by six percentage points. a 65-year-old caring for a disabled husband and four orphaned children. a 70-year-old paying grandchildren's school fees. a widowed mother turning a K300 payment into K400 in doughnut sales funding her foster children's school fees.

the fiscal and development argument: social cash transfers are a direct human capital investment, not a welfare cost. a programme reaching 1.56 million households, financed by the world bank, UK, and sweden, is a core pillar of zambia's development infrastructure.

the safety net is not a side story to zambia's development. for 1.56 million households, it is the most direct development intervention they receive.

why the old curriculum failed to deliver: widely criticised as outdated and not aligned with job market needs. the 2022 UNESCO report found zambia's teachers often lacked adequate teacher guides aligned with the curriculum. the result: strong enrolment numbers but foundational literacy and numeracy below the levels primary completion should guarantee.

what the new curriculum changes: validated 2024, implementation began january 2025. significant emphasis on STEM subjects. strengthens vocational and ICT competencies. the judgement: graduates need skills matching what mining technology, agritech, fintech, and the broader digital transformation actually require.

what successful curriculum reform requires — four conditions: teacher retraining (not just what changed but how to teach it effectively, particularly in under-resourced rural schools). learning materials (new textbooks, teacher guides, and computers and digital tools for ICT components, constrained by connectivity and power gaps). assessment systems measuring whether students acquired intended skills rather than rote memorisation testing. sustained funding — curriculum reform is not a one-time cost.

the implementation reality: eighteen months in, zambia is in the difficult middle phase where reforms most often falter. the 2025 world bank edtech readiness index — more than half of TVET institutions reporting unreliable electricity despite grid connection, teachers at beginner digital proficiency — directly measures the implementation gap for ICT components.

the STEM ambition and the economy it serves: a direct response to specific labour market needs — the data analysts the mine of 2031 will need, the agronomic extension officers operating ZIAMIS, the software engineers building on mobile money infrastructure, the technicians maintaining predictive maintenance systems.

the stakes: zambia's 60% under-25 population depends on an education system that converts enrolment into capability. the new curriculum's success or failure over the coming decade will be one of the most consequential development stories in zambia's near-term future.

the el niño shock: in early 2024, zambia declared a state of disaster. more than 1 million hectares of cropland affected, maize production reduced by up to 40%. approximately 5 million zambians — roughly a quarter of the country's population — pushed into acute food insecurity.

the drought's economic dimension: not only an agricultural event — a development event. maize price increases cascaded through the food supply chain. ZESCO's electricity generation fell sharply as kariba's water level dropped, causing prolonged load shedding. the drought affected health, education, business activity, household welfare, and government fiscal revenues simultaneously.

the structural vulnerability: more than 85% of zambia's smallholder farmers practise rain-fed agriculture. in a world where climate change is increasing the frequency and severity of drought events in southern africa, this rain-fed dependency is a structural vulnerability whose costs the 2023-2024 drought has now quantified.

the investment argument: approximately 423,000 hectares under irrigation — roughly 5-7% of zambia's irrigable potential. every additional hectare under reliable irrigation is not dependent on rainfall, can produce two crops per year, and represents a buffer against food security shocks. the return on irrigation investment is among the highest of any development investment in zambia's portfolio.

crop diversification: zambia's smallholder sector is disproportionately dependent on maize. government support for soybean, groundnut, cassava, and sorghum production reduces this risk. ZIAMIS digital extension services provide crop diversification advice and early warning systems based on rainfall and temperature data.

the emergency preparedness dimension: the strategic food reserve was depleted more rapidly than anticipated, requiring more extensive international procurement than a better-managed reserve would have required.

food security is the development story's foundation. a country whose food security is vulnerable to el niño cannot sustain educational, health, and economic progress — because a drought year erases years of progress simultaneously. the el niño lesson is an investment mandate.

the global minimum standard: the WHO recommends a minimum of 44.5 health workers per 10,000 population. zambia falls well below this threshold, with sustained workforce pressure affecting the quality and accessibility of care at every level.

the training capacity: zambia trains doctors primarily at UNZA school of medicine and CBU school of medicine — combined annual output significantly smaller than required to fill vacancies while replacing those who retire or emigrate. clinical officers — with three-year clinical training — are zambia's most important front-line health workforce cadre, providing a significant proportion of care at district hospitals and health centres.

the brain drain: a doctor who completes UNZA training is a competitive candidate for overseas recruitment by the UK NHS, australian hospitals, or south african health systems. the UK's active recruitment of trained health workers from low- and middle-income countries draws from the same workforce zambia needs for its own system.

the rural-urban maldistribution: health professionals prefer urban postings — career opportunities, school quality, housing, social infrastructure. government rural service requirements address the maldistribution partially. retention after the mandatory posting period is low.

the community health worker response: trained lay health workers deployed into communities, delivering antenatal care promotion, immunisation support, nutrition counselling, malaria prevention, and basic triage — within communities where formal health workers rotate through the system.

the investment argument: the return on investment in health worker training and retention is among the highest in the development portfolio. a health worker trained, employed, and retained in zambia produces health outcomes that improve educational attainment, labour force productivity, and household welfare across their entire career.

the health workforce is not a fixed resource. it is a buildable resource — if the training capacity, the retention incentives, and the deployment infrastructure are aligned.

the scale of the challenge: lusaka's population has grown from approximately 300,000 in 1980 to roughly 3 million today — a tenfold increase in four decades, driven by rural-urban migration, high natural population growth, and the concentration of economic opportunity in the capital.

what urban planning does: it determines where roads go, which areas are designated for housing, where schools and health clinics are built, where water and sanitation infrastructure is laid. when planning works well, infrastructure comes before or alongside population. when it doesn't — informal settlement: communities where people build where they can, without the infrastructure that formal planning would have provided.

lusaka's planning history: designed as a colonial-era capital for approximately 100,000 people. the lusaka structure plan has been revised periodically, but implementation has consistently lagged behind the pace of development. the result: settlement in areas not designated for it, roads not built where settlement has occurred, infrastructure consistently chasing rather than preceding population growth.

the three planning priorities:

first: settlement upgrading with security of tenure. in-situ upgrading of existing settlements — road access, water and sanitation, electricity, formal land titles — rather than demolition and relocation. the evidence base for this approach is now strong enough to inform policy decisions in lusaka.

second: corridor development planning for new settlement areas. designating roads, utilities, and service zones that define the structure of new development areas before settlement occurs — allowing infrastructure to precede population rather than chasing it.

third: transport infrastructure. reliable, affordable, high-frequency bus rapid transit routes connecting major residential areas to employment centres — the single planning intervention that would most improve the daily experience of the majority of lusaka's residents.

lusaka is going to grow. the question is whether it grows in ways that make the lives of its residents better or in ways that compound the challenges the development series has described.