"The New Dealâs simultaneous aggrandizement of carceral capacity and attention to rehabilitation served to construct carceral liberalism. In the early 1930s, Roosevelt deployed his bold ideas through the jurisdictional complexity that he inherited. Along with its national ambition and constitutional humility, carceral liberalism balanced radical reformism with disciplinary pragmatism, and so by the late 1930s a discernible program arose, combining discipline with a rejection of brutality. The conceit of humane incarceration promised to make the carceral state more palatable even as it expanded. Whether in defending repression in terms of its opposite or leveraging state power as a critique of itself, Sanford Bates [director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons], Homer Cummings [Attorney-General], and Howard Gill [former head of the Norfolk Prison Colony] each articulated different facets of this new paradoxical program.
Batesâs 1937 Prisons and Beyond offered one reconciliation of the tensions. Bates championed scientific understanding of every prisoner, the abolition of county jails, restorative justice, and a âmore or less permanentâ isolation of âincorrigible criminalsâ from society. He wanted effective parole and probationâa humane regime of âconstructive disciplineâ that avoided âbrutality on the one hand and sentimentality on the other.â Hardly a work of reactive expediency, Batesâs tract depicted the prison as a social constant, a fixture of the future, its core functions eclipsing historical particularity. Bates optimistically anticipated technocratic discipline, which had already defeated the draconian vagaries of antiquity. With âthe failure of the British colonial penal venturesâ now behind, âwe have discovered much about sanitation, hygiene, and protective medicine,â Bates enthused. The world was made smaller by the âtelegraph and radioâ and there remained âno inherent reason why a prison colony should be a place where cruelty abides.â Bates enthusiastically envisaged the âprison of the future!â freed of the need for âsilent, lonelyâ guards carrying firearms âat great expense to the taxpayers,â for the âinstitutionsâ might be âprotected entirely by science.â Batesâs prison was liberated not only from history but also from materialist political economy, with disciplinary âpublic-work projects, labor camps, and opportunities for individual or group serviceâ shorn from such considerations as unfair competition with free labor. Prison laborâs purpose was to provide prisoners with meaningful work.
Bates rejected brutality but eschewed the very notion of leniency, defending reform on disciplinary grounds. Restitution would prevent lax justice. Inmate psychiatry did not imply coddling. Batesâs ideal deputy warden was an âabsolute monarchâ who must âdecide as justly as he canâ whether inmates violated rules so as âto mete out punishment. He must be neither too soft nor too harsh.â Even Batesâs defense of parole venerated the punitive state. Far from lessening reliance on punishment, parole would augment and ensure it. Parole violations had loose standards of due process that could easily ensnare the guilty and afford âa higher degree of protection to the public.â Parole thus meant longer prison sentences. In sum, Batesâs harsh vision was not reactionary but visionary. His carceral utopia of discipline and redemption in reciprocal reinforcement, freed from its premodern and economically grounded past, was already on its way.
Bates even started sounding different on Alcatraz. Once a critic of its lack of rehabilitative functions, he now argued that even with the strictest âdisciplineâ in the federal system, Warden Johnston ensured âthat no brutality or inhumanity shall be practiced.â Batesâs change of mind pleased Cummings, who, now retired, was defending the prison against media depictions of torture and mistreatment, and criticisms from his successor, Attorney General Frank Murphy. Cummings vented: abolishing this âsymbol of the triumph of law and orderâ would be a âtragedy.â Bates shared Cummingsâs distaste for the âselfish and ill-timedâ press reports and agreed that the institution was âhumanely and efficiently administeredâ and its inmate treatment gave no âcause for concern.â
Whereas in the early 1930s Cummings and Bates represented distinct strains of New Deal penology, their carceral liberalism now converged on Alcatraz. While Bates defended rehabilitation for serving discipline, Cummings defended his unforgiving prison on reformist grounds. Cummingsâs 1939 defense of Alcatraz turned on the dyad of control and humanityâmirrored in his depiction of Bates as a âcareer penologist of long experience . . . both a scholar and a realist.â Cummings stressed Alcatrazâs decency: Its prisoners enjoyed designated time to âtalk freelyâ and smoke cigarettes. They could choose between âlightâ or âheavyâ portions of the âgood and wholesomeâ mess hall offerings, although they had to finish their plates unless sick. And despite its housing the 300 of the most seemingly dangerous inmates out of 17,000 federal prisonersâdespite a founding purpose of unremittingly detaining the irredeemableââeven some of those in Alcatraz may sometime reform,â Cummings conceded. Consulting with Bates, he had transferred some prisoners from Alcatraz to other prisons. In other words, security and redemption were like yin and yang, each containing a seed of the other.
In response to his piece, Cummings received reassurance that Alcatraz would survive its public relations stumble and would serve âan essential public need through the years.â One letter hailed Alcatrazâs âstringent discipline without brutality,â which secured âhumane treatment for the other nine tenths of society.â For the sake of âhonest men crushed . . . by inexorable circumstances,â America should âstiffen her back against the brigand and racketeer in high places as well as lowâ and âlet hardened criminals have the hard rock.â Bates applauded the diplomatic tone of Cummingsâs article, which he guessed was âa little more dignified than you would have liked it to be.â Roosevelt responded with encouragement that âno one is in in a better position to explain the purposeâ than its architect Cummings, but stayed neutral on the controversy between his attorneys general. Despite internal disagreements in the war-on-crime coalition, the island prison was secure in the New Deal state. It would stay open until 1963.
...
But carceral liberalism was not mere synthesis of discipline and reformâ it contained one more paradox, a critique of itself, a radical dissent that legitimated the whole. The minority report lived in Howard Gill, author of volume 5 of the Survey of Release Procedures, published in 1940. Gill, once a superintendent at Norfolk Prison Colony in Massachusetts, issued a scathing indictment of prison growth. Gill lamented the increasing reliance on prisons. The public were told âthat only with high walls, steel bars, and cage-like cells were criminals kept from breaking forth to murder, rob and rape law-abiding citizens,â but prison construction âcreated a vicious circle.â The system fueled âas much desperation and degradation as it has sought to restrain.â Incarceration had become blunt and indiscriminate, sometimes allowing âthe most dangerous criminalsâ more âfreedomâ than lesser offenders. Prison design harmed prisoners and poisoned their will. Subjecting virtually all prisoners to âinterior cell blocks, originally designed as punishment cellsâ was in fact âunnecessary, expensive, and detrimental to health and morale.â
Interestingly, volume 5 included the most radical indictment of carceral systems, focused as it was on prisons themselves. And yet the radicalism of its critique barely extended to the problem of race, which would come to define the penitentiary in future years. Here and there Gill mentioned segregation and racial discrimination, but only in several passing mentions, such as noting that Texas prisons âusually separatedâ the races, as did Mississippiâs. Gill also gestured toward the strange racial practices of carceral disciplineâbut with very little commentary. He noted the curiosity that in Missouriâs âprison farms . . . a dozen white inmates act as unarmed guard-foremen over negro crews working in the fields.â In this respect Gill embodied the colorblind conceit of carceral liberalism. As he leveled the most adamant criticism of any of the volumes, he spent little time on the long-term racial consequences of the system that the national government was building in cooperation with the Jim Crow South and the discriminatory North.
Nevertheless, volume 5 dissented from the dominant ethos of prison discipline, articulated by Bates and Cummings in defending Alcatraz. In prisoners âthe maintenance of disciplineâ remained âonly skin-deep while underneath there smolder the fires of revolt, kept hot by the demands of those in authority.â Prison order relied on a myriad of ârules and regulations, not only for inmates but for guards and officers alikeâârules enforcing good manners, banning unpatriotic behavior, and much else. Unwritten rules were potentially tyrannical. The relationship between officer and prisoner resembled that between Indiaâs higher castes and âuntouchables.â
But Gillâs outlook was fatalistic. The need to shield society âfrom the depredations of the abnormal, sub-normal, or vicious criminalâ made prisons necessary, however evil. This short-term pragmatism accompanied a long-term pessimism; searching the American history of incarceration for ârehabilitation, moral, physical, intellectual or industrial, does not incline one to an optimistic conclusion.â Volume 5 marked the radical boundary of carceral liberalism, simultaneously building and lamenting the instruments of repression."
- Anthony Gregory, New Deal Law and Order: How the War on Crime Built the Modern Liberal State (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Univervisity Press, 2024), p. 230-232, 233-234.


















