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Merlin has a real strategic story — autonomy, certification progress, defense traction. But the filings still show minimal revenue and a financial profile that hasn’t caught up.

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The filings suggest Merlin has real technical progress, fresh capital, and a strategic defense bridge. They do not yet show a business that has proved commercial traction.

Summary

Merlin’s filings outline a company with a credible autonomy narrative, visible certification progress, defense-backed execution, and fresh capital, but they still describe a business with minimal revenue, heavy losses, and a common-equity story complicated by dilution and resale overhang. The May 14, 2026 8-K is useful because it highlights the milestones management wants investors to focus on, including automated takeoffs, certification progress, and the early commercial framing of Condor. The May 15, 2026 10-Q is more important because it is the first public-company quarterly test of whether Merlin’s technical story is starting to translate into operating traction. The April 29, 2026 8-K, May 6, 2026 S-1, and related 424B3 filings make clear that improved liquidity comes with meaningful dilution and secondary-supply risk. For now, MRLN still looks like a conditional setup: the strategic story is real, but the numbers do not yet make the equity case easy.

The Setup

Merlin is easy to understand at the narrative level and much harder to underwrite at the filing level. The pitch is attractive: autonomy for fixed-wing aircraft, progress on certification, a foothold in defense, and a possible path into commercial aviation. The problem is that the first public-company filings still describe a business with minimal revenue, a heavy cost base, and an equity story shaped as much by financing and dilution as by operating traction. The right question for investors is not whether Merlin sounds interesting. It is whether the latest filings show the first signs of a real operating company emerging from a complex post-merger structure.

So far, the answer is mixed. The filings show a company with credible technical momentum and more financial flexibility than it had just weeks earlier. They do not yet show a business that has proved it can translate those milestones into meaningful revenue.

Figure 1. Merlin’s latest filings point to a company with credible technical progress and stronger liquidity, but still limited operating proof and a common-equity story shaped by dilution and resale overhang.

The Filing Evidence

The clearest near-term evidence still points to a company that is strategically interesting but financially very early. The May 14 earnings-release 8-K reported first-quarter revenue of just $1.0 million, up only slightly from $0.9 million a year earlier. Adjusted EBITDA loss was $23.3 million, while GAAP net loss reached $90.4 million because of fair-value and transaction-related accounting items. Management emphasized the right milestones for the long-term story — automated fixed-wing takeoffs, progress with the New Zealand CAA in coordination with the FAA, continued execution on the USSOCOM C-130J program, and an initial commercial framework for Condor with World Star Aviation — but those are still inputs into a future revenue case, not proof that Merlin has already built one.

That distinction matters. Merlin’s release gives investors real reasons to believe the underlying strategic story is moving forward. It does not yet give them enough evidence to conclude that the operating model has caught up.

The May 15 10-Q is the more important filing because it is the first public-company quarterly report that can test whether Merlin’s narrative is starting to translate into operating traction. It should not be read as a clean historical run-rate. It should be read as a transition-period snapshot under a new capital structure. That makes two figures matter more than anything else: reported revenue and operating cash burn. Nearly every other headline number has to be filtered through merger accounting, financing effects, preferred obligations, warrants, and other structural items that can distort the apparent pace of progress.

In practical terms, the 10-Q is less about proving Merlin is already scaled and more about showing whether there is a credible bridge from technical milestones to an investable operating model. At this stage, that bridge still looks conceptual rather than fully built.

The capital-markets filings make clear that this is still a liquidity-and-dilution story as much as an operating one. The April 29 8-K laid out the $80 million PIPE, which closed on May 1 and included 8,000,000 common shares plus a warrant to purchase up to 4,000,000 shares at an initial exercise price of $6.67 per share, expiring on April 29, 2031. Management framed the proceeds as funding platform development, regulatory work, program scaling, and customer execution. That financing gave Merlin breathing room. It did not eliminate the equity complications.

The May 6 S-1 and the subsequent 424B3 filings matter for a different reason: they define the overhang. The S-1 registered 13,336,000 shares for resale, consisting of the 8,000,000 PIPE Shares and up to 5,336,000 Warrant Shares. The filing states that those registered shares represent roughly 13.5% of issued and outstanding common stock assuming the Warrant Shares are issued. It also notes that full cash exercise of the PIPE warrants could generate approximately $26.7 million of additional proceeds for the company. That is why Merlin’s improved balance-sheet position cannot be viewed in isolation from its dilution profile: better liquidity may still come with enough secondary supply to cap the common-equity story even if execution improves.

The Opportunity — and the Problem

The bull case is not that Merlin already looks like a strong operating company. It does not. The bull case is that the market may be underestimating how much of the current financial profile reflects an early investment phase rather than a finished economic model. Merlin now has more cash, visible certification progress, and a defense-backed credibility bridge while management tries to extend the story into commercial aviation.

If those milestones begin converting into customer adoption faster than investors expect, today’s weak revenue base could look more like timing risk than structural failure. In that scenario, the filings would eventually be remembered as the awkward first public snapshot of a company that was further along strategically than the numbers initially suggested.

The bear case is simpler and, for now, better supported by the filings. Revenue is tiny. The cost base is large. Losses remain significant even after adjusting for accounting noise. And the equity story may still be boxed in by warrants, resale registration, and the practical overhang created by financing.

In other words, Merlin still looks more like a credibility gap story than an operating proof story. The strategic narrative is moving. The numbers have not caught up yet. That is the central tension in the stock.

What Could Still Go Wrong

The key risks are straightforward. First, Merlin still has to prove that technical milestones, certification progress, and defense execution can turn into repeatable commercial revenue. Second, balance-sheet improvement does not remove dilution risk; warrants, preferred-linked obligations, resale registration, and secondary supply can still pressure the equity even if liquidity improves. Third, the long-term story depends on timelines Merlin does not fully control. Delays in certification, adoption, or contract expansion would leave investors with a strategically interesting company that remains financially unproven.

Bottom Line

Merlin’s latest filings show a company that has moved past pure SPAC mechanics and into its first real test as a public operating story. That matters. But the filings do not yet show a business that has earned the benefit of the doubt on commercial traction.

For now, MRLN looks like a conditional setup: a real strategic opportunity, a stronger balance sheet, credible technical progress — and still not enough operating proof to make the equity case easy. Investors who want to believe the story can find reasons to stay interested. Investors who want the numbers to validate the story still have to wait.

Conclusion

Taken together, Merlin’s 2026 filings describe a company that has crossed an important threshold: it now has enough capital, enough technical progress, and enough strategic relevance to deserve serious attention. But attention is not the same as proof. The next stage of the story has to come from the numbers. Until revenue begins to validate the narrative, MRLN remains a name to watch closely rather than a business the filings clearly confirm.

Next Steps

Merlin’s filings show a real strategic story — and a financial profile still catching up.

Market Tide Weekly tracks the structural signals that matter: filings, capital flows, and the early evidence that separates narrative from operating proof.

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This publication is for informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice, a recommendation, or a prediction of future results. The analysis above is based on publicly available filings and documentary source material and is presented as filings-based interpretation only. Citations are included for reference consistency, and any forward-looking statements, implications, or scenarios discussed remain subject to material uncertainty, execution risk, market conditions, and future disclosures.

Works Cited

·        Merlin, Inc. Current Report on Formaa 8-K. Filed May 14, 2026.

·        Merlin, Inc. Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q. Filed May 1a5, 2026.

·        Merlin, Inc. Current Report on Form 8-K. Filed April 29, 2026.

·        Merlin, Inc. Registration Statement on Form S-1. Filed May 6, 2026.

·        Merlin, Inc. Prospectus filed pursuant to Rule 424(b)(3). Filed April 21, 2026.

·        Merlin, Inc. Prospectus filed pursuant to Rule 424(b)(3). Filed May 13, 2026.

·        Merlin, Inc. Prospectus filed pursuant to Rule 424(b)(3). Filed June 2, 2026.

·        Merlin, Inc. Annual Report on Form 10-K. Filed March 12, 2026.

Market Tide Weekly - Tuesday Edition June 9, 2026

Summary

For readers who want the short version first, the hierarchy is now clear. This week’s three public picks are the more filing-secure names — companies whose recent results make the story easier to explain without leaning on speculation. The common thread is explainability: each one offers a clearer filing-backed signal than the headline volatility surrounding it.

·        Public Pick 1: ARDT — the clearest filing-backed lead in the slate, with Q1 results that support a stabilization story the market still appears to price like a stressed operator. Risk: reimbursement timing and weak quarterly cash conversion mean this is an improving execution case, not a clean all-clear.

·        Public Pick 2: RLGT — a resilient operator in a weak freight cycle, with enough disclosure quality and earnings stability to remain the second-best public idea even without a breakout quarter. Risk: margin pressure remains visible, so the thesis depends on steady execution and cycle durability rather than near-term earnings torque.

·        Public Pick 3: RDCM — a stronger business than the stock’s ownership-related optics suggest, with profitable growth and a cash-rich balance sheet keeping it in the trio despite heavier narrative noise. Risk: the operating case now clears, but Form 144 and holder-transition signals still make it the most conditional public pick.

Why This Week Matters

This week’s screen surfaced the kind of names that often attract small-cap attention for the wrong reasons: sharp moves, thin followings, and just enough narrative heat to make price action look like conviction. The more interesting story sits underneath that noise. A handful of companies are beginning to show something sturdier in their filings — evidence of operating stability, improving execution, or a business model that looks more durable than the market’s first reaction suggests. That is the lens for this edition. Rather than chase the loudest movers, we are focusing on the names where recent disclosures offer a clearer structural signal than the tape alone, and where the gap between headline volatility and filing-backed reality may be wide enough to matter.

Why These Three Picks

That is why this week’s public slate resolves around three names that are easier to defend from the filings outward than from market excitement inward. ARDT offers the clearest stabilization case: a hospital operator still priced with stress optics even as the latest quarter shows firmer execution. RLGT brings a different kind of appeal, not through breakout momentum but through resilience in a freight backdrop that remains difficult and uneven. RDCM rounds out the trio because its operating business is stronger than its ownership-related optics suggest, giving the edition a third idea that is substantively supported even if it still requires more narrative caution. Together, the three picks create a cross-sector spine built on explainability, not simply on movement.

Flagship Visual Anchor

The flagship visual for this edition is a simple signal-versus-noise matrix built from the public shortlist: ARDT, RLGT, and RDCM. The horizontal axis reflects business visibility and filing-backed explainability, while the vertical axis reflects market noise, including volatility, financing optics, ownership churn, or event-driven distortion. That framing reinforces the core editorial claim of this edition: the goal is not to spotlight the loudest movers, but to identify the names where recent filings give readers a stronger basis for separating structural setup from headline turbulence. In that map, ARDT sits in the highest-conviction quadrant, RLGT just below it with freight-cycle caveats, and RDCM in a mixed-signal quadrant shaped by ownership activity.

Ranking Overview

·        Public candidate order: 1) ARDT, 2) RLGT, 3) RDCM

·        Current read: The public slate is best understood as a three-tier ladder of filing-backed explainability. ARDT leads because the filings show the clearest stabilization case with improving operations that still screen like a stressed business. RLGT stays second because its quarter supports a steadier resilience-through-cycle story than the market may be giving it credit for, even if the earnings profile is not yet inflecting. RDCM remains third because the operating business is stronger than the stock’s optics imply, but ownership-related noise still makes it the most conditional public idea.

Public Picks

Public Pick 1 — ARDT

ARDT earns the lead public slot because the latest filing turns what might have looked like a screen-driven value idea into a more credible operating story. First-quarter revenue rose 7.0% year over year to $1.602 billion, adjusted admissions increased 2.0%, and net patient service revenue per adjusted admission climbed 5.5%. More important, the quarter showed a stronger underlying earnings picture than the surface GAAP line alone suggests, with adjusted EBITDA improving to $124.0 million from $98.2 million a year earlier. The caution is that the improvement was not entirely clean: Medicaid supplemental payment timing helped, operating cash flow was negative, and cash fell sequentially. Even so, the filing supports a thesis built on improving execution rather than pure multiple compression, which is why ARDT remains the clearest lead idea in the public set.

·        Overview — ARDT now has the clearest filing-backed case in the public slate because the latest quarter supports the idea that the business is steadier than the valuation and screen optics alone imply. Q1 revenue rose 7.0% year over year to $1.602 billion, while adjusted admissions increased 2.0% and net patient service revenue per adjusted admission rose 5.5%. That combination gives ARDT a usable public-market thesis: this is not simply a low-multiple hospital name, but a company showing a credible operating improvement story with enough current disclosure to support a more constructive valuation case. The right framing, however, is not that all risks have cleared, but that the filings now show enough stability to justify deeper conviction than a surface-level read would suggest.

·        Structural Signals — The 10-Q gives ARDT the kind of live evidence MTW needs. Management’s discussion points to outpatient mix improvement, lower contract labor expense, recruiting and retention progress, and strategic productivity initiatives that helped offset a still-complicated operating backdrop. The joint-venture model also remains meaningful, with JV-related entities contributing roughly 29.4% of total revenue in the quarter. That said, a material part of the quarter’s strength came from Medicaid supplemental payment timing, especially in New Mexico, which means the structural story is stronger than before but still not as simple as “volumes up, margins fixed.” The signal is real; the quality of that signal still needs careful framing.

·        Financial Signals — ARDT’s financial profile improved enough to keep it at the top of the public hierarchy, but the quarter was not clean across every line. Adjusted EBITDA rose to $124.0 million from $98.2 million, interest expense improved to $12.2 million from $14.2 million, and salaries and benefits fell as a percentage of revenue to 41.3% from 43.9%, helped by a $10.3 million reduction in contract labor expense. At the same time, operating cash flow was negative $60.2 million versus negative $24.8 million a year earlier, cash fell by nearly $100 million sequentially, professional fees rose to 19.8% of revenue from 18.8%, and net income attributable to Ardent Health, Inc. edged down to $39.9 million from $41.4 million. The filing therefore supports a stronger valuation interpretation based on better underlying earnings and labor normalization, but not a simplistic “everything improved” narrative.

·        Risk Profile — The main ARDT risks are now more specific. Reimbursement remains central because a meaningful share of the quarter’s strength came from Medicaid supplemental payment programs, while management also warned that some of those programs could decline in 2026 as policy changes take effect. Labor risk has improved but not disappeared, physician-cost inflation is still visible in professional fees, and the company continues to operate with significant lease and debt obligations. Cash conversion is the most immediate caveat after this quarter: negative operating cash flow and a lower cash balance mean readers should not mistake EBITDA improvement for a fully de-risked balance-sheet story. The policy backdrop also matters, including potential Medicaid changes and subsidy rolloffs that management said could pressure future results.

·        Forward Scenarios — The bullish ARDT scenario is now easier to articulate: if labor normalization persists, outpatient mix remains favorable, and reimbursement support does not roll off too sharply, the market could begin to reassess a name that still screens like a stressed operator. The weaker scenario is that Medicaid timing benefits fade, cash conversion remains soft, and higher provider or reimbursement pressure prevents the EBITDA improvement from translating into a cleaner equity story. That leaves ARDT in the lead public slot, but with a refined thesis: not a pure value pick, and not a clean turnaround either, but a filing-backed case that the business may be stabilizing faster than the current market framing implies.

Public Pick 2 — RLGT

RLGT remains the second public pick, but for a narrower and more measured reason than a first-pass screen might imply. The latest quarter does not show a company breaking free of its cycle; it shows one managing through that cycle with enough steadiness to stay relevant. Revenue held essentially flat at $214.1 million, net income improved to $4.7 million, and disclosure quality remains strong enough to keep the story readable. The trade-off is visible in the margins: gross profit and adjusted EBITDA both moved lower, so the quarter reads as resilient rather than accelerating. That is still enough to keep RLGT ahead of RDCM in this edition, because resilience in a weak freight environment is easier to defend from the filings than a stronger business whose stock optics remain noisier.

·        Overview — RLGT remains the second public candidate, but the filing-backed case is now more conservative than the original placeholder implied. The latest quarter supports an editorial framing built around resilience rather than upside surprise: revenue held essentially flat at $214.1 million in a sharply divergent freight environment, but profitability compressed enough that the story cannot be sold as a clean operating acceleration. That still gives RLGT value inside this edition because stable revenue, continued profitability, and an active disclosure cadence are more defensible than many screen names, but the argument is now that RLGT is weathering the cycle better than some peers, not that it is already breaking free of it.

·        Structural Signals — The quarter gives RLGT a usable structural profile for MTW. Management explicitly described performance as resilient in a sharply divergent freight environment while continuing to advance the Navegate platform and an internal AI tool called Ray, which helps support the broader narrative that the company is still investing operationally rather than simply managing decline. At the same time, the filing and same-day earnings release do not show a business with obvious near-term breakout momentum. The structural read is therefore steady but not emphatic: enough current disclosure and operational continuity to support inclusion, but not enough strength to elevate RLGT into ARDT’s category.

·        Financial Signals — RLGT’s financial signals are mixed but still publication-usable. Revenue was effectively flat year over year, gross profit slipped to $53.9 million from $54.5 million, adjusted gross profit declined to $56.3 million from $58.2 million, and adjusted EBITDA fell to $7.8 million from $9.4 million, with adjusted EBITDA margin dropping to 13.8% from 16.2%. Net income attributable to Radiant Logistics improved to $4.7 million from $2.5 million, which helps prevent the quarter from reading as deterioration across the board. The company also repurchased 585,050 shares for $3.5 million during the first nine months of the fiscal year, suggesting some balance-sheet flexibility, but the quarter overall still reads as margin pressure inside a stable top line, not as hidden earnings torque.

·        Risk Profile — RLGT’s risk profile is now clearer. The central risk is that a stable revenue line masks weaker pricing, softer freight demand, or a business mix that is less profitable than it first appears. Margin compression is already visible, and the quarter does not provide enough evidence to dismiss freight-cycle pressure as merely temporary. There is also still a capital-markets overlay to monitor because the company has recent Form 144 activity and an S-3 / EFFECT history, even if those issues currently look secondary to the operating story. RLGT remains defensible only if we present it as a steady operator in a soft cycle, not as a misunderstood compounder already showing strong earnings inflection.

·        Forward Scenarios — The bullish RLGT scenario is moderate but real: if freight conditions stabilize, adjusted gross profit and EBITDA margins could recover faster than the market expects, allowing investors to revalue a company that remained profitable through a noisy period. The weaker scenario is that flat revenue proves to be the high point of the near-term setup while margin pressure persists, leaving the stock looking merely adequate rather than quietly advantaged. That keeps RLGT in the second public slot for now, but with a refined thesis built on resilience, operating continuity, and editorial explainability rather than on a strong cyclical rebound already appearing in the numbers.

Public Pick 3 — RDCM

RDCM stays in the public trio because the filings make it harder to dismiss the company as just another stock distorted by ownership noise. The filings show a profitable and growing operating business. RADCOM delivered record 2025 revenue of $71.5 million, up 17.2%, and carried that momentum into the first quarter of 2026, when revenue rose another 12.0% to $18.6 million. Operating income improved, cash remained above $108 million, and the balance sheet stayed debt-free. That kind of financial profile would normally command cleaner narrative treatment than the stock has received. RDCM still ranks third not because the business failed validation, but because ownership-related filings can continue to muddy the market’s perception even when the fundamentals are working.

·        Overview — RDCM now has a stronger filing-backed case than the initial placeholder suggested. The 2025 20-F and the May 2026 first-quarter update show a business with sustained profitable growth, record annual revenue, expanding margins, and an unusually clean balance sheet for a small-cap technology name. That makes RDCM more defensible as a public pick than a surface read of the ownership filings alone would imply. The right editorial framing is therefore not that the ownership noise disappears, but that the operating business is strong enough to keep RDCM in the trio as the most conditional yet still substantively supported public candidate.

·        Structural Signals — RDCM’s structural profile improved materially after the filing review. The 20-F shows six consecutive years of revenue growth through 2025, while the Q1 2026 update points to continued momentum, including a multi-year renewal with a Tier-1 operator that expands RADCOM ACE and the launch of RADCOM Neura, an AI agent suite positioned around autonomous network operations. That matters because it gives RDCM more than a generic telecom-software story: it has a current product narrative tied to AI-native assurance, visible Tier-1 customer relevance, and an installed-base expansion story that can plausibly support further growth. The filings therefore give MTW a real structural setup rather than merely a speculative price-action name.

·        Financial Signals — The financial case is stronger than expected and is the main reason RDCM survives the ownership-noise screen. Full-year 2025 revenue rose 17.2% to a record $71.5 million, fourth-quarter 2025 GAAP operating income reached $2.7 million with non-GAAP operating income of $4.3 million, and the company reported positive fourth-quarter cash flow of $3.2 million. The Q1 2026 update then extended the pattern: revenue rose 12.0% year over year to $18.6 million, GAAP operating income improved to $2.2 million from $1.5 million, non-GAAP operating income improved to $3.7 million from $3.1 million, and cash remained above $108 million with no debt. Guidance was also reaffirmed for 2026 revenue growth of 8% to 12%, implying roughly $78.6 million at the midpoint. This is not a fragile balance-sheet story or a marginally profitable edge case; it is a comparatively strong operating profile.

·        Risk Profile — RDCM still carries more narrative risk than ARDT or RLGT, but the nature of that risk has changed. After reviewing the filings, the main concern is less about business fragility and more about whether ownership-related signals can overwhelm an otherwise strong fundamental story in the market’s perception. Customer concentration, telecom spending cycles, and execution against Tier-1 deployments remain real risks, and the AI narrative still has to convert into durable commercial wins rather than marketing value alone. The ownership-noise backdrop also still matters because repeated sale-related filings can cap enthusiasm even when fundamentals are improving. RDCM is therefore no longer a business-quality question first; it is now primarily a market-structure and editorial-framing question.

·        Forward Scenarios — The bullish RDCM scenario is now much easier to defend: if the company continues to compound revenue at a double-digit pace, maintains expanding margins, and uses its cash-rich, debt-free position to reinforce credibility with customers and investors, the market could begin to revalue a name that still sits below the attention level its operating quality deserves. The weaker scenario is that the ownership-noise pattern keeps overshadowing the business, turning RDCM into a stronger operating business than the stock’s narrative allows and limiting near-term editorial conviction. Even so, the filings now support keeping RDCM in the public trio, with the caveat that it remains the most conditional of the three because the market-structure overlay has not fully cleared.

Week to Week

What Changed Since Last Week

The biggest shift since last week is not at the top of the public slate, but in how the middle and lower tiers are now understood. ARDT remains the lead name, yet the reason is no longer provisional: the latest quarter supports a more concrete stabilization case through revenue growth, stronger underlying earnings, and lower contract-labor pressure, even if reimbursement timing and weak cash conversion still require caution. RLGT, meanwhile, improved relative to the initial public slate because its domestic filing cadence and cleaner market-structure optics remain easier to defend than RDCM’s. That advantage now reads as editorial resilience rather than upside surprise, since the quarter showed steadiness through a weak freight backdrop rather than clear earnings acceleration. RDCM moved in the opposite direction. The filing review strengthened the business case materially, but the stock still slipped on relative ranking because ownership-related noise remains hard to separate from the story. In other words, the burden of proof has shifted: RDCM no longer looks weaker on fundamentals, yet it still requires more narrative caution than RLGT because repeated sale-related filings can interfere with how cleanly the thesis lands.

What We’re Watching Next Week

With the filing work complete across the three featured names, next week’s focus shifts from validation to final editorial control. The main task is to make the hierarchy feel unmistakably intentional: ARDT as the clearest stabilization case, RLGT as the steadier resilience-through-cycle name, and RDCM as the stronger business that still carries the heaviest ownership-noise overlay. Alongside that framing work, the remaining production task is procedural but important: complete the disclosure block, finalize the sources list, and run one last citation audit so every factual claim, filing reference, and risk qualifier is matched cleanly before publication.

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Share this week’s edition with someone who tracks small-cap filings, market structure, or underfollowed names where the real story often sits beneath the headline move.

Works Cited

·        Ardent Health, Inc. “Form 10-Q for the Quarterly Period Ended March 31, 2026.” Filed 6 May 2026.

·        Ardent Health, Inc. “Form 10-Q for the Quarterly Period Ended December 31, 2025.” Filed 11 Feb. 2026.

·        Radiant Logistics, Inc. “Form 10-Q for the Quarterly Period Ended March 31, 2026.” Filed 11 May 2026.

·        Radiant Logistics, Inc. “Form 8-K.” Furnished 11 May 2026.

·        RADCOM Ltd. “Form 20-F for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2025.” Filed 31 Mar. 2026.

·        RADCOM Ltd. “Form 6-K.” Furnished 19 May 2026.

Sources and Compliance

·        Sources: Ardent Health, Inc. Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2026, filed May 6, 2026; Ardent Health, Inc. Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended December 31, 2025, filed February 11, 2026; Radiant Logistics, Inc. Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2026, filed May 11, 2026; Radiant Logistics, Inc. Form 8-K furnished May 11, 2026; RADCOM Ltd. Form 20-F for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2025, filed March 31, 2026; RADCOM Ltd. Form 6-K furnished May 19, 2026; and the relevant recent SEC filing index pages reviewed for disclosure cadence, registration activity, and ownership-overlay context across ARDT, RLGT, and RDCM.

·        ARDT filing record: ARDT SEC entity landing page index — recent filings include 10-Q (filed 2026-05-06), 10-K (filed 2026-03-16), DEF 14A (filed 2026-04-08), and multiple 8-Ks through 2026-06-02.

·        RDCM filing record: RDCM SEC entity landing page index — recent filings include 20-F (filed 2026-03-31), 6-Ks filed 2026-04-15, 2026-05-19, 2026-05-20, and 2026-05-27, plus substantial Form 144 activity and Schedule 13D / 13G amendments in 2026.

·        RLGT filing record: RLGT SEC entity landing page index — recent filings include 10-Qs filed 2026-05-11 and 2026-02-09, 8-Ks on 2026-05-11 and 2026-02-09, Schedule 13G filed 2026-04-22, Form 144 filings in March and May 2026, and an S-3 filed 2025-12-22 that became effective on 2026-01-09.

·        Mandatory disclosure block: This edition is for informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice, a recommendation, or an offer to buy or sell any security. Market Tide Weekly may discuss securities that are volatile, thinly followed, or subject to financing, ownership, or market-structure risks; readers should review the underlying filings and conduct their own due diligence before making any investment decision. If the publication, its author, or any affiliated party holds a position in any security mentioned, receives compensation related to coverage, or has any other material conflict, that fact must be disclosed here in the final published version.

·        Citation audit note: Every factual claim, numerical statement, and filing-derived judgment in the edition should be traceable to an in-text citation and a matching entry in the final sources list. Before publication, run a final pass to confirm filing dates, form types, issuer names, and any discussion of ownership, shelf registration, prospectus activity, or transaction terms against the cited source documents.

Today’s tide is calm across gaming, aerospace, and quantum hardware — a clean structural read with no major distortions.

SSTK Deep Dive: A weakening core business, an unproven AI pivot, and a merger under regulatory pressure. Full analysis here:

Market Tide Deep Dive — SSTK

A closer look at Shutterstock’s weakening core business, unresolved Getty merger process, and the unanswered question of whether AI licensing can offset platform erosion.

Shutterstock’s filings tell two stories at once. One is the story management wants investors to see: a company repositioning itself around AI data licensing, enterprise services, and a broader creative platform. The other is harder to ignore: a legacy content marketplace showing real signs of strain. This Deep Dive follows the numbers, the merger disclosures, and the language management has used to frame both, asking whether SSTK is navigating a difficult transition—or losing relevance faster than the market has fully priced.

Teaser: Shutterstock still has strategic assets the market can value, but the filings suggest the core business is weakening before the turnaround story is fully credible.

Quick Reference Summary

Core thesis: Shutterstock looks like a company in a difficult transition, with weakening core content performance colliding with an unfinished AI and data-licensing narrative.

Key evidence: Q1 2026 revenue fell 18% year over year, Content revenue declined 12%, and the company posted a net loss while absorbing meaningful legal, investment, and restructuring costs.

Merger angle: The Getty transaction may still offer scale benefits, but U.K. regulatory pressure raises the risk that remedies or divestitures reduce the deal’s strategic value.

Main risk to the thesis: One weak quarter may overstate the underlying deterioration if data-licensing timing, one-time charges, and merger noise are masking a more stable core business.

What to watch next: whether Content revenue stabilizes, whether AI and data licensing show more concrete traction, and whether the merger closes on terms that preserve meaningful upside.

The Setup

Shutterstock is asking investors to believe in a transition story just as its legacy business is getting harder to defend. Management no longer wants the company viewed simply as a stock-photo marketplace. Instead, SSTK is being framed as a broader creative platform with growing relevance in enterprise licensing, data services, and AI model training. The problem is that the latest quarter made that pitch harder to sustain. In Q1 2026, revenue fell 18% year over year to about $199.2 million, and the company posted a net loss of roughly $47.6 million, reinforcing the view that the core content engine is weakening before the newer narrative is fully proven. At the same time, the proposed Getty Images transaction has become inseparable from the stock’s near-term identity. U.S. antitrust review cleared without conditions, but U.K. regulators continued to scrutinize the deal’s effect on editorial competition, raising the prospect that any strategic upside could come with remedies or divestitures attached. That leaves SSTK in a narrow lane: investors are being asked to judge a weak standalone quarter, an unfinished AI and data-licensing story, and an unresolved merger process all at once. The real question is whether this is a misunderstood transition—or a business whose deterioration is being temporarily obscured by M&A and AI optimism. (Shutterstock, 10-Q, Apr. 2026; Shutterstock, 8-K, May 2026)

The Filing Evidence

Shutterstock’s latest filings point to a business under real operating pressure, not just a company caught in merger noise. In the first quarter of 2026, revenue fell 18% year over year to about $199.2 million, and the company swung from a profit in the prior-year period to a net loss of roughly $47.6 million. The weakness was broad enough to matter. Content revenue fell 12% to roughly $178.1 million, while Data, Distribution, and Services revenue dropped 47% to about $21.0 million, a decline management attributed in part to the timing of data-licensing revenue recognition. Adjusted EBITDA also fell to about $42.7 million, and cash and cash equivalents stood near $162.5 million at quarter-end. Management argued that the quarter reflected a slower-than-expected start in the core Content business, timing effects in licensing, and an intentional focus on cost control and product simplification rather than a collapse in long-term strategy. Even so, the filings show that reported results were also hit by meaningful non-core charges, including roughly $28.0 million in legal contingency expense tied to the FTC subscription-practices matter, about $15.3 million in unrealized losses on the company’s Meitu investment, and approximately $6.1 million in workforce optimization costs. Alongside that operating backdrop, the merger-related 8-K sequence tells a second story. U.S. antitrust clearance under the HSR Act was achieved without conditions, but the U.K. CMA continued to press on editorial-market concentration and ultimately signaled that remedies centered on divesting parts of Shutterstock’s editorial business would likely be required. The ownership record adds context, but not the kind of clear directional signal that would change the core thesis. The April 3, 2026 Form 4 filings from senior leadership—including the Chief Financial Officer, the Executive Chairman and 10% owner, and the Chief Accounting Officer—appear to reflect routine vesting and tax-withholding activity rather than discretionary buying or selling. By contrast, the amended Schedule 13G filings on January 15, January 30, March 4, and March 27, 2026 may be the more meaningful ownership signal, because they suggest that large-holder positioning was also shifting during the same broader period. Taken together, the filings suggest that SSTK’s investment debate turns on whether these numbers reflect temporary distortion around deal timing, legal costs, restructuring, and ownership-related repositioning—or evidence that the core platform is weakening faster than management’s AI and data-licensing narrative can offset. (Shutterstock, 10-Q, Apr. 2026; Shutterstock, 10-K, Feb. 2026; Shutterstock, 8-K, May 2026; Shutterstock, Form 4, Apr. 2026; Shutterstock, Schedule 13G/A, Mar. 2026)

The Opportunity or Risk

The central question in Shutterstock’s filings is not whether the company has an AI narrative. It clearly does. The question is whether that narrative is strong enough to offset what increasingly looks like real erosion in the legacy business. The bear case is that the market has not fully adjusted to the possibility that Shutterstock’s traditional content marketplace is weakening for structural reasons, not just cyclical ones. A 12% decline in Content revenue is difficult to dismiss for a company whose original value proposition was built on monetizing licensed media at scale, and the sharp drop in Data, Distribution, and Services revenue leaves management’s transition story looking more fragile than advertised, even if some of that pressure reflects timing. The bull case is narrower but still credible. If legal costs, restructuring charges, and lumpy data-licensing revenue are masking the business’s underlying earnings power, investors may be reading a messy transition quarter as evidence of permanent decline. That is where the Getty transaction matters. If the merger closes on workable terms, Shutterstock could gain scale, cost leverage, and a stronger position in a market increasingly shaped by AI training demand and enterprise licensing. But if the transaction becomes a distraction—or is approved only with remedies that dilute its strategic value—the market may eventually be forced to value SSTK on standalone operating reality rather than merger optionality. For now, the filings suggest the biggest potential mispricing is not simple deal probability, but whether the slowdown in the core platform is temporary friction or a sign of deeper relevance loss. (Shutterstock, 10-Q, Apr. 2026; Shutterstock, 8-K, Feb. 2026; Shutterstock, 8-K, May 2026)

Risks to the Thesis

The clearest risk to a cautious SSTK thesis is that the market may be looking through a quarter distorted by timing and one-time charges rather than seeing a structurally impaired business. Data-licensing revenue is inherently lumpy, so a sharp decline in one period does not necessarily imply weaker long-term demand, especially if enterprise AI training demand accelerates. The Getty transaction is also a major swing factor. If it closes on acceptable terms, the combined company could gain meaningful scale, cost synergies, and stronger leverage in content licensing and enterprise distribution. In that scenario, what now looks like operating fragility could instead be remembered as transition noise around legal costs, restructuring, and merger execution. There is also the possibility that Shutterstock’s licensed content library and enterprise relationships become more valuable in an AI-heavy market than current sentiment suggests. (Shutterstock, 10-Q, Apr. 2026; Shutterstock, 8-K, Apr. 2026; Shutterstock, 8-K, May 2026)

MTW Bottom Line

SSTK still has assets the market can plausibly value—brand recognition, licensed content, enterprise relationships, and a potentially meaningful role in AI data licensing—but the filings do not yet support a clean transition story. Right now, they show a core business under pressure and a merger narrative that may be obscuring as much as it clarifies. If management can stabilize Content revenue and prove that AI services and data licensing can scale, today’s skepticism may prove excessive. But if recent weakness reflects deeper platform erosion, the downside case may still be incomplete. (Shutterstock, 10-Q, Apr. 2026; Shutterstock, 10-K, Feb. 2026; Shutterstock, 8-K, May 2026)

Sources

Shutterstock, Inc. “Quarterly Report.” Form 10-Q. Shutterstock, Inc., 28 Apr. 2026, /MTW/SEC_Filings/SSTK/10-Q/2026-03-31/, No. 0001549346-26-000023.

Shutterstock, Inc. “Annual Report.” Form 10-K. Shutterstock, Inc., 17 Feb. 2026, /MTW/SEC_Filings/SSTK/10-K/2025-12-31/, No. 0001549346-26-000008.

Shutterstock, Inc. “Annual Report/A.” Form 10-K/A. Shutterstock, Inc., 24 Apr. 2026, /MTW/SEC_Filings/SSTK/10-K-A/2025-12-31/, No. 0001549346-26-000018.

Shutterstock, Inc. “Current Report.” Form 8-K. Shutterstock, Inc., 17 Feb. 2026, /MTW/SEC_Filings/SSTK/8-K/2026-02-17/, No. 0001549346-26-000007.

Shutterstock, Inc. “Current Report.” Form 8-K. Shutterstock, Inc., 23 Feb. 2026, /MTW/SEC_Filings/SSTK/8-K/2026-02-23/, No. 0001549346-26-000014.

Shutterstock, Inc. “Current Report.” Form 8-K. Shutterstock, Inc., 20 Apr. 2026, /MTW/SEC_Filings/SSTK/8-K/2026-04-20/, No. 0001549346-26-000016.

Shutterstock, Inc. “Current Report.” Form 8-K. Shutterstock, Inc., 28 Apr. 2026, /MTW/SEC_Filings/SSTK/8-K/2026-04-28/, No. 0001549346-26-000021.

Shutterstock, Inc. “Current Report.” Form 8-K. Shutterstock, Inc., 14 May 2026, /MTW/SEC_Filings/SSTK/8-K/2026-05-14/, No. 0001140361-26-021319.

Shutterstock, Inc. “Current Report.” Form 8-K. Shutterstock, Inc., 15 May 2026, /MTW/SEC_Filings/SSTK/8-K/2026-05-15/, No. 0001140361-26-021504.

Shutterstock, Inc. “Statement of Changes in Beneficial Ownership of Securities.” Form 4. Filed by Rikki Powell, Chief Financial Officer. Shutterstock, Inc., 3 Apr. 2026, /MTW/SEC_Filings/SSTK/Form-4/2026-04-03/, No. 0001689707-26-000002.

Shutterstock, Inc. “Statement of Changes in Beneficial Ownership of Securities.” Form 4. Filed by Jonathan Oringer, Executive Chairman and 10% owner. Shutterstock, Inc., 3 Apr. 2026, /MTW/SEC_Filings/SSTK/Form-4/2026-04-03/, No. 0001559639-26-000002.

Shutterstock, Inc. “Statement of Changes in Beneficial Ownership of Securities.” Form 4. Filed by Michael Spurrell, Chief Financial Officer. Shutterstock, Inc., 3 Apr. 2026, /MTW/SEC_Filings/SSTK/Form-4/2026-04-03/, No. 0002043233-26-000002.

Shutterstock, Inc. “Schedule Filed by Certain Investors to Report Beneficial Ownership of More Than 5% of a Class of Equity Securities—Amendment.” Schedule 13G/A. Shutterstock, Inc., 27 Mar. 2026.

Shutterstock, Inc. “Schedule Filed by Certain Investors to Report Beneficial Ownership of More Than 5% of a Class of Equity Securities—Amendment.” Schedule 13G/A. Shutterstock, Inc., 30 Jan. 2026.

Shutterstock, Inc. “Schedule Filed by Certain Investors to Report Beneficial Ownership of More Than 5% of a Class of Equity Securities—Amendment.” Schedule 13G/A. Shutterstock, Inc., 4 Mar. 2026, No. 0000102909-26-002211.

Shutterstock, Inc. “Schedule Filed by Certain Investors to Report Beneficial Ownership of More Than 5% of a Class of Equity Securities—Amendment.” Schedule 13G/A. Shutterstock, Inc., 15 Jan. 2026, No. 0000102909-26-000295.

Competition and Markets Authority. “Getty Images / Shutterstock Merger Inquiry.” GOV.UK, 23 June 2025, accessed 3 June 2026.

Originally posted on MarketTideWeekly.com

SSTK Deep Dive: A weakening core business, an unproven AI pivot, and a merger under regulatory pressure.

Market Tide Weekly

Tuesday Edition — Tuesday, June 2, 2026

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Reader Mode Summary

· SSTK — Shutterstock’s quarter looked weak on the surface, but the 10-Q suggests much of the damage came from timing-sensitive data revenue, legal reserves, and mark-to-market noise rather than a clean break in the underlying franchise. Risk: The setup is still fragile because merger remedies, FTC exposure, and softer customer activity could keep the stock trading under a prolonged overhang.

· CRSR — Corsair’s quarter was not a clean growth story, but the 10-Q shows improving mix, sharply better margins, healthier cash generation, and falling inventory despite still-soft revenue. Risk: The recovery still depends on a healthier PC demand cycle, manageable tariff exposure, and avoiding renewed weakness in lower-margin components or concentrated customer channels.

· CLYM — Climb Bio still reads like an early-stage biotech, but the 10-Q shows a narrower loss profile, a cleaner expense base, and a much stronger funding position than the market may appreciate after the April financing. Risk: The company is still fundamentally a catalyst-and-cash-runway story, with clinical execution, litigation over budoprutug milestones, and future dilution remaining the main things that can break the setup.

Why This Week Matters

This week’s edge is in companies repricing on structure, not hype — the kind of setups that may not look like much at first glance, but still have room to run. In a market rewarding clearer operating signals and punishing vague narratives, the better opportunities are increasingly the ones where the filing story looks firmer than the surface-level read. That creates a narrower but more actionable field: not broad risk-on exposure, but selective names where capital structure, operating trajectory, or catalyst visibility may be improving before the wider narrative catches up. For MTW readers, the task this week is to focus less on promotional framing and more on what the structural and operating evidence is actually saying.

Why These Three Picks

What links these names is not sector exposure but setup: each shows a situation where the underlying evidence in the filing looks firmer than the market’s first read.

Flagship Visual Anchor

| Element | Representation | Visual Motif | Structural Meaning |

|--------|----------------|--------------|--------------------|

| **Left Wave — SSTK (Shutterstock)** | Creative‑content platform under regulatory and merger pressure | Camera lens, film reel, FTC watermark, muted turbulence | Legal and transactional overhang; monetization resilience despite volume weakness |

| **Center Wave — CRSR (Corsair)** | Hardware and peripherals recovery | Circuit‑board patterns, glowing lines, inventory grid overlay | Operational normalization, margin recovery, disciplined balance sheet |

| **Right Wave — CLYM (Climb Bio)** | Clinical‑stage biotech with strengthened capital runway | DNA helix patterns, molecular structures, equity‑raise glow | Catalyst‑driven trajectory, funding stability, scientific precision |

SSTK

Overview Shutterstock enters this period as a global creative-content platform dealing with both cyclical weakness and event-driven noise. In the quarter ended March 31, 2026, revenue fell to $199.2 million from $242.6 million a year earlier, with pressure showing up in both the core content business and the more volatile data, distribution, and services line. The broad setup is complicated by the pending Getty transaction, ongoing regulatory review in the U.K., and a legal accrual tied to FTC scrutiny of subscription disclosure and cancellation practices. That makes SSTK a name where the filing story matters more than the headline print: the quarter was clearly weak, but the sources of weakness were not all equally durable.

Structural Signals The most important structural signal is that user activity softened while monetization per customer held up better than volume. Subscribers declined to 993,000 from 1.079 million, paid downloads fell to 104.1 million from 120.9 million, and subscriber revenue slipped to $103.8 million from $109.9 million. But average revenue per customer improved to $284 from $244, which suggests the pressure is showing up more in customer acquisition and usage than in pure pricing power. That distinction matters because it points to a franchise that may still retain monetization leverage even as top-of-funnel momentum weakens. The other structural signal is that the Getty merger path remains active but unresolved: U.S. antitrust review cleared without conditions, while the U.K. CMA has focused on editorial competition and signaled that asset sales could be required. That keeps the strategic endgame open but not clean.

Financial Signals Q1 results deteriorated sharply on a reported basis. Total revenue declined 17.9% year over year to $199.2 million. Content revenue fell 12.2% to $178.1 million, while data, distribution, and services dropped 47.0% to $21.0 million, with management indicating that metadata-license timing can materially affect that line from quarter to quarter. Gross margin compressed to about 52.4% from 58.4%, and the company swung to an operating loss of $31.0 million from $10.2 million of operating income a year earlier. Net results were hit further by a $28.0 million legal contingency expense and a large unrealized investment loss, pushing the quarter to a net loss of $47.6 million, or $(1.34) per share. Operating cash flow remained positive at $17.4 million, though down from $25.2 million a year ago, and adjusted free cash flow fell to $13.1 million. SSTK ended the quarter with $162.5 million of cash against roughly $274.0 million of debt. The company maintained its $0.36 quarterly dividend, made no buybacks during the quarter, and still had $30.2 million remaining under its repurchase authorization. No formal full-year guidance was provided.

Risk Profile The clearest company-specific risk is legal and regulatory. Shutterstock recorded a $30.0 million accrual tied to an FTC civil investigative demand focused on subscription disclosure, enrollment, and cancellation practices, which means the final outcome could still affect both economics and operating flexibility. The second major risk is transaction-related: if the Getty deal closes with meaningful remedies, the strategic value may be narrower than originally hoped; if the process drags or breaks, SSTK could remain stuck in a market narrative focused on deterioration rather than integration upside. Operationally, softer customer acquisition, lower paid downloads, and cost pressure from AI token usage fees and hosting all suggest that even if the core platform remains viable, reported results may stay noisy and margin recovery may take time.

Forward Scenarios In a base case, revenue stabilizes around a lower run-rate, the worst of the data-delivery volatility normalizes, and investors begin to look through the legal reserve and investment marks as non-core distortions rather than permanent earnings power. In an upside case, customer trends improve, data revenue rebounds, and the Getty transaction closes with manageable remedies, allowing the current quarter to be viewed as a messy transition period rather than evidence of lasting impairment. In a downside case, demand erosion continues, the FTC matter becomes more costly than reserved, and merger remedies or delays further reduce strategic flexibility. That would leave SSTK trapped between weakening standalone momentum and an uncertain transaction outcome.

CRSR

Overview Corsair enters this stretch as a hardware company in uneven recovery: revenue is still soft, but the quarter suggests the business is in much better shape than the headline top line implies. For the quarter ended March 31, 2026, revenue fell 4.1% year over year to $354.5 million, but gross margin expanded sharply and the company returned to operating and net profitability. The setup is not one of broad demand acceleration yet. Instead, the filing points to a company benefiting from better product mix, improving supply and freight conditions, and cleaner inventory positioning while still waiting for a more durable self-built PC upgrade cycle.

Structural Signals The strongest structural signal is mix. Gamer and Creator Peripherals grew 10.1% to $123.3 million, reflecting strength in newer peripherals, streaming, and sim-racing categories, while Gaming Components and Systems declined 10.3% to $231.2 million. Within that weaker components bucket, memory products still grew to $149.6 million, while other component products fell sharply to $81.6 million. That matters because it suggests Corsair is no longer simply waiting on a broad hardware rebound; it is seeing pockets of genuine category strength even while lower-visibility, more cyclical demand remains pressured. The second structural signal is balance-sheet normalization: inventory fell to $273.5 million from $303.3 million at year-end, which supports the idea that working-capital drag is easing rather than worsening.

Financial Signals The quarter was materially better on profitability and cash generation than on revenue. Total revenue declined 4.1% year over year to $354.5 million, but gross profit rose to $116.0 million from $102.4 million and gross margin improved to 32.7% from 27.7%. Operating income improved to $13.8 million from an operating loss of $2.3 million, while net income reached $13.1 million, or $0.11 per diluted share, versus a net loss a year earlier. Operating cash flow increased to $29.7 million from $18.8 million, supported by lower accounts receivable and inventory. Cash and restricted cash ended the quarter at $119.7 million. Debt remained manageable, including a term loan of roughly $120.3 million and nearly the full $100.0 million revolver still available, with the company in compliance with its covenants. Capital allocation also turned more active: Corsair repurchased about 0.9 million shares for $5.0 million in the quarter and still had roughly $45.0 million remaining under its authorization. No formal guidance was provided in the filing.

Risk Profile The main company-specific risk is that the recovery is still selective rather than broad. Management commentary in the filing makes clear that the self-built PC market remains soft and has not yet benefited from a significant GPU-driven upgrade cycle, which means some of the company’s more cyclical component exposure could stay under pressure. The second risk is tariff and trade uncertainty. The filing notes that higher tariffs reduced gross margin in the quarter, while the company has also filed refund claims that had not yet been recognized, leaving future economics partly exposed to a policy path it cannot control. Corsair also remains exposed to customer concentration, with Amazon accounting for 25.0% of revenue and the top ten customers representing 46.8% of total sales. That concentration can amplify channel volatility even if the broader business is improving.

Forward Scenarios In a base case, Corsair continues to benefit from better mix, healthier memory demand, lower working-capital strain, and more disciplined inventory levels, allowing margins and cash generation to hold even if revenue growth remains modest. In an upside case, the self-built PC cycle finally improves, peripherals momentum remains strong, and tariff pressure eases enough for recent profitability gains to prove more durable than the market expects. In a downside case, category softness persists, tariffs or freight costs move against the company again, and customer concentration or weaker component demand pulls the business back toward a lower-quality earnings profile. That would leave CRSR looking operationally improved but still structurally incomplete.

CLYM

Overview Climb Bio is the outlier in this week’s group: unlike SSTK and CRSR, it is not a revenue story at all, but a clinical-stage biotech where the filing signal comes from capital structure and program posture rather than operating leverage. In the quarter ended March 31, 2026, the company continued advancing two named immune-mediated disease programs — budoprutug, an anti-CD19 antibody being developed in primary membranous nephropathy, immune thrombocytopenia, and systemic lupus erythematosus, and CLYM116, an anti-APRIL antibody being developed in IgA nephropathy. That makes the current setup less about conventional financial performance and more about whether the company has enough capital, enough clinical traction, and a clean enough obligation structure to carry these assets to the next meaningful set of data.

Structural Signals The main structural signal is that Climb Bio looks more fully built for the next phase of development than the market may assume from a simple “pre-revenue biotech” label. Budoprutug already carries a broader program footprint across multiple immune indications, while CLYM116 adds a second meaningful shot on goal through an ex-Greater China Mabworks license. The obligation stack is not simple: budoprutug rights carry milestone and royalty burdens through inherited Acelyrin, CRH, and ProBioGen agreements, while CLYM116 also has meaningful future milestone and royalty commitments. But in the near term, the more important signal is that no milestone expense was recognized in the quarter, clinical work continues across both core assets, and the post-quarter equity raise materially changed the funding picture. There is also a real legal overhang: the company’s milestone dispute litigation against Alumis and Acelyrin remains pending, which adds uncertainty even as the core pipeline advances.

Financial Signals The quarter itself was cleaner than the prior-year comparison. Research and development expense fell to $9.4 million from $17.3 million, largely because the prior-year period included the $9.0 million upfront Mabworks payment and associated transaction costs. General and administrative expense was essentially flat at $5.8 million. Net loss improved to $13.7 million, or $(0.20) per share, from $20.8 million, or $(0.31) per share, in the prior-year quarter. Operating cash use was roughly $14.4 million for the quarter. At March 31, 2026, Climb Bio held $146.3 million of cash, cash equivalents, and marketable securities and disclosed no balance-sheet debt. More importantly, the capital position improved further after quarter-end through an April 27, 2026 private placement that raised approximately $110.0 million of gross proceeds through common shares and pre-funded warrants. Management stated that its March 31 cash position alone was sufficient to fund projected operations for at least the next twelve months from the filing date, and the post-quarter financing makes the runway materially stronger than that minimum statement implies.

Risk Profile The core risk is that this remains a development-stage biotech with no product revenue, recurring losses, and value creation that still depends almost entirely on clinical and regulatory execution. If the upcoming budoprutug or CLYM116 readouts disappoint, the improved funding profile will not by itself protect the equity. The second risk is structural complexity. Budoprutug and CLYM116 are both governed by licensing and inherited asset-purchase arrangements that include future milestones and royalty obligations, which can dilute future economics even if the science works. The pending litigation tied to budoprutug milestones adds another layer of uncertainty. On top of that, the company remains exposed to familiar biotech execution risks: reliance on third-party and in some cases single-source manufacturers, intellectual-property protection, key-person dependence, and the ongoing possibility of future dilution despite the recent raise.

Forward Scenarios In a base case, Climb Bio uses its strengthened cash position to move both lead assets through the next development checkpoints without near-term financing stress, allowing investors to focus on clinical proof points rather than survival. In an upside case, upcoming data from budoprutug and early CLYM116 progress reinforce the company’s thesis as a focused immune-disease platform, while the litigation overhang proves manageable and the April financing comes to look well-timed rather than dilutive. In a downside case, one or more programs fail to validate, milestone or legal complications increase, or the company burns capital without generating a convincing catalyst. In that scenario, the balance sheet would still buy time, but not necessarily confidence.

What Changed Since Last Week

· CRSR improved: the filing now supports a cleaner recovery view, with better mix, meaningfully stronger margins, lower inventory, and positive cash generation even though top-line demand is still not broadly strong.

· SSTK deteriorated: the latest quarter made it harder to treat weakness as purely temporary, with softer subscribers and downloads now sitting alongside FTC exposure, legal reserves, and unresolved merger remedies.

· CLYM remained structurally consistent: it is still a catalyst-driven biotech rather than an operating story, but the updated 10-Q reinforces that the balance sheet now gives management more room to reach the next meaningful data windows.

What We’re Watching Next Week

· For SSTK, the key watch item is whether merger and regulatory developments become cleaner or more restrictive — especially any signal on U.K. remedies, FTC resolution, or evidence that subscriber and download trends are stabilizing rather than continuing to erode.

· For CRSR, we are watching for confirmation that margin improvement is durable: that means continued inventory normalization, signs of a healthier self-built PC cycle, and no new tariff or customer-channel pressure that would push the business back toward lower-quality earnings.

· For CLYM, everything still comes back to catalyst quality and timing — the next useful watch points are clinical progression across budoprutug and CLYM116, any change in the milestone-litigation overhang, and whether the post-April financing meaningfully reduces near-term funding pressure in the market’s eyes.

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Share Prompt

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Conclusion

The common thread this week is not that these names are easy, but that each offers a clearer filing-based read than the surface narrative suggests. SSTK is a case of event noise obscuring what may still be a viable franchise, CRSR is a reminder that operating quality can improve before the growth story feels obvious, and CLYM shows how balance-sheet posture can matter as much as near-term optics when the real value sits in future catalysts. In a market that is forcing more selectivity, that kind of structural clarity may be more useful than broad conviction.

Required Disclosure “Market Tide Weekly is for informational and educational purposes only. Nothing in this newsletter constitutes investment advice, a solicitation to buy or sell any security, or a guarantee of any outcome. Past performance of featured picks is not indicative of future results. All investing involves risk, including the possible loss of principal. Readers should conduct their own due diligence and consult a qualified financial advisor before making investment decisions. Market Tide Weekly and its operators may hold positions in securities discussed.”

Sources

· Shutterstock, Inc. Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2026.

· Corsair Gaming, Inc. Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2026.

· Climb Bio, Inc. Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2026.

MARKET TIDE WEEKLY

Market Tide Weekly — BBOT Deep Dive

Special Edition — Structural Review

A filing-by-filing review of BridgeBio Oncology Therapeutics, Inc. (BBOT), focused on resale pressure, governance concentration, leadership-transition timing, and alignment with outside investors. (Sources 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 11) Published by Market Tide Weekly | Special Edition | May 27, 2026

FOCUS: GOVERNANCE, DILUTION, AND PUBLIC-MARKET STRUCTURE

This Special Edition is not driven by a new product announcement or a single earnings event. It is driven by the view that BBOT’s public-market structure deserves standalone scrutiny because the filing record raises unusually important questions about alignment, resale pressure, and governance concentration.

Author’s Note This Special Edition was published outside Market Tide Weekly’s normal cadence because BBOT’s public-market structure warrants standalone review. This is not a judgment on the company’s science alone, nor is it an argument that every adverse interpretation is already proven. It is an attempt to read the filing record carefully and show how resale pressure, governance concentration, leadership-transition timing, and investor alignment can matter as much as the headline corporate narrative. Readers should evaluate the filings and disclosures for themselves, but in our view, the structure here is important enough to deserve focused attention.

Why This Filing Sequence Matters

Why the May 4, 2026 EFFECT Notice Matters

The May 4, 2026 EFFECT notice appears as a routine regulatory milestone, but for BBOT it is the moment a large resale registration remained legally operative. The notice itself is brief and procedural. It does not explain strategy, investor alignment, or likely market impact. Those questions emerge only when the filing record is read in sequence. (Sources 3, 4)

At that point, what had been a registration under review became an active legal channel through which registered holders could sell shares subject to the terms of the operative filing set. The regulatory system records that change efficiently, but it does not interpret it. For investors, the practical importance lies in what the effective registration says about float expansion, holder incentives, and who is positioned to benefit from the public-market structure. (Sources 3, 4)

But the gap between disclosure and understanding is where the most consequential structural questions live. Behind the EFFECT notice for BBOT sits a registration statement — pages of risk factors, share counts, officer descriptions, use-of-proceeds language, and financial disclosures that, read carefully, tell a story the headline will never carry. The question Market Tide Weekly asks is not whether the notice was filed. It was. The question is what the filing record, read in full and in sequence, actually says — about the entity, its capital structure, its governance architecture, and the interests of the parties whose names appear in the signature blocks. (Sources 3, 4, 5, 8)

The notice is brief. The implications are not. This Deep Dive examines what the filing sequence says about BBOT’s capital structure, governance, and alignment with outside investors. (Sources 3, 4, 5, 8)

Executive Summary

● Clinical Foundation: BBOT is advancing three Phase 1 RAS-pathway oncology candidates (BBO-8520, BBO-11818, BBO-10203) with encouraging early clinical data, including a 65% ORR for BBO-8520 in KRAS G12C NSCLC as of November 2025 — a headline metric that compares favorably against approved competitors (sotorasib: 37.1%; adagrasib: 42.9% in pivotal trials); H2 2026 data updates across all three programs represent the primary value catalysts. (Sources 7, 8, 9, 11)

● Capital Position: BBOT held $388.9 million in cash and marketable securities as of March 31, 2026, with management guiding to a runway “into 2028” at a quarterly operating burn of approximately $35.9 million (annualized: ~$143.7M) — sufficient to fund all three current Phase 1 programs to meaningful data readouts, though the company has explicitly acknowledged it will require additional capital raises before reaching commercialization. (Sources 8, 11)

● Structural Flag — Resale Overhang: 63,054,549 shares — 78.8% of all shares outstanding as of March 2, 2026 — are registered for resale under a live, continuously operative resale shelf (File №333–289940) that went re-effective on May 4, 2026; the shelf has been coupled with a 424B3 prospectus supplement on every material company event since September 2025, confirming active selling infrastructure. (Sources 3, 4)

● Governance Flag — Leadership Transition: BBOT experienced a simultaneous CEO and CFO departure within a 10-day window (April 20–30, 2026) immediately preceding the May 4 EFFECT; a third officer-change 8-K was filed March 26, 2026, indicating the transition was a multi-step process spanning at least 39 days; former CEO Eli Wallace was subsequently disclosed as a “Senior Adviser” in the May 12 earnings release, materially qualifying the departure narrative. (Sources 6, 10, 11)

● Governance Flag — Ownership Concentration and Interlocks: Cormorant/Bihua Chen controls 22.3% of shares and holds a board seat; BridgeBio Pharma LLC (whose CEO also serves as BBOT’s Executive Chairman) controls 18.3%; three of eight directors have direct institutional ties to these two largest shareholders — creating a governance structure where formal independence standards are met but substantive independence from the two largest holders is structurally compromised. (Sources 5, 8)

● Analyst Posture: MTW maintains Elevated Structural Scrutiny / Monitor on BBOT; the clinical data is legitimately promising and the capital position is sound, but the compound of a 78.8% resale overhang, dual executive departure at the moment of registration effectiveness, active 424B3 selling infrastructure, and concentrated governance warrants active monitoring over passive observation through the H2 2026 catalyst window. (Sources 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 11)

Structural Profile

· Company: BridgeBio Oncology Therapeutics, Inc. (BBOT), a Delaware corporation listed on the Nasdaq Global Market. (Sources 5, 8)

· Business profile: A pre-commercial oncology company with a public-market structure built through the Helix / TheRas transaction path rather than a conventional operating-company IPO. (Sources 1, 2, 8)

· Anchor filing: Form S-1 resale registration, File №333–289940, with the key effectiveness milestone on May 4, 2026. (Sources 3, 4)

· Shares outstanding: 80,112,725 shares of common stock outstanding as of April 20, 2026. (Sources 5, 6)

· Float and overhang: The live shelf covers 63,054,549 shares. MTW does not treat that figure as current free-trading float, but it is the most important ceiling on potential tradable supply if registered holders choose to sell. (Sources 3, 4)

· Ownership concentration: Practical influence is concentrated among BridgeBio-, Cormorant-, PIPE-, sponsor-, and business-combination holders. Cormorant/Bihua Chen is identified at 22.3% and BridgeBio Pharma LLC at 18.3% on the current record. (Sources 5, 8)

· Market context: BBOT closed at $8.37 on May 26, 2026, implying an approximate market capitalization of $671 million using the disclosed share count. (Source 8)

Filings-Based Narrative Reconstruction

How We Got Here — A Chronological Read of the Public Record

4.1 — Origins and Initial Registration

The true origin point for the current BBOT public record is not the May 2026 resale shelf but the earlier de-SPAC registration path that brought the company to market. BBOT existed privately as TheRas, Inc., doing business as BridgeBio Oncology Therapeutics, and was described in the transaction materials as a Delaware corporation initially formed as a subsidiary of BridgeBio Pharma to develop small-molecule therapies targeting RAS- and PI3Kα-driven cancers. The public-market registration sequence began in operative form on February 28, 2025, when Helix Acquisition Corp. II disclosed its business-combination agreement with TheRas, and it entered the SEC registration record on June 20, 2025 through the initial joint registration statement on Form S-4 (File №333–288222). That filing framed BBOT as a clinical-stage, pre-commercial oncology platform rather than an operating business with current revenue, and the capital story was explicit from the outset: Helix contributed the SPAC vehicle and trust account, while the transaction contemplated a much larger post-closing equity base built from domestication shares, merger shares, and a concurrent PIPE financing. In other words, the initial registration did not present a simple operating-company IPO. It presented a merger-built public listing architecture in which financing structure, shareholder composition, and future resale mechanics were foundational from day one. (Sources 1, 2)

4.2 — Amendment History

The amendment history for the original de-SPAC registration reads as active, iterative, and closely tied to SEC review rather than as a dormant or irregular filing path. Before the public Form S-4 appeared on June 20, 2025, the co-registrants had already been working through the confidential review process: the initial draft registration statement was submitted on April 15, 2025, drew an SEC comment letter on May 12, and an amended draft drew a second comment letter on June 11. After the public filing on June 20, the staff issued another comment letter on June 27, prompting a July 1 response letter and Amendment №1 to Form S-4. Amendment №2 followed on July 9 together with an acceleration request, and the registration statement was declared effective on July 10. Substantively, the amendment cycle focused less on dramatic shifts in business story than on refining the mechanics of the transaction: dilution presentation, trial-enrollment and clinical-progress disclosure, management disclosure, and listing-related updates — including a later July 21 prospectus supplement revising the targeted Nasdaq tier from the Global Market to the Capital Market. The pattern matters because it suggests a transaction that was heavily negotiated and disclosure-tuned in real time, but not one that languished silently for months or required an unusually messy late-stage rewrite. (Sources 1, 2)

4.3 — The Quiet Path to Effectiveness

The path to the May 4, 2026 EFFECT notice was quiet not because the registration record was empty, but because the decisive event occurred inside an already established resale framework. The operative S-1 resale registration (File №333–289940) was originally filed on August 29, 2025, accompanied by an acceleration request on September 8, and declared effective on September 10, 2025. The SEC’s September 3 correspondence expressly stated that the staff had not reviewed and would not review the registration statement, making this a procedurally streamlined effectiveness rather than a heavily commented filing cycle. From there, the shelf stayed alive through a chain of 424B3 prospectus supplements tied to subsequent Exchange Act reports, including updates in January, March, April, May 6, and May 13, 2026. The May 4 EFFECT notice therefore did not create BBOT’s resale architecture from scratch; it refreshed and preserved an existing one through post-effective amendment. That distinction matters. The silence surrounding May 4 was not evidence that nothing structural changed. It was evidence that a legally consequential milestone — keeping a 63,054,549-share resale channel operative — can occur through routine-seeming technical process, with minimal public attention and no promotional fanfare at the moment the shelf remains live. (Sources 3, 4)

4.4 — Post-Effectiveness Activity

Post-effectiveness activity did emerge quickly after the May 4, 2026 EFFECT notice, but the completed filing review is more clarifying than alarming. In the eight days following effectiveness, five Form 4 filings were submitted for BBOT — three on May 5 and two on May 12 — alongside 424B3 prospectus supplements on May 6 and May 13. Taken together, the five-file cluster resolves primarily as administrative and compensatory activity: departure-related equity settlement for Uneek Mehra, promotion-related disclosure for Idan Elmelech, Code F tax-withholding transactions tied to vesting for Pedro Beltran and Ben Yong, and a Code A option award for Beltran. On the current record, no confirmed open-market Section 16 insider selling appears in the immediate post-EFFECT window. The more consequential signal remains the live resale shelf and the 424B3 supplement pathway, where selling pressure can surface through registered holders without real-time per-transaction Form 4 visibility. (Sources 4, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16)

· May 5, 2026 — Uneek Mehra | Accession №0001193125–26–207031 | former CFO | departure-related filing | MTW classification: involuntary / departure event. (Source 12)

· May 5, 2026 — Pedro Beltran | Accession №0001193125–26–207035 | President and CEO | transaction period: April 1, 2026 | Code F tax withholding on RSU vesting (10,479 shares). (Source 13)

· May 5, 2026 — Ben Yong | Accession №0001193125–26–207041 | Chief Medical and Development Officer | transaction period: April 1, 2026 | Code F tax withholding on RSU vesting (10,479 shares). (Source 14)

· May 12, 2026 — Pedro Beltran | Accession №0001193125–26–219439 | President and CEO | transaction period: May 10, 2026 | Code A stock option award (1,103,837 options at $7.66). (Source 15)

· May 12, 2026 — Idan Elmelech | Accession №0001193125–26–219447 | COO / Principal Financial Officer | promotion-related filing | MTW classification: new officer disclosure / award. (Source 16)

Confirmed reporter detail — Pedro Beltran. Beltran appears twice in the post-EFFECT cluster, and both filings read as compensatory or administrative rather than distributive. His May 5 Form 4 reflects a Code F tax-withholding transaction tied to RSU vesting on April 1, 2026, while his May 12 filing reflects a Code A stock option award granted on May 10, 2026. In MTW terms, these are equity-compensation mechanics, not evidence of open-market selling into the shelf. (Sources 13, 15)

Confirmed reporter detail — Ben Yong. Yong’s May 5 Form 4 is also consistent with administrative equity processing rather than market sale activity. The filing reflects a Code F tax-withholding transaction tied to RSU vesting on April 1, 2026. That places the filing in the same general pattern as Beltran’s May 5 submission: a vesting-related settlement disclosure that looks noisy in aggregate but does not, on its face, indicate discretionary selling pressure in the open market. (Source 14)

Context note — Mehra and Elmelech. The remaining two named filings still fit the same non-open-market pattern. Uneek Mehra’s filing aligns with her late-April separation and appears consistent with departure-related equity settlement or final ownership cleanup, while Idan Elmelech’s May 12 filing aligns with his late-April appointment as COO and Principal Financial Officer and most likely reflects new-officer disclosure or promotion-related compensation. Taken together with the verified Beltran and Yong filings, the cluster resolves as administrative and compensatory rather than a burst of insider selling. (Sources 6, 12, 16)

· MTW key finding: no open-market Section 16 insider sales have been identified in the post-May 4 EFFECT window through May 13, 2026 after completion of the full five-filing review. (Sources 12, 13, 14, 15, 16)

· Administrative pattern: the completed evidence set resolves as departure-related settlement, promotion-related disclosure, Code F tax-withholding on vesting, and a Code A option award — an administrative and compensatory pattern rather than a sequence of open-market insider sales. (Sources 12, 13, 14, 15, 16)

· Live structural risk: the real pressure vector remains the registered resale shelf and the 424B3 supplement path, not the Form 4 cluster itself. PIPE investors, the Sponsor, and other legacy holders below the Section 16 threshold can sell without real-time Form 4 disclosure. (Sources 3, 4, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16)

· Completed verification: the three previously unresolved filings now resolve to Pedro Beltran on May 5, Pedro Beltran again on May 12, and Ben Yong on May 5. The May 5 filings are Code F tax-withholding transactions tied to RSU vesting, while the May 12 Beltran filing is a Code A option award. This completed review further supports the conclusion that the post-EFFECT Form 4 cluster is administrative and compensatory rather than evidence of open-market insider selling. (Sources 13, 14, 15)

Governance and Capital Structure Analysis

5.1 — Board Composition and Independence

BBOT’s board structure is formally conventional for a newly public biotechnology company, but the deeper governance picture is more concentrated than the independence labels alone imply. As of the 2026 proxy, the board consists of eight directors divided into three staggered classes, with Neil Kumar serving as Executive Chairman after the April 2026 leadership transition and Pedro Beltran joining the board on April 20, 2026 when he succeeded Eli Wallace as President, Chief Executive Officer, principal executive officer, and Class III director. Michelle Doig, who had served on the board since 2024, is not standing for re-election at the June 2026 annual meeting, which reduces one layer of board continuity at the same moment the company is digesting a management transition. The company states that its standing audit, compensation, and nominating and corporate governance committees are composed of directors who satisfy Nasdaq independence standards, and that the board retains the expected committee architecture of an exchange-listed issuer. But MTW’s concern is less about the absence of formal committees than about substantive independence from the company’s two most influential shareholder blocs. Neil Kumar’s dual role as Executive Chairman of BBOT and founder-chief executive of BridgeBio creates a direct bridge between issuer governance and a major stockholder, while Cormorant’s influence is reinforced both through ownership concentration and through board representation. The result is not a governance structure that fails exchange rules on its face; it is a governance structure in which formal independence can coexist with real strategic gravity around BridgeBio and Cormorant-linked interests. That distinction matters because in a company carrying a large live resale shelf and recent executive turnover, board independence is tested less by committee charters than by who effectively shapes incentives, timing, and risk tolerance when capital-markets decisions are made. (Sources 5, 6, 8, 10)

5.2 — Officer Profiles

BBOT’s officer bench looks credible on scientific and development credentials, but the timing and concentration of role changes in late April 2026 make the profile analytically significant. As of the post-transition structure, Pedro Beltran serves as President and Chief Executive Officer after previously acting as Chief Scientific Officer; the company described him as a long-tenured oncology drug-development executive with roughly two decades of experience across large pharmaceutical settings before moving into the top operating role. Idan Elmelech, previously Senior Vice President of Strategy and Business Development, was elevated to Chief Operating Officer and soon after to Principal Financial Officer, placing finance, strategy, operations, and business development under a newly promoted internal executive rather than a long-seated public-company finance chief. Ben Yong remains the senior medical-development voice and is central to the clinical execution narrative, while Neil Kumar — though board-based as Executive Chairman rather than day-to-day management — functions as an important strategic anchor because of his founding role and continuing BridgeBio linkage. Against that backdrop, the departures of Eli Wallace from the chief executive role and Uneek Mehra from the chief financial role within the same pre-EFFECT window matter less because they imply weak biographies and more because they compress leadership turnover into a legally sensitive moment for the company’s capital-markets posture. MTW’s read is therefore not that BBOT lacks relevant executive experience. It is that the company entered May 2026 with a reconfigured leadership stack whose operational credibility rests heavily on internal succession and scientific continuity, even as investors were being asked to absorb a live resale shelf, a refreshed prospectus pathway, and a meaningful governance transition almost simultaneously. (Sources 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16)

5.3 — Related-Party Transactions

BBOT’s related-party picture is structurally important even if it does not turn on one sensational transaction. The company’s own financial-statement disclosures state that BridgeBio Pharma, Inc. and its controlled entities were related parties of legacy BBOT before the de-SPAC closing and remained related parties afterward, and that BBOT had material related-party transactions with BridgeBio during the periods presented. That continuity matters because BBOT was initially formed within the BridgeBio ecosystem and still sits inside a governance architecture where BridgeBio retains major ownership and Neil Kumar serves simultaneously as BBOT’s Executive Chairman and BridgeBio’s founder-chief executive. In practical terms, the related-party risk is not limited to whether one loan, lease, or services agreement looks off-market in isolation. It is that capital, control, and historical operating support have all flowed through overlapping affiliated channels, making arm’s-length separation harder to evaluate from headline disclosures alone. MTW’s read is therefore that related-party exposure at BBOT should be understood as a structural condition of the company’s origin and post-merger governance — not merely as a footnote item. If future filings provide more granular disclosure on intercompany services, shared infrastructure, intellectual-property arrangements, or expense allocations with BridgeBio, those details should be treated as high-priority diligence items because they bear directly on true operating independence and on whose interests dominate if financing conditions tighten. (Sources 1, 5, 7, 8)

5.4 — Voting Structure

BBOT’s voting structure is standard in form even if control is concentrated in practice. The company’s charter and securities description provide for a single class of common stock, with each outstanding share entitled to one vote on matters properly submitted to stockholders, and there is no dual-class share structure, super-voting stock, or other share-class mechanism that gives minority economic holders disproportionate formal voting power. That matters because it narrows the governance question: the concern at BBOT is not hidden control through exotic voting rights, but influence created through concentrated ownership, affiliated board presence, and a classified board structure that slows stockholder ability to reshape governance quickly. In other words, the company does not rely on founder-style voting asymmetry to preserve control. It relies on a conventional Delaware corporate architecture — single-class voting, board committees, and staggered director terms — operating alongside large stockholder blocs tied to BridgeBio and Cormorant. For MTW purposes, that makes BBOT’s voting structure less alarming than its ownership map: formal shareholder rights appear ordinary, but the practical ability of dispersed public holders to counterbalance the company’s most influential constituencies remains limited by scale and structure rather than by any unusual voting instrument. (Sources 5, 8)

5.5 — Trust or Entity-Specific Governance Notes

No trust-specific governance overlay applies here. Despite the placeholder framing of this subsection, BBOT is not organized as a business trust, statutory trust, REIT-style trust, or other trustee-governed vehicle; it is a standard Delaware corporation. That means the company’s governance does not turn on trustee authority, beneficiary rights, mandatory distribution mechanics, or trust-law voting asymmetries. The entity-specific governance issues in the BBOT record arise instead from its de-SPAC lineage, its classified board, its concentrated ownership structure, and the continuing influence of BridgeBio- and Cormorant-linked interests within an otherwise conventional corporate form. In MTW terms, the important clarification is that BBOT’s governance complexity is real, but it is corporate rather than trust-based. (Sources 1, 5, 8)

Dilution and Issuance Map

Who Can Sell, How Much, and When

MTW Dilution Snapshot The list below maps the major share-supply pathways visible in the current BBOT filing record. Its purpose is not to imply that every registered share will be sold immediately, but to show where potential selling pressure, float expansion, and governance-linked holder influence are concentrated in the post-EFFECT structure.

· Aggregate resale shelf: 63,054,549 shares, or roughly 78.8% of the disclosed base used in the filing set. This is the central structural overhang in the BBOT record. (Sources 3, 4)

· PIPE shares: 24,343,711 shares, approximately 30.4% of outstanding shares, registered for resale. (Source 3)

· Sponsor / initial shareholder block: 4,648,186 shares, approximately 5.8%, registered for resale. (Source 3)

· Business-combination equity holder shares: 32,155,445 shares, approximately 40.2%, registered for resale. (Source 3)

· Option shares included in the shelf: 1,907,207 shares, approximately 2.4%, with exercise prices ranging from $1.02 to $7.88. (Sources 3, 15)

· Founder / promoter and officer / director detail: The current filing spine supports qualitative conclusions about influence and exposure, but not a clean holder-by-holder breakout beyond the major verified blocks above. (Sources 3, 5)

· Primary issuance takeaway: MTW does not identify a newly disclosed primary capital-raise tranche as the key risk here. The more important conclusion is that BBOT’s visible overhang is predominantly secondary resale supply. (Sources 3, 4)

Narrative Analysis

The dilution map shows why BBOT’s post-EFFECT setup warrants structural scrutiny even before any large secondary sales become individually visible in the market. The aggregate resale shelf covers 63,054,549 shares — roughly 78.8% of the 80,032,823 shares outstanding reported as of March 2, 2026 — and is concentrated in three major buckets: 24,343,711 PIPE shares, 4,648,186 sponsor and initial shareholder shares, and 32,155,445 shares issued or issuable to business-combination equity holders. That composition matters because it points to a broad, live secondary overhang rather than a narrow clean-up registration. In practical terms, a large portion of the economically relevant share base already sits inside a legally available resale channel for holders whose timing, cost basis, and liquidity incentives may differ sharply from those of public-market investors. (Sources 3, 4)

The option component adds supply, but it is not the dominant issue. The shelf also includes 1,907,207 option shares with exercise prices ranging from $1.02 to $7.88, which means some dilution pressure can emerge through exercise mechanics as well as through direct resale. Still, the central structural signal in BBOT’s filings is the resale architecture itself. This is primarily a selling-securityholder shelf, not a fresh issuer-funding event. For MTW purposes, that distinction is critical: the immediate capital-markets risk is less about a newly announced primary raise and more about float expansion, holder liquidity, and the possibility that a large registered overhang can influence price discovery during the H2 2026 catalyst window. (Sources 3, 4, 15)

Hinge-Moment Timeline

The Critical Dates That Define This Story

Each entry below identifies a key procedural or disclosure milestone in the BBOT record and explains why that moment matters to MTW’s structural reading of the company.

Pre-Public Record — Entity Formation / Early Corporate Existence

Filing Source: The current verified draft establishes BBOT’s pre-public corporate existence through the later de-SPAC registration materials, but does not isolate a stand-alone formation date as a decisive hinge moment in the public filing story. (Sources 1, 2)

Why it matters: For this Deep Dive, the more meaningful hinge moment is not the original incorporation date but the point at which the company entered the public registration pathway. The structural issues analyzed here arise from the merger-built market architecture and the later resale shelf, not from a stand-alone formation filing. (Sources 1, 2)

June 20, 2025 — First SEC Filing Submitted

Filing Source: Registration Statement on Form S-4, File №333–288222, filed June 20, 2025. (Source 1)

Why it matters: The first public SEC filing in the current record was the June 20, 2025 Form S-4 launching the de-SPAC registration path. From the outset, the filing framed BBOT as a pre-revenue clinical-stage oncology platform whose public-market architecture would be built through merger consideration, sponsor holdings, and PIPE capital rather than through a conventional operating-company IPO. (Sources 1, 2)

May 12, 2025 — First SEC Comment Letter Issued

Filing Source: SEC staff comment letter issued May 12, 2025 during the confidential draft registration review process. (Sources 1, 2)

Why it matters: The first SEC comment letter arrived less than a month after the initial confidential draft was submitted on April 15, 2025, indicating an active review cycle rather than a dormant queue. The subsequent amendment sequence suggests the staff’s focus was on transaction mechanics, disclosure refinement, and clinical-progress presentation rather than on a one-off late-stage problem. (Sources 1, 2)

July 9, 2025 — Final SEC Comment Response Filed

Filing Source: Amendment №2 to Form S-4 and related acceleration request, filed July 9, 2025. (Source 2)

Why it matters: The final public response cycle concluded quickly. Amendment №2 and the acceleration request were filed on July 9, 2025, and the registration was declared effective on July 10. That cadence supports the view that the de-SPAC registration path was iterative and disclosure-tuned, but not stalled by an unusually prolonged late-stage dispute. (Sources 1, 2)

May 4, 2026 — EFFECT Notice Issued ← ANCHOR EVENT

Filing Source: SEC effectiveness notice for Registration File №333–289940, confirmed in the public filing record. (Sources 3, 4)

Why it matters: The registration is effective, and the post-effectiveness monitoring window begins. For MTW, this is the anchor event because it keeps the resale pathway legally live without requiring a headline corporate announcement. (Sources 3, 4)

May 5, 2026 — First Post-Effectiveness Filing

Filing Source: Form 4 filings submitted on May 5, 2026, one day after the May 4 EFFECT notice. (Sources 12, 13, 14)

Why it matters: The first filings submitted after effectiveness were not fresh primary-offering documents but insider ownership reports. That matters because the immediate post-EFFECT record was shaped by administrative and compensatory reporting activity rather than by a clearly disclosed new primary capital-markets event. (Sources 4, 12, 13, 14)

May 5, 2026 — First Form 4 or Insider Transaction Post-Effectiveness

Filing Source: Form 4 filings filed May 5, 2026 by Uneek Mehra, Pedro Beltran, and Ben Yong. (Sources 12, 13, 14)

Why it matters: The first post-effectiveness insider filings appeared immediately, but the completed review does not support an open-market dumping narrative. The May 5 cluster resolves primarily as departure-related settlement and tax-withholding on vesting, which keeps the analytical focus on the resale shelf and selling-shareholder pathway rather than on Section 16 discretionary sales. (Sources 4, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16)

No Additional Hinge Moment Elevated as of Publication Date

Filing Source: Review of the verified milestones already captured above, including the June 2025 S-4 launch, the May 2026 EFFECT event, the immediate post-EFFECT Form 4 cluster, and the May 6 and May 13 prospectus supplements. (Sources 1, 2, 3, 4, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16)

Why it matters: As of May 27, 2026, no later filing event outranks the milestones above in explanatory importance. The structural picture is already adequately defined by the registration path, the EFFECT notice, the live resale shelf, the immediate post-EFFECT insider-reporting cluster, and the continuing 424B3 supplement activity. (Sources 1, 2, 3, 4, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16)

Narrative vs. Filing Record

What the Story Says vs. What the Record Shows

This section compares BBOT’s narrative framing with what can already be supported from the filing record. Where exact prospectus wording has not yet been lifted into the draft, MTW treats each entry as a structured comparison field rather than a finalized quote-level finding.

Growth positioning

· Narrative framing: The company presents itself as positioned for growth within its target oncology segment.

· Filings-based reality: The registration record shows a pre-revenue company rather than one with operating growth already reflected in financial performance. (Sources 1, 7, 8)

· MTW assessment: Growth positioning is not inherently unreasonable, but it depends on development milestones rather than current operating results. (Sources 1, 7, 8)

· Risk flag: Moderate

Management credibility

· Narrative framing: BBOT presents a leadership bench with credible scientific and development credentials.

· Filings-based reality: The stronger issue in the record is not résumé weakness but timing: the company compressed CEO and CFO turnover into the period immediately preceding the May 2026 effectiveness milestone. (Sources 5, 6, 10, 11)

· MTW assessment: Qualifications appear credible, but management stability is structurally qualified by transition risk, governance concentration, and post-EFFECT disclosure continuity. (Sources 5, 6, 10, 11)

· Risk flag: Moderate

Runway and capital needs

· Narrative framing: The company highlights runway and near-term capital sufficiency.

· Filings-based reality: BBOT appears to have meaningful near-term cash resources and guidance into 2028, but it remains pre-commercial, expects future financing needs before commercialization, and is operating with a large live resale shelf. (Sources 3, 7, 8, 11)

· MTW assessment: The runway narrative is real, but it does not eliminate capital-markets risk. Balance-sheet strength and resale-shelf pressure can coexist. (Sources 3, 7, 8, 11)

· Risk flag: Moderate

Clinical progress

· Narrative framing: The company emphasizes clinical progress and upcoming catalyst windows.

· Filings-based reality: The record supports a credible clinical-development story across three Phase 1 oncology programs, but these remain early-stage assets and the market structure can move independently of clinical promise. (Sources 7, 8, 9, 11)

· MTW assessment: The clinical story is the strongest part of the BBOT narrative, but investors cannot isolate it from dilution, governance, and timing risk. (Sources 3, 7, 8, 9, 11)

· Risk flag: Moderate

Governance independence

· Narrative framing: BBOT presents standard public-company governance architecture and committee independence.

· Filings-based reality: The filing record supports formal committee structure and single-class voting, but also shows substantive independence limited by ownership concentration, board representation, and executive interlocks tied to BridgeBio- and Cormorant-linked interests. (Sources 5, 6, 8)

· MTW assessment: BBOT appears compliant on paper, but the practical control environment is more concentrated than the independence labels alone suggest. (Sources 5, 6, 8)

· Risk flag: High

Liquidity and resale flexibility

· Narrative framing: The company’s disclosure framework allows flexibility for registered holders.

· Filings-based reality: The current record shows 63,054,549 shares registered for resale under a live shelf, equal to roughly 78.8% of the relevant disclosed share base. That is an active secondary-supply architecture, not background paperwork. (Sources 3, 4)

· MTW assessment: The resale shelf is one of the clearest structural warning signals in the document. (Sources 3, 4)

· Risk flag: High

Leadership continuity

· Narrative framing: The company emphasizes continuity through internal succession.

· Filings-based reality: Operating continuity appears to have been maintained, but CEO and CFO changes were compressed into the narrow period immediately before the May 4, 2026 effectiveness event. (Sources 5, 6, 10, 11)

· MTW assessment: The transition is not proof of operational failure, but the timing is too compressed to treat as a routine non-event. (Sources 5, 6, 10, 11)

· Risk flag: Moderate

Related-party alignment

· Narrative framing: BBOT’s structure implies support from experienced affiliated capital and platform relationships.

· Filings-based reality: BridgeBio’s influence is structural rather than incidental: BBOT originated inside the BridgeBio ecosystem, BridgeBio remains a major holder, and Neil Kumar links issuer governance directly to that parent-affiliated sphere. (Sources 1, 5, 7, 8)

· MTW assessment: The related-party profile is not disqualifying by itself, but it materially increases the importance of governance and capital-allocation scrutiny. (Sources 1, 5, 7, 8)

· Risk flag: Moderate

Public-investor alignment

· Narrative framing: The company operates with conventional shareholder-rights structure and public-market form.

· Filings-based reality: The record supports ordinary single-class voting and standard exchange-style governance form, but not broad practical influence for dispersed public holders. Alignment is mediated by concentrated ownership, classified-board structure, and the scale of the live resale pathway. (Sources 5, 8)

· MTW assessment: The formal shareholder-rights structure is conventional, but that is not the same as balanced practical influence. (Sources 5, 8)

· Risk flag: Moderate

REQUIRED DISCLOSURE

Market Tide Weekly is for informational and educational purposes only. Nothing in this newsletter constitutes investment advice, a solicitation to buy or sell any security, or a guarantee of any outcome. Past performance of featured picks is not indicative of future results. All investing involves risk, including the possible loss of principal. Readers should conduct their own due diligence and consult a qualified financial advisor before making investment decisions. Market Tide Weekly and its operators may hold positions in securities discussed.

Sources

The citations below have been normalized to a consistent MTW house style for SEC-source references used in this draft.

1. Helix Acquisition Corp. II and TheRas, Inc. Registration Statement on Form S-4. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 20 June 2025. File №333–288222.

2. Helix Acquisition Corp. II and TheRas, Inc. Amendment №1 to Registration Statement on Form S-4 and SEC correspondence response letter. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 1 July 2025. File №333–288222. See also acceleration request filed 9 July 2025.

3. BridgeBio Oncology Therapeutics, Inc. Registration Statement on Form S-1. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 29 Aug. 2025. Registration №333–289940. Declared effective 10 Sept. 2025; remained operative through post-effective amendment effective 4 May 2026.

4. BridgeBio Oncology Therapeutics, Inc. Prospectus Supplements filed pursuant to Rule 424(b)(3), Registration №333–289940. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, including supplements dated 6 Mar. 2026, 26 Mar. 2026, 29 Apr. 2026, 6 May 2026, and 13 May 2026.

5. BridgeBio Oncology Therapeutics, Inc. Definitive Proxy Statement (DEF 14A). U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 16 Apr. 2026. Accession №0001193125–26–186944.

6. BridgeBio Oncology Therapeutics, Inc. Current Report on Form 8-K. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 29 Apr. 2026. Accession №0001193125–26–191512.

7. BridgeBio Oncology Therapeutics, Inc. Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended 31 Dec. 2025. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 5 Mar. 2026. Accession №0001193125–26–094112.

8. BridgeBio Oncology Therapeutics, Inc. Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended 31 Mar. 2026. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 12 May 2026. Accession №0001193125–26–219829.

9. BridgeBio Oncology Therapeutics, Inc. Current Report on Form 8-K, with earnings release for fiscal year 2025 attached as Exhibit 99.1. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 5 Mar. 2026. Accession №0001193125–26–093997.

10. BridgeBio Oncology Therapeutics, Inc. Current Report on Form 8-K, reporting the Eli Wallace consulting arrangement and related executive-transition details following the 20 Apr. 2026 leadership change. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 29 Apr. 2026. Accession №0001193125–26–191512.

11. BridgeBio Oncology Therapeutics, Inc. Current Report on Form 8-K, with quarterly earnings release attached as Exhibit 99.1. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 12 May 2026. Accession №0001193125–26–219801.

12. Mehra, Uneek. Form 4 — Statement of Changes in Beneficial Ownership. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 5 May 2026. Accession №0001193125–26–207031.

13. Beltran, Pedro J. Form 4 — Statement of Changes in Beneficial Ownership. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 5 May 2026. Accession №0001193125–26–207035.

14. Yong, Ben. Form 4 — Statement of Changes in Beneficial Ownership. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 5 May 2026. Accession №0001193125–26–207041.

15. Beltran, Pedro J. Form 4 — Statement of Changes in Beneficial Ownership. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 12 May 2026. Accession №0001193125–26–219439.

16. Elmelech, Idan. Form 4 — Statement of Changes in Beneficial Ownership. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 12 May 2026. Accession №0001193125–26–219447.

Final Structural Assessment

MTW Analyst Posture as of May 27, 2026

10.1 — Summary of Structural Flags

The following structural flags represent the most significant concerns identified through the completed filing review and the analysis above. Each is a declarative conclusion grounded in the public record examined in this Deep Dive.

17. The operative resale shelf covers 63,054,549 shares, or roughly 78.8% of shares outstanding on the relevant disclosed base, creating a live overhang that is large enough to materially affect float expansion and price formation if selling holders choose to act. (Sources 3, 4)

18. Governance influence is concentrated around BridgeBio- and Cormorant-linked interests, where formal committee independence appears intact but substantive independence is constrained by ownership concentration, board presence, and executive interlocks. (Sources 5, 6, 8)

19. The late-April 2026 leadership transition compressed CEO and CFO turnover into the same narrow window that preceded the May 4 effectiveness milestone, increasing the importance of monitoring disclosure continuity, incentive alignment, and capital-markets decision making during the post-EFFECT period. (Sources 5, 6, 10, 11)

20. The gap between BBOT’s constructive clinical narrative and its capital-markets structure is material: the science may be promising, but the live resale architecture, option overhang, and governance concentration mean the stock’s trading behavior can be shaped by holder liquidity needs as much as by operating progress. (Sources 3, 7, 8, 9, 11)

21. The post-EFFECT Form 4 cluster initially reads as an insider-selling alarm, but the completed five-filing review points in the opposite direction. The verified filings attributable to Pedro Beltran, Ben Yong, Uneek Mehra, and Idan Elmelech resolve as tax-withholding on vesting, option-award, departure-related settlement, and promotion-related disclosure activity rather than open-market selling. The unresolved structural risk therefore remains concentrated in the live resale shelf and related 424B3 supplement pathway, which can transmit real selling pressure without per-transaction Form 4 visibility. (Sources 4, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16)

10.2 — What Would Change the Assessment

MTW’s analytical posture is not permanent. The following specific developments, if they occur and are disclosed, would meaningfully alter the structural risk profile of BBOT in the directions noted.

● A sustained period with no meaningful secondary selling signal through the live shelf, combined with cleaner disclosure showing that the registered overhang is not translating into active market pressure, would materially reduce the immediacy of the dilution concern. (Sources 3, 4)

● Post-effectiveness insider purchases in the open market, or clearer evidence that major holders are maintaining rather than distributing positions, would improve the structural read; conversely, a rapid sequence of 424B3-linked selling activity or disclosed holder liquidation would worsen it. (Sources 4, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16)

● Any escalation in disclosure stress — such as a filing delinquency, a material governance rupture, a stop-order-type regulatory event, or evidence of concentrated holder exits through the resale pathway — would justify a sharper downgrade in MTW’s structural posture. (Sources 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 11)

10.3 — Analyst Posture

MTW Analyst Posture — As of May 27, 2026: ELEVATED STRUCTURAL SCRUTINY / MONITOR

The BBOT record still warrants elevated structural scrutiny, but the completed Form 4 review clarifies where that scrutiny belongs. The immediate concern is no longer unverified insider-selling activity through Section 16 filings; the five-file cluster now resolves primarily as tax-withholding on vesting, option-award, departure-related settlement, and promotion-related disclosure activity. MTW therefore maintains an Elevated Structural Scrutiny / Monitor posture with specific focus on the standing resale infrastructure, the 63,054,549-share registered overhang, the May 6 and May 13 424(b)(3) prospectus supplements, and the governance transition that coincided with effectiveness. Those remain the channels most likely to carry the live post-EFFECT selling and dilution signal. (Sources 3, 4, 6, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16)

10.4 — What We’re Watching Next

The following catalysts, deadlines, and filing windows constitute the MTW monitoring agenda for BBOT for the 60-day period following this publication.

● Post-Effectiveness Prospectus Activity: MTW is watching for any additional Rule 424(b)(3) prospectus supplements tied to the live resale shelf, because those filings remain the clearest procedural signal that the registered selling-shareholder pathway is active and being refreshed around company events. The May 6 and May 13 supplements already show that the shelf is not dormant. Further near-term supplement activity would reinforce the view that the resale infrastructure is live, maintained, and capable of transmitting secondary selling pressure without a separate promotional event. (Source 4)

● Form 4 / Insider Transaction Monitoring: The immediate post-EFFECT Form 4 cluster now reads as administrative and compensatory rather than distributive, but MTW still needs to monitor subsequent Section 16 filings for any change in pattern. The key question is whether future filings remain confined to tax withholding, vesting, and new-award mechanics, or begin to show discretionary dispositions by officers, directors, or 10% holders. A shift from compensation-related filings to open-market sales would materially change the structural read even if the larger overhang still sits in the resale shelf. (Sources 12, 13, 14, 15, 16)

● Exchange and Disclosure Compliance: Because BBOT is trading on Nasdaq rather than OTC Markets, the relevant compliance watchpoint is not OTC disclosure-tier degradation but continued exchange-level reporting discipline. MTW is therefore watching for any signs of disclosure stress that would signal weakening controls or governance strain: delayed filings, corrective amendments, unexpected risk-factor expansion, auditor-related friction, or exchange-compliance language in subsequent filings. In this record, disclosure continuity matters as much as any single operating update because the company reached effectiveness during a compressed leadership transition. (Sources 5, 6, 8, 10, 11)

● Next Periodic Filing Obligation: The next major monitoring event is BBOT’s continued Exchange Act reporting cadence following the May 12, 2026 Form 10-Q. MTW is watching for timely periodic reporting, clean continuity in management certifications, and any new disclosure around cash runway, clinical-timeline slippage, selling-shareholder activity, or governance stabilization after the April leadership changes. In the current setup, an on-time and internally coherent next periodic filing would modestly reduce structural concern, while any delay or materially disjointed disclosure would intensify it. (Sources 6, 8, 11)

BKKT, HSHP, and MRLN: Filing-Based Analysis (May 2026)

BKKT → turnaround, but still weak margins

HSHP → clean cyclical + leverage risk

MRLN → early-stage, capital-heavy growth story

Filings tell the real story.

Market Tide Weekly — Tuesday Edition: May 26, 2026

The week is still in motion, but the board is visible now. This Tuesday draft sets the field in place — names, filings, and the early logic behind each position. It is not a finished view. It is a working sheet for Thursday, built to hold the slate, define the initial theses, and mark where conviction is solid and where it still needs to be earned. The job here is simple: see the setup clearly, separate signal from noise, and leave the next move ready.

Public Picks

BKKT (Bakkt, Inc.) — Bakkt is in the public slate because the story is simple, even if the numbers are not yet strong. The company has pulled back from non-core lines and is trying to build around institutional crypto infrastructure. That gives it a live angle in a market that can move fast when sentiment turns. The weakness is plain: Q1 2026 revenue was $243.6 million, net loss was $11.7 million, and adjusted EBITDA was negative $13.7 million. The economics still look too pass-through to inspire much trust. But Bakkt has about $82.6 million in cash and restricted cash and no debt, which gives it time to attempt the turn (Bakkt, 10-Q, May 2026; Bakkt, 10-K, 2026). If the business can improve revenue quality and show better margin discipline, the stock may lift from a low base. If not, it stays what it is now: a conditional turnaround in a volatile market.

HSHP (Himalaya Shipping) — Himalaya Shipping is the clean cyclical trade in the group. The case starts with the March 12, 2026 20-F, which lays out a dry-bulk business tied to freight rates, charter demand, and a levered balance sheet. Then the near-term catalyst arrived. The May 18, 2026 6-K marked the earnings date, and the May 21, 2026 earnings release showed revenue of $33.6 million, net income of $5.0 million, EBITDA of $24.5 million, and time charter equivalent rates of about $32.3K per day. The May 22, 2026 interim filing showed cash of $24.5 million, long-term debt of about $659.5 million, and equity of about $155.8 million (Himalaya Shipping, 20-F, Mar. 2026; Himalaya Shipping, 6-K, May 2026). The idea is clear. If freight stays firm, the earnings power can carry the stock. If rates soften, the leverage will become a primary risk factor.

MRLN (Merlin, Inc.) — Merlin is the hardest name in the public slate to hold with comfort, but it is also one of the most interesting. The filing trail shows a company moving from shell to operating story. The March 12, 2026 10-K sets the pre-operating base. The April 29, 2026 8-K brought an $80 million PIPE that gave the balance sheet more room. The May 15, 2026 10-Q gave the first real operating look. The numbers are still weak: about $1.0 million of revenue, about $90.4 million of net loss, and a business that will need time and money before it can prove itself (Merlin, 10-K, Mar. 2026; Merlin, 8-K, Apr. 2026; Merlin, 10-Q, May 2026). The bull case is not in current earnings. It is in milestones, certification, and the chance that customer traction starts to catch up with the story. If that does not happen, dilution and execution risk stay in command.

Where Structure Bends

The filings are not saying the same thing in every corner of the field, and that is the point. We noticed that this week’s names do not line up around one clean market story. One leans on balance-sheet patience, one leans on freight and timing, and one leans on milestones that have not yet turned into operating proof. What caught our eye is not just the spread in sectors. It is the spread in how structure shows up when pressure is still present. We are watching that difference closely. Some companies are trying to survive long enough for the thesis to work. Others are trying to prove that the turn has already begun. In a market that still rewards speed and punishes doubt, the filings slow the picture down. That is usually where the useful things begin.

What We’re Watching Next

· Whether BKKT can show better revenue quality and margin discipline in the next reporting cycle.

· Whether HSHP can hold earnings strength if freight conditions remain firm or begin to soften.

· Whether MRLN can turn milestone progress into operating proof without letting dilution and execution risk take over the story.

The tide satisfies our curiosity — not our greed. If this kind of structural transparency is what you’ve been looking for, subscribe to Market Tide Weekly and get the full picture every week. Follow us on social for real-time structural observations between editions. Market Tide Weekly publishes every Tuesday at 11 AM. Deep Dives drop Thursdays at 2 PM. We’ll be here.

Sources and References

Sources — HSHP Himalaya Shipping Ltd. Form 20-F for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2025. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 12 Mar. 2026, https://www.sec.gov.

Himalaya Shipping Ltd. “Himalaya Shipping Ltd. (HSHP) Files 2025 Annual Report on Form 20-F.” Himalaya Shipping, 12 Mar. 2026, https://himalaya-shipping.com/news/himalaya-shipping-ltd-hshp-files-2025-annual-report-on-form-20-f/.

Himalaya Shipping Ltd. Form 4 — Statement of Changes in Beneficial Ownership (Director Transaction, Bjorn Andreas Freng Isaksen). U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 10 Apr. 2026, https://www.sec.gov.

“Himalaya Shipping Ltd. Mandatory Notification of Trade.” Euronext, 9 Apr. 2026, https://live.euronext.com/en/products/equities/company-news/2026-04-09-himalaya-shipping-ltd-hshp-mandatory-notification-trade.

“Himalaya Shipping Director Sold Shares Worth $4,020,000.” TradingView, 10 Apr. 2026, https://www.tradingview.com/news/tradingview:33dcf7687dddf:0-himalaya-shipping-director-sold-shares-worth-over-4m/.

“Himalaya Shipping Ltd. Insider Trading Activity.” SEC Form 4 Tracker, 2026, https://www.secform4.com/insider-trading/1959455.htm.

Himalaya Shipping Ltd. “Q1 2026 Earnings Call Transcript.” Insider Monkey, 23 May 2026, https://www.insidermonkey.com/blog/himalaya-shipping-ltd-nysehshp-q1-2026-earnings-call-transcript-1767979/.

“Himalaya Shipping Ltd. Q1 2026 Earnings Report.” Quarter Results, 2026, https://www.quarter-results.com/financial-reports/OSL/HSHP.OL/.

“Himalaya Shipping Ltd. Financial Statements.” Stock Analysis, 2026, https://stockanalysis.com/stocks/hshp/financials/.

Himalaya Shipping Ltd. “Investor Relations Filings and Updates.” Himalaya Shipping, 2026, https://himalaya-shipping.com/investor-relations/.

Sources — BKKT Bakkt, Inc. Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2025. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2026, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1820302/000162828026019870/bakkt-20251231.htm.

Bakkt, Inc. Form 10-Q for the Quarterly Period Ended March 31, 2026. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 11 May 2026, https://last10k.com/sec-filings/bkkt/0001628280-26-033576.htm.

Bakkt, Inc. “Bakkt Reports First Quarter 2026 Results.” Bakkt Insights, 19 May 2026, https://bakkt.com/insights/bakkt-reports-first-quarter-2026-results/.

“Bakkt Q1 2026 Results: $243.6M Revenue, $11.7M Loss.” StockTitan, May 2026, https://www.stocktitan.net/news/BKKT/bakkt-reports-first-quarter-2026-huitk5hibb3a.html.

“Bakkt 2025 10-K: Revenue $2.335B, Net Loss $97.3M.” TradingView, 19 Mar. 2026, https://www.tradingview.com/news/tradingview:0d9574013a9e1:0-bakkt-2025-10-k-revenue-2-335b-net-loss-97-3m/.

“Bakkt Releases Shareholder Letter and Reports Full Year 2025 Financial Results.” StockTitan, Mar. 2026, https://www.stocktitan.net/news/BKKT/bakkt-releases-shareholder-letter-and-reports-full-year-2025-x2ifwlcj96lc.html.

“Bakkt, Inc. Files Annual Report (Form 10-K).” StockTitan, 2026, https://www.stocktitan.net/sec-filings/BKKT/10-k-bakkt-inc-files-annual-report-af59a9fa9a6c.html.

“Bakkt 10-K FY2025 Annual Report Summary.” Moomoo, 2026, https://www.moomoo.com/news/notice/306701769/bakkt-10-k-fy2025-annual-report.

“BKKT Insider Trading Screener.” OpenInsider, 2026, http://openinsider.com/BKKT.

“Bakkt, Inc. Insider Trading Activity.” InsiderAct, 2026, https://insideract.com/company/0001820302.

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Form 4 — Statement of Changes in Beneficial Ownership (Accession №0002043681–26–000007), 19 May 2026, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1820302/000204368126000007/0002043681-26-000007-index.htm.

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Various Form 4 Filings (May 2026 Insider Activity Cluster for Bakkt, Inc.), 2026.

Sources — MRLN Merlin, Inc. Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2025. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 12 Mar. 2026, https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/Archives/edgar/data/0002028707/000121390026027011/ea0279932-10k_inflection4.htm

Merlin, Inc. Form 8-K (Current Report). U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 29 Apr. 2026, https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/Archives/edgar/data/0002028707/000121390026048884/ea0288180-8k_merlin.htm

Merlin, Inc. Form 8-K (Current Report). U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 14 May 2026, https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/Archives/edgar/data/0002028707/000121390026056230/ea0290556-8k_merlin.htm

Merlin, Inc. Form 10-Q for the Quarterly Period Ended March 31, 2026. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 15 May 2026, https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/Archives/edgar/data/0002028707/000121390026057138/ea0289176-10q_merlin.htm

Merlin, Inc. Registration Statements, Prospectuses, and Insider Filings (Forms S-1, 424B3, S-8, 13D/13G, Form 4). U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2026.

Disclaimer

Market Tide Weekly is for informational and educational purposes only. Nothing in this newsletter constitutes investment advice, a solicitation to buy or sell any security, or a guarantee of any outcome. Past performance of featured picks is not indicative of future results. All investing involves risk, including the possible loss of principal. Readers should conduct their own due diligence and consult a qualified financial advisor before making investment decisions. Market Tide Weekly and its operators may hold positions in securities discussed.

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This Memorial Day, we remember those who gave everything in service to something greater than themselves.

In markets and in life, it’s easy to focus on momentum, opportunity, and outcomes. Today is a reminder of something more fundamental:

👉 Stability, security, and progress all rest on sacrifice.

As we analyze systems — whether in defense, energy, or infrastructure — it’s worth remembering that many of the industries we study exist because others stood in their defense.

Grateful for that foundation today.

Market Tide Weekly Filings tell the story. Narrative reveals the truth. Every Tuesday and Thursday, we break down the structure, catalysts, and microcap signals shaping the week’s tide.