Chapter 2 – New Deal Housing Policy and the Making of National Mortgage Markets
Debtor Nation: The History of America in Red Ink // annotated review
the 1930s marked a moment of doubt about the future of capitalism, making govt intervention experiments politically viable
some within the administration saw this as an opportunity to sidestep the constraints of the market economy
others saw it as a chance to create new directions for private investment
practical solutions in a desperate time, more than ideology, guided Roosevelt's policies
FHA changed the way banks operated forever by turning mortgages into nationally-traded commodities
flood of funds, guaranteed profits, standardized policies
the Public Works Administration (PWA) created & underfunded work relief programs
attracted criticism from all sides for doing either too little or too much
PWA decided what to do / how to do it, but passed most costs to local government
lacked funding => PWA's vision for restoring the economy by restoring the cities came to little
the real innovation of New Deal policy was the practical harnessing of private capital for social ends
using markets rather than govt spending to provide housing/stimulate the economy was controversial
the range of possible interventions in the economy was circumscribed by compliance of the business community
before the 1920s, mortgages were seen as a short-term debt with a certain claim on property, like any other form of consumer lending
after the stock market crash, investors/banks withdrew capital from the mortgage market, making it expensive for borrowers to renew their mortgages
foreclosures during the Depression resulted as much from the drop in home owner's income as from the withdrawal of short-term mortgage funds from the market
without mortgages, the housing industry collapsed
restoring the economy turned on restoring the construction industry
beginning in 1933, creation of Home Owner's Loan Corporation (HOLC) provided much-needed liquidity in the short term
refinanced mortgages on longer terms, up to 15 years
the hope was that by lowering the monthly payments, owners could meet their obligations
20% of loans ended in foreclosure, but the primary aim (restoring liquidity to markets) was successful
restricted to refinancing mortgages in default => stopped hemorrhaging of housing stock, but had no mechanism to revive new construction
idea behind FHA: “a new kind of mortgage instrument which will be the soundest thing in the market, the most approved standards, which will be amortizing and paying off”
homes would be owner-occupied / not speculative instruments
“It was the last hope of private enterprise. The alternative was socialization of the housing industry.”
FHA guidelines deemed what kinds of properties a loan could be procured for
goal = to avoid the shoddy, speculative construction that had been the norm in the 1920s
quality was assured by FHA inspectors + mortgages standardized => investors all over the country could know exactly what a particular mortgage was worth
mortgages could the be resold nationally like any other standardized commodity
enabled the $$ of capital-rich east to flow south and west
the federal govt organized the FHA, but private capital paid for and profited from it
compliance with FHA guidelines was mandatory for the insurance
if borrowers defaulted, the insurance program would repay the principal to the lenders
the program was paid for by a 0.5% slice of the interest from every FHA loan
if there were no defaults, lenders got all of the insurance payments back
by focusing on those who were already doing well, the FHA drew fire from critics who believed the govt should be helping the millions out of work / struggling
the idea of expanding American debt seemed suspect at best
criticized for burdening the solvent with debts – did the New Dealers want to bring down the stable portion of society still left?
New Dealers responded that “any measure that increased employment would add wealth and repay that debt”
While PWA was justified by doing work that the private sector could/would not do, the FHA created the opportunity fro the private sector to act
while the opportunity for profit existed, govt intervention was necessary to reduce the risk of investment
the insurance “furnished a margin of security more important in its psychological effect on investors than the govt's actual financial commitment”
amortized payment plans were far more predictable, less risky
by amortizing payments, need to refinance the principal at the end of 20 years would be gone
extending the mortgage over many business cycles would stabilize the supply of mortgage money
amortization greatly increased the # of Americans who could afford to buy homes
despite the moniker “federally insured”, govt didn't insure the loans – merely set up a system that would function by itself
business enthusiastically endorsed the FHA
no fear of being “crowded out” by the FHA
by working through private channels, didn't seem like another one of Roosevelt's unnecessary, possibly socialist/fascist boondoggles
organized by experienced businessmen
cultivating the consent of business was the foundation of the FHA's success
two types of loans under FHA:
Title I – home improvement / “modernization” loans
Title II – home purchase mortgages
Title I program saw a 40% rise every week between its creation in mid-August 1934 and October
FHA encouraged suburbanization
housing quality was the foundation of the FHA system
implicit and explicit hierarchies of what home buyer's ought to want
planners' social assumptions/preferences shaped the planning criteria as much as macroeconomic considerations
imagined ideal home as opposite of crowded urban slums
believed that homogeneity of surrounding housing stock indicated stable housing prices
believed multiuse districts threatened residential value
“adverse influences” category of the mortgage application was mostly concerned with the danger of class/racial mixing
believed the city was not a good investment, making suburban lending risk free and urban lending bad business
with the city such a bad investment, the suburb was not a choice, it was *the *choice
protection took a variety of forms – from the man-made “high-speed traffic artery” to natural “hills and ravines” to the social “college campus”
enforcement by “established barriers” or the law was essential to a good mortgage rating
the “lack of appropriate and adequate deed restrictions” to keep out Jews/Asians/African Americans jeopardized the collateral for the mortgage
stimulating demand was a priority
buying used homes created no demand for labor or materials, so FHA guidelines steered buyers towards new homes
space for ample and replaceable furniture was important, since it allowed for greater consumption
While FHA planners were rhetorically ambivalent toward transportation type, they preferred the kinds of places automobiles could get to
housing policies created demand for autos – and automobile financing
without increasing – or at least stable – values, the entire scheme of the long term mortgage would become untenable
PWA policy focused on the rejuvenation of the city; the point of the FHA was to escape the cities, not save them.
possibility of divorcing jobs/housing/investment from a specific location is what gave FHA policies their power
but also constrained their ability to redress economic inequality
in helping to recover the economy through suburbanization, the FHA further entrenched wealth inequality along racial lines
many people left the crowded cities through the FHA, but others – denied access to federal mortgages – were left behind
prior to the FHA, mortgages were extremely local ... unable to lend $$ from a distance, capital tended to accumulate in slow-growth areas and be scarce in fast-growing ones
because all FHA-insured mortgages conformed to standard specifications, the FHA created conditions favorable to a nation-wide mortgage market
w/o local financial borders to stop capital flow, but with federal impositions of max interest rates, mortgage rates converged
individual investors went from 60% of mortgage market in 1900 to ~10% in 1962
competing views between PWA & FHA:
PWA – govt could boost the economy while helping the disadvantaged and boosting the city
FHA – believed the best way to sustainably jumpstart the economy was through loosening private capital
govt language reframed mortgages not as heavy debt, but as responsible long-term investments for the borrower
only when houses began to be seen primarily as investments, rather than debts, could they acquire long-term financing
what had been a marker of financial uncertainty became a marker of financial responsibility
FHA remade what was considered a sound and *normal *mortgage