Luminium-1: Ballistic Deripaska and the Shy Irish.
The hypocritical attack by a Washington-based Human Rights Watch human-rights advocate over weapons has brought a broad range of questions to the fore, to the point where one could compile a ranking of the most vile purveyors of empty rhetoric who indulge the kremlin.
But what is interesting here is not so much the personalities as the mechanisms for covering up and formalizing de facto complicity in the killing of Ukrainians.
None of the people involved, especially those living in respectable countries, wants to look like toxic villains. Hence, the art of evading responsibility, including moral responsibility, has been perfected.
As a rule, the tactic contains two mandatory elements: the diplomatic formulation, “we are so concerned that we will conduct an investigation,” and the legal formula, “what is your evidence?”
The clumsy use of the legal formula was recently on display after the utterly absurd contortions of Israeli officials who tried to justify purchasing grain stolen from Ukrainian territories under occupation. But Israel eventually backed down, because publicly picking a fight with Ukraine right now is a very unprofitable proposition for Netanyahu.
At the same time, there are much more toxic stories that have not yet received the attention they deserve, even though they are periodically covered.
One of them is the supply of alumina (aluminum oxide) to russia.
At present, this is completely legal; there are no formal restrictions on this raw material. At the same time, it is no secret to anyone that aluminum and its alloys produced from alumina are used to manufacture ballistic and cruise missiles, combat aircraft, and a vast range of other military products.
Therefore, I will make two illustrative posts about aluminium. The first about the Irish, the second about the Kazakhs. It is simply too revealing.
1. In recent months, the Ukrainian public sphere has been quoting russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska approvingly, as he allows himself some mild criticism of the economic realities in russia. To particularly impressionable people, Deripaska is presented as almost a dissident.
Yet somehow they forget that Comrade Deripaska is the principal owner of Rusal, one of the world's largest aluminum producers.
Among other things, Rusal supplies metal to russia's key missile plants. Its products are used by:
Tactical Missiles Corporation (Kh-101, Kh-22, Kh-69 missiles);
Arzamas Machine-Building Plant (components and assemblies for the same missiles);
Votkinsk Plant (Iskander, Oreshnik…);
Almaz-Antey concern (S-300, S-400 air-defense systems), and many others.
When yet another missile hits Kyiv/Kharkiv/Dnipro… collapsing an apartment-building entrance and killing dozens of people, there is (let's add the formal caveat) an extremely high probability that a little Deripaska is sitting inside it.
But he is not alone there. Along with him, in roughly every fifth or sixth missile, little Irish politicians and officials arrive to kill Ukrainians.
2. The essence of the story is that for many years russia has traditionally imported around 4.5–5 million tonnes of alumina for aluminum production.
Before 2022, almost 3.2 million tonnes of this raw material were supplied collectively by Rusal's assets in Ukraine (Mykolaiv Alumina Refinery) and Australia. In Ukraine, the plant was seized. The Australians banned supplies of aluminum raw materials to russia.
Rusal rushed to replace the lost volumes. One source of compensation became the Rusal-owned alumina refinery in Ireland — Aughinish Alumina (County Limerick).
The plant came under Deripaska's control in 2007, when the aluminum assets of Rusal, SUAL, and the Anglo-Swiss behemoth Glencore merged. The Irish plant had belonged to the Anglo-Swiss company before the merger.
Rusal invested in modernizing the facility, increasing its capacity to 1.8–2 million tonnes of alumina per year. This turned Aughinish Alumina not only into one of Ireland's largest industrial enterprises, but also into a major supplier of alumina to the European market.
In 2018, the US temporarily squeezed Deripaska and Rusal with sanctions. However, through some magical sleight of hand, the oligarch's stake in the corporation was formally reduced to a level acceptable to the Americans (this excellent episode deserves attention in its own right, but that's for another time). As a result, the oligarch remained sanctioned while Rusal continued to operate freely.
After 2022, despite a number of restrictions on russian aluminum in Europe, there were no sanctions in the opposite direction: Deripaska's Irish asset at least doubled its exports of alumina to russia, from approximately 400,000 tonnes in 2020 to 827,000 tonnes in 2024 (17% of russian imports).
In 2025, the Irish showed a slight decline, but few people believe it. On the contrary. By 2024, the Irish plant was formally exporting 48% of its alumina production to russia. According to outside estimates, this share could have risen to as much as 80% in 2026.
3. In the second half of 2026, Ireland holds the presidency of the EU.
And in the first half of the year, lively discussions erupted both in Ireland itself and in European institutions about what to do with Rusal's Irish asset.
“Suddenly,” it turned out that raw material from this plant reaches Rusal's aluminum plants in Sayanogorsk (Khakassia) and Krasnoyarsk. From there, through the Aluminum Sales Company, it reaches more than 40 russian defense-industry enterprises — from Uralvagonzavod to the aforementioned Almaz-Antey.
A thought emerged that was astonishing in its radicalism: if we all agree that russian missile strikes on Ukrainian cities are evil, perhaps we should stop supplying the raw material used to manufacture missiles? And then, perhaps, there would be a little more time to solve air-defense problems.
It went so far that Aughinish Alumina was proposed for inclusion in the EU's 21st sanctions package. A general ban on supplying alumina to russia is also being discussed. But so far, it has amounted only to a political resolution by the European Parliament, with no real consequences.
Ireland played it by the book.
First, local politicians expressed extreme surprise and concern that raw material from Rusal's alumina refinery was allegedly ending up at Rusal's aluminum plants and then being sent on to military factories. Who could have imagined! To verify this outrageous fact, a series of investigations was launched.
The very first investigation “suddenly” showed that it was impossible to reliably confirm — but also impossible to disprove — that specifically Irish alumina participates in the production chain of specific missiles. After all, there is a possibility that alumina from Ireland is used only to make wires, foil, and aluminum forks. Definitely not missiles!
Do you have evidence that Deripaska personally produces aluminum from Irish alumina, personally cuts out a missile component with a jigsaw, and then turns the launch key? No? There you have it!
And if that's the case, why put 500 jobs at the plant itself and around 1,000 associated jobs at risk? Why upset a business that has doubled its revenue from alumina supplies to russia (from €173 million in 2021 to €318 million in 2025)? This would only harm County Limerick and the families of ordinary Irish people, who presumably do not support Putin.
4. Since there are currently no formal restrictions on alumina supplies to russia, the Ukrainian side is behaving as correctly as possible, bringing our concerns to the attention of the Irish authorities. And the Irish, judging by their public reaction, have launched an endless game of “what is your evidence?”
In this game, it is impossible from the outset to present evidence that will be deemed satisfactory, because everything is already obvious at the starting line: there is an unwillingness to acknowledge reality.
However, since the context is clear to everyone, a solution may come under pressure from an irresistible force.
Rusal has an aluminum plant in Sweden — Kubal (Kubikenborg Aluminium AB). Sweden's Tax Agency began legal proceedings in Cyprus last year to recover taxes that it believes the plant failed to pay (money was routed through Cyprus). In March 2026, two managers of the Kubal plant were arrested on charges of circumventing sanctions.
The Swedish tax authorities' position is that oligarch Deripaska's actual influence over Rusal is above the permitted threshold. Therefore, all activities of Rusal's assets in the EU fall under sanctions. Including the Irish plant.
In fact, the activity of the Swedes has become a major catalyst for the discussion, pushing the Irish to take some kind of position.
While Ireland holds the EU presidency, it will be difficult to resolve anything serious. However, over these months — especially against the backdrop of russian attacks on Ukraine — the public toxicity of the story could become so great that in winter 2027 the Irish plant will simply be chopped down with a sword.
But it doesn't have to come to that if reality is acknowledged and compensatory measures are put in place. It could make for a good case study…
In Kazakhstan, things are even more interesting. To be continued.
Collage featuring Deripaska and the plant — Business Post.ie
