#woke lunatics

By: Jesse Arm

Published: Mar 9, 2026

California Governor Gavin Newsom suggested during a recent CNN appearance that to win again, Democrats need to become “more culturally normal.” In response to this obvious point, far-left commentators accused Newsom of betraying the party’s values and ceding moral ground to the Right.

The backlash was predictable—and, if you look at the data on who Democrats are, absurd. Most Democratic voters aren’t radical. But the party is run by people who are, and who have built institutions to ensure that their preferences dominate.

A new Manhattan Institute survey of nearly 2,600 Democratic voters and 2024 Kamala Harris supporters offers the most granular look yet at this disconnect. Contrary to broadly held assumption, the Democratic base is not a caricature coalition of socialist revolutionaries and woke militants. The activists are there, but they are a minority—and not a particularly large one.

In the survey, a plurality of respondents (38 percent) said that their party should move toward the ideological center. Just 22 percent supported shifting to the left. Democratic voters also said, by a greater than 2-1 margin, that future party leaders should prioritize effective governing over fighting Donald Trump and Republicans.

The median Democratic voter, in other words, is not asking for a more far-left version of the party. He wants something closer to the moderation of Bill Clinton or the politics to which Newsom is now unconvincingly paying lip service.

Analysis of the data suggests the Democratic coalition can be broken into three distinct blocs. Moderates—voters who identify as moderate Democrats, independents, or anti-Trump Republicans—account for 47 percent. They are demographically diverse, older on average, and the most electorally flexible—only 45 percent say they have never voted for a non-Democratic presidential candidate.

A second bloc, Progressive Liberals, make up 37 percent. They are reliably left-leaning, whiter than the other blocs, and disproportionately concentrated in suburbs and on the West Coast.

Last comes the Woke Fringe—voters who identify as democratic socialists or Communist. These add up to just 11 percent of the coalition. The Woke Fringe is the youngest of the three groups, the most conspiratorial, the most likely to report poor mental health, and—not incidentally—the most likely to spend excessive sums of time on the internet. Notably, previous quantitative and qualitative Manhattan Institute research on the GOP coalition shows that the youngest and most hyper-online Republicans also skew hardest toward ideological wackiness.

As this distribution implies, our polling reveals that moderate views are more common than many might expect. Take immigration: in our poll, only about one in ten Democratic voters actually supports open borders. Fewer than a quarter want to increase legal immigration levels. Majorities favor shifting the system toward skills-based admissions while prioritizing the deportation of criminal offenders.

On public safety, Democrats are divided over their support for the criminal justice system in general. But they strongly support aggressive prosecution of gun crimes, view the police as essential to maintaining order, and overwhelmingly reject political violence. On transgender issues, most voters support preventing biological boys from competing in girls’ sports, banning transgender medical and surgical interventions for minors, and requiring schools to notify parents if a child requests to identify as transgender or change pronouns in class.

The coalition’s economic views are similarly less revolutionary than the party’s rhetoric often implies. Democrats favor redistribution and consumer protections, but only small minorities embrace the more radical view that America’s economic system is so rigged it ought to be torn down or that billionaires should not exist. Most express real concern about welfare fraud. Large numbers show renewed interest in free trade and other supply-side policies.

On foreign policy, most Democrats affirm Israel’s right to exist, though younger voters are markedly more skeptical. Remarkably, two in three Democratic voters still say that America has historically been a force for good in the world.

If Democrats are this moderate, why does the party so frequently appear otherwise?

Part of the answer is the institutional ecosystem that now governs Democratic politics. Over the past two decades, a network of progressive advocacy groups, ideological nonprofits, activist donors, and aligned unions has accumulated enormous influence over candidate recruitment, messaging, and policy priorities. Primary candidates who deviate from activist orthodoxy often face organized opposition, well-funded primary challenges, and relentless pressure campaigns from within their own coalition.

As a result, Democratic politicians’ incentives point toward escalation rather than moderation. It’s often safer, electorally speaking, for them to echo the loudest voices in the party than to represent the quieter instincts held by most of their voters.

Economics supercharges this dynamic. Many party leaders depend directly on government spending, regulation, or nonprofit advocacy for their livelihoods. This produces a kind of patronage politics, as the leadership benefits materially from an ever-expanding progressive agenda. Any electoral value offered by moderation pales in comparison to the threat that it poses to these interests.

In such circumstances, meaningful reform rarely comes from within the system itself. It often requires an outsider willing to disrupt it. A decade following Donald Trump’s hostile takeover of the Republican Party—which paired a radical, populist disposition with substantive policy moderation—it is striking that a majority of today’s Democrats now say they would support some notable figure from outside politics running for president in 2028.

Whether such a figure will emerge remains to be seen. What the data make clear, however, is that the Democratic electorate itself is not the problem. Most Democratic voters don’t want a more radical party. They want a more normal one.

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By: Jesse Arm

Published: Mar 6, 2026

A new national survey conducted by the Manhattan Institute examines today’s Democratic coalition and the tensions shaping the party ahead of the 2026 midterm and 2028 presidential election cycles. The poll reached 2,593 respondents who are either registered Democrats and/or voted for Kamala Harris in 2024. The survey also includes oversamples of Hispanic and black voters who meet that criteria.

This study helps clarify a central question confronting the modern Democratic Party: is the median Democratic voter actually moving left—or is the party being pulled left by a smaller activist faction that dominates elite discourse and low-turnout politics? The findings point to a coalition that is often more moderate, more internally divided, and more pragmatic than what is found across left-leaning social media, cable news, and donor-funded groups. More voters favor moving the party toward the ideological center than further left.

The Democratic coalition is best understood as three blocs. The largest bloc—Moderates—hold middle-of-the-road views across many of the most contentious issues in national politics, including immigration, crime, transgender policy, and DEI. A second bloc—Progressive Liberals—leans left but remains closer to the party’s institutional mainstream. A significantly smaller but distinct third bloc—the Woke Fringe—takes consistently maximalist positions on issues and is disproportionately young and conspiratorial.

Across issue areas, the coalition’s preferences tend to reflect this structure. On immigration, only one-in-ten take a true “open borders” position, less than one-in-four want to see more legal migrants come into the country, and majorities support shifting to prioritize skills-based immigration and deporting criminals. On public safety, the coalition is divided over the criminal justice system in general, but it strongly supports aggressive prosecution of gun crimes, views the police as essential, and rejects political violence. On transgender issues, most voters support parental notification requirements, preventing biological boys from participating in girls’ sports, and age limits on medical transitions. On economics, the coalition favors redistribution and consumer protections, but it shows limited appetite for “burn it down” politics, real concerns about welfare fraud, and a new interest in free trade as well as certain other supply-side policies. On Israel, most voters affirm the Jewish state’s right to exist, though younger voters are markedly less supportive and more open to antisemitic tolerance. And on national identity more broadly, two in three Democrats see America as historically a force for good in the world.

The political implication is straightforward: activist politics often speaks for the most ideologically intense voters, but on many issues, the majority view within the coalition is that of the Moderates—often alongside black and Hispanic voters—rather than the party’s most activist faction. The Woke Fringe, however, may still exert outsized influence in low-turnout primaries and online discourse. Because this group is younger, it represents a plausible source of future ideological change inside the party, even if it is not the median position today.

For the purposes of this report, the Democratic coalition—or today’s Democrats—refers to (1) all 2024 Harris voters, regardless of party registration, and (2) all registered Democrats, including those who did not vote for Harris. To understand the coalition more precisely, we divide it into three analytically distinct blocs based on self-identified ideology:

Moderates (47% of the Democratic coalition)—voters who describe themselves as a “Moderate Democrat,” “Independent,” or “Anti-Trump Republican.”

Moderates form the largest segment of the coalition. With an average age of 53, they are somewhat more likely to be non-college graduates and are demographically diverse: 62% white, 17% black, 13% Hispanic, and 5% Asian. More than half live in suburban communities, and they are the most electorally flexible faction in the coalition—only 45% say they have never voted for a non-Democratic presidential candidate.

Progressive Liberals (37% of the Democratic coalition)—voters who describe themselves as a “Liberal Democrat” or “Progressive Democrat.”

Progressive Liberals are similar in age, averaging 52 years old. They are the whitest (65%, with 11% Hispanic, 17% black, 5% Asian) of the three groups and are evenly split between those with a college degree and those without. A large majority describe themselves as ideologically left leaning. This group is also disproportionately concentrated on the West Coast and in suburban areas.

The Woke Fringe (11% of the Democratic coalition)—voters who describe themselves as a “Democratic Socialist” or “Communist.”

The Woke Fringe stands apart demographically and attitudinally. It is the youngest faction, with an average age of 43 and seven in ten members under the age of 50. It is the group with the fewest Hispanics (6%) but the largest proportion of black (22%) and Asian voters (7%); 60% are white. This group is more likely to live in urban areas, particularly in the Northeast. Ideologically, it is the most consistently left-leaning faction, with a majority identifying as “very left-leaning.” Members of this group are also significantly more likely than other Democrats to report poor mental health (25%), compared to the other groups (14% for Moderates, 16% Progressive Liberals.)

[ Continued... ]

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