#stablecoins

LPKWJ Overview: TRON USDT Supply Surpasses $87.9 Billion in Q2

Surging Stablecoin Volume

TRON’s USDT circulating supply hit a record $87.9 billion in Q2, with quarterly transfer volume reaching $2.1 trillion. At LPKWJ, observing these network benchmarks highlights how on-chain digital dollars are becoming essential for global value transfer. Daily transaction averages hovered around 11.8 million, showing consistent operational demand across international markets.

Ecosystem Growth and Infrastructure

Institutional engagement continues to grow alongside retail adoption. Tokenized funds and asset management solutions are expanding on public ledgers, requiring robust liquidity and fast transaction execution. Maintaining high platform performance at LPKWJ ensures users can interact with this maturing digital asset ecosystem reliably and securely.

Compliance and Account Verification

At LPKWJ, maintaining operational compliance and identity verification standards remains central to protecting platform integrity and safeguarding user accounts across digital markets.

Forex is beginning to move on-chain, but there are actually two very different markets developing.

The first is leveraged forex trading using stablecoins as collateral. A trader deposits USDC or DAI and opens synthetic exposure to EUR/USD, GBP/USD, USD/JPY or another currency pair.

The second is potentially much more important: tokenised currencies trading directly against one another on blockchain infrastructure. That means USD, EUR, GBP, JPY, ZAR, SGD, IDR and other currencies can increasingly exist as programmable stablecoins rather than merely price feeds inside a derivative.

Our latest Decentralised News research looks at both sides of this emerging market.

We examine: ✓ USDC, DAI and USDT as forex collateral ✓ Ostium for USDC-based global market perpetuals ✓ gTrade for multi-collateral synthetic forex ✓ GMTrade for Solana-based RWA markets ✓ Mento and multicurrency on-chain FX ✓ Ratio and institutional Asian stablecoin settlement ✓ Kaia’s growing regional stablecoin infrastructure ✓ deBridge for cross-chain collateral routing ✓ ChangeNOW and SideShift for asset and network conversion ✓ Stablecoin collateral haircuts ✓ Depeg and liquidation risk ✓ Funding, borrowing and rollover ✓ Foregone stablecoin yield ✓ Cross-chain transfer risk ✓ Tax implications

The biggest conceptual shift is this: A EUR/USD perpetual gives you exposure to a currency price. A USD stablecoin exchanged directly for a GBP stablecoin gives you the currencies themselves in tokenised form.

That turns on-chain FX from a purely speculative product into infrastructure for: • Payments • Treasury management • Remittances • Cross-border settlement • Currency diversification • Institutional liquidity • Programmable money

Stablecoins may ultimately become much more than crypto’s settlement asset. They may become part of the global FX market itself.

Read the full analysis on Decentralised News: https://decentralised.news/trading-forex-with-stablecoins

#Forex #Stablecoins #OnChainFX #DeFi #USDC #USDT #DAI #Ostium #gTrade #GMTrade #Mento #Kaia #StablecoinFX #RWA #TokenisedAssets #CrossBorderPayments #BlockchainFinance

A Decentrally Stabilized Cryptocurrency

I've been thinking about a cryptocurrency with a property I haven't seen before: a currency whose supply adjusts itself in a completely decentralized way, without any central authority or mandatory intervention.

The underlying observation is surprisingly simple.

Miners only mine when the expected reward is worth more than the cost of producing it. In practice, that means they mine when the value of the cryptocurrency exceeds the cost of the electricity (and other operating expenses) required to obtain it.

That naturally leads to an interesting idea.

If more mining power joins the network, the currency is likely overvalued relative to its production cost. The circulating supply should increase, pushing the price back down.

If mining power leaves the network, the currency has become too cheap to produce. The circulating supply should decrease, allowing scarcity to push the price back up.

The difficult part is making that happen without anyone being in charge.

My First Attempt

My first idea was to automatically lock and unlock individual coins based on the hashes of their identifiers.

Since cryptographic hashes are uniformly distributed, the protocol could decide which coins were spendable simply by comparing each identifier hash against a moving threshold tied to the mining difficulty.

As mining power increased, the difficulty would fall, making more coins spendable. When mining power decreased, the difficulty would rise again, automatically locking more coins and reducing the circulating supply.

On paper, it was elegant.

In practice, it was terrible.

Coins with unusually large identifier hashes would become intrinsically more valuable because they would remain spendable more often than others. Rational users would naturally start preferring those coins, and from there the entire system develops increasingly complicated incentive problems.

I spent a long time trying to fix those issues.

Every solution only introduced even worse ones.

Eventually I accepted that the entire approach was fundamentally flawed.

A Different Direction

Instead of forcing the protocol to decide which coins may circulate, I asked a different question:

What if users voluntarily adjusted the circulating supply themselves because doing so maximized their own profits?

That led me to combine two existing ideas.

Bitcoin uses Proof-of-Work. The more computational power and electricity you invest, the more frequently you statistically win block rewards.

Ethereum (conceptually speaking) associates rewards with locked capital. The more value you commit to the network, the greater your economic participation.

My proposal combines these ideas—but in a different way than traditional hybrid systems.

Consensus remains pure Proof-of-Work.

The probability of mining the next block depends only on hash power, exactly as in Bitcoin.

However, the size of the mining reward depends on how many coins the miner has voluntarily locked as stake.

In other words, Proof-of-Stake never determines who wins a block.

It only determines how much the winner earns.

The Feedback Loop

Once those two incentives coexist, the supply adjustment becomes entirely voluntary.

When electricity is cheap, miners are incentivized to unlock their coins and spend them on mining. More coins enter circulation, increasing supply and putting downward pressure on the price.

When electricity becomes expensive, miners are less willing to spend money competing for additional hash power. Instead, they lock more coins to increase the rewards they receive whenever they successfully mine a block.

That removes coins from circulation, reducing supply and increasing the currency's value.

No coins are confiscated.

No balances are frozen by the protocol.

Nobody is forced to participate in either strategy.

Every participant simply chooses whichever option maximizes their expected return, and the aggregate result becomes a decentralized monetary policy driven entirely by economic incentives.

That's the part I find most satisfying.

The protocol never wakes up one morning and says, "Congratulations. One percent of your balance is now locked."

Instead, every change in the money supply is the consequence of voluntary decisions made by rational participants pursuing their own interests.

A nagi tervem, h csinálok egy decentralizáltan stabilizált kriptovalutát - és oylan még nincs.

Az alapötlet: a bányászok akkor bányásznak ha a fitying többet ér, mint az elektromos energia, amit béfeccölnek. Ha nő tehá a bányászkapacitás, akkor túlértékelt a fitying, és növelni kell a készletet, hogy leértékelődjön. Ha esik a bányászkapacitás, akkor meg alulértékelt a fitying, és be kell korlátozni a forgalomban levő mennyiséget, hogy hiány miatt felmenjen az értéke.

Csak hogyan?

A tevút: címletes pénz automatikus zárolása a címletek hashei alapján. Ha a hash, ami egyenletes eloszlású, nagyobb a dufficulty-nél, akkor szabad a fitying, lévén növekvő bányászkapacitásnál esik a difficulty, aminek a bányászati hash-ek (másik fajta hash) alá kell lőjön. Ezáltál pedig nőne a forgalmazható fityingek mennyisége… Fordítva: ha esik a bányászerő, emelekdik a lassan szabályozott difficulty, a fölibe eső azonosítójú (egyik hash) fityingek száma csökken így, és visszanő a valuta értéke.

Na tehát ez a tévút, rengeteg okból, pl. mert a nagyon nagy azonosító hashű fityingek automatikusan értékesebbé válnak, mert ritkábban tiltódnak, így mindenki azokra hajt majd, hogy azokból tartson. És innen 1000nyi kalamajka keveredik ki, bárhogy akartam is megoldani. Mindig csak még vacakabb bajokba futottam bele.

De az elmélet szép.

A gyakorlat meg a Bitcoin árammal és matek-feladvánnyal bányászati és az Ethereum lekötéssel arányos bányászati modelljének kombója!

A BTCben minél több áamot feccölsz a bányászatba, statisztikus alapon annál gyakrabban nyered meg a jutifalat. Az ETHnél kb. kilottózzák ki a nyertes, és annak amennyi lekötött pénze van, azzal arányos jutifalat kap.

(A jutifalat esetében meg implicit tárgyragot használtam, igen.)

NAÉÉÉS, ha a 2t összekombózzuk, akkor megkapjuk a mennyiségszabályozást, áramérték alapokon: a felhaszbáló jövedelme arányos azzal is, hányszor nyeri a BTC jellegű hash versenyt, és azzal is, mennyi lovetája van lekötve ETH jelleggel a számláján!!

Így ha olcsó az áram? Akkor felszabadítja a lekötéseit, hogy elverhesse elektromos bányászatra. Ezzel nő a forgalomban levő, elverhető oénzmennyiség, és esik a valuta ára, konvergálva az áram értékéhez.

Ha drága az áram? Nem érdemes elektromosan versenyezni azért, hogy hamarabb nyerjen jutifalit, inkább leköti a pénzt, hogy azzal növelje a nyereséget, amikor épp sikeresen bányászik. Ezzel csökkentve a forgalomban levő lovettát, és növelve annak értékét!

It'll be won by companies that quietly rebuild how money moves.

Everyone still asks the wrong question.

"Will crypto replace banks?"

That's not what's happening.

The real shift is much quieter.

We're watching money become software.

Payments are becoming programmable.

Treasury is becoming automated.

Settlement is becoming global.

And stablecoins are turning the internet into a financial operating system.

The companies that win won't necessarily be the ones issuing tokens.

They'll be the ones solving boring but expensive problems:

• Cross-border settlements that take days. • High payment processing fees. • Treasury fragmentation across multiple currencies. • Merchant cash flow delays. • Financial infrastructure that still depends on banking hours.

The future of payments isn't about convincing everyone to use crypto.

It's about making financial infrastructure so seamless that users don't even notice what's underneath.

That's how every major technology wins.

Invisible infrastructure.

The biggest opportunity isn't building another wallet.

It's becoming the layer businesses trust to move value globally.

Infrastructure rarely makes headlines.

But it almost always creates the biggest companies.