Our findings may also help explain why individuals with ASD exhibit adequate person perception performance in settings that allow for deliberation, reflection, and reasoning (e.g., extended time) (18). Individuals with ASD may be recruiting their knowledge of social psychological phenomena as a form of compensatory learning to understand other individualsâ mental states. For instance, consider discerning someoneâs intentions. Individuals without ASD are able to automatically discern, for instance, that another individual shares their intentions via highly automatic social processes (e.g., social projection) (12). Those with ASD, however, are unable to automatically do so and, thus, may instead deliberately and systematically apply their social psychological skill to intuit othersâ intentions. This interpretation aligns with a common strategy for clinical intervention in ASD, teaching social skills in terms of explicit social rules rather than mental state inference (19).
Social-cognitive skills can take different forms, from accurately predicting individualsâ intentions, emotions, and thoughts (person perception or folk psychology) to accurately predicting social phenomena more generally. Past research has linked autism spectrum (AS) traits to person perception deficits in the general population. We tested whether AS traits also predict poor accuracy in terms of predicting generalized social phenomena, assessed via participantsâ accuracy at predicting social psychological phenomena (e.g., social loafing, social projection, groupthink). We found the opposite. In a sample of âź6,500 participants in 104 countries, AS traits predicted slightly higher social psychological skill. A second study with 400 participants suggested that heightened systemizing underlies this relationship. Our results indicate that AS traits relate positively to a form of social cognitive skillâpredicting social psychological phenomenaâand highlight the importance of distinguishing between divergent types of social cognition.
Why do AS traits predict slightly higher social psychological skill? While AS traits are linked to deficits in mentalizing and affective empathy, they predict above-average systemizingâidentifying rules and regularities of type systems (e.g., if x, then y) (14). Potentially, then, unlike person perception judgments, which require mentalizing and affective empathy (9), predicting social psychological phenomena relies on systemizing. Consistent with this interpretation, social-psychological skill, but not person perception, is linked to skill in intuitive physics (11), which relates to systemizing (15).
Although past literature has documented that AS traits predict deficits in person perception (e.g., mentalizing, emotion recognition) (2âââ5), we found AS traits to positively predict an alternate social-cognitive skillâsocial psychological skill. And our findings indicate that this link is driven by social psychological skill relating to heightened systemizing. These findings contribute to social-cognitive theories of autism by providing a constraint in terms of the social-cognitive deficits associated with AS traits: While AS traits relate to deficits in person perception tasks, they relate slightly positively to accurately inferring social psychological phenomena. Additionally, our findings contribute to a growing literature indicating that some cognitive skills remain unaffected by, or are even enhanced by, ASD (17); we find that even a form of social-cognitive skill may be enhanced by ASD.
On top of contributing to the literature on autism, our results indicate that person perception and generalized social prediction are divergent social-cognitive skills that are predicted by different processes. While accurate person perception is predicted by mentalizing and empathic abilities (9), social psychological skill was predicted by systemizing. As such, we propose 2 divergent types of social cognition: a more individual, perceptive form pertaining to the inference of individualsâ intentions, emotions, and mental states and a more general, reasoning-based form pertaining to the inference of social phenomena more generally. Future research should more closely examine the potential mechanisms underlying these divergent types (e.g., causal inference, simulation/introspection) and how these mechanisms align and differ. Indeed, if certain processes are involved in accurate person perception but not in generalized social prediction, then these processes are particularly likely to be uniquely impacted by ASD.
The current results may even apply to the clinical domain. In study 1, participants likely to be diagnosed with ASDâparticipants who scored higher than the diagnostic cutoff point on the AQ-10âexhibited greater social psychological skill. This potential link likely only applies to individuals with ASD who have normal intelligence, however; individuals with lower-than-average intelligence would likely exhibit poor social psychological skill given the cognitive demands associated with this skill (11).
Our findings may also help explain why individuals with ASD exhibit adequate person perception performance in settings that allow for deliberation, reflection, and reasoning (e.g., extended time) (18). Individuals with ASD may be recruiting their knowledge of social psychological phenomena as a form of compensatory learning to understand other individualsâ mental states. For instance, consider discerning someoneâs intentions. Individuals without ASD are able to automatically discern, for instance, that another individual shares their intentions via highly automatic social processes (e.g., social projection) (12). Those with ASD, however, are unable to automatically do so and, thus, may instead deliberately and systematically apply their social psychological skill to intuit othersâ intentions. This interpretation aligns with a common strategy for clinical intervention in ASD, teaching social skills in terms of explicit social rules rather than mental state inference (19).