Probabilistic Public Key Encryption for Controlled Equijoin in Relational Databases
We present a public key encryption scheme for relational databases (PKDE) that allows the owner to control the execution of cross-relation joins on an outsourced server. The scheme allows anyone to deposit encrypted records in a database on the server. Thereafter, the database owner may authorize the server to join any two relations to identify matching records across them, while preventing self-joins that would reveal information on records that are unmatched in the join. The security of our construction is formally proved in the random oracle model based on the computational bilinear Diffie–Hellman assumption. Specifically, before a relation is joined, its encrypted records enjoy indistinguishability under adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA2) security; after a join, our scheme offers One-Way CCA2 security protection on the records. Our PKDE construction is shown to outperform the only existing work, both in security guarantee and in efficiency.
Source: Oxford Journals
Probabilistic Public Key Encryption for Controlled Equijoin in Relational Databases was originally published on Computer Guru
