#philphys

PHILPHYS

Anonymous

It depends on what we mean by agnosticism. if we mean that the evidence is equal on either side and we cannot make any reasonable claim about the existence of god then I disagree because we dont have any evidence for the existence of god and it is more reasonable to suppose non existence of god. See Russell’s Teapot

I really like this question, because it's rather easy to answer and I haven't checked my Tumblr crushes in ages so it'll be interesting to see where most of my love is going.

As of Jan 8th 2012, here they be:

9 - violenceandscience

  This blog is deeply personal, and wonderfully insightful. Some of the more outstanding posts include intriguing ideas on feminism & gender, and insights into the inner workings of forensic pathology.

8 - ryrnun

  A personal blog from a musical Colorado lass. My first follower who I hadn't met before (making her my second follower), so has put up with my incessant ramblings on science and life (and some of my more cringeworthy posts) for the best part of a year-and-a-half. She posts some awesome photos, and tells amusing tales about a rabbit called Pepper. I now want a rabbit.

7 - orangushamstursaurus

Three words: Oranges. Rats. Medicine.

Orangehamstursaurus' blog chronicles the academic hardships on the journey of an aspiring medic. A very honest, open and poignant blog, accompanied by cool pictures of a medical and/or Dubai nature.

6 - nocountryforslaughter

Not sure where to start with this one. Posts of a phallic/Nicolas Cage/Ukrainian/Russian/Post Apocalyptic/Film/Blurry-GPOY nature from a misanthropic Canadian, with personal anecdotes ranging from the hilarious to the downright bizarre - or even a bit of both at once. A fascinating, and brutally real perspective on life. There's no dressing up reality in this one.

5 - azalulu

Put all the Harry Potter aside for a moment, and there are some really warming GIF's from varying corners of modern pop-culture. Not much else to say apart from that. It makes me smile. I like being made to smile.

4 - doctorwho

Yes. It's the official Doctor Who blog. I'm a Whovian.

Also - Karen Gillan. That will be all.

3 - ianbrooks

Nerdy fun, from posts on niche, unique inventions and technologies to pictures of awesome pieces of alternative modern artwork. I mean, like, real freakin awesome pieces of artwork (not his own work, this blog just accumulates cool stuff like that). Like - art inspired by Portal and Minecraft.... I play Minecraft. Blame amisanthropichumanist for that.

2 - lithiatedlemonsoda

Anarchism, Punk and anti-capitalism are the order of the day in lithiatedlemonsoda's blog. The name is also totally awesome, cause it's like an allusion to Lithium salts (which, incidentally, are used prophylactically to treat the mania phases in bipolar depression. Can't remember the mechanism anymore, but I remember something to do with interference in the inositol triphosphate (IP3) pathway). Contains great quotes that I generally can find some agreement with, and just general awesomeness on a whole.

1 - philphys

Ah yes. My man, Philphys. He isn't really my man, I don't actually know Philphys, but he seems like the sort of dude I'd like to meet. Not the point. A blog about Philosophy, Physics and Mathematics which really provokes thought. Not surprised this has topped my Tumblr Crushes list, as there's always an inspiring quote, image or article on something science related. It's philosophy presented in a most credible form, and just seems really pure. This guy knows what he's talking about. If you're a scientist who thinks they don't have much time for philosophy, you should check this blog out, or ask this guy some questions in his ask. One thing he said really stood out:

'Philosophy is hypothesis generating. Science is hypothesis verifying'

To expand on this I'd say, that's not to say science doesn't generate hypotheses (of course it does! It generates loads). It's implying that philosophy can generate them too - but it's ultimately up to the scientific method to validate a philosophical assertion. Pure logic doesn't always hold, because logic is a human(though not necessarily exclusive to humans)/cognitive ability which relies on knowledge and experiences we already have - and some things seem counter intuitive or illogical to us because we simply do not know enough on the intricate workings of the matter at hand. The human mind is limited, and there is no substitute for hard evidence gathered in a systematic and unbiased fashion - enter, science.

A bit off topic there, but it's an example of how Philphys' blog is intellectually stimulating and raises my awareness of topics and issues such as the conflict, compromise and coexistence of philosophy and science.

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Are there cases where we can argue from conceivability to possibility? Yes and no.

(1) Something is conceivable if we cannot rule it out a priori.

(2) Something is possible if it doesn't contradict a necessary truth.

(3) We can argue from conceivability to possibility if and only if a concept is semantically stable, i.e. has the same intension across a 2-dimensional semantic framework.

Cases where we can't make the move: The case of water. It's conceivable that 'water=XYZ' is true. Such an identity would only be discoverable a posteriori, and therefore we cannot rule it out on a priori grounds. In the actual world, 'water=H2O' expresses a necessary truth. So even though it is conceivable that 'water=XYZ' is true, it is not possible, because 'water=XYZ' contradicts a necessary truth. On the primary intention, corresponding generally to the Fregean sense, Water= odorless, colorless, liquid, found in lakes etc. The secondary intension, corresponding generally to the Kripkean meaning, water=H20. Therefore our concept of water is unstable, i.e. the primary intension differs from the secondary intension. We cannot infer the possibility that 'water=XYZ' is true from the fact that it is conceivable.

Cases where we can make the move: The case of Zombies. It is conceivable that 'pain≠c-fibers firing' is true (where the 'c-fibers firing' is a placeholder for a complete physical description of some brain state). We cannot rule out 'pain≠c-fibers firing' on a priori grounds. In the actual world, and in all possible worlds, pain is ontologically subjective, so 'pain≠c-fibers firing' does not contradict a necessary truth. This becomes more apparent when we check the semantic stability of pain across the 2D semantic framework. The primary and secondary intension of pain is the same; on both intensions pain is just what it is like to feel pain. There is no strong dissociation between the appearance and reality of pain, as there was in the case of water. Pain=the quality of pain, localized shooting, unpleasant sensations, etc in both the case of primary intension and secondary intension. So if we can conceive of pain existing without a corresponding brain state, we thereby admit the possibility of pain existing without a corresponding brain state. 

It is possible to object to certain brands of materialism on the basis that pain may exist without some corresponding brain state. See: Chalmers' argument against materialism

Philphys asks: What are your motives to go against cluster theory?

Okay here we go. I'm pretty much just going to repeat Kripke's criticisms. Kripke takes Cluster Theory to hold some variations of the following six theses:

(1) To every name of designating expression 'X', there corresponds a cluster of properties, namely the family of those properties f such that A believes 'fX'

(2) One of the properties, or some conjointly, are believed by A to pick out some individual uniquely.

(3) If most, or a weighted most, of the f's are satisfied by one unique object y, then y is the referent of 'X'.

(4) If the vote yields no unique object, 'X' does not refer.

(5) The statement, 'if X exists, then X has most of the f's' is known a priori by the speaker.

(6) The statement, 'If X exists, then X has most of the f's' expresses a necessary truth.

Kripke argues that most, if not all, of these theses do not hold up under scrutiny.

Start with #6 - We'll take for our example Aristotle = the teacher of Alexander the Great. This is obviously a contingent truth. Socrates needn't have ever gone into pedagogy. Further, it is not a necessary truth that Aristotle had any of the properties commonly attributed to him. It seems like, intuitively, we can still refer to Aristotle even if he had never done any philosophy (especially when we take 'Aristotle' to rigidly designate the same individual in all possible worlds in which he exists). We could still refer to Aristotle if he died as an infant. So much for that.

Moving about, we'll take #2 - We can still use a name to pick out some individual, even if we don't have enough knowledge of their achievements to pick them out uniquely. You may have enough information to pick out Richard Feynman uniquely, but someone in the street who only knows that Feynman is a physicist or something still succeeds in referring to Feynman. So much for that.

Take #3 - It could be the case that the f's mistakenly associated with 'X' really are true of z and not y, yet 'X' can still successfully be used to refer to y. For example, Christopher Columbus was the first man to realize the earth was round and the first European to land in the Western Hemisphere. Of course these descriptions don't pick out Columbus, but some Greek or Norseman (probably). Nevertheless, when we use 'Columbus' as attached to these mistaken descriptions, we still refer to Columbus, and not to the Greek or Norseman. 

How about #4 - Let's say hypothetically that there is some fatal error in Kurt Godel's proof for the incompleteness of arithmetic. 'Godel' will still refer to Godel, even if there is no unique individual who actually proved the incompleteness of arithmetic (given that that is the description which we used to fix 'Godel' as the name of Godel). 

Now #5 - It seems like #5 falls on the basis of our rejection of #6, #2 and #3.