#opticsoftherupee

Who Owns the Crisis? Indian Banking from Nationalization to Crony Regime by DebaprasadBandyopadhyay Via Flickr: onceinabluemoon2021.in/2026/04/01/who-owns-the-crisis-ind... This article traces the historical transformation of Indian banking from postcolonial state-led social banking to the contemporary regime of what it terms “resolution capitalism,” foregrounding the shifting configurations of power, distribution, and knowledge. Beginning with the pre-1969 era of private concentration and systemic fragility, it examines how bank nationalization sought to democratize credit and align finance with developmental and redistributive goals, albeit with embedded contradictions of bureaucratic inefficiency and political interference. The post-1991 liberalization phase introduced prudential norms and market discipline within a hybrid structure, delivering growth and crisis resilience—most notably during the 2008 global financial crisis—while simultaneously generating latent vulnerabilities through corporate over-leverage and regulatory forbearance. The article argues that the post-2014 period marks a decisive rupture: the recognition of NPAs through the Asset Quality Review was followed by massive recapitalization, large-scale write-offs, and the institutionalization of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), which together reconfigured the system toward asset resolution rather than social intermediation. Through a detailed political-economic analysis, including the case of Dewan Housing Finance Corporation Limited (DHFL), the study demonstrates how the IBC operationalizes a structural asymmetry—socializing losses through public sector banks and taxpayers while privatizing gains for a narrow set of corporate acquirers—under conditions of institutional opacity, particularly within the Committee of Creditors. By situating these developments within broader trends of wealth concentration, regulatory opacity, and declining democratic accountability, the article contends that contemporary Indian banking no longer functions as an instrument of public purpose but as a mechanism of financialized redistribution upward. Ultimately, it raises a fundamental question for the political economy of the Indian republic: who bears the cost of financial crises, who appropriates their outcomes, and who controls the knowledge through which these processes are legitimized?

Who Owns the Crisis? Indian Banking from Nationalization to Crony Regime by DebaprasadBandyopadhyay Via Flickr: onceinabluemoon2021.in/2026/04/01/who-owns-the-crisis-ind... This article traces the historical transformation of Indian banking from postcolonial state-led social banking to the contemporary regime of what it terms “resolution capitalism,” foregrounding the shifting configurations of power, distribution, and knowledge. Beginning with the pre-1969 era of private concentration and systemic fragility, it examines how bank nationalization sought to democratize credit and align finance with developmental and redistributive goals, albeit with embedded contradictions of bureaucratic inefficiency and political interference. The post-1991 liberalization phase introduced prudential norms and market discipline within a hybrid structure, delivering growth and crisis resilience—most notably during the 2008 global financial crisis—while simultaneously generating latent vulnerabilities through corporate over-leverage and regulatory forbearance. The article argues that the post-2014 period marks a decisive rupture: the recognition of NPAs through the Asset Quality Review was followed by massive recapitalization, large-scale write-offs, and the institutionalization of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), which together reconfigured the system toward asset resolution rather than social intermediation. Through a detailed political-economic analysis, including the case of Dewan Housing Finance Corporation Limited (DHFL), the study demonstrates how the IBC operationalizes a structural asymmetry—socializing losses through public sector banks and taxpayers while privatizing gains for a narrow set of corporate acquirers—under conditions of institutional opacity, particularly within the Committee of Creditors. By situating these developments within broader trends of wealth concentration, regulatory opacity, and declining democratic accountability, the article contends that contemporary Indian banking no longer functions as an instrument of public purpose but as a mechanism of financialized redistribution upward. Ultimately, it raises a fundamental question for the political economy of the Indian republic: who bears the cost of financial crises, who appropriates their outcomes, and who controls the knowledge through which these processes are legitimized?

Who Owns the Crisis? Indian Banking from Nationalization to Crony Regime by DebaprasadBandyopadhyay Via Flickr: onceinabluemoon2021.in/2026/04/01/who-owns-the-crisis-ind... This article traces the historical transformation of Indian banking from postcolonial state-led social banking to the contemporary regime of what it terms “resolution capitalism,” foregrounding the shifting configurations of power, distribution, and knowledge. Beginning with the pre-1969 era of private concentration and systemic fragility, it examines how bank nationalization sought to democratize credit and align finance with developmental and redistributive goals, albeit with embedded contradictions of bureaucratic inefficiency and political interference. The post-1991 liberalization phase introduced prudential norms and market discipline within a hybrid structure, delivering growth and crisis resilience—most notably during the 2008 global financial crisis—while simultaneously generating latent vulnerabilities through corporate over-leverage and regulatory forbearance. The article argues that the post-2014 period marks a decisive rupture: the recognition of NPAs through the Asset Quality Review was followed by massive recapitalization, large-scale write-offs, and the institutionalization of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), which together reconfigured the system toward asset resolution rather than social intermediation. Through a detailed political-economic analysis, including the case of Dewan Housing Finance Corporation Limited (DHFL), the study demonstrates how the IBC operationalizes a structural asymmetry—socializing losses through public sector banks and taxpayers while privatizing gains for a narrow set of corporate acquirers—under conditions of institutional opacity, particularly within the Committee of Creditors. By situating these developments within broader trends of wealth concentration, regulatory opacity, and declining democratic accountability, the article contends that contemporary Indian banking no longer functions as an instrument of public purpose but as a mechanism of financialized redistribution upward. Ultimately, it raises a fundamental question for the political economy of the Indian republic: who bears the cost of financial crises, who appropriates their outcomes, and who controls the knowledge through which these processes are legitimized?

Who Owns the Crisis? Indian Banking from Nationalization to Crony Regime by DebaprasadBandyopadhyay Via Flickr: onceinabluemoon2021.in/2026/04/01/who-owns-the-crisis-ind... This article traces the historical transformation of Indian banking from postcolonial state-led social banking to the contemporary regime of what it terms “resolution capitalism,” foregrounding the shifting configurations of power, distribution, and knowledge. Beginning with the pre-1969 era of private concentration and systemic fragility, it examines how bank nationalization sought to democratize credit and align finance with developmental and redistributive goals, albeit with embedded contradictions of bureaucratic inefficiency and political interference. The post-1991 liberalization phase introduced prudential norms and market discipline within a hybrid structure, delivering growth and crisis resilience—most notably during the 2008 global financial crisis—while simultaneously generating latent vulnerabilities through corporate over-leverage and regulatory forbearance. The article argues that the post-2014 period marks a decisive rupture: the recognition of NPAs through the Asset Quality Review was followed by massive recapitalization, large-scale write-offs, and the institutionalization of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), which together reconfigured the system toward asset resolution rather than social intermediation. Through a detailed political-economic analysis, including the case of Dewan Housing Finance Corporation Limited (DHFL), the study demonstrates how the IBC operationalizes a structural asymmetry—socializing losses through public sector banks and taxpayers while privatizing gains for a narrow set of corporate acquirers—under conditions of institutional opacity, particularly within the Committee of Creditors. By situating these developments within broader trends of wealth concentration, regulatory opacity, and declining democratic accountability, the article contends that contemporary Indian banking no longer functions as an instrument of public purpose but as a mechanism of financialized redistribution upward. Ultimately, it raises a fundamental question for the political economy of the Indian republic: who bears the cost of financial crises, who appropriates their outcomes, and who controls the knowledge through which these processes are legitimized?

Who Owns the Crisis? Indian Banking from Nationalization to Crony Regime by DebaprasadBandyopadhyay Via Flickr: onceinabluemoon2021.in/2026/04/01/who-owns-the-crisis-ind... This article traces the historical transformation of Indian banking from postcolonial state-led social banking to the contemporary regime of what it terms “resolution capitalism,” foregrounding the shifting configurations of power, distribution, and knowledge. Beginning with the pre-1969 era of private concentration and systemic fragility, it examines how bank nationalization sought to democratize credit and align finance with developmental and redistributive goals, albeit with embedded contradictions of bureaucratic inefficiency and political interference. The post-1991 liberalization phase introduced prudential norms and market discipline within a hybrid structure, delivering growth and crisis resilience—most notably during the 2008 global financial crisis—while simultaneously generating latent vulnerabilities through corporate over-leverage and regulatory forbearance. The article argues that the post-2014 period marks a decisive rupture: the recognition of NPAs through the Asset Quality Review was followed by massive recapitalization, large-scale write-offs, and the institutionalization of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), which together reconfigured the system toward asset resolution rather than social intermediation. Through a detailed political-economic analysis, including the case of Dewan Housing Finance Corporation Limited (DHFL), the study demonstrates how the IBC operationalizes a structural asymmetry—socializing losses through public sector banks and taxpayers while privatizing gains for a narrow set of corporate acquirers—under conditions of institutional opacity, particularly within the Committee of Creditors. By situating these developments within broader trends of wealth concentration, regulatory opacity, and declining democratic accountability, the article contends that contemporary Indian banking no longer functions as an instrument of public purpose but as a mechanism of financialized redistribution upward. Ultimately, it raises a fundamental question for the political economy of the Indian republic: who bears the cost of financial crises, who appropriates their outcomes, and who controls the knowledge through which these processes are legitimized?

Who Owns the Crisis? Indian Banking from Nationalization to Crony Regime by DebaprasadBandyopadhyay Via Flickr: onceinabluemoon2021.in/2026/04/01/who-owns-the-crisis-ind... This article traces the historical transformation of Indian banking from postcolonial state-led social banking to the contemporary regime of what it terms “resolution capitalism,” foregrounding the shifting configurations of power, distribution, and knowledge. Beginning with the pre-1969 era of private concentration and systemic fragility, it examines how bank nationalization sought to democratize credit and align finance with developmental and redistributive goals, albeit with embedded contradictions of bureaucratic inefficiency and political interference. The post-1991 liberalization phase introduced prudential norms and market discipline within a hybrid structure, delivering growth and crisis resilience—most notably during the 2008 global financial crisis—while simultaneously generating latent vulnerabilities through corporate over-leverage and regulatory forbearance. The article argues that the post-2014 period marks a decisive rupture: the recognition of NPAs through the Asset Quality Review was followed by massive recapitalization, large-scale write-offs, and the institutionalization of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), which together reconfigured the system toward asset resolution rather than social intermediation. Through a detailed political-economic analysis, including the case of Dewan Housing Finance Corporation Limited (DHFL), the study demonstrates how the IBC operationalizes a structural asymmetry—socializing losses through public sector banks and taxpayers while privatizing gains for a narrow set of corporate acquirers—under conditions of institutional opacity, particularly within the Committee of Creditors. By situating these developments within broader trends of wealth concentration, regulatory opacity, and declining democratic accountability, the article contends that contemporary Indian banking no longer functions as an instrument of public purpose but as a mechanism of financialized redistribution upward. Ultimately, it raises a fundamental question for the political economy of the Indian republic: who bears the cost of financial crises, who appropriates their outcomes, and who controls the knowledge through which these processes are legitimized?