7 Powerful Fixes for Digiever DS-2105 Pro CVE-2023-52163
Your CCTV NVR Is a Server (Treat It Like One)
If you manage CCTV or NVR gear in a small business, treat it like a production server—not a “set-and-forget” appliance. CISA added the Digiever DS-2105 Pro NVR vulnerability (CVE-2023-52163) to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog amid active exploitation, proving that “non-IT” devices can quickly become botnet footholds and lateral-movement launchpads.
This post turns the Digiever DS-2105 Pro incident into an actionable IoT patch hygiene program SMBs can run without a huge budget—with configs, scripts, and audit-friendly evidence you can hand to leadership, auditors, or your MSP.
TL;DR: The 7-Fix Playbook
Find every NVR (including Digiever DS-2105 Pro) and assign an owner
Remove internet exposure: no port forwards, no inbound WAN to NVRs
Disable UPnP so routers don’t reopen ports automatically
Isolate NVRs on a dedicated CCTV VLAN and restrict egress (default-deny)
Lock down admin access: unique creds, least privilege, MFA via VPN/jump
Patch on a KEV-driven emergency workflow; use compensating controls if delayed
Turn on budget detection: DNS spikes, outbound beacons, unusual destinations
1) Why NVRs Get Owned (and Why It Keeps Happening)
Most NVR compromises follow a repeatable pattern: the device is reachable from the internet, firmware is outdated, and the network treats it like a trusted internal host. Once an attacker lands, they can drop a botnet payload, pivot into file shares, or exfiltrate footage.
Common exposure patterns
NVR web UI exposed to WAN (port-forwarding, public IP, or cloud relay)
UPnP enabled → automatic inbound mappings
Default/reused admin credentials; shared “installer” accounts
Flat network: NVR sits beside laptops, servers, POS
No centralized logging: compromise looks like “normal traffic”
2) Operationalize CISA KEV for Edge/IoT (Not Just Servers)
Many SMBs treat CISA KEV as an IT problem for Windows and servers. That’s the mistake. KEV additions should be “drop-everything” for edge/IoT too: NVRs, routers, VPN gateways, printers, NAS.
Minimum viable KEV workflow (SMB-friendly)
Triage (30 minutes): Do we have the product/model/version anywhere?
Decide (2 hours): Patch now, isolate now, or disable exposure now
Execute (48 hours): Implement the fix + capture evidence (exports/screenshots)
Close the loop: Validate externally (reachability) + internally (logs/alerts)
KEV mapping script (offline, no external links)
Keep a locally synced KEV file (JSON/CSV) inside your environment and compare it to your IoT inventory:
# kev_match.py import csv import json from pathlib import Path KEV_JSON = Path("kev_catalog.json") # locally synced copy ASSETS_CSV = Path("iot_inventory.csv") # your CMDB-lite export def norm(s: str) -> str: return (s or "").strip().lower() kev = json.loads(KEV_JSON.read_text(encoding="utf-8")) kev_rows = kev.get("vulnerabilities", kev) hits = [] with ASSETS_CSV.open(newline="", encoding="utf-8") as f: for row in csv.DictReader(f): product = norm(row.get("product") or row.get("vendor_model")) vendor = norm(row.get("vendor")) for k in kev_rows: if norm(k.get("product")) in product and norm(k.get("vendor")) in vendor: hits.append({ "asset_id": row.get("asset_id"), "hostname": row.get("hostname"), "product": row.get("product") or row.get("vendor_model"), "cveID": k.get("cveID") or k.get("cve"), }) print(f"KEV matches: {len(hits)}") for h in hits: print(f"- {h['asset_id']} {h['product']} => {h['cveID']}")
3) The 7 Powerful Fixes (48-Hour Hardening Sprint)
Use these steps for Digiever DS-2105 Pro CVE-2023-52163, then keep them as a repeatable playbook for any NVR vulnerability.
Fix 1 — Find Every NVR (Inventory + Discovery)
Start with “IoT CMDB lite”: devices, owners, location, firmware, access path, patch dates.
asset_id,hostname,ip,mac,vendor,product,firmware,location,owner,criticality,remote_access,notes,last_patch_date,kev_hit iot-001,nvr-frontdesk,10.30.10.10,AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF,Digiever,DS-2105 Pro,3.1.0.71-11,Front Desk,Facilities,High,None,"On VLAN 30",2025-12-01,yes
Discovery scan (authorized only):
nmap -sS -sV -Pn --open -p 22,23,80,443,554,8000,8080,8443,8899 10.30.0.0/16 -oA cctv_discovery
Fix 2 — Remove Inbound WAN Exposure (Port Forwards = Compromise)
Fastest risk reduction: delete port forwards, disable remote management, block inbound WAN to CCTV subnet.
Linux nftables (example pattern):
nft add table inet filter nft 'add chain inet filter input { type filter hook input priority 0; policy drop; }' nft 'add rule inet filter input ct state established,related accept' nft 'add rule inet filter input iifname "lo" accept' nft 'add rule inet filter input ip saddr 10.10.0.0/16 accept' # Admin VPN
MikroTik (drop inbound to CCTV VLAN + remove NAT forwards):
/ip firewall filter add chain=input connection-state=established,related action=accept add chain=input src-address=10.10.0.0/16 action=accept comment="Admin VPN/jump subnet" add chain=input in-interface=WAN dst-address=10.30.0.0/16 action=drop comment="Block WAN to CCTV" /ip firewall nat # Remove any dst-nat rules that forward ports to 10.30.0.0/16
Ubiquiti EdgeOS (example):
configure delete service nat rule 100 # remove a port forward rule set firewall name WAN_LOCAL default-action drop set firewall name WAN_LOCAL rule 10 action accept set firewall name WAN_LOCAL rule 10 state established enable set firewall name WAN_LOCAL rule 10 state related enable set firewall name WAN_LOCAL rule 50 action drop set firewall name WAN_LOCAL rule 50 destination address 10.30.0.0/16 commit; save; exit
Fix 3 — Disable UPnP (Stop Ports From Reopening)
UPnP is how routers silently expose NVR admin panels.
MikroTik:
/ip upnp set enabled=no
OpenWrt:
uci set upnpd.config.enabled='0' uci commit upnpd /etc/init.d/miniupnpd stop /etc/init.d/miniupnpd disable
Fix 4 — Isolate NVRs on a CCTV VLAN (Segmentation You Can Prove)
Dedicated VLAN prevents pivoting into business systems and creates clean audit evidence.
Cisco IOS (VLAN 30 example):
conf t vlan 30 name CCTV_NVR interface range gi1/0/10-12 switchport mode access switchport access vlan 30 spanning-tree portfast end wr mem
Default-deny egress (allow only what’s needed):
nft add rule inet filter forward ip saddr 10.30.0.0/16 ip daddr 10.30.0.53 udp dport 53 accept nft add rule inet filter forward ip saddr 10.30.0.0/16 ip daddr 10.30.0.53 tcp dport 53 accept nft add rule inet filter forward ip saddr 10.30.0.0/16 udp dport 123 accept nft add rule inet filter forward ip saddr 10.30.0.0/16 ip daddr 10.20.5.25 tcp dport 443 accept # viewing station nft add rule inet filter forward ip saddr 10.30.0.0/16 oifname "WAN" drop
Fix 5 — Lock Down Admin Access (Accounts, MFA, Safe Remote Viewing)
Even after patching, assume attackers probe exposed admin paths.
Remove/rename default admin accounts; eliminate shared installer creds
Unique long passwords in a password manager
Admin UI only from admin VLAN/VPN (never WAN)
Remote viewing via VPN/jump host (no port forwarding)
Enable NTP/time sync for usable logs
Internal-only allowlist reverse proxy pattern:
server { listen 443 ssl; server_name nvr-admin.local; allow 10.10.0.0/16; # Admin VPN allow 192.168.50.0/24; # Jump host subnet deny all; location / { proxy_pass http://10.30.10.10; proxy_set_header Host $host; } }
Fix 6 — Patch Fast (KEV Emergency SLA) + Compensating Controls
For KEV-listed issues like CVE-2023-52163, use an emergency SLA (48 hours), even if normal IoT patching is monthly. If patching is blocked (EOL, vendor delay), apply compensating controls until replacement.
Patch SLA tracker:
# patch_sla.py import csv from datetime import datetime, timedelta EMERGENCY_DAYS = 2 MONTHLY_DAYS = 30 def parse(d): return datetime.strptime(d, "%Y-%m-%d") today = datetime.utcnow().date() with open("iot_inventory.csv", newline="", encoding="utf-8") as f: for r in csv.DictReader(f): last_patch = r.get("last_patch_date") or "1970-01-01" sla = EMERGENCY_DAYS if (r.get("kev_hit","").lower() == "yes") else MONTHLY_DAYS due = parse(last_patch).date() + timedelta(days=sla) if today > due: print(f"[OVERDUE] {r.get('asset_id')} {r.get('product')} due={due} owner={r.get('owner')}")
Virtual patch example (block risky path while patching):
location ~* /time_tzsetup\.cgi { return 403; }
Fix 7 — Detection on a Budget (Beacons, DNS Spikes, Unusual Destinations)
You don’t need a full SOC—just a few high-signal checks.
Minimum viable logging
Firewall logs for CCTV VLAN egress (at least denies)
DNS logs (queries from CCTV VLAN devices)
DHCP leases (MAC-to-IP history)
Syslog from NVR (auth/config changes/reboots), if supported
Suricata-style alert (example):
alert ip 10.30.0.0/16 any -> any ![53,80,123,443] (msg:"CCTV unusual egress port"; sid:1003001; rev:1;)
DNS spike watch:
# dns_spike_watch.py from collections import Counter import re LOG = "dns.log" CCTV_SUBNET_PREFIX = "10.30." pattern = re.compile(r"(\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+)\s+query\s+(\S+)") counts = Counter() with open(LOG, encoding="utf-8", errors="ignore") as f: for line in f: m = pattern.search(line) if not m: continue ip, domain = m.group(1), m.group(2).lower().strip(".") if ip.startswith(CCTV_SUBNET_PREFIX): counts[(ip, domain)] += 1 for (ip, domain), n in counts.most_common(25): if n >= 50: print(f"[DNS SPIKE] {ip} -> {domain}: {n}")
4) Free Security tool Screenshots (Trust + Conversions)
Free Website Vulnerability Scanner tool by Pentest Testing Corp
Sample report from the tool to check Website Vulnerability
5) Compliance Angle: Turn Controls Into Audit Evidence
Even without formal certification, these artifacts help with customer questionnaires, cyber insurance, and incident response.
Evidence pack (copy/paste):
/evidence/iot-nvr-hardening/ 01_inventory/iot_inventory.csv 02_network/segmentation_diagram.png 03_firewall/cctv_vlan_rules_export.txt 04_patching/firmware_versions_before_after.csv 05_validation/external_port_scan_before_after.txt 06_monitoring/dns_spike_alerts_screenshots/ 07_change_control/change_record.yaml
Hash manifest:
find evidence -type f -print0 | xargs -0 sha256sum > evidence_hashes.sha256
6) When to Bring Experts (and What to Scope)
Bring in a scoped assessment when:
You can’t confidently remove WAN exposure
Segmentation is messy / breaks operations
You suspect compromise already
You need audit-grade validation
Practical scope: validate remote-access paths, test segmentation boundaries, review firewall rules, and simulate pivot attempts from CCTV VLAN into business systems.
Where Pentest Testing Corp Helps (Internal Links Only)
If you need an audit-friendly plan to reduce IoT and network risk, start at:
https://www.pentesttesting.com/
For formal gap mapping and prioritization:
Risk Assessment Services: https://www.pentesttesting.com/risk-assessment-services/
Remediation Services: https://www.pentesttesting.com/remediation-services/
Relevant testing services for edge/IoT exposure:
Internal Network Penetration Testing: https://www.pentesttesting.com/internal-network-pentest-testing/
External Network Penetration Testing: https://www.pentesttesting.com/external-network-pentest-testing/
Managed IT Services: https://www.pentesttesting.com/managed-it-services/
Related reading (recent):
https://www.pentesttesting.com/misconfigured-edge-devices-hardening-sprint/
https://www.pentesttesting.com/cisa-kev-remediation-sprint-in-30-days/
https://www.pentesttesting.com/sierra-wireless-airlink-aleos-vulnerability/
Run a quick exposure sweep with our free tools: https://free.pentesttesting.com/ Then isolate your CCTV/NVR fleet, patch KEV hits, and prove the fix.
