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Miniduke es fichado por Cream Real Betis
Ismael Martínez, conocido en la Grieta del Invocador como Miniduke, ha sido fichado por el reconocido equipo español de deportes electrónicos Cream Real Betis. Miniduke cuenta con una gran trayectoria y notable experiencia en diferentes equipos del continente europeo. Ha destacado por su participación en equipos como Movistar Riders, ASUS Rog Army, Team Queso y […]
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MiniDuke Malware, 3 Minute Profile
MiniDuke malware is a highly customizable malware platform that was uncovered by Kaspersky Lab in February 2013. The malware may have been developed as early as 2010. According to Eugene Kaspersky, MiniDuke is unique in that it resembles more complex old school malware; in fact, many of its components are written in Assembly, a complex low-level programming language. This could indicate that the Russian authors behind MiniDuke have significant experience in the field. Preferred attack vector is social engineering.
MiniDuke
MiniDuke is a highly customizable malware platform that was uncovered by Kaspersky Lab in February 2013. The malware may have been developed as early as 2010. According to Eugene Kaspersky, MiniDuke malware is unique in that it resembles more complex old school malware; in fact, many of its components are written in Assembly, a complex low-level programming language. This could indicate that the Russian authors behind MiniDuke have significant experience in the field and its Preferred attack vector is social engineering. The initial MiniDuke campaign compromised government institutions in Ukraine, Belgium, Portugal, Romania, the Czech Republic, and Ireland. Additionally, a research institute, two think tanks, and a healthcare provider were compromised in the United States, as well as a research foundation in Hungary. Victims were targeted with spear phishing emails containing malicious PDF files. If opened, the malicious attachments exploited a zero-day vulnerability and dropped a small downloader (20kb) onto the victim system.
OLDSCHOOLMALWARE
MiniDuke
MiniDuke is a highly customizable malware platform that was uncovered by Kaspersky Lab in February 2013. The malware may have been developed as early as 2010. According to Eugene Kaspersky, MiniDuke malware is unique in that it resembles more complex old school malware; in fact, many of its components are written in Assembly, a complex low-level programming language. This could indicate that the Russian authors behind MiniDuke have significant experience in the field and its Preferred attack vector is social engineering. The initial MiniDuke campaign compromised government institutions in Ukraine, Belgium, Portugal, Romania, the Czech Republic, and Ireland. Additionally, a research institute, two think tanks, and a healthcare provider were compromised in the United States, as well as a research foundation in Hungary. Victims were targeted with spear phishing emails containing malicious PDF files. If opened, the malicious attachments exploited a zero-day vulnerability and dropped a small downloader (20kb) onto the victim system.
SOCIALENGINEERING
MiniDuke
MiniDuke is a highly customizable malware platform that was uncovered by Kaspersky Lab in February 2013. The malware may have been developed as early as 2010. According to Eugene Kaspersky, MiniDuke malware is unique in that it resembles more complex old school malware; in fact, many of its components are written in Assembly, a complex low-level programming language. This could indicate that the Russian authors behind MiniDuke have significant experience in the field and its Preferred attack vector is social engineering. The initial MiniDuke campaign compromised government institutions in Ukraine, Belgium, Portugal, Romania, the Czech Republic, and Ireland. Additionally, a research institute, two think tanks, and a healthcare provider were compromised in the United States, as well as a research foundation in Hungary. Victims were targeted with spear phishing emails containing malicious PDF files. If opened, the malicious attachments exploited a zero-day vulnerability and dropped a small downloader (20kb) onto the victim system.
SOCIALENGINEERING
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OnionDuke, 3 minute profile
In October 2014, Leviathan Security Group disclosed that a Russia based Tor exit node was attaching malware onto the files that passed through it by wrapping legitimate executables with the malware executable. The technique increased the attacker’s chance of bypassing integrity check mechanisms. The malware campaign is believed to have been active from at least February 2013 through spring 2015. OnionDuke does not operate like the other Duke campaigns; however, it does share some C&C infrastructure with the miniduke attacks.Moreover, unshared domains in both campaigns were registered using the same alias, John Kasai. As such, it stands to reason that OnionDuke is another Russian state sponsored APT group.
OnionDuke
In October 2014, Leviathan Security Group disclosed that a Russia based Tor exit node was attaching malware onto the files that passed through it by wrapping legitimate executables with the malware executable. The technique increased the attacker’s chance of bypassing integrity check mechanisms. The malware campaign is believed to have been active from at least February 2013 through spring 2015. OnionDuke does not operate like the other Duke campaigns; however, it does share some C&C infrastructure with the miniduke attacks. Moreover, unshared domains in both campaigns were registered using the same alias, John Kasai. As such, it stands to reason that OnionDuke is another Russian sponsored APT group. OnionDuke attacks target government agencies in Central Europe. However, because it is unlikely that European government agencies are accessing Tor from their high value systems, the secondary distribution vector of the malware remains unclear. The malware has also been found targeting pirated software. It is possible that the campaign distributes the malware through scattershot attacks via the Tor network and torrent sites and through another yet unobserved vector, such as phishing or wateringhole attacks. The infection of Tor files appears to fail if the victim users a VPN channel that encrypts traffic. Systems infected with CozyDuke may be infected with OnionDuke if the former malware is used to deliver and execute the latter malware’s dropper. It is possible that the OnionDuke attacks were conducted to infect a broad range of target to gather information for the other Duke campaigns and to build a botnet for the adversary.
