A World Appears: A Journey Into Consciousness (Michael Pollan, 2026)
"For feelings are, by their very nature, conscious; how could there be a feeling that wasnât felt, or experienced?
In this respect, feelings may be different from other kinds of mental contents.
Computer-simulated thoughts can do what real thoughts doâthink of an algorithm that can convincingly answer complex questions, as large language models now can.
But would computer-simulated feelings qualify as real feelings? Or do feelings depend on having a body?
The centrality of feeling and emotion to our experience of consciousness is scarcely mentioned in most theories of consciousness currently on offer.
Affect is not one of the five axioms of integrated information theory; it doesnât figure into global workspace theory either.
This is odd. Can you think of a conscious experience that isnât in some way colored by feeling, either positively or negatively?
Yes, apparently, if youâre the typical AI engineer, neuroscientist, or philosopher of consciousness.
âThe stereotype was that emotions and feelings were feminine,â Damasio explained, âand not as serious or useful a process as rational thought.â
Scientific research back then was generally conducted by men who prized their rational faculties above all else, and I asked Damasio if he thought that this fact had contributed to the neglect of feelings.
âWithout a doubt,â he said.
I was reminded of Alison Gopnikâs cautionary note about the inherent biases of what she called âprofessor consciousness.â"