#lavinius

Since the Magisterium chose, in the 17th century,to neither condemn the teachings of Molinism (promoted heavily by the Jesuits) as Semi-Pelagianism   nor anathematize those of Thomism (favored,of course, by the Dominicans), this is a far murkier issue than what even many Catholics make it out to be...

One could summarize how the Thomistic option (which I would favor) is differentfrom (old school) Calvinism as follows:

1.      Calvin believed that fallen man was indeed robbedof any liberty except the liberty to sin. Without saving grace, humanity had noway to fulfill the law. By contrast, the Thomists distinguish between sufficientand efficacious grace. All human beings have the former, the real ability to knowand do the moral law. Otherwise, God would be violating His own justice by commandingthe impossible. At the same time, Efficacious grace is necessary in order for thisinner possibility of righteousness to be actualized. But, contra Calvin, thisis not merely an extrinsic application of redemption to an otherwise completely depraved race of rebels. Efficacious grace is rather included in sufficient grace as thefruit is within the flower. Or, rather, the former is included in this way, for those whodo not resist the latter (see point 3)

2.      Calvin denies that the good works possessedmerits. Thomists by contrast say that good works really do possess merit in theeyes of God, even though, like all good things, He is their source and author. Thisis not a competition between God and His creatures; God is too over abounding in glory to begrudge us some scraps of credit-it cost Him nothing. Secondary causespossess actuality, even though their actuality is dependent on that of another,even though, in fact, their actuality would cease if they were not every momentsustained by a reality outside of themselves. The messenger of a great king isin a real sense the one who delivers this or that proclamation, even though hisoffice, his mission, and the text itself comes from his sovereign. Hence salvationmay be said to both a reward for good works and an act of mercy, even thoughthe sense that it is an act of mercy is logically prior to sense in which it is earned.

“There is no distinction between what flowsfrom free will, and what is of predestination. For the providence of God produces effects through the operation of secondary causes, as was above shown (22, 3). Wherefore, that which flows from free-will is also of predestination. We must say, therefore, that the effect of predestination may be considered in a twofold light—in one way, in particular; and thus there is no reason why one effect of predestination should not be the reason or cause of another; a subsequent effect being the reason of a previous effect, as its final cause; and the previous effect being the reason of the subsequent as its meritorious cause, which is reduced to the disposition of the matter. Thus we might say that God pre-ordained to give glory on account of merit, and that He pre-ordained to give grace to merit glory.

From the Summa Theologica by Thomas Aquinas

3.      Both Aquinas and Calvin would say that savinggrace is irresistible, concurring in this with St. Augustine. But Aquinas,unlike Calvin, maintains the nuance that God does preserve the freedom of thecreature when He saves it, and in fact realizes it when He overcomes it. Partof this difference arises from changing notions of what freedom, in the strictsense, is. Aquinas located the essence of liberty in a “Dominating indifference”towards all particular goods in the world which is the human image of the Pure DivineAct; Calvin, the other reformers, and Catholics like Molina tended to operate, explicitly or not, undera notion that freedom that prioritized  a sort of “potential indifference”, on theability to actually not do this or that. 

"It is thus formulated by Molina at the beginning of his work: ‘That agent is said to be free, which, granted all the requisites of action, can either act or not act…’

In the opinion of the Thomists, the Molinist definition of liberty is not formulated according to the true definition of logical procedure, because it abstracts from the object that specifies the free act.It neglects the fundamental principle that faculties, habits, and acts are specified by their object. If on the contrary, we consider the object to be the specifying principle, then we shall say with the Thomists: Liberty is the dominating indifference of the will in regards every object proposed by the reason at the moment of consideration as good in one aspect, and not good in another; rightly so it is the indifference as to willing or not willing an object, an indifference that is potential on the part of the faculty, and actual on the part of the free act. For even when the will actually wills this object, when it is already determined to will the same, it still tends towards this object with an indifference that is no longer potential but actual. Liberty, therefore, results from the disproportion prevailing between the will that is specified by universal good and a certain finite good, the latter being considered good in one aspect and not in another. This is what St.Thomas says, for he remarks as follows: ‘If the will is offered an object which is not good from every point of view, it will not tend to this of necessity.’ And in opposition to Suarez, the Thomists add: ‘Even by His absolute power, God cannot, by moving the will, necessitate it to will a certain object, when the indifference of judgment remains unchanged.’ Why so? Because it implies a contradiction for the will to wish necessarily the object proposed to it as indifferent by the intellect, or one that is absolutely out of proportion to the universality of it’s scope.”

From Predestination: The Meaning of Predestination in Scripture and the Church by Fr.Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P. 

As it so happens, the negative definitionof liberty does find its realization of sorts within Thomas’s system, as the one fullfilled in the act of sin…..

4.      Calvin held to a theory of double predestinationin which God, with equal lack of concern for merits damns the wicked and raisesup the elect. Aquinas and those who follow him hold only to a doctrine of negative reprobation,by which those who have not been elected to glory are allowed to fall to ruin.This divine permission for the reprobate to sin is a necessary condition fortheir fall, but it is not the cause of it. Moreover, this withdrawal of divinefavor is a punishment for a prior defection of the creature from the divinewill, not an arbitrary caprice. Salvation is always, at bottom, an undeserved gift.Damnation, by contrast, is always a thoroughly deserved punishment.

As it is written in Isaiah 13:9:

Destruction is thy own, O Israel: thy help isonly in me

***

All of this in contrast to the solution of Molinism, which to, putit simply, involves asserting that election follows from foreknowledge of merits- post prævisa merita. This contravenesthe clear sense of St. Paul, St. Augustine, and St Thomas; enchains the sovereigntyof God to humanity; and turns the gratuity of divine mercy into a mere prizedue to the human striving, vindicating the prejudices of the perennial Phariseesand making a mockery of the sacrifice of the Cross.  

(Nevertheless, it also probably most popular of theories outthere and, you should not be surprised if you run into a Catholic telling youthat something like this is not only a school of Catholic thought, but an official teaching as well)

If you or anyone else would like to look into a book length study of suchtheological questions, I would recommend: 

Probably depends on the history of House Kiryuuin before Ragyo.