You are dull of heart and blind of eye by reason of your anxiety to give good reasons for your opinions.

seen from Israel
seen from China
seen from Israel
seen from United Kingdom
seen from China

seen from Israel
seen from Israel

seen from United Kingdom

seen from Jordan
seen from China
seen from France

seen from Germany

seen from Mexico
seen from United Kingdom

seen from Italy
seen from Mexico

seen from Italy
seen from United Kingdom

seen from Italy

seen from Jordan
You are dull of heart and blind of eye by reason of your anxiety to give good reasons for your opinions.

Anya is live and ready to show you everything. Watch her strip, dance, and perform exclusive shows just for you. Interact in real-time and make your fantasies come true.
Free to watch • No registration required • HD streaming
The Dialectic of the Nomothetic and the Ideographic
Two Pathways to Scientific Rigor.—Schopenhauer’s historical categoricity presents the possibility of a way to nomoethetic rigor in history distinct from the nomothetic rigor of the natural sciences, attained through formal concepts rather than general concepts, but can we also define ideographic rigor for history? Although Windelband’s distinction between the nomothetic and the ideographic has been with us for well over a century, comparatively little effort has gone into clarifying ideographic methodology or into elaborating and extending ideographic methods so that they can stand as a viable alternative to nomothetic methods. There have been exceptions, like Heinrich Rickert, but nothing that we could call a scientific research program has appeared to advance the ideographic paradigm. Windelband himself tempered the distinction, arguing that sciences shift back and forth between nomothetic and ideographic methods as they pass through stages of development that tend toward the one or the other, implying that there are no pure species of the genus. Because the distinction has languished, there has been little or no effort contrariwise to more clearly define nomothetic methodology in contradistinction to ideographic methodology. If ideographic methodologies are to define an entire class of the sciences, demarcating them from the nomothetic sciences, the ideographic method itself would have to be developed in much greater detail. While there is little agreement within philosophy of science as regards what exactly constitutes rigorous nomothetic methodology, there is at least an attempt to capture and extend the methods of the natural sciences, which has been fruitful in its internal disagreement. This effort would be even more fruitful if it was consciously differentiating itself from ideographic methodology.
The Reconstruction of the Synchronic Present as Diachronic Sequence
Historical Modes of Thought.—What is or what would constitute a distinctive mode of historical thought? Some would say it was Ranke who formalized historical method and professionalized the discipline, but much of Ranke’s method was already implicitly present in early modern histories, as with Étienne Pasquier, discussed by Paul Veyne in Did the Greeks Believe in Their Myths? Critical textual studies date all the way back to Lorenzo Valla, who proved the Donation of Constantine to be a forgery in the early fifteenth century. The formalization of text criticism is a means to an end, and the end is the reconstruction of past time from evidence available in the present. In other words, the historical mode of thought is the reconstruction of synchronic evidence as diachronic sequence. Collingwood’s a priori historical imagination is a method of reconstruction in the light of ellipses in the historical record. Danto’s analysis of narrative sentences is the weighting of an event in reconstructed time in relation to another event in reconstructed time, the better to produce a diachronic sequence. Varve chronology and dendrochronoloy are reconstructions of past time facilitated by advances in technology and scientific technique—advances that continue in the form of nuclear dating techniques and DNA sequencing. Again, this begins early with the laws of superposition in Nicolas Steno; the use of advanced technologies tend to overshadow the fact that these are new tools in the old quest to reconstruct the past. Perhaps the most distinctive of methods of historical reconstruction is seriation. Here the historians (or the archaeologists) can claim originality. It could be argued that all historical reconstruction is a form of seriation, because we do not find the events of history in serial order, but must render them in a series, and this is the work of reconstruction—transposing the simultaneous order of the present into the serial order of the past. It is here that we should seek after ideographic rigor.
The Pursuit of Ideographic Rigor
Rigor without Revolution.—Because historians, and the histories that they wrote, were passed over by the scientific revolution, there was no inflection point in history that distinguished pre-modern history from modern history, and while the methods of historians gradually and incrementally became more rigorous, there was never a time when the tradition was discontinuous from one generation to the next. The argument could be made that there was a greater transformation in the writing of history in the passage from the ancient to the medieval world than in the passage from the medieval to the modern world. If we are interested in a counterfactual for the intellectual life of Western civilization had its linear development never been preempted by the scientific revolution and then the industrial revolution, we can look to the development of historical thought, which has experienced no revolutions. Instead, history has ever so slowly built on its past, but never enough to introduce a discontinuity into the tradition, and still today we prize histories for the literary qualities, keeping alive the problem of whether history is a science or an art. The possibility of nomothetic rigor denied history for its failure to enter into the spirit of the scientific revolution has left it with the elusive possibility of ideographic rigor. If we view the history of history through this lens, we can trace a wavering line of increasing ideographic rigor from the inception of history in Herodotus to the present day, with two steps forward always followed by one step back. Historians were on their own, without the help of either logicians (whose rigor gave us the formal sciences) or mathematicians (whose rigor informed the natural sciences) in their pursuit of independent canons of ideographic rigor.
Beyond Objectivity and Below Subjectivity
Transcendental Formalism.—The aspiration for history to be a science constituted in naïve positivity has been the will-o’-the-wisp that has distracted some historians from the possibility of a shared foundation of historical knowledge that would be the foundation for any knowledge whatsoever. Dilthey, Windelband, and Rickert postulated a distinct method for history, still capable of scientific rigor, but not the method of the empirical sciences, and not the rigor of the empirical sciences. This is another distraction. Both are attempts to grasp from the outside that which is known for what it is only from within—even more so in the case of idiographic particularity as compared to nomothetic regularity. The mathematical formalisms expressing the inner truth of physical bodies come closer to fundamental reality than the contingent details that differentiate historical individuals. Husserl noted, “…what is a mutual externality from the point of view of naïve positivity or objectivity is, when seen from the inside, an intentional mutual internality.” (Crisis, section 71) Approaching the problem from a specifically historical perspective, Collingwood understood an aspect of this, holding that historical events must be known from their inside, but his conception of internality fell short of a foundation that could mutually constitute disjoint bodies of knowledge. What is required is an internality that transcends subjectivity, and in attaining this transcendence there is the possibility of a formalism that transcends objectivity. A formalism to express historical events would capture their distinctiveness better than the most painstaking exterior description, but converging upon mutuality internality—an internality sufficiently fundamental that it equally underlies disciplines as diverse as the empirical and social sciences—lies beyond (or below) the internality that is the complement of objectivity.

Anya is live and ready to show you everything. Watch her strip, dance, and perform exclusive shows just for you. Interact in real-time and make your fantasies come true.
Free to watch • No registration required • HD streaming
TODAY IN PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY
Paul Oskar Kristeller and the Status of Historical Knowledge
Wednesday 22 May 2024 is the 119th anniversary of the birth of Paul Oskar Kristeller (22 May 1905 – 07 June 1999), who was born in Berlin on this date in 1905.
Kristeller was an historian of renown of renaissance thought, which gives his reflections on the philosophy of history a particular edge. Being himself an historian, we should not be surprised to find Kristeller holds that the philosopher of history should draw from the work of historians, but he also holds that historians take their guiding ideas from philosophers.
Quora: https://philosophyofhistory.quora.com/
Discord: https://discord.gg/r3dudQvGxD
Links: https://jnnielsen.carrd.co/
Newsletter: http://eepurl.com/dMh0_-/
Text post: https://geopolicraticus.substack.com/p/paul-oskar-kristeller-and-the-status
Video: https://youtu.be/Zn4SjntNsSE
Podcast: https://spotifyanchor-web.app.link/e/YD1PtCLROJb
Gottlob Frege 1
(b. 1848, d. 1925) German mathematician, logician, and philosopher who worked at the University of Jena. Frege essentially reconceived the discipline of logic by constructing a formal system which, in effect, constituted the first ‘predicate calculus’. In this formal system, Frege developed an analysis of quantified statements and formalized the notion of a ‘proof’ in terms that are still accepted today. Frege then demonstrated that one could use his system to resolve theoretical mathematical statements in terms of simpler logical and mathematical notions. One of the axioms that Frege later added to his system, in the attempt to derive significant parts of mathematics from logic, proved to be inconsistent. Nevertheless, his definitions (e.g., of the predecessor relation and of the concept of a natural number) and methods (e.g., for deriving the axioms of number theory) constituted a significant advance. To ground his views about the relationship of logic and mathematics, Frege conceived a comprehensive philosophy of language that many philosophers still find insightful. However, his lifelong project, of showing that mathematics was reducible to logic, was not successful.
Nell’Inghilterra del 1850 inizia un rinnovato interesse nei confronti della logica, in particolar modo nascono numerose discussioni in merito alla Logica Aristotelica ('unico modello di logica allora in vigore) poiché i numerosissimi commenti tra l’epoca antica, tardo antica e medioevale avevano consegnato alla modernità un numero molto nutrito di problemi che fanno tutti riferimento a quella che e’ la logica del primo ordine.
Il problema fondamentale che si comincia a voler affrontare riguarda non tanto la quantificazione del Soggetto ( già trattata in modo deciso da Aristotele> ex. Tutti gli uomini sono mortali oppure qualche uomo e’ Bianco : tutti e qualche sono i due quantificatori che vanno a quantificare il Soggetto della proposizione). Si cominciò invece a pensare di poter quantificare anche il predicato, ovvero poter analizzare affermazioni come: ogni uomo e’ qualche animale. Quindi qualche naturalmente va a quantificare non il Soggetto della proposizione ma il predicato. Quindi porsi dei problemi logici che vanno ben oltre quello che era stato lo schema generale proposto da Aristotele. Ecco che è proprio all'interno di questo humus culturale che spicca la figura di Frege.
Frege è un matematico, un logico che si pone però un problema molto più circoscritto rispetto alla logica del linguaggio in generale, ovvero: come possiamo trovare i fondamenti della matematica? Dove dobbiamo cercare i fondamenti della matematica?
Stando appunto a quelli che sono i risultati più moderni della logica proposizionale e tutti i tentaivi di matematizzare la logica. Frege dice che ne la matematica ne l’aritmetica sono due domini all'interno dei quali possiamo trovare una loro fondazione, una loro giustificazione. Per trovare elementi che fondano l’aritmetica è necessario guardare oltre, al di la'della matematica e dell’aritmetica stessa e quindi far riferimento alla Logica. Questa una posizione che viene chiamata logicismo.
La teoria di Frege è sostanzialmente questa: ricercare l'elemento fondazionale della Matematica e dell’aritmetica al di fuori di questi due ambiti.
Per realizzare la teoria diviene fondamentale una riforma radicale del linguaggio quotidiano. Frege quindi si inventa un nuovo linguaggio che viene chiamato idiografia. A partire dall’idiografia di Frege che si comincia a parlare di linguaggio Formale. Purtroppo l’idiografia inizialmente non è stata colta in modo positivo dai suoi contemporanei, come spesso succede con idee così innovative, ma Frege persiste nella sua teoria perchè convinto che sia possibile costruire un Linguaggio Logico che vada a fondare la Matematica e che possa rispondere a tutte quelle domande relative alla possibilità di quantificare il predicato.
Does anyone do A-level psychology?? I need some essay plans for debates for the PSYB4 exam, please?