Big History and Collective Learning
One of the distinctive ideas of big history is that of collective learning. David Christian describes collective learning in this way in his Maps of Time: An Introduction to Big History:
Human language... allows more precise and efficient transmission of knowledge from brain to brain. That means that humans can share information with great precision, creating a common pool of ecological and technical knowledge... The possibility of learning collectively changes everything... Collective learning is what gives humans a history, because it means that the ecological skills available to humans have changed over time. And there is a clear directionality to this process. Over time, processes of collective learning ensure that humans as a species will get better at extracting resources from the environment, and their increasing ecological skills ensure that, over time, human populations will increase.
Collective learning brings a new perspective to how human beings and human communities differ cognitively from other species, including even the most closely related primates, and it does so in a purely naturalistic fashion, without even appealing to any special faculty of the mind. In this way, this big history perspective on human cognition is compatible with the reductivist and eliminativist philosophies of mind commonly found among contemporary scientists. One can easily see, then, the attraction of this formulation.
Another way to think about collective learning (or, if you like, another way to use the formulation of collective learning to think about big history) is that collective learning allows minds to do what genetic inheritance allows bodies to do: with collective learning there can be a flow of ideas from mind to mind and social group to social group, as in biological inheritance there is a flow of genes from individual to individual and population to population.
This is nothing other than the "idea flow" mentioned by futurist Cadell Last that I mentioned in my post on the third day of the 2014 IBHA conference, and the source of idea diffusion, which has long been at the center of discussions about the origins of evolution of civilization. Idea flow, idea diffusion, and collective learning are all intimately related concepts. Is any one of them more fundamental than the others, so that it can be used in the exposition of the others? Or is there is yet more fundamental idea to which these all implicitly appeal?
How might a Kantian transcendental argument proceed in deriving the necessary conditions of idea flow and idea diffusion? An answer to this question could serve as a bridge between the methodological naturalism of big history and the epistemological tradition of post-Cartesian philosophical thought.












