#existential anxiety

but there's another line that encapsulates Owen's fear/anxiety and his decision to stay closeted

"it's not real if i don't think about it"

The philosophy of existential trust is a profound and often overlooked dimension of existentialist and phenomenological thought. It refers to the basic, pre-reflective stance of trust in existence itself—a fundamental orientation that precedes any specific act of trusting this or that person, institution, or claim.

Existential trust is not optimism (the belief that things will go well), nor is it faith (belief in a transcendent being). It is a primordial attitude toward being—the sense that existence is fundamentally reliable, that reality is not ultimately hostile, that one can venture forth into the world without being annihilated.

Here is a systematic exploration of the philosophy of existential trust.

I. DEFINING EXISTENTIAL TRUST

Existential trust is the basic confidence in the reliability of existence that makes life possible. It is:

Pre-reflective: It is not the result of reasoning or evidence; it is prior to reflection.

Embodied: It is felt in the body as a sense of safety, openness, and possibility.

Primordial: It precedes specific acts of trust; it is the condition for the possibility of trusting anything at all.

Vulnerable: It can be shattered by trauma, betrayal, or prolonged exposure to meaninglessness.

Related Concepts:

Trust in others

Specific, interpersonal; depends on experience and judgment

Faith

Belief in a transcendent reality (God, providence)

Optimism

Expectation that outcomes will be positive

Hope

Desire for a positive future despite uncertainty

Security

Absence of threat; a condition, not an attitude

II. THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF EXISTENTIAL TRUST

A. The Natural Attitude

For Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, our everyday experience is characterized by the "natural attitude" —a pre-reflective belief in the existence of the world and its basic reliability. We do not prove that the world exists; we live in it, assume it, trust it. This is not a propositional belief but an existential stance.

B. The Body as Ground of Trust

Maurice Merleau-Ponty argued that existential trust is rooted in the body. The body is our "anchor" in the world, the zero-point from which all experience unfolds. The body's basic capacity to orient itself, to reach toward things, to find its balance—this is existential trust in its most concrete form.

When we wake up and place our feet on the floor, we trust that the floor will hold. This is not a belief we consciously entertain; it is enacted in our posture, our gait, our relationship to gravity. Existential trust is embodied knowledge.

C. The Primacy of the Lifeworld

Husserl's concept of the lifeworld (Lebenswelt) refers to the pre-scientific, pre-theoretical world of everyday experience—the horizon within which all our activities take place. The lifeworld is not a collection of objects but a field of trust. We move through it without questioning its reality; we take it for granted. This taking-for-granted is existential trust.

III. EXISTENTIALIST AMBIVALENCE

Existentialist philosophy has a complex relationship with trust.

A. Kierkegaard: The Leap of Faith

Søren Kierkegaard is often read as a philosopher of radical anxiety, but he is also a philosopher of trust—trust of a very specific kind. For Kierkegaard, the existential condition is one of dread (Angst) in the face of freedom. But this dread is the precondition for the leap of faith—the passionate commitment to the absurd, to the paradox of the God-man, to existence itself.

Kierkegaard's trust is not naive; it is wrested from the abyss. It is trust that knows despair, that has passed through the sickness unto death, and has chosen nonetheless to believe.

B. Nietzsche: Trust and Its Betrayal

Friedrich Nietzsche is the great critic of trust—or rather, of misplaced trust. He diagnosed the modern condition as one of nihilism: the devaluation of the highest values, the collapse of the metaphysical ground of trust. "God is dead," and with him died the guarantee that the universe is ordered, meaningful, and just.

But Nietzsche is not merely a destroyer. He also sought a new form of trust—trust in the will to power, trust in the eternal return, trust in the possibility of the Übermensch. This is trust without metaphysical guarantees, trust that says "yes" to existence even as it affirms its chaos and cruelty.

C. Camus: Trust Without Hope

Albert Camus offers perhaps the most austere form of existential trust. In The Myth of Sisyphus, he argues that the absurd—the confrontation between the human need for meaning and the world's silence—must be lived without appeal. There is no transcendent consolation, no ultimate justification.

Yet Camus does not despair. His Sisyphus, condemned to roll a boulder up a hill for eternity, is "happy." This is trust without hope, trust without a future, trust that finds meaning in the struggle itself. As Camus writes: "One must imagine Sisyphus happy."

D. Heidegger: The Uncanny and the Familiar

Martin Heidegger offers a complex account of the tension between the familiar and the uncanny. In Being and Time, he argues that our everyday existence is absorbed in the familiar world of the "they" (das Man). This is a kind of existential trust—but it is inauthentic trust, trust that has never been tested.

Authentic existence, for Heidegger, requires the confrontation with anxiety (Angst). Anxiety individualizes; it tears us from the comfortable familiarity of the "they" and reveals our thrownness, our finitude, our being-toward-death. But this anxiety is not the end of trust; it is the condition for a new kind of trust—trust in one's ownmost possibilities, trust in the call of conscience, trust in being itself.

IV. PSYCHOANALYTIC PERSPECTIVES

Psychoanalysis has contributed powerfully to our understanding of existential trust, particularly through the concept of basic trust.

A. Erik Erikson: Basic Trust vs. Basic Mistrust

The psychoanalyst Erik Erikson argued that the first psychosocial crisis of life is basic trust vs. basic mistrust. In the first year of life, the infant learns whether the world is reliable. Consistent, responsive care creates a sense that the world is trustworthy; neglect or inconsistency creates a pervasive sense of threat.

This basic trust is not merely a psychological trait but an existential orientation. It is the foundation for all later trust: in others, in institutions, in the self, in existence itself. When basic trust is damaged, the world is experienced as fundamentally dangerous, even when there is no specific threat.

B. D.W. Winnicott: Holding Environment

D.W. Winnicott extended this insight with the concept of the "holding environment." The infant needs an environment that "holds" her—that provides reliable support, physical and emotional. This holding environment creates the capacity for being alone in the presence of another, the capacity for spontaneity, the capacity for trust.

When the holding environment fails, the self does not develop the basic sense of security that allows for genuine engagement with the world. Existential trust is not given; it is cultivated through early experience.

C. Trauma and the Collapse of Trust

Trauma, particularly early or repeated trauma, can shatter existential trust. Judith Herman and Bessel van der Kolk have shown how trauma destroys the sense of safety, the sense of continuity, the sense of a meaningful world. The traumatized person lives in a state of hypervigilance, expecting danger at every moment. Trust is not merely damaged; it is unavailable.

Recovery from trauma, in this view, is the slow, painstaking process of rebuilding existential trust—learning again to inhabit a body, to be present in the world, to trust that the floor will hold.

V. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DIMENSIONS

Existential trust is not merely individual; it is also social and political.

A. Trust and Social Order

Émile Durkheim argued that modern societies require a new basis for trust. Traditional societies had mechanical solidarity, based on shared beliefs and rituals. Modern societies require organic solidarity, based on interdependence. The question of trust is the question of whether this interdependence can be experienced as mutual support rather than mutual threat.

B. Systemic Betrayal

Jennifer Freyd has developed the concept of "institutional betrayal" —the failure of institutions to protect those who depend on them. When institutions (churches, schools, governments) betray trust, the damage is not merely to the specific individuals but to existential trust itself. The world becomes a place where protection is not available, where the structures that should support us can harm us.

C. Trust and Democracy

John Dewey argued that democracy is not merely a form of government but a way of life—a way of building trust through shared experience, collective problem-solving, and mutual engagement. Democracy requires existential trust: trust that others are capable of participation, trust that collective deliberation can produce wise decisions, trust that the experiment of self-governance is worth continuing.

When this trust erodes, democracy becomes impossible. Citizens become cynical, disengaged, or hostile. The erosion of existential trust is the erosion of the democratic condition.

VI. THE SHATTERING AND RESTORATION OF TRUST

Existential trust can be shattered. The question then becomes: Can it be restored?

A. The Abyss of Mistrust

When existential trust is shattered, the world appears as fundamentally hostile. This can happen through:

Trauma: Physical or sexual abuse, violence, betrayal

Prolonged exposure to meaninglessness: The Holocaust, genocide, systemic oppression

Loss: The death of a loved one can shatter the sense of a reliable world

Institutional betrayal: When those who should protect us harm us

In this state, the world is experienced as abyss. There is no ground to stand on, no horizon to move toward, no trust to rely on.

B. The Possibility of Restoration

Can trust be restored? Philosophers and psychologists have explored this question:

Witnessing: Judith Herman argues that recovery requires a witness—someone who can bear witness to the trauma, who can affirm that what happened was real, that it matters, that survival is meaningful.

Repair: Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick writes about "reparative reading"—the practice of approaching texts, and the world, with the possibility of repair rather than with suspicion.

New experience: Trust is not rebuilt through argument but through new experience. Each small act of reliability, each moment of safety, each experience of being held, slowly rebuilds the capacity for trust.

The unguaranteed leap: Ultimately, existential trust requires a leap—a decision to trust without guarantees. This is the Kierkegaardian insight: trust cannot be proven; it can only be chosen.

VII. EXISTENTIAL TRUST AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

The problem of evil is the problem of existential trust: How can we trust existence in a world that contains suffering, injustice, and meaninglessness?

A. The Theistic Response

For theistic traditions, existential trust is ultimately trust in God. This trust does not deny evil but sees it as transcended by a larger purpose, a larger love, a larger justice. The book of Job is the great biblical exploration of this: Job's trust is shattered, then restored—not through explanation but through encounter.

B. The Secular Response

For secular traditions, existential trust is trust without a transcendent guarantor. This is Camus's Sisyphus: trust in the struggle itself, trust in solidarity with others, trust that meaning can be created even in a meaningless universe.

C. The Post-Holocaust Response

After Auschwitz, some have argued, existential trust is impossible. Theodor Adorno wrote that "to write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric." This is not a claim about art but about the possibility of affirming existence after systematic atrocity. Others, like Primo Levi, have insisted on the necessity of trust even in the face of the camps: trust in testimony, in memory, in the human capacity to bear witness.

VIII. CONCLUSION: THE RISK OF TRUST

The philosophy of existential trust teaches that trust is never guaranteed. It is always a risk. To trust existence is to venture forth without assurance, to act without certainty, to love without guarantee.

This is why existential trust is not naive. It knows the abyss. It has passed through anxiety, despair, and meaninglessness. It has looked into the void and chosen, nonetheless, to say "yes."

Existential trust is the courage to be (Paul Tillich). It is the willingness to exist without final justification, to act without ultimate certainty, to love without promise of return.

As the poet Rilke wrote: "Perhaps everything terrible is in its deepest being something helpless that wants help from us." Trust is the willingness to offer that help, to respond to the helplessness of existence, to be present to the world even when the world is not present to us.

It’s so weird… thinking that our world is the more happier one… we’re no one actually dies, and where we manage to still be friends.

Existential anxiety, at its core, revolves around the deep uncertainties that arise from our human condition: the quest for meaning, the inevitability of death, the nature of freedom, and the challenges of isolation. When seen through the lens of schizoid tendencies, these concerns can become profound driving forces that shape behavior, perception, and interactions. Let's explore the significance of existential anxiety in those with schizoid tendencies.

1. The Quest for Meaning and Identity:

For many with schizoid tendencies, there's a fundamental sense of 'drift' or a feeling of not truly knowing oneself. This disconnection from a core sense of self can intensify existential anxieties. The world becomes a place where they're searching not just for external meaning but also a consistent internal narrative. This search often becomes a central theme, pushing them to introspection and sometimes further withdrawal.

2. Fear of Engulfment:

One of the core features of existential anxiety is the dread of losing one's unique identity. Schizoid individuals often manifest this fear as a pronounced fear of 'engulfment', where they're afraid that getting too close to someone or forming attachments will erase their sense of self. It's as if their boundaries are porous, and they must guard against external influences overpowering their innermost identity.

3. Solitude vs. Isolation:

Solitude can be a choice, a moment of reflection, and personal growth. However, when combined with schizoid tendencies and existential anxiety, solitude can morph into isolation. This self-imposed isolation arises from a desire to confront or escape from life's inherent uncertainties. While solitude can offer a sanctuary from the overwhelming nature of existence, it can also exacerbate feelings of loneliness and the sense of being an outsider looking in.

4. The Nature of Freedom:

While freedom is often seen as a positive aspect of human existence, it comes with the responsibility of choice. Schizoid individuals, dealing with existential concerns, might find this freedom burdensome. The need to consistently define and redefine oneself, especially when one's sense of self is already shaky, can be a heavy weight to bear.

5. Confronting Mortality:

Existential anxiety invariably brings us face to face with our mortality. Schizoid tendencies, with their introspective nature, often mean that individuals ruminate more on the nature of life and death. Their internal world becomes a theater where they play out various scenarios, confront their fears, and grapple with the idea of life's transience.

Summary:

Existential anxiety is not exclusive to those with schizoid tendencies; it's a part of the human condition. However, in individuals with schizoid tendencies, this anxiety finds unique expressions and plays a significant role in shaping their worldviews. Understanding this can provide a compassionate lens through which to support and empathize with individuals navigating these deep waters of existence.