OSCE and Ukraine
Eric Cappon
At the 2014 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Parliamentary Assembly Winter Meeting held February 13th and 14th, there was an organized debate on the situation in Ukraine. The 57-member OSCE — which includes the likes of Russia and the United States and lists crisis management as one of its main functions — had an understandable interest in the growing turmoil. On February 24th, two days after Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych was removed from power, OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) Astrid Thors cautiously commended the solutions emerging to end the violence. Thors noted that all actors must tread carefully though, as the situation on the ground remained precarious. In reaction to the decision made the previous day to cancel the 2012 law on the “Principles of State Language Policy”, Thors also warned that language policy is a very divisive issue and that the acting leaders of Ukraine should take a “balanced and inclusive approach towards language policy” that respects speakers of Russian, Ukrainian and other languages.
Before leaving for Ukraine on March 2nd to assess the situation first-hand and to participate in meetings aimed at de-escalating the crisis, Thors expressed concern about the events unfolding on the Crimean peninsula. On the 3rd, Thors met with acting Foreign Minister of Ukraine Andrii Deshchytsia to discuss how the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities could contribute to resolving the conflict. Deshchytsia requested that the HCNM provide assistance in creating new Ukrainian legislation in the area of minority language policy. In making this request, the interim government signalled its trust in the HCNM as a reliable advisor of minority issues.
Although Thors did participate in some of her scheduled meetings in Crimea, her visit there was cut short when angry crowds amassed to protest her presence. Meanwhile, a small OSCE observer mission that had been sent, at Ukraine’s request, to monitor Crimea was denied entry to the region altogether. On the 6th of March, Thors reiterated her concern that tensions between ethnic groups on the Crimean peninsula might be mismanaged as the climate of fear deepened. She reminded authorities to ensure that everyone’s rights are protected, “regardless of whether they are of Russian, Ukrainian or Crimean Tatar or other origin”.
On March 14th, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that OSCE Chair-in-Office Didier Burkhalter had overstepped the mark three days earlier by declaring the forthcoming referendum in Crimea illegal. Russia felt that Burkhalter had strayed from the OSCE mandate, formalized in 2002, to take the opinions of all member states into account when acting as chairman on behalf of the organization. In a statement reminiscent of comments made by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov at the beginning of 2013, the Ministry accused other OSCE member states of maintaining “double standards” that unfairly target Russia.
Despite these signs of turbulence, the potential of the OSCE to serve as a point of contact between Russia and Western states was demonstrated less than one week later. As an organization that acts on the consensus of its members, the OSCE proved on the 21st of March that it can be a useful forum for negotiation on issues of peace and security when it announced that its members (including Russia) had decided to send a 6-month special monitoring mission to Ukraine. The Kiev-based mission, consisting initially of 100 civilian monitors, will gather information, report on the security situation, establish facts, monitor human rights and the rights of minorities, and work to normalize relations between the conflicting parties.
With OSCE Chairperson Burkhalter expressing on April 2nd his satisfaction with the state of deployment in the early stages of the OSCE special mission to Ukraine, one major sticking point remains: whether or not Crimea is included in the mission’s scope. Immediately following the March 21st announcement, the United States argued that it “is clear that with the adoption of this decision this mission has a mandate to work in Crimea and in all other parts of Ukraine”. Russian Ambassador OSCE Ambassador rebutted that the mission has no mandate in Crimea, staying true to the Russian assertion that Crimea is now part of Russia. This sentiment was reinforced the following day by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Sending observers from the OSCE Ukraine mission into Crimea would fundamentally undermine Russia’s claim that Crimea is no longer a part of Ukraine. As such, it appears unlikely that its officials would support sending anyone operating under that banner into Crimea. On this front, the OSCE’s hands may be tied, as deploying observers against Russia’s will would be asking for trouble. At the very least, such a move would signal the end of the OSCE as a bridge for dialogue between East and West. Although the bigger issues might be best contested in a bigger forum, the OSCE has shown the potential in the past few weeks to be an invaluable resource both in terms of championing minority rights and in bridging the gap between East and West. With regard to the latter quality, it is telling that German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly agreed during a telephone conversation in late March that the OSCE special monitoring mission in Ukraine is a positive move. At a time when Russia and the West can find little else upon which to agree, this is no small feat.
