#dynamicworkforce

A critical Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability, designated CVE-2026-40933, has been disclosed in Flowise, a widely adopted open-source platform for building Large Language Model (LLM) workflows and AI agents. With a near-perfect CVSS score of 9.9, this flaw allows attackers to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable servers simply by tricking an administrator into importing a malicious chatflow configuration.

The Vulnerability: Command Injection via MCP

Discovered by Obsidian Security, the vulnerability stems from a systemic command injection issue within the Anthropic Model Context Protocol (MCP) adapter used by Flowise. Specifically, the flaw arises from unsafe serialization of stdio (standard input/output) commands within the MCP adapter.

The attack vector is deceptively simple:

- Malicious Payload Creation: An attacker creates a specially crafted chatflow JSON file containing a malicious Custom MCP Tool configuration with embedded shell commands. - Social Engineering: The attacker convinces a Flowise administrator to import this chatflow—potentially disguised as a useful template, integration, or community contribution. - One-Click Exploitation: Upon import, Flowise processes the MCP configuration without proper validation, triggering immediate server-side code execution.

Crucially, no further interaction is required. The act of importing the chatflow is sufficient to compromise the system.

Impact: Full Server Compromise

Successful exploitation grants attackers OS-level execution privileges. In typical containerized deployments (Docker, Kubernetes), this often translates to root access within the container, enabling:

- Credential Theft: Extraction of API keys, database passwords, LLM provider tokens (OpenAI, Anthropic, etc.), and environment variables stored in plaintext. - Lateral Movement: Pivoting from the Flowise instance to connected services, internal networks, or cloud infrastructure using stolen credentials. - Data Exfiltration: Access to conversation logs, user inputs, proprietary workflows, and any data processed by the AI agents. - Persistence: Installation of backdoors, web shells, or cryptocurrency miners that survive service restarts.

For organizations using Flowise in production environments—particularly those handling sensitive customer data or integrating with critical business systems—this vulnerability represents an existential threat.

Affected Versions and Patch Status

Vulnerable: All Flowise versions prior to 3.1.0

Patched: Flowise 3.1.0 and later include input validation checks designed to prevent malicious MCP configurations from being imported.

However, security researchers have raised concerns about the comprehensiveness of the initial fix. Some reports suggest that alternative exploitation paths may still exist, warranting continued vigilance even after patching.

Flowise Cloud: The managed cloud offering is not affected, as stdio MCP is disabled by default in the hosted environment.

Immediate Mitigation Steps

If you operate a self-hosted Flowise instance, take the following actions immediately:

1. Upgrade to Version 3.1.0 or Later npm update flowise # Or, if using Docker: docker pull flowiseai/flowise:latest docker-compose restart 2. Disable Stdio MCP (Recommended)

If your deployment does not require stdio-based MCP integrations, disable them entirely by setting the following environment variable before starting Flowise:

CUSTOM_MCP_PROTOCOL=sse

This forces Flowise to use Server-Sent Events (SSE) for MCP communication, which is not vulnerable to this injection attack.

3. Audit Imported Chatflows

Review all chatflows imported in the last 90 days, especially those sourced from community repositories, GitHub gists, or third-party marketplaces. Look for:

- Custom MCP Tool nodes with unfamiliar configurations - Shell command executions or script invocations - Connections to unknown external endpoints 4. Rotate Compromised Credentials

If you suspect your instance may have been exploited prior to patching:

- Rotate all API keys stored in Flowise environment variables - Change database passwords and connection strings - Revoke and regenerate LLM provider tokens (OpenAI, Anthropic, Azure OpenAI) - Audit cloud IAM roles attached to the deployment for unauthorized access 5. Implement Network Segmentation

Restrict Flowise's network access to only required endpoints:

- Block outbound connections to unknown IPs/domains - Place Flowise behind a firewall or in a isolated VPC/subnet - Use egress filtering to prevent data exfiltration

Broader Implications for AI Infrastructure Security

CVE-2026-40933 highlights a growing class of vulnerabilities at the intersection of AI orchestration and traditional application security:

The "Import" Attack Surface

Many AI platforms (Flowise, LangChain, LlamaIndex) allow users to import/export workflow configurations as JSON or YAML files. These files are often treated as data rather than code, bypassing security reviews. However, as this vulnerability demonstrates, configuration files can be executable payloads when deserialized without strict validation.

MCP and the Expanding Trust Boundary

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) enables AI agents to interact with external tools, databases, and APIs. While powerful, MCP significantly expands the trust boundary of AI systems. Each integrated tool represents a potential injection point, and unsafe serialization of tool parameters can lead to RCE, SQL injection, or SSRF vulnerabilities.

AI-Specific Supply Chain Risks

The AI ecosystem relies heavily on community-contributed components, templates, and integrations. Unlike traditional software supply chains, AI component marketplaces often lack rigorous security vetting. A single malicious chatflow template distributed through a popular repository could compromise thousands of downstream deployments.

Recommendations for AI Platform Operators

Beyond immediate patching, organizations deploying AI orchestration platforms should adopt the following security practices:

- Treat Configuration as Code: Apply the same security review processes to chatflow JSON files as you would to application source code. Use version control, peer review, and automated scanning for imported configurations. - Principle of Least Privilege: Run Flowise and similar platforms with minimal permissions. Avoid running as root, and use read-only filesystems where possible. - Secret Management: Never store API keys or credentials in environment variables accessible to the application. Use dedicated secret management solutions (HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, Azure Key Vault) with fine-grained access controls. - Runtime Protection: Deploy runtime application self-protection (RASP) or container security tools that can detect and block suspicious process execution, network connections, or file access patterns. - Vendor Due Diligence: Before adopting AI orchestration platforms, evaluate their security posture: frequency of security audits, bug bounty programs, incident response capabilities, and transparency around vulnerability disclosures.

Conclusion

CVE-2026-40933 serves as a stark reminder that the rapid innovation cycle in AI infrastructure often outpaces security hardening. The convenience of one-click integrations and community templates comes with inherent risks that must be actively managed.

For Flowise administrators, the window of exposure is closing—but only if action is taken immediately. Upgrade to version 3.1.0, disable stdio MCP, audit your chatflows, and rotate credentials. For the broader AI industry, this vulnerability underscores the urgent need for secure-by-design architectures that treat configuration files as potential attack vectors and enforce strict boundaries between AI agents and the systems they control.