#deletant

Degenerare din punct de vedere al economiei românești și al politicii economice a lui Ceaușescu. Din cauză că el și-a pus toate ouăle într-un singur coș, n-a putut, cred, ca formație să renunțe la politica de industrializare intensă. Atunci când vorbesc de perioada de după ’75, când s-a dublat prețul petrolului, industria românească chimică era bazată pe un anumit preț al petrolului. Dar după criza petrolului din Iran, sau din Orientul Mijlociu mai bine zis, s-a scumpit petrolul iar produsele românești chimice de export au devenit prea scumpe pentru piața mondială. România era producător de petrol și a început să importe petrol. Era producător mare de carne și exporta carne de porc în Uniunea Sovietică, dar politica aceasta a dus la introducerea raționalizării în România, cozile care s-au văzut. Era o politică aberantă pentru că România era mare producătoare de cereale, dar pâinea era pe cartelă. Cum explici asta în termeni economici? Este o politică economică falimentară, n-are rațiune. De aceea zic degradare, N-a existat o opoziție în sânul Partidului Comunist din România – spre deosebire de alte țări comuniste, sau alte regimuri comuniste unde erau mișcări, n-as spune chiar concludente în sânul partidului, dar totuși mișcări destul de importante ca să schimbe sau să nuanțeze. Politica economică a Ungariei, este un exemplu, Cehoslovacia, într-un anumit sens, și Polonia. Dar în România Ceaușescu a continuat pe făgașul lui în detrimentul populației din România. Paradoxul este politica externă. Pe plan extern, Ceaușescu era un politician foarte abil. Și de aceea a reușit să-i convingă pe americani să introducă statutul de ‘națiunea cea mai favorizată’; a obținut anumite înlesniri de la americani în ceea ce privește tarifele, a devenit un fel de lider neoficial al lumii a treia după moartea lui Tito. Pe plan internațional era văzut, cum spuneam, drept un politician abil care a știut să navigheze în apele foarte periculoase ale politicii mondiale. Dar, pe plan intern, după ce a venit Gorbaciov la putere, în martie ’85, Ceaușescu a devenit irelevant pentru Statele Unite. Pentru că Gorbaciov a fost un reformist care voia să reformeze tot sistemul socialist. Ceaușescu era o fosilă, era ca un vechi Brejnev. Era un om din trecut, era un stalinist. Americanii nu mai aveau evoie de el și nici el nu s-a adaptat. Și nici nu și-a dat seama, plus că nevastă-sa tot intervenea. Dacă citiți stenogramele Biroului politic după ’85, să vedeți intervențiile doamnei Ceaușescu … mă rog, n-am cuvinte.

Deletant argues that Romania had always been rather inclined towards the cause of the Allies, owing to their support in 1918 of the creation of Greater Romania (comprising Transylvania, Bukovina, Bessarabia and the Old Kingdom), but that the country was surrounded by revisionist neighbours (especially Hungary, Bulgaria and the Soviet Union). This position changed only when the European order started crumbling after the 1938 Munich Accords, which in a short span led to Romania losing considerable parts of its territory to its aforementioned neighbours. With France and Britain geographically far away, and with the French being knocked out of the war in the summer of 1940, the spectre of Stalin weighed heavily on Romania’s political leaders. It was under this context that Romania turned towards Germany for an alliance and some sort of insurance against its Eastern neighbour. Yet, Deletant is not an apologist for Antonescu’s regime. He thus argues that while not necessarily the most eager of the Axis Powers, Romania’s war effort was on par with that of Italy, making it one of the senior partners in the alliance and a participant in war crimes on the Eastern Front (e.g. the Odessa Massacre).

British and Romanian cultural and diplomatic relations are another issue that concerns Deletant in this book. In his view, these two seem to have been interlinked; by looking at them in detail, one can see beyond the general assumptions. This leads the reader to understand that despite Britain’s lack of overall interest in Romania as an individual country, the interwar period saw some efforts being made to create cultural ties through the teaching of English and the introduction of Anglo-Saxon literature in local libraries through various donations. But he argues that these efforts, while impressive, paled in comparison to those of the French and Italians, who went as far as financing university positions through various scholarships. He also pays attention to the ultimate fate of those who had worked for the British, and the efforts made to save them from the clutches of the communists. These men and women came under the scrutiny of the new regime as the Cold War began: they were seen as suspicious, as possible agents of the West and, as Deletant argues, there might also have been a little bit of envy from the Romanian communist leader, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, towards these educated individuals.

However, the major focus of the book is, as the title suggests, British clandestine operations in wartime Romania. Deletant argues that these were focused around two main objectives. Firstly, it was Britain’s wish to hit Germany’s oil supplies by sabotaging the oil fields, refineries or at least parts of the infrastructure, but this could only be done with the help of the Romanians, who were less than keen on destroying their precious resources and hard-to-obtain technology. Here, he offers stories of how British agents worked with Romanian allies, with some having a darkly comic aura. This includes the case of Captain Russell who was parachuted into Yugoslavia before moving into Romania, where he was to spread propaganda material in a calculated manner; however, his plans were thwarted by a drunk village mayor who did not respect instructions. Unfortunately, the captain and his partners were forced  into hiding and ending up being killed during a mugging by a still-unknown assailant; the operation’s money was also stolen.

The other objective was both more pragmatic, but also harder to achieve: knocking Romania out of the war. Given the geographical distance between the two countries, there was only one real way in which this could be done: namely, a coup d’etat to replace Antonescu’s regime. In order to achieve this goal, the British sought an ally in the opposition and National Peasants’ Party leader, Iuliu Maniu, the only figure they saw as being capable of leading a possible revolt. The fact is that the relationship between this political figure and the dictator of Romania was somewhat ambivalent. While most dictators seek out to eliminate their opposition, Antonescu tried at first to convince Maniu to join in the formation of the new government but was refused; yet this did not lead to a suppression of the parties as they were left alone, although the Romanian parliament remained suspended. But, as Deletant explains, the British quickly became fed up with Maniu’s lack of decisiveness as he was not very keen on turning his country into a war zone, even less so after Germany had enacted Operation Margarethe in Hungary.

Deletant’s latest book is yet another much-needed and useful addition to the history of Romania and of East-Central Europe. Going beyond his traditional approach, he introduces elements of international relations that help to tie together the pasts of two European places that are otherwise geographically distanced. This is also long overdue research into understanding Allied attitudes towards what would become the Iron Curtain after the Second World War. Those invested in the study of history can hope that this book will rekindle scholarly interest in the evolution of this part of Europe.