#compatibilism

By: Jerry Coyne

Published: Apr 1, 2026

I have long argued that free will, as understood by most people, is simply an illusion, and I recently criticized Shermer’s view that it is not. In response, Shermer says I’m mistaken, but concludes that the issue of free will versus determinism is “an insoluble problem because we may be ultimately talking past one another at different levels of causality.”

In fact, the problem is not one of levels of causality, but of semantics: Shermer has made up a new definition of free will that’s very different from the one most people hold, and different as well from definitions offered by other “compatibilists”—people who argue that yes, human decisions and behavior are determined by the laws of physics, but we still have free will anyway. Here, I argue that Shermer’s compatibilist definition of free will is incoherent and incapable of refutation. In contrast, my form of determinism, adhering to purely physical causation of thoughts and behaviors free from any human “will,” is scientifically testable—and, so far, supported by lots of evidence.  

But first let’s look at our respective definitions. I adhere to biochemist Anthony Cashmore’s definition of free will:

… I believe that free will is better defined as a belief that there is a component to biological behavior that is something more than the unavoidable consequences of the genetic and environmental history of the individual and the possible stochastic laws of nature.

In this definition there’s a “will” that doesn’t involve physical processes but can alter decisions. Another way of saying this is the way most people understand free will: “If you could replay the tape of life and return to a moment of decision at which everything—every molecule—was in exactly the same position, you have free will if you could have decided differently—and that decision was up to you.” This in turn can be condensed to the view that “you could have done other than what you did.” This concept is called “libertarian free will” or “contra-causal free will.” 

Surveys in different countries show that most people indeed think we live in a world in which behavior is not deterministic, and our actions are controlled by an intangible, nonphysical “will.” The prevailing view is that we could have done other than what we did. 

This concept is rejected by physical determinists like Shermer and me. Determinism does, however, allow different outcomes in a moment of decision, but only insofar as the laws of physics are non-deterministic and inherently unpredictable. The only physical laws with such unpredictability are those of quantum mechanics (some physicists suggest that quantum events are deterministic in a way we don’t yet understand). For example, it is possible that you ordered a steak rather than salmon because, somewhere in the neurons of your brain, a quantum event took place when you gave your order. But most physicists and biologists think that quantum effects don’t apply on the macro scale of human behavior, where classical mechanics probably rules. And, at any rate, quantum effects cannot buttress free will, for we cannot will the movement of electrons. Libertarianism says the decision must be up to you, not up to probabilistic movements of particles. 

Like most compatibilists, Shermer is a determinist, asserting that, “I agree with Jerry and Dan [Dennett] that we live in a determined universe governed by laws of nature.” But he argues that this determinism still leaves us room for free will. 

How can that be? It’s because Shermer defines free will in such a way that even in a physics-determined universe we still have a “freedom to choose.” Although I find his definition somewhat confusing, here’s what he says:

So, while the world is determined, we are active agents in determining our decisions going forward in a self-determined way, in the context of what already happened and what might happen. … Here, for example, is [Robert] Sapolsky defending his belief that free will does not exist because single neurons don’t have it: “Individual neurons don’t become causeless causes that defy gravity and help generate free will just because they’re interacting with lots of other neurons.” In fact, billions of interacting neurons is exactly where self-determinism (or volition or free will) arises.

Shermer adds that our behavior satisfies the three requirements for volition given by philosopher Christian List. We have:

“the capacity to form an intention to pursue different possibilities,”

“the capacity to consider several possibilities for this action (this is the ‘could have done otherwise’ element),” and

causal control, “the capacity to take action to move toward one of these possibilities.” 

All this is puzzling because if we live in a universe governed by the laws of nature, then of course our bodies and brains are part of that physical nexus. Our brains, of course, are the meat computers that form intentions, weigh possibilities, and emit decisions. But this doesn’t answer the critical question: At any moment, could we have done other than what we did? If so, then there is something spooky going on whereby our brains are somehow exempt from the laws of physics. This seems to reside in Shermer’s claim that we are “active agents in determining our decisions going forward in a self-determined way.” What else can that mean but a form of dualism, or even magic?

This smuggled-in dualism becomes clear when Shermer claims that although the action of individual neurons may be determined, “billions of interacting neurons is exactly where self-determinism (or volition or free will) arises.” But how can one neuron be governed by the laws of physics but a group of interacting neurons not be governed by the laws of physics. If they are, then there is no freedom, no volition, no “willed” control of our behavior, and no ability to have done otherwise. Yet Shermer argues that when a group of neurons cooperates, some kind of “will” arises. This dilemma won’t be resolved until Shermer explains the relevant difference between the behavior of one neuron and of a group of neurons.

This is not a semantic distinction, for the definition of free will I gave is testable while Shermer’s is not. There are many experiments and phenomena showing that our sense of agency can be altered by physically manipulating the brain (a big group of neurons), observing human behavior, or performing psychological tricks. For example, neurological experiments show that predictable binary “choices” occur in the brain well before they are consciously made by an individual—up to ten seconds in advance. Such decisions cannot come from conscious “will.” Various lesions in the brain can remove the illusion that we can make real choices (e.g., alien hand syndrome), and doctors, by electrically stimulating parts of the brain can create intentions to do specific acts, like licking your lips or moving your arms. Given more electricity, patients report that they had indeed done those acts even when they didn’t.

Alternatively, computer games or Ouija boards show that humans can perform actions they attribute to external forces like spirits even though they’re actually, but unconsciously, moving their muscles. All of this suggests that our conscious intentions are not “free,” but are formed by the brain before we’re aware of them, and can be manipulated to either add or remove feelings of “intention.” “Will,” “volition,” or “agency” may well be post facto phenomena in which deterministic activity in the brain is brought into consciousness a bit later, so that what we think of as choice is really a neuronal newsreel screened after the events have already happened. To repeat, it’s useless to see freedom in groups of neurons if it doesn’t occur in single neurons. As Cashmore noted:

Some will argue that free will could be explained by emergent properties that may be associated with neural networks. This is almost certainly correct in reference to the phenomenon of consciousness. However, as admirably appreciated by Epicurus and Lucretius, in the absence of any hint of a mechanism that affects the activities of atoms in a manner that is not a direct and unavoidable consequence of the forces of GES [genes, environment, and stochastic processes], this line of thinking is not informative in reference to the question of free will.

The science suggests that our feeling that we could have acted differently is, pure and simple, an illusion. 

In contrast, Shermer’s definition of free will is untestable, precisely because he’s defined free will tautologically: because people feel and act like they have free will, they do have some form of it. We feel like we control our actions, weigh alternatives, and make “choices” among those alternatives. But if we couldn’t have done other than what we did—if, at bottom, all we think and do reflects physical law—then what exactly is “free” about our decisions and behaviors? 

As Shermer notes, 59 percent of surveyed philosophers are compatibilists while the rest are almost equally divided between libertarians, determinists, and those with no opinion. He deems philosophers the “most qualified people” to pronounce on the problem, but are philosophers more qualified than neuroscientists or physicists? As Sam Harris (a neuroscientist and a determinist) said: 

[Compatibilism] ignores the very source of our belief in free will: the feeling of conscious agency. People feel that they are the authors of their thoughts and actions, and this is the only reason why there seems to be a problem of free will worth talking about. … Compatibilism amounts to nothing more than an assertion of the following creed: A puppet is free as long as he loves his strings.

Importantly, the “folk” conception of free will—the libertarian version—is what most people think they have. It is that version that permeates society, the legal system, and, of course, religion, and is therefore the most important version to discuss.

Frankly, I’m puzzled by the eagerness of intellectuals to embrace various forms of compatibilism, and I’ve concluded—Dennett said this explicitly—that this comes largely from the view that without some idea that we have free will, society would fall apart, with nobody being “morally responsible” for their actions. I don’t have space to rebut that claim, except to say that it’s an untested assertion. Further, it’s clear that most determinists are not running amok by flouting morality and the law, nor are we nihilists who see no point in getting out of bed. I’ll add that while we are “responsible” for our actions in the sense that we performed them, under determinism the concept of moral responsibility is incoherent, for it assumes we could have made either a moral or an immoral choice.

Finally, Shermer poses what he sees as an unassailable challenge to my determinism: 

In fact, billions of interacting neurons is exactly where self-determinism (or volition or free will) arises. This is why I like to ask determinists: Where is inflation [of the monetary sort] in the laws and principles of physics, biology, or neuroscience? It’s not, because inflation is an emergent property arising from millions of individuals in economic exchange, a subject properly described by economists, not physicists, biologists, or neuroscientists.

That is a red herring. Like all phenomena in human society, you won’t find monetary inflation in the laws of physics. Nor will you find academics, music, sports, or any other human endeavor. The question is not whether these phenomena are in the laws of physics, but whether they result from the laws of physics as emergent phenomena wholly compatible with underlying naturalism. And Shermer himself said yes, they do: “we live in a determined universe governed by laws of nature.”

The philosophy of agency is a branch of philosophy that explores the nature of human action, the capacity for individuals to act, and the conditions under which actions are performed. It is primarily concerned with understanding what it means to be an agent, how agency is exercised, and what factors influence or determine an agent’s actions.

Key Concepts in the Philosophy of Agency:

Agency:

Definition: Agency refers to the capacity of an individual to act independently, make choices, and impose those choices on the world. An agent is typically understood as a being with the ability to initiate actions based on desires, intentions, or reasons.

Central Question: What does it mean to be an agent, and what are the essential characteristics that distinguish agents from non-agents?

Free Will:

Relationship to Agency: Free will is a central concept in discussions of agency. It concerns the ability of individuals to make choices that are not determined by prior causes. The extent to which agents possess free will is a key area of debate in the philosophy of agency.

Debates: The debate between determinism (the view that all events, including human actions, are determined by preceding causes) and libertarianism (the view that free will is incompatible with determinism and that agents have the ability to choose freely) is crucial in understanding agency.

Intentionality:

Definition: Intentionality refers to the quality of mental states that are directed towards something, such as beliefs, desires, or intentions. An agent's actions are often said to be intentional if they are guided by specific goals or purposes.

Importance: The philosophy of agency examines how intentions translate into actions and how intentional actions differ from non-intentional or accidental behaviors.

Moral Responsibility:

Connection to Agency: Moral responsibility presupposes agency; that is, individuals are held morally responsible for their actions because they are agents capable of making decisions and acting on them.

Questions: How does the capacity for agency relate to moral responsibility? Are agents always morally responsible for their actions, or are there circumstances that mitigate or eliminate responsibility?

Autonomy:

Definition: Autonomy refers to the capacity of an agent to govern themselves, make their own decisions, and act according to their own principles and values.

Relevance: Autonomy is often discussed in relation to agency, especially concerning the conditions that must be met for an action to be truly autonomous (e.g., freedom from coercion or manipulation).

Action Theory:

Field of Study: The philosophy of agency is closely related to action theory, which investigates the nature of actions, the processes leading to actions, and the distinctions between different kinds of actions (e.g., intentional vs. unintentional, voluntary vs. involuntary).

Key Questions: What distinguishes an action from a mere bodily movement? What role do reasons, beliefs, and desires play in the performance of an action?

The Role of Rationality:

Rational Agency: Many philosophical accounts of agency emphasize the role of rationality in guiding an agent’s actions. Rational agents are those who act based on reasons that align with their beliefs and desires.

Debate: There is debate over whether all agency must be rational or whether irrational or non-rational actions can still be considered genuine exercises of agency.

Major Theories of Agency:

Causal Theories of Action:

Overview: Causal theories assert that actions are events caused by mental states, such as beliefs and desires. An action is typically seen as the outcome of a causal chain that begins with an agent's intention.

Non-Causal Theories of Action:

Overview: Non-causal theories challenge the idea that actions must be caused by prior mental states. Instead, they propose that actions can be explained through reasons rather than causes, emphasizing the role of rational deliberation and choice.

Compatibilism:

Overview: Compatibilism is the view that free will and determinism are compatible. Compatibilists argue that agents can be free even if their actions are determined by prior causes, as long as those actions align with their desires and intentions.

Libertarianism:

Overview: Libertarianism asserts that agents have free will and that this freedom is incompatible with determinism. Libertarians believe that agents have the power to make genuinely free choices that are not determined by past events.

Structural Theories of Agency:

Overview: These theories emphasize the structures within which agency is exercised, such as social, economic, or institutional frameworks. They explore how these structures enable or constrain individual agency.

I'm a compatibilist, which just means "I'm not here to argue who's right, I'm here to figure out which parts of who's argument have good evidence or are otherwise useful." Like every good -ism it's a reaction to something—in this case the constant desire to come-up with a new "take" and argue it in opposition to every previous one. This is an extremely common thing for humans to do, but is exacerbated by an academic peer review system that tends to reward the perception of "novelty".

At minimum 10 times a day I am faced with media for which I feel much of what is presented is either straight-up wrong or built on such shaky foundations it is largely unusable. Very rarely am I faced with a piece that is completely useless—most claims to such are really just "torque semantics": the worry that other people's impression will be too favorable if you give your honest assessment, resulting in over-claims in the opposite direction to twist your audience's opinion to the desired location.

What should we do with the usable nuggets? We should harvest them.

Us compatibilists have started a massive undertaking that will never be finished, call it Knowledge Logistics. We would like to figure out better ways to store concepts and evidence so that we may connect different patterns and perspectives from different spaces. Surely there are conceptual technologies in biology and AI that either could use but only one of them knows about?

How do you solve this incredible logistics program? We must start a whole new kind operations research—organization research—this one will give us the "analogous pattern link" to connect different fields where the former gave us the "penny post" that connected all of England.

Where do you start? You start by joining our nomadic fleet of Compatibilist Logisticos. We are scouring the informational universe, sometimes in fleets and sometimes alone, but always with a radio at our control panel. We land down on a new work like an asteroid and see what we can find—and what we are willing to take.

We should be unafraid to catalog everything, carefully outlining what we think is useful. We should be economic, if it is too difficult to draw such outlines, we can leave it to another Logisitco or it may be lost to time—there is too much work and not everything will be saved, but there is no reason not to take the nuggets that might be useful if all we need to do is stop worrying whether they will be misunderstood.

But what if they are misunderstood? We have reached a point in digital collection and annotation where it is easy to include context and comments when we archive a piece. When we do this we get three benefits:

(i) We become used to contextualizing contributions and consider what might have been overlooked in individual contexts.

(ii) We explore the space of ideas 10 times faster because we don't need an individual piece to cite for every idea.

(iii) We create a culture of building-up from imperfect goods, which is all we had to work with in the first place.

Is Open Theism Biblical?

By Bible researcher Eli Kittim

Open Theism

“Open theism” (aka openness theology) is a theological movement which holds that God doesn’t exercise complete sovereignty over the universe but allows it to be “open” to the contribution of human free will. Put differently, because God cannot possibly know the future in an exhaustive sense, the future is not predetermined by him. Paradoxically, even though open theists seem to affirm God’s omniscience, they nevertheless deny God’s foreknowledge and claim that he doesn’t know everything that will occur. In his book “The Grace of God, The Will of Man,” Clark Pinnock, a Christian theologian and proponent of open theism, writes:

Decisions not yet made do not exist

anywhere to be known even by God. They

are potential— yet to be realized but not yet

actual. God can predict a great deal of

what we will choose to do, but not all of it,

because some of it remains hidden in the

mystery of human freedom … God too faces

possibilities in the future, and not only

certainties. God too moves into a future not

wholly known …

Similarly, in his book “Letters from a Skeptic,” author Greg Boyd, a leading advocate of open theism, explains it thusly:

In the Christian view God knows all of reality

—everything there is to know. But to assume

He knows ahead of time how every person

is going to freely act assumes that each

person’s free activity is already there to

know—even before he freely does it! But it’s

not. If we have been given freedom, we

create the reality of our decisions by

making them. And until we make them, they

don’t exist. Thus, in my view at least, there

simply isn’t anything to know until we make

it there to know. So God can’t foreknow the

good or bad decisions of the people He

creates until He creates these people and

they, in turn, create their decisions.

Open theism is basically a new model through which scholars have tried to explain the relation of God’s foreknowledge to the free will of human beings. Their argument runs as follows: humankind could not really be free if God knew absolutely everything pertaining to the future. And since open theists believe that human beings are completely free, it follows that God cannot absolutely know all there is to know about the future. This argument would carry over to our understanding of Biblical eschatology and would suggest not only that the future is unknowable, but also that God doesn’t know the future.

Invalid Arguments

However, it seems to me that open theists are committing a logical fallacy, namely, equating the foreknowledge of God with determinism. If that were the case, their conclusion would be correct, to wit, that a deterministic foreknowledge of God would necessarily be incompatible with human free will. But the premise is misconceived. Foreknowledge in and of itself doesn’t necessarily presuppose determinism. Just because God can foresee the future doesn’t mean that he causes it. Calvinism, of course, is the other extreme which maintains that God is the cause of all events, thereby postulating hard determinism without apologies. However, If we, as free agents, were to act in whichever way we chose, and God could foresee our decision, God’s foreknowledge and human free will would be perfectly compatible!

What is more, Open Theism asserts that although God knows all truths, there are certain possibilities which cannot yet be established about the “open” and undetermined future, and thus even God himself doesn’t know their outcome. But this, too, seems to be a logical fallacy. They create a strawman argument in which they falsely equate foreknowledge with logical impossibilities. Once again, the premise is invalid. Just because the “truth” of what will happen is based on many complex, contingent factors, and is unknowable to human beings, doesn’t necessarily imply that it’s equally impossible for God to know it. On the contrary, it wouldn’t be considered illogical for God to know the outcome of any given event. Yet Open theists claim that it’s as logically impossible for God to create squared circles or make 2 + 2 = 5 as it is for him to know the future. But foreknowledge is not a logical impossibility like a squared circle or a married bachelor.

This, of course, can take the form of a very deep and protracted philosophical discussion about the nature of free will and the essence of God’s sovereignty, namely, to what extent are we free agents, and so on. According to open theism, instead of God exhaustively knowing the course of history in toto, God gradually gains knowledge of events as they occur. This is viewed as the “open view of God” since it considers God as open and receptive to new realities. Thus, in contradistinction to classical theism, open theism suggests that God is, in some sense, dependent on the material world to enhance his knowledge.

There is, however, a contradiction in this premise. How could one compare God’s learning curve from the point of view of time if God is said to be timeless? And how could a transcendent God possibly be dependent upon an “inferior reality” (as both Paul and Plato put it) to gain knowledge?

Bible Proofs of God’s Immutability

Opponents of open theism accuse the latter of employing anthropopathisms (i.e. the practice of ascribing human emotions to God). Moreover, Open theist interpretations of the Bible comprise anthropomorphic characterizations of God as “changing His mind” or “seeming to gain knowledge” or even “being surprised” (see Gen. 6.6; 22.12; Exod. 32.14; Jon. 3.10). But these passages should not be read out of context. God is simply trying to describe himself in ways that we can relate to. God’s language of being disappointed with humanity doesn’t mean their actions caught him by surprise. The idea that he “changes His mind” is to illustrate in human terms that he responds to human behavior and allows our free will to make an impact, especially through prayer, not that he literally is unaware of future events. In fact, the immutability of God can be demonstrated Biblically. For example, in Malachi 3.6 (NRSV), God declares “For I the Lord do not change.” In Numbers 23.19, Scripture reads:

God is not a human being, that he should

lie, or a mortal, that he should change his

mind. Has he promised, and will he not do

it? Has he spoken, and will he not fulfill it.

1 Samuel 15.29 says:

the Glory of Israel will not recant or change

his mind; for he is not a mortal, that he

should change his mind.

Bible Proofs of Future Prophecies

Not a few scholars think that in dismissing classical theism’s doctrine of God’s exhaustive foreknowledge, open theism is dangerously reinterpreting the God of the Bible. In this radical re-envisioning of the God of Scripture, how can a clueless God, concerning the future, guarantee the fulfilment of Old Testament prophecies? Yet contrary to this position, Psalm 139 verses 4 & 16 read:

Even before a word is on my tongue, O Lord,

you know it completely … Your eyes beheld

my unformed substance. In your book were

written all the days that were formed for

me, when none of them as yet existed.

How could God predict explicit details about Jesus Christ in the Hebrew Bible if he doesn’t even know what the future holds? And, more importantly, how could God possibly guarantee our salvation if he doesn’t have the slightest clue about the future? Furthermore, did God lie in Isaiah 46.9-10 where he declared that he can see the future?:

I am God, and there is no one like me,

declaring the end from the beginning and

from ancient times things not yet done,

saying, ‘My purpose shall stand, and I will

fulfil my intention.’

Conclusion

Open Theism is an attempt to balance God’s foreknowledge and humanity’s free will. Open theism’s conclusion is that God doesn’t possess an infallible knowledge of the future. But just as Calvinism is an extreme form of “theological determinism,” turning humans into pre-programmed robots, so open theism goes to the opposite extreme by turning God into a human being who hasn’t the foggiest idea of what the future looks like. Besides rejecting the credible evidence of eschatology and Bible prophecy, on which our faith and hope depend, open theism ultimately fails to demonstrate its key points both scripturally and philosophically!