#agonistics

Tuesday, January 2, 2018

Theorists of aesthetics have declared that art is no longer a viable form of cultural critique. Art's function has largely been the construction of new worlds, new perspectives, and thus new relationships, offering an outlet for the critique of society's constructions. As fordist modes of production bled their way into culture, it began to seem as though every critical artistic output became appropriated, neutered for use by the system of capitalist symbol production, for its benefit. Subversivenesses and counter-cultures became ads in magazines, trends, and then finally just forgotten pieces of yesteryear's gift guide.

 As political and artistic acts have been twisted into aesthetic baubles, citizens have become impotent consumers, left as "passive functions of the capitalist system" (86). This operation is reflexive. As art is commodified and harnessed for consumerist symbol-production, its mode of operation becomes that: art is taken as consumerist symbol-production from the start, without any deference to other possibilities of operation. As this process becomes business-as-usual, the other possibilities of art wither away - art as capitalist becomes a given, and is seen as naturally-occurring, due to the years of sedimentation within a cultural loop. But is the process really so veiled, is there really no way to attack the appropriation of artistic criticism, or at least to appeal to the passive masses?

 Because alternatives have become veiled within the capitalist mode of value production, art must point towards those very alternatives. To do so within a complex system of appropriation requires first appropriating the capitalist mode of value production, which largely lies within the creation of desire. Politically-charged art that brow-beats the viewer usually isn't very successful, because it offers no alternative. When the viewer is coaxed into a new subjectivity, by way of their own conscious attention to their current subjectivities (and the newly presented alternatives), then they become the critical agent. Though Mouffe's description of this process does not allude to it, it seems that the "new" critical art that she describes actually acts as proxy for criticism: it is an empty vessel which only has meaning in context, and can only have positive results when used by the viewer.

Sunday, December 31, 2017

To begin to address the issue of global neoliberal hegemony, common contemporary arguments have to be deconstructed. Underlying the majority of leftist criticisms of neoliberalist hegemonies is exodus. This escapist strategy purports to allow for new forms of hegemony (or the supposed lack of) to rise in the void left once the current hegemony is abandoned by its constituents, left to wither and disappear. As common as the strategy may be, it allows for empty movements, through which public dissent is expressed but no alternative is given, and for right-wing alternatives to rise from the shadows.

 The alternative, which is doubtless criticized as moderate and perhaps even neoliberal itself, is Mouffe's radical democracy, within which the institutions of the current hegemony are positively engaged for the new goals of the revolutionary governance.  She proposes this as a continual process, rather than the means to an idealized end. For this reason, Mouffe rejects the resurrection of communism on the basis that, ideologically, it is a fixed ideal: once put in place, it is perfected, ignoring the political and affective. To incorporate these facets of societal construction, her model of continual reform works with the current system to reinforce citizens' desires.

 On a conceptual basis, it would seem that Mouffe's reformist mentality is in fact revolutionary, but not in terms of a radical break with the current system. In keeping the basic structure, change is enacted in a way to secure its own resilience both as sufficient for the time in which it was developed, and as a groundwork to enable flexibility as circumstances change. That is, in and of itself, revolutionary in a time when capitalist-run bureaucracy petrifies the political landscape. Operating through capitalism, the social movements of the 60s and 70s were subsumed into the consumerist wave of identity construction through materialism. Once the movements were so easily nullified and channeled back into the system they sought to jam, they worked to benefit that system, becoming ghosts of their former selves. Reflecting counterhegemonic movements hegemonically onto consumers, thus discursively looping their actions like a hamster's wheel, became an extremely powerful tool for neoliberalism.

 Thus, Mouffe's Gramscian "war of position" seems to necessitate plural engagement within the institutions that support the neoliberal system. Each position must be taken individually, as the institutions are individual, but the groundswell of the altered movements will work against the Thing as a whole. For, in the most realistic terms, there is no way to pragmatically attack neoliberalism; it must be dismantled piece by piece. In this way, the system is not only dismantled conceptually, but it is immediately rearticulated in a different direction, working for the new goals and against neoliberalism. Rather than a living beast dissected, but unaffected, the system must be molecularly reordered into another organism entirely, all the while maintaining its breath and heartbeat, for we are its cells.

Saturday, December 30, 2017

In this chapter, Mouffe discusses the greatest example of a sort of unified but statified governance, the EU. She uses the he criticisms and challenges faced by the EU to further describe her agonistic model of governance. Finally, Mouffe begins to discuss the importance of regionalism in her model, and why it must play a part in this "new EU."

 First, some basics are outlined: the EU is in danger of falling apart, mainly due to challenges with the identities of its constituents; national identity is strengthened when the nation is perceived to be under threat; and the rationalistic conception of identity formation heretofore utilized to critique the EU lacks confrontation with the affectual aspects of identity formation. Mouffe is adamant here that communal identity development must be recognized as, at least in part, inherently affectual, and so any formulation of a unified governance based on the rationale of "greater unity," as a whole of the continent as one people, is impossible.* Not only does the hope for such a unified identity ignore the affectations of identity construction on a sociological scale, but also, perhaps more importantly, on a psychological scale.

 Mouffe quickly mentions Freud's contribution to this aspect, but I would hope to suggest that a reading of individual identity construction, especially in the early 21st century, is more a game of self-eroticization than that of a basic libidinous drive. The individual is gratified by the design, reinforcement, and the fantasy of their own identity, however it may have come to be. Some identities are based in fear, as is obvious in many forms of aggressive masculinity, but some are more neoliberal in nature, stemming from material accoutrements which, in and of themselves, have little to no meaning.

 Indeed, these are the two essential problems faced by the EU today: aggression and neoliberal forces. The first issue is usually dealt with rationally, but to little success. On the other hand, neoliberal forces are so deeply engrained in societal discourse, that few are able to imagine a world beyond their grasp. For both, however, Mouffe provides the solution of "A truly Gramscian 'intellectual and moral reform,'" "challenging the basic tenets of our current consumerist model" (63, 64). In this chapter, her deconstruction of this reform in respect to neoliberal forces is not fully developed. However, she does provide enough to mull over in respect to aggression.

 Mouffe supports the generation of a federation, within which states are sovereign, but deal with common issues not antagonistically, as the EU is haunted by today, but agonistically. How she proposes this is more nuanced than her explained desire to "combine solidarity and competition" (53). She seems to support trans-national regionalism, but explicitly refers to the continuation of national identities. I wonder if this is a stepping stone within her world order: to get nations to take part in an agonistic federation, allow them to govern sovereignly, but as the conflicts progress, more factions would arise, as they already are (Scotland, Catalonia, etc.), eventually forming sovereign regionalism. How far their sovereignty would go is another question: do these regions have economic regulations, must they abide by a human bill of rights?

 Readers at least get answers to the former as Mouffe begins to deconstruct the neoliberal hegemonic forces which rule all of Europe today. She is decidedly anti-free market, citing the usual downfalls of the system, and focusing on the necessity of domestically-focused economics, wherein the localized community benefits first, and fewer workers are taken advantage of on the grand scale allowed by neoliberal capitalist free markets. This, in turn, would help define regional identities, as well as aid in recognition of other regionalities and their respective value systems (via negotiations, both economically and politically). Within Mouffe's proposed "diversity of practices within a field of shared rules," the possibility of a shift away from EU consumership, towards EU citizenship is born.

 Towards this end, Mouffe suggests that the EU must abandon neoliberal capitalism and begin to work towards a new democratic socialism, taking the successful aspects from the past and applying them in novel ways, "integrating economic questions with social, environmental, and political ones," essentially rewriting the European social democracy for contemporary problems (60). Regionally specific, social democracy is the historic expression of new Europeanism, and would doubtless lead to the European citizenship Mouffe desires, depending on its implementation.

 And here we find the most difficult issue with Mouffe's proposal: how are the power dynamics within Europe to change? How can an entire continent shift from nationalism-born-out-of-colonialism-born-out-of-autocracy shift to a federation of states bound by a non-enforceable social democracy? And how are the gaps between the regional governments and the continental government to be handled? Simply granting regional sovereignty cannot be sufficient in gathering the European continent to a new social democratic table. Too many previous perceived wrongs need righted, and crises of late capitalism (proxy wars, waves of refugees, the need for global reparations) will not simply disappear. It is obvious that Mouffe's assertion that the ways of life of the global rich must change, but what can possibly initiate such a shift? The comfortably privileged will not willingly discard their luxuries.

Friday, December 29, 2017

 In her second chapter, Mouffe begins to describe how her concept of a multipolar governance system conflicts with other thinker's notions of world governance, and how democracy can still be found outside the model of Western development. Mouffe suggests that the violent outbreaks we have seen on our brave new globalized political stage are the result of "lack of political channels for challenging the [current global] hegemony" (19).

 The first, and perhaps most daunting, hurdle is the current unipolar political system which underlies all international politics today. When the United States declared itself victor in the Cold War, its modern system of capitalist imperialism became the norm for the entire world. Here, Benedict Anderson's depiction of a world divided into nation states in his Imagined Communities serves to lay a conceptual foundation of international conflict, with deep roots in the economic-political supremacy of the West. Mouffe's assertion that radical negative is insurmountable is a product of this history, both born of it and constantly reinstated through it. Given this backdrop of conflictuality and Western imperialism, how can a multipolar, agonistic world come to light?

 Mouffe's main argument is that the assumptions of Western/neoliberal need to be addressed and deconstructed, allowing the great multitude of "others" to flourish under their own capabilities, as regional poles. She constructs this argument in opposition to cosmopolitanism, portrayed as global governance under the rule of what amounts to one body. While this portrayal seems shallow, or at the very least unimaginative, Mouffe's argument is wholly realist and situated in the present, disallowing it an idealism. Perhaps more of this attitude is needed in academic writing of this sort, as daydreaming intellectuals too often write wandering tomes of utopianisms without providing any pragmatic means of attainment in the real and tractionable political landscape. It seems this is Mouffe's main driving point as she systematically draws others' cosmopolitan constructions against her own criticism. In doing so, she forces the reader (her other critical combatant in dialogue, her agonist) to discard any notion other than dealing with what we currently have (there can be nothing else, in this exact moment), situated in the history we rely on (however constructed), so that we may forge a path forward, in utterly realist terms.

 In doing so, we must recognize the unipolarity of the global affairs, consider it and its antagonisms as the causes of fractionalism today, and, from there and only there (or, logically, if and only if) begin to construct something different. Mouffe begins by suggesting a multipolar system of governance, in the form of separate, sovereign regions, free from the overwatch of Western neoliberalism, including the widely accepted notions of democracy, secularism, and human rights. Indeed, even if these constructions are "lost," a multipolar world "is better than a unipolar order because it is less likely to foster the emergence of extreme forms of antagonisms," such as terror attacks, drone strikes, construction of settlements, gassings, or invasions (29). Indeed, one man's definition may be different from another's: democracy, too, can be redefined, and so can our approaches to human dignity.

 For example, Mouffe brings the example of the "Far Eastern" concept of harmony, within which the human individual does not take precedence over its environment. The formulation of "human rights," as such, typically removes the individual from their context, so that they may be objectified, like a car in a production line: all components can be accounted for, and development can be tracked, as if on an assembly line. Mouffe's assertion is sound: this simply cannot be the only way humanity conceives of "human rights," or more specifically, the way in which human dignity is fulfilled.

 Though she names Martha Nussbaum as being of the individualist camp of philosophical/moral liberalism, my reading of Nussbaum shows these two academics' theories to parallel on another, not contradict one another. Though Nussbaum is focused on the individual, her focus is contextualized; the "weakest link" in the family, community, or country must be brought up to the point of dignity so that all may flourish. Nussbaum's driving march is for capabilities, which seems less obtrusive than the neoliberalist moral imperialism imposed by Mouffe's ideological enemies. It seems contradictory that Mouffe supports a plurality of personhoods, rooted in the acknowledgement of other culture's emphasis on cooperation, but opposes idealist conceptions of global unity.

 Overall, Mouffe wants regional cultures to be able to develop in their own way, devising their governance as they see fit. Given that she is so bound to an historical framework, I wonder how she imagines this will happen without internal strife. How will women be able to govern in misogynistic cultures? How can we assign value to these more subtle (to some) violences as compared to violent outbreaks of resistance? Mouffe's relativism is appreciable, but seems to lack any form of progressivity. A peace-maker is not necessarily a breaker of bonds. Though I fully support "vernacular forms of democracy," especially contextualized within their preceding cultures and religions, I can't support the continued oppression of any person under all others, be it a woman, a non-cis person, someone who isn't heteronormative, or someone of a religious or ethnic minority. I can't imagine that Mouffe has abandoned these considerations, but it is doubtless that there would not be regional poles of governance that were religiously opposed or ethnically biased.

Below are my notes on the interview in the back of the book, which overviews Mouffe’s theories and provides sufficient groundwork for reading the rest of the book. 

16 Dec 16:

 Antagonism: negativity is constitutive and cannot be overcome. Reveals that there is no rational solution to some conflicts. Leads to an understanding of pluralism that implies the impossibility of the final reconciliation of all views (like Nietzsche or Max Weber). This ineradicable dimension is called "the political" (as differing from "politics" - the practices aimed at organizing human coexistence).

 Hegemony is present everywhere: the exercised power of one group over others. More specifically: "every social order is a contingent articulation of power relations that lacks an ultimate rational ground."

 Post-structural critique of essentialism: Derrida, Lacan, Foucault (also Amer. Pragmatism and Wittingstein)

+

Gramsci & hegemony

=

Theoretical approach called post-Marxist or "discourse theory"

 "Every order lacks a final ground:" someone will always disagree. "Every order is predicated on the exclusion of other possibilities." "Every order is political." (contingent power relations)

 Margaret Thatcher : neoliberal globalization. "There is no alternative."

 "There are always alternatives that have been excluded by the dominant hegemony and that can be actualized."

 Any hegemony can be challenged by counter-hegemonic practices, with the aim of disarticulating the current hegemony with another form of hegemony. Political struggle, then, is the constant duel of hegemonic practices and projects, competing and countering. There is no "perfect" political form, then, because one cannot be reached, in the essence of the theory of the political. The project of the Left is suggested to be a "radical and plural democracy." This has to be thought of as an unending process.

 Chain of equivalences: all struggles must take into account others' struggles, so the whole front will be forwarded with each step of progress.

(This is what Black Lives Matter have been doing, and, I think, what Bernie's coalition involved. )

 "The objective of the Left […] should be to create a collective will of all the democratic forces in order to push for the radicalization of democracy and to establish a new hegemony."

 Revolution is not necessary under a modern pluralist democracy, because deep changes can occur from within via critique of existing institutions.

 What Gramsci calls a "war of position" could lead to shifts within contemporary forms of democracy, leading to the creation of a new hegemony, though not through radical breaks. The bases of democracy - liberty and equality - are not what's at issue, but instead their enforcement. A radical break is not necessary, but rather a full support, a "war of position."

 27 Dec 16:

 "Instead of struggling for a radicalization of democracy, we are forced to struggle against a further destruction of fundamental democratic institutions." This is how she describes the effects of the rise of Thatcherism and Reaganisms that led to the great momentum behind neoliberal globalization, thus dismantling social democracy and the welfare culture that went with.

 She believes that the unified liberal front must work with the establishment to move forward, unlike those influenced by the ideas of Hardt and Negri, who believe that the Multitude (proleteriat) controls the now-immaterial labor, the power lies in the same place as the deterministic Marxism of the Second International. This didn't work the first time, and Mouffe asks: how does the Multitude become a political subject? They hold that the multitudinous struggles ought to remain independent and aim to the heart of Empire, rather than unify, which would be more difficult due to their respective radicalizations and thus independent mentalities and practices, etc. Mouffe argues that this difficulty is exactly what must be confronted: how to organize across differences so as to create a chain of equivalences among the different struggles.

 Marxism falls short of a "theory of the political," as does liberalism (due to its rationalism and individualism, according to Mouffe, which are two points argued against by Nussbaum - have they ever clashed?). Rationalism ignores the realities of antagonistic ideas, and individuality ignores the creation of political identities, always collective, constructed in the form of a we/they relationship. Doesn't allow for "passions:" the affective dimension (i.e., nationalism). "For liberals, everything which implies a collective dimension is seen as archaic, something irrational that should not exist anymore in modern societies." See Schmitt's critique of liberalism. He argued that liberalism couldn't address politics, and, when it tried, it borrowed vocabulary from economics or ethics, which lines up with the two main schools of liberalism present in democracy today: the aggregative (economic) and the deliberative (Rawls & Habermas - ethical, not political). (Doesn't Nussbaum argue against both?) Schmitt saw liberalism and democracy as incompatible, whereas Mouffe promotes an introduction of politics to a pluralist democracy. Her answer is the agonistic model.

 The political is constituted, in part, by the antagonistic, i.e., "the permanence of conflicts which cannot have a rational solution." Antagonism proper: friend v. enemy (Schmitt), which would mean the destruction of a political institution with both parties involved. Agonism: a relation "between adversaries who recognize the legitimacy of the demands of their opponent. While knowing that there is no rational solution to their conflict, adversaries nevertheless accept a set of rules according to which their conflict is going to be regulated." This sounds like social contract theory to me, mapped onto political social groups, expanded from individuals. Mouffe presents her agonistic model as an alternative to the aggregative and deliberative models of democracy: "the advantage of such a model is that by recognizing the role passions play in the creation of collective identities, it provides a better understanding of the dynamics of democratic politics, one that acknowledges the need for offering different forms of collective identification around clearly defined alternatives."

 Mouffe is against the middle-ground politics which have risen in American politics, instead backing a well-defined left and right so that citizens can make actual choices (see 2017 presidential election, where the "alt-right" won over very middle "bland" politician, when a very left opponent - Bernie - would have won for radical democracy, providing a clear opposition to the "alt-right" politics that swelled under Trump). "Democratic politics must be partisan. In order to get involved in politics, citizens have to feel that real alternatives are at stake."  

 Everyone needs a collective identity - the fall of communist parties in France led to a rise in Muslim identities. The religious replaced the political, which, as we have seen in other places, can be very problematic. If the politics are too bland, some other identity will be sought - something that promotes the ideas of the citizen who feels abandoned by the political party unwilling to state their position in so many issues. Citizens must feel that they have a voice, they must feel that they have a representative in whatever fight they see as important. Religion "does not provide the terrain for agonistic debate," instead, I would think, promoting dogmatic oppositionalism. Has individualism made people eschew collective forms of identification, at least in part?

I would assume that the need for a we/they distinction and identity construction is the result of evolutionary psychology. As with almost every other problem in our human society, this would be resolved with the objectivity brought once we can separate our consciousness(es) from our bodies. All fear is rooted in the biological form, though so too are all pleasures and cultural creations.

 Moral condemnation has replaced proper political struggles: wrong v. right, good v. evil, as opposed to right v. left. The "moralization of politics." "This is, of course, not good for democracy because when the opponents are not defined in a political but in a moral way, they cannot be seen as adversaries, but only as enemies. With the evil ones, no agonistic debate is possible. They have to be eliminated."

 The media are a tool, but are not the final word, and are not all-powerful. Needs to be used as they were with ACT UP, highlighting political issues of race and homophobia around AIDS. "…the subversive re-appropriation of the dominant forms of communication." "To acknowledge the power of the media is also to become aware of the many possibilities of diverting this power. What the left needs is more imagination in their use of the media so as to transform it into a terrain of agonistic confrontation."

 The struggle against neoliberalism is global and necessitates solidarity. The struggles need to be regionally contextualized (and that means different forms of democracy).