Moroccan Crises: German v. French Imperialism
The Moroccan Crises were two international incidents, the first in 1905-6 and the second in 1911, when Imperial Germany, eager to expand its empire, threatened France's presence in Morocco. France's position was supported by Britain and Russia, meaning Germany was obliged to back down twice. Although not a direct contributor to war, the Moroccan Crises certainly caused a strengthening of alliances and worsened the atmosphere of international distrust then prevalent in Europe, a distrust which was itself one of the primary causes of WWI as Europe shifted into two mutually opposed alliance groups.
The Kaiser's Weltpolitik
Kaiser Wilhelm II (1859-1941) came to power as emperor of Germany in 1888 (reigning until 1918), and he pushed for more territorial and military expansion in order to secure the natural resources Germany's booming economy demanded. This new policy was called 'World Policy' or Weltpolitik. Wilhelm II's chancellor, Bernhard von BΓΌlow (1849-1929), and the naval minister, Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz (1849-1930), were both in wholehearted agreement with this policy, which had the added advantage of distracting the population from domestic problems such as the weakening of the power of the Junker Prussian landowners in the ongoing process of industrialisation and democratisation. Popular support for the policy was whipped up by a jingoistic press. The policy of Weltpolitik only worsened the pervading instability in international relations. As the historian F. McDonough states: "The policy created a great deal of tension, accomplished very little, and soured international relations" (9). As the historian D. Khan adds: "From the 1890s imperial Germany was a fundamentally dissatisfied power, eager to disrupt the status quo and to achieve its expansive goals, by bullying if possible, by war if necessary" (209). In short, Germany was now widely seen as enemy number one when it came to world peace. Countries began to form alliances to counter Germany's rising power.
In 1904, Britain and France signed the Entente Cordiale, which removed conflicts of interest in Africa and Asia but did not cover mutual assistance in the case of a war in Europe. The same year, France agreed with Spain to divide Morocco between themselves. Britain agreed not to interfere in exchange for a free hand to control Egypt. The problem was now for France to defend its gains in North Africa. Long in decline, by the early years of the 20th century, France was "a second-class naval power" (Bruce, 139). Germany's navy, thanks to an unrelenting arms race with Britain, was moving in the opposite direction.
Germany was anxious over the development of the Entente Cordiale since France's diplomatic ties (established in 1894) with Russia would effectively mean that three powerful states might align themselves against Germany. Indeed, the kaiser was convinced, despite a lack of evidence, that the Entente Cordiale contained a secret clause that promised mutual military aid in Europe. The kaiser was determined to test the strength of the Entente Cordiale, and the ideal place to do it seemed to be North Africa.
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