#acciaioli

#tramonto #acciaioli #lidodivolano #volano #valle #lididicomacchio #lidiferraresi #8dicembre (presso Lidi di Comacchio) https://www.instagram.com/p/CXPCNAPq4oVC3igX2gQM-UtI3lL4yZ1SwVPz8A0/?utm_medium=tumblr

In my last post on [Aquinas, Burley, and Buridan](http://emto.tumblr.com/post/31344316858/experience-in-the-moral-realm-i-the-medieval) I have identified two open questions in the debate on the role of experience in the moral realm. It is disputed whether or not the lack of morally relevant experiences can be compensated for by other means (e. g. teaching). And it is not clear whether moral knowledge in the strictest sense of the word is required in the moral education of a young person. In this post, I will discuss three early modern commentaries on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* that adress these problems (more or less obliquely): Acciaoli's [*In expositionem libri ethicorum Aristotelis*](https://bdigital.sib.uc.pt/bg1/UCBG-R-59-16/UCBG-R-59-16_item1/) (1478), Melanchton's remarks in the [*Enarrationes [...] librorum ethicorum Aristotelis*](http://www.mdz-nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn=urn:nbn:de:bvb:12-bsb10360378-8) (first published in 1529, I quote the edition in vol. 16 of the *Corpus Reformatorum*), and the [*Ethicorum ad Nicomachum compendium*](http://books.google.de/books?id=5Sk8AAAAcAAJ), published in 1540 by the German theologian and philologist Johannes Lonicer. ### Acciaioli At first sight, Acciaioli's commentary on *NE* does not depart from the medieval tradition: He concedes that young people disqualify for moral philosophy, because they are young and lack the required experiences - arguments discussed by Aquinas, Burley, and Buridan, too. According to him, adolescents even lack the capability for making such experiences: >[...] iuvenis non habet experientiam actuum humanorum propter aetatem nec est idoneus illos experiri [...][^1] So it seems that Acciaioli reads Aristotle literally as stating that young people cannot profit from moral philosophy. But on closer examination, it can be seen that Acciaioli chooses a more indirect approach: He states that moral philosophy may at times help to turn a bad person into a virtuous person.[^2] And those who have a disposition for virtue without being fully virtuous may profit most from being educated about moral philosophy.[^3] But if this is the case, it would only make sense to exclude young people from the opportunities moral philosophy may provide in education, if one of these conditions were met: * Young people are inherently immoral, so moral philosophy cannot have any effect on them. * Young people have no disposition for moral virtue, so that moral education is superfluous. This is highly counterintuitive, because it would mean that the *dubium* refered to in the text would be true: moral philosophy would be superfluous.[^4] But since Acciaioli believes that what he says is a refutation of this counterargument, we should read him in my opinion as trying to distance himself from the literal sense of the Aristotelian text without questioning the authority of the Philosopher explicitly. So according to Acciaioli, the lack of experiences and the missing ability to make the right experiences that is characteristic for young people can be alleviated by moral instruction: Young people may already have a predisposition for moral virtue that can be fully realised by appropriate instruction, so that there is no strict requirement for having moral experiences in order to become virtuous. Teaching the young (using speech and instruction, *sermo et doctrina*) can, however, only be successful, if the pupil has been prepared for accepting moral truth. So before a young person encounters moral philosophy for the first time, the student's mind must be ready to receive its insights, serving as 'soil' in which the 'seeds' of moral education can be planted.[^5] ### Lonicer A similar position is adopted by Johannes Lonicer: He concedes that ideal students of moral philosophy would understand its scope and principles. But this does not provide a reason why the less talented should be excluded, as long as they express a willingness to learn (*satis est pronam exhibere mentem docenti*).[^6] Instead of keeping them away from moral philosophy, students should be trained to study it properly. This consists first in obeying moral authorities (*recte monentibus obsequi*). Thereby, affects that stand in the way of hearing moral philosophy may be tempered.[^7] If students are properly prepared, i. e. if they have been educated properly, a teacher can focus on their moral integrity (*morum integritas*) and disregard typical failings of the young like the instability of their moral convictions (*iuvenis aetatis instabilitas*).[^8] So Lonicer takes a stronger view than the medievals: He silently equates experience and moral knowledge. But still, lack of such experiences does not justify to keep the young away from moral philosophy, because these deficits can be overcome in moral teaching, if the student is properly prepared for studying moral truth.The crucial question is then, whether or not this preparative step should be regarded as part of moral philosophy (i. e. whether or not moral philosophy is identical with moral instruction). ### Melanchthon Melanchthon adresses this problem in his *Enarrationes*, first published in 1529. He takes up the Stoic distinction between *praecepta* and *decreta* and connects it to the Aristotelian distinction between knowledge of facts and knowledge of causes (i. e. knowledge *quod ita sit* and knowledge *propter quod*). In this model, the student first learns about the content of moral teachings, or, as one could say, 'moral facts'. In this context, Melanchthon uses medicine as an example: if a doctor only tells the febrile patient to avoid wine, this is a *praeceptum nudum*, i. e. a command that does not contain any reason for why this course of action is recommendable. In the moral realm, such commands are contained in the Decalogue or the moral teachings of the ancient poets.[^9] If the student makes some experiences, he has acquired prudence: then he begins (by himself?) to inquire about causes (or reasons) of these moral truths.[^10] So, for Melanchthon, this preparation for proper moral inquiry is itself a part of moral philosophy, because moral philosophy has two functions: it is not only concerned with reasons for moral action, i. e. reflection on *decreta*, but it also has the task to guide moral actions (it contains *praecepta*). Investigation into the 'why' of moral truths requires experiences. Making such experiences conveys prudence (a connection that had not been mentioned in this context by the medievals): Only the prudent student can reason morally. But this reasoning on *decreta* is only one part of moral philosophy. Its other part consists in action-guiding norms (*praecepta*). ### Conclusion Regarding the question whether or not the lack of morally relevant experiences can be compensated for by other means (e. g. teaching), early modern Aristotelians begin to distance themselves from a literal reading of the Aristotelian text: experience in the moral realm is no necessary condition for studying moral philosophy. Acciaioli and Lonicer assume that nevertheless the student's soul must have been prepared by moral education. Melanchthon seems to believe that this process (i. e. teaching *praecepta*) is itself a part of moral philosophy. The idea defended by Acciaioli that some moral education must have taken place, before anyone can study moral philosophy suggests that moral education does not require moral knowledge in the strict sense of the word. Melanchthon has a different view: he makes explicit the conceptual connection between making experiences and becoming prudent. Prudence is required to reflect on reasons for moral truths (this echoes Buridan's distinction between 'knowledge by testimony' of moral truths and reflective acquisition of moral knowledge presupposing epistemic autonomy). Lonicer's equivocation of experience and moral knowledge points into a similar direction. [^1]: Acciaioli, In expositionem, [fol. 10 v](http://bdigital.sib.uc.pt/bg1/UCBG-R-59-16/UCBG-R-59-16_item1/P25.html). [^2]: Cf. Acciaioli, In expositionem, [fol. 11 r](http://bdigital.sib.uc.pt/bg1/UCBG-R-59-16/UCBG-R-59-16_item1/P26.html): "Nam pravi licet cum difficultate tamen quoquomodo revocari possunt a vitiis et flecti ad virtutes audiendo [...]" [^3]: Cf. [ibid.](http://bdigital.sib.uc.pt/bg1/UCBG-R-59-16/UCBG-R-59-16_item1/P26.html): "Verum medii inter curabiles et optime se habentes praecipue ferent fructum: quasi bene dispositis ad virtutem suscipiendam proderit maxime haec moralis doctrina [...]". [^4]: Cf. [ibid.](http://bdigital.sib.uc.pt/bg1/UCBG-R-59-16/UCBG-R-59-16_item1/P26.html): "Dubitatur quia haec scientia videtur superflua, cum non prosit hominibus pravis: boni vero ea non egeant." [^5]: Cf. [ibid.](http://bdigital.sib.uc.pt/bg1/UCBG-R-59-16/UCBG-R-59-16_item1/P26.html): "Sermo autem et doctrina nunquam in omnibus vires habent: sed oportet ut antecultus sit animus auditoris ad recte agaudendum odendumque tanquam ager qui semina sit nutriturus." [^6]: Cf. Lonicer, Compendium, [fol. 88 v](http://books.google.de/books?id=5Sk8AAAAcAAJ&hl=de&pg=PT178#v=onepage&q&f=false): "Aristoteles prudentissimus philosophus recte, primum inquit, futurum huius philosophiae discipulum bonis moribus exornatum esse convenit, eoque pervenisse decet, uti norit principia et finem, hoc est quid sit, et quo sese acclinet haec institutio. Quod si neque elementa, neque scopum tenuerit, satis est pronam exhibere mentem docenti, [...]" [^7]: Cf. Lonicer, Compendium, [fol. 89 r](http://books.google.de/books?id=5Sk8AAAAcAAJ&hl=de&pg=PT178#v=onepage&q&f=false): "Atqui etiamsi non sit idoneus, non est tamen ido arcendus, sed assuefaciendus ad morum studia. Non obest quenquam nihil scire in philosophia et bonis moribus, sed ideo commendandus est puer, quod recte monentibus obsequatur, quorum diligentia et fide cum doctior tum melior redditur." [^8]: Cf. [ibid.](http://books.google.de/books?id=5Sk8AAAAcAAJ&hl=de&pg=PT178#v=onepage&q&f=false): "Si adfectus cohibens recte monentibus obtemperet, iam est commodus huius philosophiae factus auscultator, praeterea morum potius integritas quam iuvenis aetatis instabilitas hic spectanda est." [^9]: Cf. Melanchthon, Ennarationes, [p. 288](http://reader.digitale-sammlungen.de/de/fs1/object/display/bsb10360378_00158.html?zoom=0.6500000000000001): "Est autem duplex docendi via, altera, cum nuda praecepta sine causis traduntur. Ut, medicus tradit praeceptum laboranti febribus non esse bibendum vinum. Talia nuda praecepta vocantur to hoti, id est, quod ita sit. Sic tradunt praecepta sine causis: Decalogus, Hesiodus, Phocylides." [^10]: Cf. [ibid.](http://reader.digitale-sammlungen.de/de/fs1/object/display/bsb10360378_00158.html?zoom=0.650000000000000): "Altera via est, cum adduntur causae, quam vocant di hoti, id est, propter quod. [...] omnes prudentes tradunt primum nuda et communia praecepta, et ad haec adiungunt honestam disciplinam. Cognitis autem his praeceptis, postea prudentiores facile inveniunt causas, [...]"