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Society has had a long history of homophobia. Often citing religious texts for the reason for their bigotry, people have frequently listed homosexuality as being abnormal and inherently deviant to the morals of society. In fact, it was only in 1973 that the American Psychological Association removed homosexuality from their list of mental illnesses and only this year has India decriminalized homosexuality. In many developing countries, homosexuality is still considered a criminal act in over 70 countries around the world with some even condemning it by death. However, it should be said that in many liberal countries like South Africa, The United Kingdom and The U.S. have made many strides in the normalization of homosexuality and advances in LGBT rights have been considerable in the past 30 or so years. In many of these countries it has now become a societal taboo to be outwardly homophobic, with many of these countries condemning homophobia as hate crime and a human rights violation. Yet still, homophobia continues to consist in society and exists in many forms such as verbal and sometimes physical abuse as well as through structural and systemic discrimination. Deeply entrenched in the very fabric of society, this post seeks to analyse the ways in which covert homophobia still persists in contemporary liberal societies and the ways in which these forms of homophobia represent the broader structural issues of cis-heterosexism that continues to characterize the world we live in despite the commendable efforts to live in a post-homophobic world.

Homophobia is arguably the result of repressive structures imposed by heterosexism and patriarchy. In a study conducted by Neil Henderson, he looks at how heteronormativity in “traditional” African communities reinforce homophobic behaviour and ideologies. Henderson (2015: 109) argues that in societies characterised by heteronormative ideals brought on by a patriarchal system that see heterosexuality as the norm perpetuate homophobia as being inherently deviant and abnormal. He goes on to argue that this sort of hetero-morality is often held up through religion, culture, and education systems with homophobic language being the key perpetrator in the perpetuation on discrimination based on non-heteronormative identities (Henderson, N., 2015: 109). In his analysis of coming out stories by gay men in Cape Town, Henderson notes that in the cases where these men presented more traditionally feminine traits faced the largest brunt of homophobia by their families and their communities as they were more likely to uphold heterosexuality and traditional gender roles as the norm, and thus condemning those who stray from these ideal, suggesting that there is a causal link between homophobia, heterosexism and traditional patriarchy (Henderson, N., 2015: 111-112).

This seems to be strengthened by Thabo Msibi’s study of the experiences of queer youth in township areas in South Africa. In many township schools, Msibi (2012: 518) notes that teachers are often not only inhibitors of homophobia complicit in their silence, but also perpetuate it themselves through repressive structures that aim to hinder and deviate from the perceived cis-heterosexual norm and thus enforce heteronormativity resulting in the lives of many queer black youth remaining bleak in the face of hegemonic masculinities. This, Msibi (2012: 520) argues that this could be because of the rampant poverty experienced by these communities largely due to the legacy Apartheid which caused heterosexual men to aggressively assert their masculinity, condemning all who deviate from it. Thus, in terms of sexual identities (particularly homosexuality), in societies highly characterized by hetero-centricity and heterosexism, the dominant discourses and cultural practices in these societies almost explicitly promote heterosexuality and traditional gender roles as being compulsory, marginalizing those identities who do not conform to this narrative into highly repressive and discriminatory structures (Msibi, T., 2012: 521).

These repressive structures brought on by heteronormativity still persists in contemporary liberal societies in various ways disguised as covert homophobia which suggest that there is still some level of societal acceptance of certain forms of homophobia. Much like “colour-blind” racism that seeks to reflect a post-racial society, homophobia has been rearticulated in more covert forms as a new form of homophobia disguised in the language of liberalism (Teal, J., Conover-William, M., 2016: 14). Much like covert racism, covert homophobia in liberal societies “fail to dismantle any of the heteronormative structures that privilege heterosexuality and oppress members of queer communities despite what appears to be advances in LGB equality” (Teal, J., Conover-William, M., 2016: 14). This is done in many ways but for the sake of this post we will focus on the “born this way” essentialism and the “some of my friends are gay…” rhetoric, both which present covert homophobia that is perpetuated by so called allies of the LGBT community. 

The most apparent of these is the “some of my friends are gay…” rhetoric. Much like the “I have black friends” rhetoric, this positions heterosexuals as not possibly being homophobic because they choose to associate with queer people (Teal, J., Conover-William, M., 2016: 19). This, Teal and Conover-William (2016: 19) argue is a form of ally entitlement where heterosexual identities claim ally status through the association with the queer communities which remains inherently problematic because claiming ally status with the intent of protect yourself against being homophobic does little to eradicate established heterosexist power relations. Furthermore, because the “but some of my friends are gay” rhetoric is often preluded by homophobic comments or slurs (such as calling someone the f-word as an insult), these so-called allies proclaim this ally status to neutralize the effect of their comment which “maintains heterosexism by assuming this neutralization is valid, and sufficient for using anti-queer sentiments,” almost directly implying queer identities should be grateful for their “acceptance” (Teal, J., Conover-William, M., 2016: 19).

Another more controversial form of covert homophobia lies in the “born this way” essentialism. Put briefly, this rhetoric relies on the dichotomy between the discourses on whether you are born queer or is it a choice. Many queer allies, and even queer individuals themselves, argue that people are born queer and that it is not a choice (Teal, J., Conover-William, M., 2016: 16). This sort of essentialism is used to justify that homosexuality is normal and presents queer people with the struggle of having to constantly have to prove something that is simply not possible (Teal, J., Conover-William, M., 2016: 16). Because of this impossibility, many homophobes use this doubt to justify their bigotry arguing that if it can be proven without a doubt that homosexuality is inborn, that they will perhaps change their positions on homosexuality (Teal, J., Conover-William, M., 2016: 16). As daunting as this may be, this has a second layer to it because by essentializing sexuality as being inborn, many people ignore the social construction of sexuality. In doing so, queer allies (and some queer individuals) use essentialism to argue that homosexuality simply could not be a choice any sane individual would make. Thus, allies make use of covert homophobia to invalidate the possibility that queerness could be an actual, valid choice to make and by “simplifying sexuality into genetic versus choice argument ignores that sexuality is a social construction and devalues queer sexualities by framing them as inherently bad or negative” (Teal, J., Conover-William, M., 2016: 17).

One key example of cover homophobia in action is Kim Kardashian’s brief ‘beef’ with model Tyson Beckford. Herein, Tyson Beckford made a comment on a popular Instagram page The Shade Room where he said he did not like Kim’s body, calling her apparent surgery as being a botched job. Shortly after, Kim took to Instagram to defend her body by shaming a sexuality he does not even identify with, boldly stating “sis we all know why you don't care for it” (EOnline, 2018). This is very problematic for a number of ways. Most notably, Kim centres her rebuttal solely on the fact that the only possible reason he doesn’t like her body is because he must be gay. Furthermore, by framing her rebuttal with the gendered noun “sis,” Kim is acting in a way that reinforces heteronormative ideals of what a straight man should be, attempting to shame his sexuality and his masculinity by reducing it to the “diminutive” femininity. Unsurprisingly enough, Kim defended her comments by saying “for anyone to say that I am homophobic for the comment of saying 'sis' like, I'm sorry, I'm the least...all my best friends are gay, I support the community, I love the community, they love me” (EOnline, 2018). This echoes the “but my friends are gay…” ally entitlement that Kim uses to justify her covertly homophobic remarks. Kim thinks that just because she is an “ally” who “loves and supports” the community, that she immediate gets a backstage pass to using any homophobic sentiment that she pleases. Kim is entitled. Kim is homophobic. Kim is reinforcing heteronormativity. Kim is far from being the ally she so boldly claims to be.  

From the above discussions it can clearly be seen that homophobia is alive and well. By people positioning themselves as liberal who do not care if you “gay, straight, black, white or blue,” liberal allies act in ways that reenforce their heteronormativity onto a community desperate to be accepted, and disguise their homophobia by common sentiments such as jokes or essentialism. By the mere fact that a celebrity as prominent as Kim Kardashian can use covertly homophobic sentiments and leave from it virtually unscathed, this shows that society, though hiding under the veil of liberal ideals, is still unashamedly homophobic. Until this is addressed, repercussions are felt, and healthy discussions are had about contemporary forms of homophobia, covert homophobia will continue to repress the lives of queer individuals even in the most progressive societies.

References:

Cohen, J. 2018. Kim defends dissing Tyson Beckford over body shaming comments. Accessed on 10 September 2018 from the World Wide Web: https://www.eonline.com/au/news/959088/kim-kardashian-defends-dissing-tyson-beckford-over-body-shaming-comments

 Henderson, N. 2015. The persistence of homophobic discourses: Narratives of a group of gay men in Cape Town, South Africa, Agenda, 29:1

 Msibi, T. 2012. ‘I'm used to it now’: experiences of homophobia among queer youth in South African township schools, Gender and Education, 24:5

In 2016 ‘post-truth’ became Oxford Dictionary’s Word of the Year. Loosely relating to the concept of personal beliefs being more important in shaping opinion than objective truths (whatever that may be), the word has become intrinsically linked with the idea of fake news. Though hardly an entirely new concept, fake news quickly became the buzz word of 2016, particularly in the wake of the 2016 U.S. elections. During this monumentally disastrous election period there seemed to be an influx of less than true articles floating across the internet that seemed to carry their own distinctly political or economic agenda. This was not seen clearer than in the case of then soon-to-be president elect Donald Trump who seemed to yell “Fake News!” at mainstream media outlets every other day, predominantly through his highly publicized Twitter account. This post attempts to map out the concepts centred around fake news within the political arena and the reason(s) for the perpetuation of fake news in the digital age using the 2016 U.S. elections as example of one of the more malevolent reasons for this, namely as a means of re-establishing hegemony.

Broadly speaking, fake news pertains to the idea of news which is made up and is manipulated to resemble that of credible journalistic articles for the sole intention of deceiving its readers (Brennen, B., 2017: 180). As noted, fake news has always existed, but with the advent of social media (and the resulting ‘sponsorship’ of social networking sites and Google gained through popularity) fake news has become increasingly easier to distribute across a wide audience that are willing not only to share, but to distribute this false news (harkening to the idea of post-truth) (Brennen, B., 2017: 180). Though it’s important to distinguish between misinformation (whose intentions aren't inherently meant to deceive you), fake news is characterized by its distinctly deceptive nature whose intention is to deceive its viewers through means such as withholding certain information, distorting information, or deflecting information (Brennen, B., 2017: 180).

This poses a serious threat to democracy as deception affects the distribution of power in society where power is given to those who deceive and take away the power of the people being deceived through altering their choices (Brennen, B., 2017: 180). Furthermore, deception may then lead the loss in the confidence of the best alternative option through the manipulation of opinion, gaining an unjust power over those who are being deceived (Brennen, B., 2017: 180). This disinformation and deceptive tactics perpetuated by fake news is used to manipulate the online publics sphere through the capitalization of the growing mistrust in communities about the reliability mainstream media outlets (Morgan, S., 2018: 39). Thus, when the credibility of established mainstream news outlets come into question, this leads the public to become more likely to fall for fake news as they struggle to identify between factual news and fabricated news, resulting in the potential for the factors in contributing to the “potentially fertile ground for those wishing to manipulate opinion in a particular direction” (Morgan, S., 2018: 39; emphasis added).

Naturally, this has resulted in a moral panic in society. Moral panics can be defined as public anxiety to a perceived social threat that may result in declining societal standards (Carlson, M., 2018: 2). In the case of fake news, this anxiety is not necessarily directed at a particular group of people, but rather towards the increasing transformation of informational spaces made possible through the advent of new media which seem to echo “broader concerns surrounding the eroding boundaries of traditional journalistic channels, the extension of mediated voices, and the growing role of social media in news distribution” (Carlson, M., 2018: 2). This sort of informational moral panic also leads to anxieties felt by professional journalists surrounding their usurpation by new media and more importantly, their growing concerns of the constant need to draw attention in their articles in order to generate a larger profit revenue in an increasingly ad-based digital environment (Carlson, M., 2018: 2).

This sort of profitability of digital advertisements is one of the most salient reasons for the prevalence of fake news. As the generation of actual profit requires there to be a relatively large volume of people to view the article, fake news has become almost reliant on the popularity of click-baiting which are purposely designed to attract a large volume of ‘clicks’ to an article (Carlson, M., 2018: 11). And, as mentioned, because media in capitalist societies rely on popularity to generate profit through advertisements, fake news in turn emulates the worst characteristics of this model (Carlson, M., 2018: 11). The more viral an article is, the more likely it is to be shared which in turn increases traffic towards the site and consequently generates a higher profit revenue for both the creator, and online platforms such as Google and Facebook which ultimately takes attention away from traditional media and increases the likelihood of this fake news to be mistaken as being credible, factual news (Carlson, M., 2018: 11).

However, though important, this is not the object of my argument as my argument centres around the (re)establishment of hegemony through fake news. According to Farkas and Schous (2018: 306), Donald Trump had not been in office for one day when he began to accuse fake news with trying to delegitimise his presidency. Largely through his Twitter account, Trump used the social media platform to discredit and delegitimise those whom he saw as his direct opponents and the proponents of this “fake news,” mainly mainstream media. Throwing the term around like it was going out of fashion, Trump began lashing out at mainstream media outlets who reported against the actual fake news purported by right-wing media sites and by Trump himself, and in turn, this resulted in Trump actively re-establishing “and re-hegemonize the term by situating it in a fundamentally opposing discourse, linking fake news to intimately to mainstream media platforms” (Farkas, J., Schou, J., 2018: 306). Within this discourse, fake news is situated as distinctly democratic problem perpetuated by mainstream media with the sole intent of promoting biased “liberal agendas” as opposed to representing “the people” reinforcing right-wing hegemonic ideologies that mainstream media is “corrupt, liberally biased, systematic liars, and in need of replacement” (Farkas, J., Schou, J., 2018: 307). Fake news then became a key signifier in an existing discourse where right-wing media and Trump explicitly equates the term to mainstream media whose deceptive propaganda is in direct violation for everything America is “supposed” to stand for (which I personally find quite ironic) (Farkas, J., Schou, J., 2018: 307). What is then witnessed here is the systematic re-hegomizing discourses around fake news by the right wing to delegitimize and dismantle critical journalism: “[fake news] becomes the focal point of a major political battleground in which the American right-wing struggles with mainstream media, liberals and anti-capitalists to fixate meaning, obtain hegemony and impose their worldview onto the social” (Farkas, J., Schou, J., 2018: 307).

Thus, it can be seen that much beyond the contemporary understandings of fake news as simply being motivated by the capitalistic need for profit, fake news can be much more malevolent in its political motivations. By misconstruing and resituating fake news as being a tool used by mainstream media as a tool of delegitimising a political party and a whole presidency, the right-wing threatens the very democracy of a country that its lauded for its purported liberal ideals. In turn America becomes stripped from its title as the land of the free, and instead becomes a term more akin to the land of right-wing manipulation in re-establishing a hegemony that goes directly against its very constitution.

References:

Bonnie Brennen (2017) Making Sense of Lies, Deceptive Propaganda, and Fake News, Journal of Media Ethics, 32:3

 Carlson, M .2018. Fake news as an informational moral panic: the symbolic deviancy of social media during the 2016 US presidential election, Information, Communication & Society

 Farkas, J. & Schou, J. 2018. Fake News as a Floating Signifier: Hegemony, Antagonism and the Politics of Falsehood, Javnost - The Public, 25:3

Oh, selfies! I don’t think anyone living in the information age can confidently say that they have never taken a selfie before or at the very least participated in selfie culture in some form or another (here’s looking at you, gran). Undoubtedly, selfies have become one of the most defining aspects of the digital era, gaining unprecedented popularity primarily through social networking sites like Instagram, Facebook and Twitter. No longer are photos of oneself taken for their own private viewing pleasures, but are now regularly disseminated to the public, and often times created for the public. Cynics have quickly reduced selfies and selfie culture as yet another extension human narcissism, but arguably selfies have become one of the greatest tools in the digital age used for self-expression and for the construction (and reconstruction) of self-identity. But is there even more towards selfie culture than meets the eye? This post seeks to take critical lens to various discourses centring around selfie culture and attempts to argue the deeper connotations and resulting ramifications this global trend has on oneself and the broader society.

To begin, let us briefly look at the concept of digital identity. Put simply, digital identities can be described as online social identities that arise from the creation of online profiles that are often used as a means self representation within a distinct social context (Bozkurt, A., 2016: 157). With the advent of social networking sites, these online spaces have become a space wherein users are presented with unrivalled control on the ways in which they are represented, and are often granted the ability to switch between identities, create new identities, or simply solidify established identities, something virtually unheard of to the common person prior to the digital age (Bozkurt, A., 2016: 156). Because of this, some argue that digital spaces have created a unique space which grant users the freedom “display idealized characteristics that do not reflect their actual personalities,” something closer akin Carl Roger’s conception of the ideal self versus the real self (Bozkurt, A., 2016: 157). Thus, in essence, online spaces have allowed users to enact a digital identity that allows them to be whomever they want to be in these digital environments, regardless of how true this identity may be to their ‘real’ identities.

Selfies are one of the principle ways in which these digital identities are reinforced. Quite succinctly Cardirci and Gungor (2016: 2) argue that selfies are “basically an embodiment the self and serve as an extension of our physical body [which] extend the self-image to a hybrid form (actual and ideal)” that serves as visual communication of one’s identity. These visual portraits are taken not as a form of remembering a particular event (or rather not entirely), but rather as a documentation of ourselves for the purpose of consumption by others: they serve as visual expression of where one is, what one is doing, and who does one think they is which allows one to explore different facets of one’s self-identity (Cardirci, T.O., Gungor, A.S., 2016: 3). Much like digital identities, selfies allow us to create highly stylized and controlled versions of our identities that present us in the most flattering light possible. This provides us with the ability to alter our identities at will, showing others what we want them to see and positioning us in a way that we think is most palatable to our ‘viewing audience,’ often resulting in performative identities that reflect our ideal selves more than our real selves (Cardirci, T.O., Gungor, A.S., 2016: 8). Nevertheless, selfies present us with the unprecedented opportunity to construct our own identities and mould them in ways in which we see fit which is why it is often regarded as the one of the ultimate forms self-expression in the digital age (Cardirci, T.O., Gungor, A.S., 2016: 12).

However, selfies (and more so selfie culture) has not come with its own critiques, particularly around this performative nature of selfies and their ‘inherent’ narcissism. Because of the sort of hypervisibility that selfie culture has brought about, people are constantly connected and are constantly participating in a never ending stream of digital information of which people are in a constant state of performance (Proulx, M., 2016: 115). Here, performance of identity is constantly regulated and monitored by others through the system of likes, comments, followers and retweets which come to themselves define the validity of the identities being performed (Proulx, M., 2016: 115). This then means that self-presentation becomes governed by these protocols which constantly serve to suggest in order for your identity to be validated and accepted, you have to look and present yourself in a certain way which may indirectly lead us to performing stylized ideals of our identities (Proulx, M., 2016: 115). Far from a tool of self-empowerment as earlier suggested, critics of selfie culture argue that it simply employs “a shallow rhetoric of empowerment and self-serving individualism” with some going a far to argue that selfie culture is merely an extension of contemporary narcissism in which this perceived obsession with oneself and one’s image seem to optimize the neoliberalist ideologies embedded into society (Proulx, M., 2016: 117). Identity expression through selfies here, is thus merely a construction and performance of an identity that serves only to show one in the most desirable light palatable to a broader audience for the sake of validation and at time, even reverence (Proulx, M., 2016: 117).

Interestingly enough, this lends to the notion of the selfie being more than classically seen. Maybe the selfie needs to be seen as more than just an identity, be it performative or empowering, and should be looked at in the broader context of society because any way you look at it, selfies and selfie culture do have political, cultural and ideological significance. Beyond the narcissism, selfies need to be looked at as wider social, cultural and media phenomenon which is itself highly contextually specific, multifaceted, with its own set of underlying ideologies which greatly reflect the hidden (and sometimes apparent) ideologies embedded into society: “people act in the way they have learned to act in accord with the dominant discourse” (Cruz, E.G., Thornham, H., 2015: 3, 7). Broadly, what is meant by this is that the way in which you take your selfies and the selfies in which you choose to present to the world says a lot not only about your identity, but the society in which it is contextually positioned in and often reflects these dominant discourses prevalent in that society (Cruz, E.G., Thornham, H., 2015: 8). Furthermore, not only are selfies laden with its own set of ideologies, the ways in which it is received and dissected by the audience also says a lot about the society in which it is contextually positioned in, often reproducing the dominant discourses of that particular society (Cruz, E.G., Thornham, H., 2015: 8).

Take for instance this selfie of Tumi Seeco and his group of friends. This photo, which has since amassed over 1000 likes on Instagram, presents the pinnacle of the idealized and highly sexualized representation of black men in contemporary South Africa: conventionally attractive, muscular, middle-to-upper class, and (perhaps most importantly) light skin. In fact, his entire Instagram feed, seem represent a performative identity that is highly representative of South Africa’s highly materialistic neoliberalist society and its embedded ideals centred around what is considered to be attractive, normalized and even aspirational. Perhaps unwittingly, Tumi and his friends represent what it means to be a desirable male in contemporary South Africa, a feat that can be attested by the sheer popularity of his Instagram page and can be seen as a key example of the power of the ideologies behind selfie culture that positions representation as more than a tool self-expression.

Thus, though there is no question that there is merit to the argument that selfies present a unique tool for identity creation and exploration in the digital age that is in itself arguably self-empowering, it cannot be ignored that there is more to the selfie than what meets the eye. Behind every carefully calculated duck face lies the hidden ideologies embedded in the image. Selfies are more than just an extension (or recreation) of identity, but are themselves a social phenomenon that more often than not echo the pervading context-specific discourses centred around society.

 References:

Bozkurt, A. & Tu, C. 2016. Digital identity formation: socially

being real and present on digital networks. Educational Media International. 53:3.

Çadırcı, T.O., & Güngör, A.S. 2016. Love my selfie: selfies in managing impressions on social networks. Journal of Marketing Communications.

 Cruz, E.G. & Thornham, H. 2015. Selfies beyond selfrepresentation:

the (theoretical) f(r)ictions of a practice. Journal of Aesthetics & Culture. 7:1.